There is no low-level fertility and development trap

Summary The theory of the low-level equilibrium trap asserts that an increase in income stimulates population growth sufficiently so that the additional people 'eat up' the 'surplus' over subsistence, and hence drive the level of income back to subsistence. Originally the theory referred primarily to mortality, but nowadays its application is to fertility. In the long-run equilibrium context in which the theory is ordinarily presented, the fact that the long-run elasticity of fertility with respect to income is negative in less developed countries fatally contradicts the accepted version of the trap. But to give every chance for trap theory to be meaningful, the paper presents a period-by-period analysis, embodying larger-than-observed positive elasticities during the early years and the logically necessary counterbalancing negative elasticities during the later years. These elasticities are combined with consumption and production figures for various age groups to estimate the effect in each year after the windfall, and altogether. The results show that even under assumptions not charitable to the conclusion of this paper, additional children do not even come close to 'eating up' the increase in income which induced their births, so that the trap theory is falsified.     

R. F. Harrod on Reviving the Birth Rate

Continuing below‐replacement fertility and projected declines in population size are demographic features of many European countries and Japan. They are variously met with complacent acceptance, calls for higher rates of immigration, or—often last and least—proposals for increasing the birth rate. Fertility was also low in the 1930s, and some of the policy debate from that period resonates today. In England and Wales, fertility then had been declining for half a century. Over the decade 1931–40, it averaged 1.8 children per woman—moreover, with net emigration. Worries over this situation and its likely consequences led to the setting up in 1944 of a Royal Commission on Population, charged with considering “what measures, if any, should be taken in the national interest to influence the future trend in population.” In a memorandum submitted to the Commission in that year, the economist R. F. Harrod set out a detailed proposal to encourage childbearing through a scheme of family endowments. Part of the introductory section of Harrod's submission, arguing the case for state intervention and for material rather than ‘spiritual’ measures, is reproduced below. An evident problem in offering economic incentives for childbearing is that, to induce a given behavioral change, well‐off families would require much larger incentives than the poor. Hence child endowments that aspire to effectiveness across the income distribution have to be skewed toward the upper end. Harrod argues that this is as it should be, that policy should establish neutrality between large and small family sizes, and that this is a conceptually separate issue from poverty alleviation. ‘We should seek a re‐distribution of national income favourable to the parents of larger families and the plan should be put into effect whether or not another re‐distribution as between rich and poor is proceeding at the same time.’ He remarks on the implausibility of the government's being able to ‘talk up’ fertility— thereby generating some kind of costless ideational change, a ‘spiritual aufklärung.’ Later pans of the submission not reprinted here cover the specific details of the proposal. The proposed annual benefit per child (intended for every child after the second, with half‐rates payable for the second child) is paid for 18 years. It is substantial and increases with the child's age—at ages 13–18, for most of the income range it amounts to 20–30 percent of the father's income (or mother's, if hers is higher). Harrod also discusses further the rationale for making the endowments (and the compulsory contributions—a flat 5 percent of income—that finance them) proportional to income. To make his case Harrod draws on the dysgenic and population‐quality arguments popular at the time: worry about ‘race decline’ and ‘a general lowering of standards and of efficiency if the parents who are best equipped in experience, knowledge and culture are relatively infertile.’ In the event, the Commission recommended a flat schedule of family allowances, together with tax exemptions for dependent children calculated to provide some income‐based benefit. These were justified on population as well as equity and welfare grounds, ‘since the handicaps of parenthood have played a large part in the fall of average family size below replacement level.‘ Population quality issues—the subject of several other submissions—were sidestepped by calling for further research. By the time the Commission's report was finally published, in 1949, the baby boom was well underway: average fertility over 1946–50 was 2.4. Roy Forbes Harrod (1900–78) was one of the foremost economists of his day. His career was largely spent at Christ Church College, Oxford. A student and sometime colleague of Keynes, his best‐known early work was centered on identifying a dynamic equilibrium growth path for the economy—building on Keynes's static equilibrium analysis. As stylized (by others), this came to be called the Harrod‐Domar growth model, a formulation basic to growth theory. Harrod was editor of the Economic Journal for the period 1945–66. He was active in politics and as an economic adviser to both Labour and Conservative governments. He was knighted in 1959. The extract is reprinted from volume 5 of the Papers of the Royal Commission on Population (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 80–85.     

The demography of words: The global decline in non-numeric fertility preferences, 1993–2011

This paper examines the decline in non-numeric responses to questions about fertility preferences among women in the developing world. These types of response—such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘it’s up to God’—have often been interpreted through the lens of fertility transition theory as an indication that reproduction has not yet entered women’s ‘calculus of conscious choice’. However, this has yet to be investigated cross-nationally and over time. Using 19?years of data from 32 countries, we find that non-numeric fertility preferences decline most substantially in the early stages of a country’s fertility transition. Using country-specific and multilevel models, we explore the individual- and contextual-level characteristics associated with women’s likelihood of providing a non-numeric response to questions about their fertility preferences. Non-numeric fertility preferences are influenced by a host of social factors, with educational attainment and knowledge of contraception being the most robust and consistent predictors.     

