共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
This paper consists of a statistical analysis of the increasing resort to divorce in England and Wales over the past hundred years. In view of the social, financial and procedural barriers surrounding the Divorce Court over most of the period it is impossible to regard the spread of divorce as an index of increasing marital breakdown. It indicates merely the greater ability and willingness of estranged couples to take advantage of the legal machinery for bringing their marriages to a formal end. The analysis of published data shows that since 1857, the rate of petitioning per 10,000 married couples (of whom the wives were 15–49 years of age) has risen from 0.83 to 37.98. Various factors have been responsible for this fifty-foild increase: it seems that a five-fold rise was due specifically to the lowering of formal barriers (which made divorce more accessible to the poor and to women petitioners), while the remaining tenfold increase was brought about by the growing acceptance by society and by discordant couples, of divorce as an appropriate end to a broken marriage. This change in public opinion can be seen not only in the slow yet persistent rise in the rate of petitioning over all but the last few years, but also in the long-term effects of the two world wars. Divorces since 1921 have been allocated to the various marriage cohorts involved so as to estimate the proportion of each cohort divorced by successive marriage anniversaries. This procedure has shown that the recent war had its greaters disruptive impact on the “hastliy contracted” marriages of the early war years; the impact on these cohorts was, however, only slightly in excess of that exerted on the immediately preceding cohorts married in the later 1930's. In fact the war took its toll of all cohorts back to 1921. As complement to this study of trends the position near the beginning and near the end of the whole period was investigated by analysing a special extraction of statistics relating to all the 1871 petitions and to a sample of those of 1951. The study of couples involved in divorce in these two years, illustrates its extension in the intervening period to most sectors of the married population. From a tiny group of predominantly well-to-do and frequently childless couples in 1871, the divorce population by 1951 appeared to have become very nearly a cross-section of all married couples, at least in respect to occupational structure and family size. To some extent, the close similarity between the divorcing and the still married couples in 1951 was a temporary phenomenon, due to the entry into the divorce courts in that year of an unuually large number of poor petitioners using the new legal aid provisions introduced in 1950. Nevertheless, there is good reasong to believe that this factor has led to only slight over-emphasis of the long-term trend for the poor and those with families to take an increasing share in divorce petitioning. So far as the mid-twentieth century position is concerned cohort analysis shows that, at least in the early years of matrimony, the couples married since 1945 have petitioned for divorce less than their immediate elders in the wartime or just pre-war cohorts. While the post-war marriages have not run their full course through the most divorce-prone years, this finding suggests that the rate of petitioning is not likely to go on increasing in the future nearly so rapidly or so persistently as it has done in the past. It seems possible that the rate may be stabilized in the next few years at approximately its present level, i.e. within the range of 5%–10% of each marriage cohort. If this should occur, it would probably mean that divorce in England and Wales had found its own level, and that virtually all those requiring to terminate marriage in the existing context of social circumstances were no longer prevented by extraneous barriers from using the appropriate legal procedures. 相似文献
2.
B. Benjamin 《Population studies》2013,67(3):225-248
The history of public health changes is taken forward from 1900 to 1950. This was a period of important development in a population in which most ofthe adult members had at the outset of the period experienced compulsory primary education; when the full effects of industrial development had made their mark on the nation's health and, at last, on the public conscience; when the force of social and economic factors in producing and perpetuating disease was becoming appreciated; and when community responsibility for the health and welfare ofthe individual was becoming accepted. Not surprisingly, great improvements were made in the scope of preventive and curative services and in their accessibility. But the most important factor in the improvement of the national health was the steady rise in the level of living of the population, especially during the last two decades of the period. 相似文献
3.
4.
