Economic opportunities,marriage squeezes and the propensity to marry: An economic analysis of period marriage rates in England and Wales

An economic model of the decision to marry has been developed by Gary Becker and is now part of the ‘new home economics’. From it one can deduce that the propensity to marry is a function of the relative earning capacities of men and women, the relative scarcity of unmarried persons of the opposite sex and real income. The effects of changes in these variables on the annual first marriage rates of men aged 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29 and women aged 16–19 and 20–24 respectively are estimated over the post-war period. It is found that women's earning capacity relative to men's has a particularly strong negative effect on marriage rates, and that the decline in first marriage rates during the 1970s was primarily attributable to the growing economic opportunities for women. As demographic studies have suggested, the relative numbers of bachelors and spinsters of particular ages (‘marriage squeezes’) also have a significant impact, and there is evidence of substitution in the ages of marriage partners in response to such ‘squeezes’. The income elasticity of marriage is only found to be significant among men below age 25 and women below age 20, and it increases as we move down the age distribution. This suggests the ‘liquidity constraints’ influence the timing of marriage among young people. In sum, this economic model is able to account for over 90 per cent of the post-war variation in young persons' marriage rates.     

Earnings,relative income,and family formation

The probability of first marriage for men who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957 was analyzed with respect to their Social Security earnings records, Wisconsin income tax reports for parents, and other variables. The findings provide no support for Easterlin's hypothesis that marriage will occur earlier when young men judge their economic prospects favorably with respect to their parents' income. However, young men's earnings and time spent in schooling to increase them were found to be important influences on marriage timing. Additional schooling had little effect net of the time it absorbed.     

Change and Continuity in the Formation of First Marital Unions in Australia

Marriage rates have now been falling in all Western countries for more than 20 years. Rising levels of women's education and employment, extra-marital cohabitation, and separation and divorce both preceded, and continue to accompany, this trend. We apply hazards models to a data-set rich in event-history information in order to study the links between these movements at the level of the individual in Australia. Contra the New Home Economists it transpires that longer education lowers women's propensity to marry, not by providing them with alternative careers to marriage, but by delaying their entry into the marriage market. Again, contra the New Home Economists, employment actually increases women's marriage probabilities. Cohabitation serves variously as an alternative and a prelude to formal marriage. Finally, in contrast with a study of marriage dissolution in Australia, the strengths of factors that variously inhibit or promote marriage, such as women's education and employment, have neither weakened nor strengthened during the recent past.     

Economic Independence and Union Formation in Sweden

Although sociologists, demographers, and economists are generally agreed that economic independence enhances the likelihood that men will marry, there is disagreement concerning its effect on women. The view that economic independence weakens women's incentive to marry has probably been the most influential, although it has been subjected to few rigorous empirical tests with individual-level data. In the present paper we examine the predictors of forming a first cohabiting union, of progressing from this union to marriage, and of marrying without previously cohabiting by applying hazard regression to event-history data from the 1992 Swedish Family Survey, supplemented by earnings data extracted from the national taxation register. We test a battery of measures that reflect people's past, current, and potential attachment to the labour market. We find that the correlates of union formation for women are largely indistinguishable from the correlates of union formation for men, and that far from being less likely than other women to cohabit or to marry, women with a greater degree of economic self-sufficiency are more likely to do so.     

Marital Status and Reproductive Performance in Kipsigis Women: Re-evaluating the Polygyny-Fertility Hypothesis

The effects of marital status on fertility and offspring survivorship are examined with data on six marriage cohorts of Kipsigis women, agro-pastoralists of south western Kenya. Neither marriage order, nor the average number of co-wives married to a man during a woman's reproductive years, is associated with completed family size, nor with any of the components of reproductive performance. The mechanisms whereby polygyny might potentially lower the reproductive performance of polygynously married women in the Kipsigis and other populations are discussed in some detail, with particular reference to resource shortages, sexual and economic favouritism, the observance of post partum taboos, disease, husband's age, co-wife co-operation, education, sterility, and age at menarche and marriage.     

Reproduction,Compositional Demography,and Economic Growth: Family Planning in England Long Before the Fertility Decline

This article offers a radical reinterpretation of the chronology of control over reproduction in England's history. It argues that, as a result of post–World War II policy preoccupations, there has been too narrow a focus in the literature on the significance of reductions in marital fertility. In England's case this is conventionally dated to have occurred from 1876, long after the industrial revolution. With a wider angle focus on “reproduction,” the historical evidence for England indicates that family planning began much earlier in the process of economic growth. Using a “compositional demography” approach, a novel social pattern of highly prudential, late marriage can be seen emerging among the bourgeoisie in the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There is also evidence for a more widespread resort to such prudential marriage throughout the population after 1816. When placed in this context, the reduction in national fertility indexes visible from 1876 can be seen as only a further phase, not a revolution, in the population's management of its reproduction.     