Engel functions revisited

Engel functions for the United States, based on cross-sectional data for 1972–73, are compared with those for 1960–61. Elasticities of expenditure for major categories of consumption are consistent with those found in other countries at various levels of economic development. However, elasticities for specific items within major categories varied markedly. Rental housing emerges as an inferior good. Superior goods are grouped into four major classes based on expenditure elasticities. Low elasticities tended to decline over time and were associated with positive family size elasticities. Expenditure elasticities that were high tended to become still higher over time and were associated with negative family size elasticities. An examination of expenditure elasticities across income classes indicates that ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ families have become more alike with respect to expenditures for ‘necessities’ but more unlike with respect to expenditures for ‘luxuries’ — education, recreation, owner housing, and men's and women's clothing. As incomes have risen, the composition of consumption has changed, as have the meaning and character of poverty. Questions are raised concerning the significance and research implications of the declining achievement/aspiration ratio for certain kinds of goods and services for many consumers within the United States and for most consumers in countries where incomes have risen less relatively and absolutely than have those of families in highly developed economies.     

Mathematical investigations of the escape from the Malthusian trap

We present a simulation model that synthesizes Malthusian and Boserupian notions of the way population growth and economic development were intertwined. The non‐linear stochastic model consists of a system of equations whose dynamics culminate in an industrial revolution after hundreds of iterations. The Industrial Revolution can thus be conceptualized as a permanent “escape”; from the Malthusian trap that occurs once the economy is capable of permanently sustaining an ever growing population. We investigate the conditions for such an escape and their sensitivity to the parameters of the model. This is done in an attempt to understand why some economies might have had difficulties escaping from the Malthusian trap (in contrast to the European experience in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). Our results show that the likelihood of an escape is sensitive to the savings rate and to the output elasticities of the two sectors of the economy. When not in a subsistence crisis, the chances that an escape will occur increase for larger values of the ratio of the savings rate to the growth rate of the population. The chances of an escape also increase substantially for larger values of the output elasticities of labor.     

Why do English-speaking countries have relatively high fertility?

In broad terms, the division in Europe between countries with very low fertility and countries with sustainable fertility matches Esping-Anderson’s classification of the same countries into ‘conservative’ and ‘social democratic’ (Esping-Anderson 1990). A central difference between these two types relates to their preferred models of the family. The conservative countries hold more to the ‘breadwinner’ model of the family while the social democratic countries seek higher levels of gender equity within the family and in the workplace. State support in both conservative and social democratic countries is designed to be consistent with these differing views of the family. Would we then not expect fertility to be very low in Esping-Anderson’s third group of countries, the ‘liberal’ countries, essentially English-speaking countries? By the Esping-Anderson definition, liberal countries are notable for their lack of support for families from public sources. Instead, according to Esping-Anderson, families must rely upon market provision for the services that they may need to combine work and family and they must rely on market employment to generate the income required to support their children. Contrary to this theory, whether measured by contemporary cross-sectional fertility or completed cohort fertility, with the exception of Canada, English-speaking countries now have the highest fertility rates among the countries that were classified by Esping-Anderson. Given the strength of theoretical explanation that arises from comparative studies of fertility in Europe, the paper examines why fertility in English-speaking countries seems not to follow expectation.     

On testing Easterlin's hypothesis using relative cohort size as a proxy for relative income

Measures of Canadian fertility (total fertility rate and fifteen-year age-specific fertility rate F_15–29) and relative cohort size (population aged 30–64 years divided by population aged 15–29 years) show a close co-movement between 1940 and 1976 but record a marked departure since then. The application of cointegration techniques to these series (1921–1988) shows that they do not form an equilibrium relationship even over the period 1940–1976. Contrary to the expected relationship between relative cohort size and relative income, income data by age groups show that there is no tight relationship between them. The absence of an equilibrium relationship between relative cohort size and fertility, therefore, does not necessarily imply that Easterlin's hypothesis is false.I would like to thank Paul Maxim for allowing me to use his data set for this analysis. My thanks are also due to Peter Smith and three anonymous referees for their constructive comments on this work.     