Michael R. Haines 《Population studies》2013,67(2):297-315
In this paper data from the 1911 Census of the Fertility of Marriage of England and Wales are used to study patterns of mortality decline by socio-economic characteristics, principally the occupation of husband. That census reported data on number of wives, children ever born, and children dead by marriage-duration cohorts for 190 non-overlapping occupations of husband. These results, along with those on number of rooms in the dwelling of the family are used to make indirect estimates of childhood mortality using the techniques described in United Nations, Manual X. These procedures produce values of q(a), the probability of dying before reaching some exact age ‘a’. Estimates for q(2), q(3), q(5), q(10), q(15), and q(20) are derived from data on women married 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20–24, and 25–29 years, respectively. These estimates can also be dated to a point in the past. These values can also be converted to a corresponding level of a Model West life table, which describes the ‘average’ mortality regime which the children of those women experienced. This furnishes a basis to look at mortality decline for various social classes and occupational groups. Ordinary least squares regressions of the levels of Model West life tables implied by the 1(a) values on time give one measure of mortality decline. Another is the absolute amount of the increase in the level of the Model West life tables from marriage-duration cohort 20–24 years to 0–4 years. The aggregate results indicate that social class in England and Wales during the 1890s and 1900s tended to be related to the speed of mortality decline: childhood mortality declined more rapidly in the higher and more privileged social class groups. But the results were neither nearly as strong nor as regular as those which predicted the level of mortality within any marriage-duration cohort. These outcomes are not particularly sensitive to the three different social-class stratification schemes used: the 1911 English Registrar General's classification; the 1951 English Registrar General's classification; and the 1950 U.S. Census classification. There was also a fairly regular and predictable gradient for the number of rooms in the home: child mortality was higher in families who lived in larger dwellings. Analysis of 190 detailed male occupational groups revealed that considerably more of the variation in mortality levels than of trends could be explained by social-class categories. Between 20 and 40 per cent of variation in mortality trend could be accounted for by social class alone, as opposed to 50 to 80 per cent of mortality levels for different marriage-duration cohorts. Results for a more restricted sample of 116 occupations for which income estimates could be made revealed a similar pattern. In addition, income was virtually unrelated to the pattern of mortality decline, and improvement was more rapid in groups who were more urban. This reflects the role of rapidly improving urban sanitation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in England. In contrast, income was significantly related to childhood morality levels for various marriage-duration cohorts (with higher income associated with lower mortality), while urbanization was inversely correlated with mortality levels (more urban groups experienced higher mortality). Overall, social class (or occupation group), income, and urbanization were more successful in explaining mortality levels than time trends across occupations, although social class and the extent of urbanization did reasonably well in accounting for trends. Over a longer period, the transition in child mortality was under way by the 1890s, but its pace and timing varied in different occupations and social class groupings. Although absolute differences in infant mortality were reduced after about 1911, relative inequality persisted even as infant and child survival improved for all groups. 相似文献
5.
Máire Ní Bhrolcháin 《Population studies》2013,67(1):103-125
A method is presented for analysing maternity history data to provide period estimates of parity progression ratios, birth intervals and related indices. This is applied to a sample of the marriage and maternity histories from the Census of England and Wales of 1971 and shows: (a) a general increase through the 1950s and into the 1960s in period estimates of marriage and parity progression ratios, especially in the progression from first to second birth; (b) a general acceleration of fertility with, again, the second birth interval becoming particularly short and compact; and (c) very steep declines in third and fourth birth progression ratios from the mid-1960s. Birth interval distributions altered during the period examined. Decomposition of a progression-based total fertility index shows change in the ratios for lower birth orders to have dominated the fertility upswing and declines in ratios for higher birth orders to have initiated the subsequent decline. 相似文献
6.
Riley J 《Population studies》2003,57(1):5-20
This paper contributes to two ongoing debates among demographers. One deals with the immediate and deferred health effects of childbearing in the past, and the other with competing explanations--the frailty and insult accumulation hypotheses--for differences in individual health later in life. The study population consists of working women who lived at four locales in England and Wales in parts of the period 1778-1929 and who were under observation for incapacitating sickness during and after their childbearing years. Mothers within the study population are contrasted with a comparison group made up principally of non-mothers. The mothers began their reproductive careers with an advantage in health that was especially evident in the duration of sickness episodes. Even though individual births were less hazardous than individual sicknesses at the same ages, the cumulative effect of childbearing appears to have eroded the mothers' advantage. By ages 50-74 the mothers resembled the comparison group in health. 相似文献
7.
A key challenge to theories of long-run economic growth has been linking the onset of modern growth with the move to modern fertility limitation. A notable puzzle for these theories is that modern growth in England began around 1780, 100 years before there was seemingly any movement to limit fertility. Here we show that the aggregate data on fertility in England before 1880 conceals significant declines in the fertility of the middle and upper classes earlier. These declines coincide with the Industrial Revolution and are of the character predicted by some recent theories of long-run growth. 相似文献
8.
Australia has one of the largest percentages of immigrant populations in the developed world with a highly regulated system of immigration control and regular censuses to track their changes over time. However, the ability to explain the population change through the demographic components of immigration, emigration, and death by age and sex is complicated because of differences in measurement and sources of information. In this article, we explore three methods for reconciling the demographic accounts from 1981 to 2011 for the Australia-born and 18 foreign-born population groups. We then describe how the immigrant populations have changed and what has contributed most to that change. We find that the sources of immigrant population change have varied considerably by age, sex, country of birth, and period of immigration. Immigrants from Europe are currently the oldest and slowest-growing populations, whereas those from elsewhere are growing rapidly and exhibit relatively young population age structures. Studying these patterns over time helps us to understand the nature of international migration and its long-term contributions to population change and composition. 相似文献
9.