Bust after boom: First marriage trends in Australia

Since the early 1970s Australia has experienced a pronounced trend to later and less universal marriage. This stands in sharp contrast to a marriage boom that began with the outbreak of World War II and lasted for three decades. The boom was the product of three sets of forces: those peculiar to wartime, those emerging in the early postwar period and creating a climate favorable to marriage, and those surfacing in the 1960s with the advent of oral contraception. Its reversal is attributed largely to less frequent resort to marriage when premaritally pregnant, the rise of cohabitation as a prelude or alternative to marriage, economic forces hindering family formation, and ideological change.     

Determinants Of Cumulative Fertility In Ghana

The relatively few studies conducted on fertility differentials in Ghana have not controlled for the effect of important demographic variables, such as age at first marriage and current age of respondent. This paper attempts a multivariate analysis of the relationship between cumulative fertility and age at first marriage, level of education, religion, form of marriage and residence of husband. Data drawn from a census sample survey in 1971 include 72,816 currently married females aged 15–49 years. Age at first marriage was inversely related to cumulative fertility. The differentials were more pronounced for older women. Among the older women, the differentials were larger for rural than urban women. There were also significant fertility differentials associated with level of education, religion and form of marriage. Husband’s residence was a poor predictor of cumulative fertility. As a policy measure, it is suggested that priority be given to providing young women with more education or employment opportunities as an alternative to early marriage.     

Fertility Decline in Czechoslovakia During the Last Two Centuries

The decline of fertility in Czechoslovakia on the territory of the Czech Socialist Republic began with a rise in the age at marriage; the decline of marital fertility began only after 1860. On the territory of the Slovak Socialist Republic marital fertility began to decline after 1900 without previous significant changes in the age at marriage. The differences between the demographic behaviour in the two parts of Czechoslovakia have persisted, although they are now gradually disappearing. There are other significant regional differences in the fertility decline caused by the overall process of economic and social development. The end of the demographic transition in the Czech Socialist Republic came during the 1930's and in the Slovak Socialist Republic during the 1960's.     

Masculinity,Money, and the Postponement of Parenthood in Nigeria

In southeastern Nigeria, several interconnected processes of social change are combining to delay parenthood. Most of the demographic and social sciences literature examining the postponement of parenthood has paid primary attention to women. To address this gap, this article foregrounds the changing social landscape of masculinity as a significant context within which to situate these demographic changes. At the core of Nigerian men's perceptions, decisions, and behaviors with regard to delaying fatherhood is a fundamental contradiction, one that seems to be common in many settings—at least many African settings—of contemporary demographic transition. The contradiction is that while the postponement of parenthood is associated historically with positive social and economic indicators, when Nigerian men articulate their rationales for delaying fatherhood (and marriage) they commonly describe feelings of uncertainty connected to a sense of struggle and deprivation. This article connects men's anxieties about—and delays embarking on—marriage and parenthood to their experiences of economic uncertainty, and specifically to the perceived need for money as the foundation for successful reproduction.     

Using Changes in Life Satisfaction and Health to Predict the Survival Status Among Older Men and Women in Taiwan

Despite policies aimed at decreasing old-age income inequality, such as Social Security and Supplemental Security Income, research consistently finds that later-life poverty is highly concentrated among women. While the early-life economic disadvantages of motherhood are well established, little work has examined whether these disadvantages persist into later life. Life course research consistently demonstrates the relationship between early-life choices and later-life inequality, but few studies have examined whether the reproductive phase of a woman's life is associated with her later-life income. Using data from the 2003 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women cohort, this research examines whether women's age at first birth and parity are associated with her later-life income within the context of marriage. From a set of multivariate analyses, I find that despite a marginal statistically significant effect, substantively for the women in this cohort the effects of childbearing are not particularly consequential for later-life income. The results suggest that as women age the economic penalties associated with motherhood are less important to financial well-being than are other factors.     

The Economic Foundations of Cohabiting Couples’ Union Transitions

In recent decades, cohabitation has become an increasingly important relationship context for U.S. adults and their children, a union status characterized by high levels of instability. To understand why some cohabiting couples marry but others separate, researchers have drawn on theories emphasizing the benefits of specialization, the persistence of the male breadwinner norm, low income as a source of stress and conflict, and rising economic standards associated with marriage (the marriage bar). Because of conflicting evidence and data constraints, however, important theoretical questions remain. This study uses survival analysis with prospective monthly data from nationally representative panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation from 1996–2013 to test alternative theories of how money and work affect whether cohabiting couples marry or separate. Analyses indicate that the economic foundations of cohabiting couples’ union transitions do not lie in economic specialization or only men’s ability to be good providers. Instead, results for marriage support marriage bar theory: adjusting for couples’ absolute earnings, increases in wealth and couples’ earnings relative to a standard associated with marriage strongly predict marriage. For dissolution, couples with higher and more equal earnings are significantly less likely to separate. Findings demonstrate that within-couple earnings equality promotes stability, and between-couple inequalities in economic resources are critical in producing inequalities in couples’ relationship outcomes.     