亚洲女性收入对生育率影响的国际比较研究--基于劳动参与率、受教育程度、就业方式的视角

通过构建家庭效用函数模型,论证了家庭收入增长中女性收入对家庭生育决策的影响,说明了随着女性收入的提高,会降低生育率。进一步,通过引用女性劳动参与率、受教育程度及就业方式作为女性收入对生育率影响的中间变量,再运用相关数据进行实证分析,发现女性劳动参与率、受教育程度对生育率有着负向的影响,而女性非全日制就业方式对生育率有着正向的影响。再进一步,对亚洲各国生育政策的调整进行国际比较,探讨生育政策的具体措施与影响女性收入的三个因素之间的关系,最后针对中国目前的生育水平提出两方面的建议：硬政策的完善和软环境的支持,以有助于提高人口素质,优化人口结构。     

Mathematical investigations of the escape from the Malthusian trap

"We present a simulation model that synthesizes Malthusian and Boserupian notions of the way population growth and economic development were intertwined. The non-linear stochastic model consists of a system of equations whose dynamics culminate in an industrial revolution after hundreds of iterations. The Industrial Revolution [in Europe] can thus be conceptualized as a permanent 'escape' from the Malthusian trap that occurs once the economy is capable of permanently sustaining an ever growing population. We investigate the conditions for such an escape and their sensitivity to the parameters of the model....Our results show that the likelihood of an escape is sensitive to the savings rate and to the output elasticities of the two sectors of the economy. When not in a subsistence crisis, the chances that an escape will occur increase for larger values of the ratio of the savings rate to the growth rate of the population. The chances of an escape also increase substantially for larger values of the output elasticities of labor." (SUMMARY IN FRE)     

鼓励生育政策能否提高生育率? ——基于生育成本缺口递增的视角

中国总和生育率的下降引发调整生育政策的讨论,但鲜有对鼓励生育政策的效果评估与理论解释.通过马斯洛需求层次理论构建生育成本缺口递增假说,并基于世界人口政策数据库与OECD家庭数据库对基于转移支付的鼓励生育政策进行了效果评估,得出如下结论:第一,生育成本是一种动态结构,需求跃迁导致生育成本缺口增速快于收入增速,进而决定鼓励...     

Additional Work,Family Agriculture,and the Birth of a First or a Second Child in Russia at the Beginning of the 1990s

At the beginning of the transition period, many Russian households faced substantial economic hardships and uncertainties. An economic downturn had become one of the major factors responsible for the significant and rapid decline of Russian fertility. However, many households tried to cope with this situation by engaging in multiple income generating activities and the cultivation of food on private plots of land. The question therefore arises whether these activities had a positive impact on fertility decisions. This paper explores the association between additional employment or subsistence measures (second jobs, part-time self-employment, and part-time family agriculture) and the probability to have a first or a second child in Russia during 1990 and the spring of 1993. Data from 966 respondents from the Russian component of the survey Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989: General Population Survey show that activities that generate an additional income were positively associated with the birth of a second child. This is especially the case if these activities produce half of a respondent's or her household's income. The birth of a second child was also positively associated with the fact that a household consumed food that was cultivated by the household itself. However, none of these activities was significantly connected with the birth of a first child.     

Books and Publications Received

Mexican fertility has remained at a high level (a crude birth rate of 42–46) in spite of rapid economic development and its concomitants: rising levels of urbanization, education, income, and female labour force participation, and falling levels of infant mortality and agricultural population, combined with rural-urban migration.

Data on child-woman ratios and children-ever-born statistics, for Mexico and each state, suggest that the constant crude birth rate is not masking age or region-specific declines in fertility.

Cross-section regressions are employed in an attempt to explain Mexico’s paradoxical fertility behaviour. Using measures of income, education, urbanization, occupational status, industrial composition, labour force participation, and the sex ratio, in a weighted log-linear form, a large portion of the variation in state adjusted child-woman ratios is explained by the ‘demographic transition’ variables. The only two which might possibly explain the trend in Mexican fertility are the income variable and the sex ratio, which have positive influences on Mexican fertility in 1960 and 1970.     

Famine Mortality in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Evidence from a Temple Death Register

Economic and demographic historians who have studied Japan's early modern period argue that preventive checks to fertility were the primary cause of Japan's stationary population in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and that the role of ‘positive’ checks was negligible. This paper presents evidence and a claim that mortality crises – famines in particular – also played an important role in checking population growth during this period. It analyses data from the death register of Ogen-ji, a Buddhist temple in the Hida region of central Japan. These data provide a remarkably detailed picture of the short-term demographic consequences of Japan's last great famine, the Tenpō famine of the 1830s. ‘Normal’ mortality patterns, by age and sex, are compared with patterns of mortality during the famine. Mortality of males rose considerably more than that of females, with the greatest rise occurring among young boys aged 5–14 and adult men aged 30–59. A surprising finding was that mortality at ages 0–4 rose relatively little, in part a consequence of a marked fall in the number of births during the famine. The Tenpō subsistence crisis was not the sole cause of population stagnation in the Ogen-ji population, but it was a prominent feature of the ‘high mortality regime’ that this population experienced during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.     