10.
Mortimer Spiegelman 《Population studies》2013,67(3):292-304
A life table for the Jewish population of Canada, based upon their mortality experience during 1940–2, yielded an average length of life (expectation of life at birth) of 67–53 years for males and 69·89 years for females. These figures are greater than those for the general population of Canada by 4·58 years for males and 3·60 years for females. These margins decrease with advance in age; the expectations of life for Jews and for the total Canadian population are equal at age 25 in the case of females, and at age 35 in the case of males. Jewish infants in Canada start life with a mortality rate, in the first year, only two-fifths of that for the general population. This advantage for Jews is observed through childhood, adolescence, and early maturity. However, the margin between the Jewish and total populations decreased with advance in age until, shortly after age 50, the Jews begin to show the higher mortality rates. The Jewish populations of the United States and of Canada have great similarities in their social and economic structures. They also share, very largely, in their European origins, and they have come to North America during the same period. It is, therefore, a fair assumption that the longevity and mortality characteristics of the relatively small Jewish population of Canada may be indicative of what might be found for the millions of Jews in the United States, for whom such information is not available. 相似文献
11.
Zhenchao Qian 《Demography》1998,35(3):279-292
Data from the U.S. Census and Current Population Survey are used to examine trends in the propensity to marry or to cohabit by the age and educational attainment of potential partners. Marriage rates declined sharply across all age and educational combinations between 1970 and 1980 and declined more sharply for less-educated persons between 1980 and 1990. The rise in cohabitation compensated somewhat for the decline in marriage rates, but the compensation was unequally spread among age and educational combinations. Highly educated men were more likely, and highly educated women were no more or less likely, to marry than to cohabit with less-educated partners in 1970 and 1980. By 1990, however, educational assortative-mating patterns between these two types of unions were similar. In 1990, marriages and cohabitations involving women who were better educated than their partners were more common than those involving women who were less educated than their partners. In addition, men and women in their early 20s tend to have partners better educated than themselves, but persons in their 30s tend to cross the less-than-high-school/ more-than-high-school educational barrier when partners differ in educational attainment. 相似文献
12.
13.
Peter Laslett 《Population studies》2013,67(3):449-454
This paper examines the relationship between the number of partnerships ever engaged in and fertility, as measured by the average number of live births. It was found that the larger the number of partnerships in which a woman had been engaged the higher is her fertility. This relationship between partnerships and fertility remains even when such variables as present age, age at first partnership, age at first pregnancy, time lost between unions, time spent in partnerships, time since entry into the first partnership, type of sexual union at first pregnancy, present type of sexual union, and current use or non-use of contraceptives are controlled by cross tabulation. Correlation analysis also bears out the positive relationship between partnerships and fertility. The data for this study came from a sample survey of 4,199 women of lower, and lower middle, socio-economic status who were interviewed in 1971 on the island of Barbados. The authors have confidence in the reliability and validity of their data and hence in their findings and conclusions. The authors believe that their findings contradict the previously established positive relationship between patterns of stability of sexual unions and fertility in English-speaking Caribbean societies. They conclude that the relationship was either not rigorously examined in the past or else has undergone changes as these societies modernize economically and socially. 相似文献
14.
Paul Huck 《Population studies》2013,67(3):513-526
Evidence about infant mortality in a number of industrial towns was derived from baptismal and burial registers of the Anglican Church. The level of infant mortality during the period 1813–1836, after correction for underregistration, was comparable to that of British towns during the second half of the century. Infant mortality increased during this period, perhaps as a reflection of rapid population growth. In each of the parishes a winter peak and a summer trough was found in the seasonal index of infant deaths during this period. This pattern is very different from the high summer mortality that prevailed in British towns during the late nineteenth century. However, mortality in the summer increased over time, thus reducing the depth of the summer trough in infant deaths, and perhaps represents a movement towards the summer peak so apparent later in the century. 相似文献
15.