Measuring Ontario's increasing housing affordability problem

This empirical study measures the prevalence and incidence of housing affordability problems in Canada in 1972, 1976, and 1983. It shows the affordability problem has not been improved by the major effort the Canadian governments made during the 1970s. Rent controls have not been adequate in reducing affordability problems. Moderate intervention in the housing market are not enough to help low income households attain affordable housing. The problem's resolution may require a major effort to stimulate housing supply, and by direct government involvement, adjustment in creating new methods and institutions for building and delivering housing services. Housing affordability problems will remain unresolved in the absence of major income redistribution programs.     

The effect of non-family experiences on age of marriage in a setting of rapid social change

This study examines the changing effects of non-family activities on the age of transition to first marriage in four cohorts of individuals across 45 years in the Chitwan Valley, Nepal. The results indicate that school enrolment had a negative effect on both men's and women's marriage rates, while total years of schooling had a positive effect on men's marriage rates. Non-family employment experiences increased marriage rates for men only. Analysing the effects of schooling and employment over time suggests that school enrolment became a growing deterrent to marriage for both sexes, and that non-family employment became an increasingly desirable attribute in men. The results are consistent with changing views about sex roles and schooling over time in the region, as the roles of student and spouse became more distinct. The results also suggest an increasing integration of husbands in the non-family labour market.     

The Intergenerational Effect of Cambodia's Genocide on Children's Education and Health

We investigate the intergenerational impact of conflict on the educational and health outcomes of children born years after the conflict ended by exploiting geographical variation in the intensity of the genocide that occurred during the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime in Cambodia. We find that children of individuals who were of prime marriage age during the genocide and experienced greater intensity of genocide have worse educational and health outcomes. In particular, for each standard deviation increase in the intensity of the genocide, average children's normal grade progression rate decreases by 0.03 standard deviations and average children's height‐for‐ age Z‐score decreases by 0.06 standard deviations. We examine several channels through which genocide could affect children born to survivors after the conflict and find suggestive evidence that the marriage market acts as a channel that transmits the adverse impact of conflict across generations. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of mortality rates and post‐KR internal migration.     

How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

Do Marriage and Cohabitation Provide Benefits to Health in Mid-Life? The Role of Childhood Selection Mechanisms and Partnership Characteristics Across Countries

Extensive research has found that marriage provides health benefits to individuals, particularly in the U.S. The rise of cohabitation, however, raises questions about whether simply being in an intimate co-residential partnership conveys the same health benefits as marriage. Here, we use OLS regression to compare differences between partnered and unpartnered, and cohabiting and married individuals with respect to self-rated health in mid-life, an understudied part of the lifecourse. We pay particular attention to selection mechanisms arising in childhood and characteristics of the partnership. We compare results in five countries with different social, economic, and policy contexts: the U.S. (NLSY), U.K. (UKHLS), Australia (HILDA), Germany (SOEP), and Norway (GGS). Results show that living with a partner is positively associated with self-rated health in mid-life in all countries, but that controlling for children, prior separation, and current socio-economic status eliminates differences in Germany and Norway. Significant differences between cohabitation and marriage are only evident in the U.S. and the U.K., but controlling for childhood background, union duration, and prior union dissolution eliminates partnership differentials. The findings suggest that cohabitation in the U.S. and U.K., both liberal welfare regimes, seems to be very different than in the other countries. The results challenge the assumption that only marriage is beneficial for health.     

Marriage or dissolution? Union transitions among poor cohabiting women

The objective of this paper is to identify the incentives and barriers to marriage among cohabiting women, especially disadvantaged mothers who are targets of welfare reform. We use the newly released cohabitation data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979-2000), which tracks the partners of cohabiting women across survey waves. Our results support several conclusions. First, cohabiting unions are short-lived--about one-half end within one year, and over 90% end by the fifth year. Unlike most previous research, our results show that most cohabiting unions end by dissolution of the relationship rather than by marriage. Second, transitions to marriage are especially unlikely among poor women; less than one-third marry within five years. Cohabitation among poor women is more likely than that among nonpoor women to be a long-term alternative or substitute for traditional marriage. Third, our multinomial analysis of transitions from cohabitation into marriage or dissolution highlights the salience of economically disadvantaged family backgrounds, cohabitation and fertility histories, women's economic resources, and partner characteristics. These results are interpreted in a policy environment that increasingly views marriage as an economic panacea for low-income women and their children.     

找回家庭：对农村单身现象的再解释——对赣南茶村的大龄未婚男青年的分析

本文延承布迪厄的学术遗产,通过对茶村大龄未婚男青年进行分析后指出,家庭不仅构成了婚姻生活的重要场域,同时亦对婚姻本身产生了重要影响：当婚姻由家族事件变成家庭事件时,它由一个“公共事件”转变成“私密事件”,他人对于族人婚姻的关注与贡献也急剧降低;“家风”作为婚姻市场上的道德要价,对婚姻双方的社区道德和口碑提出了要求;当男青年的家庭结构不完整或经济实力不济,这将使得男性在婚姻市场上无法获得女方的青睐。