Inequality and demographic response to short-term economic stress in North Orkney,Scotland, 1855–1910: Sector differences

We examine economic inequality and social differences in infant and child mortality, and fertility responses to food price changes in North Orkney, 1855–1910, using linked vital records. This small population featured a diverse occupational structure, limited land resources, and geographic isolation from mainland Scotland. Segments of Orkney’s non-agricultural working population were living so close to the margin of subsistence in normal years that an increase in food prices in bad years cost the lives of their children. Delayed childbearing, in addition to increased labour intensity, occupational diversification, and poor relief, failed to mitigate the negative effects of unfavourable prices in this group. While previous studies for Western Europe show a strong social gradient in mortality responses to food prices, and for Eastern Asia a strong household gradient, this study shows a strong sectoral gradient, indicating low standards of living for the non-agricultural working population well into the twentieth century.     

Land use as a mediating factor of fertility in the Amazon

Despite implications for both humans and the environment, a scant body of research examines fertility in forest frontiers. This study examines the fertility–environment association using empirical data from Ecuadorian Amazon between 1980 and 1999. Fertility dramatically declined during this period, and our empirical models suggest that households’ relationship to land partially explains this decline. Controlling for known fertility determinants such as age and education, women in households lacking land titles experienced a 27 % higher birth rate than did women in households with land titles. This suggests insecure land tenure was associated with higher fertility. Furthermore, each additional hectare of new pasture was associated with a 16 % higher birth rate, suggesting the potential role of a more stable and lucrative income source in supporting additional births. Findings from this research can help inform strategic policies to address sustainable development in frontier environments.     

Marital Fertility Control Among the Qing Nobility: Implications for Two Types of Preventive Check

Demographers, as early as Malthus, have assumed that the preventive checks, delayed marriage and celibacy, were absent in traditional China. In this paper on the Qing (1644–1911) imperial lineage, we demonstrate that, instead, there may have been a different, more ‘modern’ preventive check: fertility control within marriage. Marital fertility of lineage couples during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was low to moderate. Such low fertility was the product of three behavioural mechanisms: late starting, early stopping and, most significantly, long spacing. Couples apparently regulated their fertility according to their economic resources and the sex of their surviving children. Moreover, they did so, we suggest, by regulating their coital frequency. Deliberate fertility control, in other words, was already within the ‘calculus of conscious choice’ for some Chinese well before this century. The speed of contemporary sinitic fertility transitions may accordingly be attributed to the fact that they did not require a change in attitudes, only the diffusion of new incentives and effective technologies.     

青海省人口和经济发展基本情况分析

青海省人口自然增长率在逐年下降,人均生产总值,人均纯收入都在快速增长,群众的最低生活保障体系正在建立;这几年出口贸易顺差大,地方财政收入增长快,这都为青海经济发展提供了有利条件。     

Marital dissolution,remarriage, and childbearing

Earlier models of fertility hypothesize that marital dissolution and remarriage influence subsequent childbearing. This issue is examined by comparing the fertility of those in disrupted marriages with that of those in stable marriages. The results indicate that, by transferring women into a nonmarried status, marital dissolution decreases childbearing. The data also suggest that discord reduces fertility even before separation occurs—separated women had reduced fertility during the two years just before separation. It was found that marital dissolution without remarriage operates to truncate childbearing, thus decreasing family size. Dissolution followed by remarriage, however, lengthens the childbearing span of whites and has no influence on average family size; remarrying white women are able to make up for the childbearing lost between marriages. For nonwhites, we found that dissolution and remarriage increase the average time to childbirth, but, even more importantly, these events greatly decrease the number of children born.     

More than an urban legend: the short- and long-run effects of unplanned fertility shocks

This paper examines the short- and long-run effects of a quasi-exogenous variation in fertility behavior due to a yearlong period of power rationing in Colombia in 1992. We show that power shortages caused a mini baby boom and that the increase in fertility was unplanned and persistent: the time in between births was reduced and overall lifetime fertility increased. We also present evidence suggesting that women who had a baby due to the outage found themselves in worse socioeconomic conditions 12 years later.     

Puzzles and further explorations in the interrelationships of successive births with husband’s income,spouses’ education and race

When fertility is examined in the detail of individual parity progressions and birth-order transitions, important interactions between the effects of income and education are seen. Among the findings are: the negative effect of education on fertility is stronger at all parities for less educated compared to more highly educated women. Additional income has a more positive effect for more highly educated than for less educated women. For women with 0-8 years of education the effect of more income is positive when the family has no children but negative thereafter, but for college-educated women the effect of more income is positive. And additional income has a less positive (more negative) effect on fertility among nonwhites than among whites.