Consumption patterns and living standards are relatively neglected in stratification research even though they are important indicators of material well-being. Consumption inequality is related to income and wealth disparities through complex processes not yet well understood. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing a striking shift in the standard of living in housing in the US that occurred at the same time as a substantial increase in income inequality. Houses became significantly bigger in the 1980s and 1990s just as inequalities deepened, reversing an earlier trend towards smaller houses. Diverse theoretical traditions in the consumption and housing stratification literatures explain this shift differently, and in particular posit very different effects of rising income inequality. I derive several alternative expectations from these traditions: two predicting that the increasing size of houses was broadly shared across income levels, while another expects it represented increasing divergence in living standards, paralleling the trend in income inequality. I use US Census and American Housing Survey data and several different methods to adjudicate between these theories. The results provide some support for each of the alternative expectations, but the most significant finding is that big house ownership became more concentrated among the affluent. A focus on living standards thus uncovers a key source of rising disparities at the turn of the 21st century with important implications for wealth stratification too since houses are the major debt and asset held by most Americans. 相似文献
16.
Data from the 1900 U.S. Census of Population show that fertility in Los Angeles California, declined by more than 50 per cent between 1880 and 1900. Women's mean age at first marriage, which rose by approximately three years, contributed to the decline, but change in marital fertility was more important than change in nuptiality. Although the fertility of in-migrating U.S.-born women was lower than that of California-born women, the decline was not explained by in-migration. The emergence of a class differential in fertility, with couples of higher status having fewer children than those of lower status, and the simultaneous weakening of class differentials in secondary-school attendance, together suggest that the rise of universal secondary schooling probably did not account for the marital fertility decline experienced in middle- and upper-status families. 相似文献
17.
Social Indicators Research - Many advanced economies have experienced significant job polarization in the last decades, with an increase in the employment share and relative wage of both low-wage... 相似文献
18.
This paper relates changes in aggregate population, affluence (measured as GDP), and indicators for environmental pressures, the latter being based upon the socioeconomic metabolism concept, for Austria from 1830 to 1995. During this period of time Austria underwent a transition from a predominantly agricultural mode of substistence to an industrial economy. The Austrian population increased by a factor of 2.3, total GDP by a factor of 28.2 and per capita GDP by a factor of 12.2. Environmental indicators change by factors of between 0.85 and over 1000. In general we find that although efficiencies (environmental pressure per unit of GDP) increased dramatically, total environmental pressures increased considerably for most indicators, except for those that are related to an agricultural mode of subsistence. Our results indicate that environmental policies that aim to reduce the environmental pressure per unit of GDP (i.e., increase ecological efficiency) are not likely to be sufficient for sustainable development because efficiency gains are more than compensated for by increases in affluence. Instead, sustainability policy should focus on reducing total environmental pressures. 相似文献
19.
Irma T. Elo Hiram Beltrán-Sánchez James Macinko 《Population research and policy review》2014,33(1):97-126
Black–white mortality disparities remain sizable in the United States. In this study, we use the concept of avoidable/amenable mortality to estimate cause-of-death contributions to the difference in life expectancy between whites and blacks by gender in the United States in 1980, 1993, and 2007. We begin with a review of the concept of “avoidable mortality” and results of prior studies using this cause-of-death classification. We then present the results of our empirical analyses. We classified causes of death as amenable to medical care, sensitive to public health policies and health behaviors, ischemic heart disease, suicide, HIV/AIDS, and all other causes combined. We used vital statistics data on deaths and Census Bureau population estimates and standard demographic decomposition techniques. In 2007, causes of death amenable to medical care continued to account for close to 2 years of the racial difference in life expectancy among men (2.08) and women (1.85). Causes amenable to public health interventions made a larger contribution to the racial difference in life expectancy among men (1.17 years) than women (0.08 years). The contribution of HIV/AIDS substantially widened the racial difference among both men (1.08 years) and women (0.42 years) in 1993, but its contribution declined over time. Despite progress observed over the time period studied, a substantial portion of black–white disparities in mortality could be reduced given more equitable access to medical care and health interventions. 相似文献
20.
Sarah K. S. Shannon Christopher Uggen Jason Schnittker Melissa Thompson Sara Wakefield Michael Massoglia 《Demography》2017,54(5):1795-1818
The steep rise in U.S. criminal punishment in recent decades has spurred scholarship on the collateral consequences of imprisonment for individuals, families, and communities. Several excellent studies have estimated the number of people who have been incarcerated and the collateral consequences they face, but far less is known about the size and scope of the total U.S. population with felony convictions beyond prison walls, including those who serve their sentences on probation or in jail. This article develops state-level estimates based on demographic life tables and extends previous national estimates of the number of people with felony convictions to 2010. We estimate that 3 % of the total U.S. adult population and 15 % of the African American adult male population has ever been to prison; people with felony convictions account for 8 % of all adults and 33 % of the African American adult male population. We discuss the far-reaching consequences of the spatial concentration and immense growth of these groups since 1980. 相似文献