The effect of non-family experiences on age of marriage in a setting of rapid social change

This study examines the changing effects of non-family activities on the age of transition to first marriage in four cohorts of individuals across 45 years in the Chitwan Valley, Nepal. The results indicate that school enrolment had a negative effect on both men's and women's marriage rates, while total years of schooling had a positive effect on men's marriage rates. Non-family employment experiences increased marriage rates for men only. Analysing the effects of schooling and employment over time suggests that school enrolment became a growing deterrent to marriage for both sexes, and that non-family employment became an increasingly desirable attribute in men. The results are consistent with changing views about sex roles and schooling over time in the region, as the roles of student and spouse became more distinct. The results also suggest an increasing integration of husbands in the non-family labour market.     

Earnings,relative income,and family formation

The probability of first marriage for men who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957 was analyzed with respect to their Social Security earnings records, Wisconsin income tax reports for parents, and other variables. The findings provide no support for Easterlin's hypothesis that marriage will occur earlier when young men judge their economic prospects favorably with respect to their parents' income. However, young men's earnings and time spent in schooling to increase them were found to be important influences on marriage timing. Additional schooling had little effect net of the time it absorbed.     

Schooling,marriage, and age at first birth in Madagascar

The low school attainment, early marriage, and low age at first birth of females are major policy concerns in less developed countries. This study jointly estimated the determinants of educational attainment, marriage age, and age at first birth among females aged 12–25 in Madagascar, explicitly accounting for the endogeneities that arose from modelling these related outcomes simultaneously. An additional year of schooling results in a delay to marriage of 1.5?years and marrying 1?year later delays age at first birth by 0.5?years. Parents’ education and wealth also have important effects on schooling, marriage, and age at first birth, with a woman's first birth being delayed by 0.75?years if her mother had 4 additional years of schooling. Overall, our results provide rigorous evidence for the critical role of education—both individual women's own and that of their parents—in delaying the marriage and fertility of young women.     

Economic opportunities,marriage squeezes and the propensity to marry: An economic analysis of period marriage rates in England and Wales

An economic model of the decision to marry has been developed by Gary Becker and is now part of the ‘new home economics’. From it one can deduce that the propensity to marry is a function of the relative earning capacities of men and women, the relative scarcity of unmarried persons of the opposite sex and real income. The effects of changes in these variables on the annual first marriage rates of men aged 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29 and women aged 16–19 and 20–24 respectively are estimated over the post-war period. It is found that women's earning capacity relative to men's has a particularly strong negative effect on marriage rates, and that the decline in first marriage rates during the 1970s was primarily attributable to the growing economic opportunities for women. As demographic studies have suggested, the relative numbers of bachelors and spinsters of particular ages (‘marriage squeezes’) also have a significant impact, and there is evidence of substitution in the ages of marriage partners in response to such ‘squeezes’. The income elasticity of marriage is only found to be significant among men below age 25 and women below age 20, and it increases as we move down the age distribution. This suggests the ‘liquidity constraints’ influence the timing of marriage among young people. In sum, this economic model is able to account for over 90 per cent of the post-war variation in young persons' marriage rates.     

Unemployment,Nonstandard Employment,and Fertility: Insights From Japan’s “Lost 20 Years”

In this study, we examine relationships of unemployment and nonstandard employment with fertility. We focus on Japan, a country characterized by a prolonged economic downturn, significant increases in both unemployment and nonstandard employment, a strong link between marriage and childbearing, and pronounced gender differences in economic roles and opportunities. Analyses of retrospective employment, marriage, and fertility data for the period 1990–2006 indicate that changing employment circumstances for men are associated with lower levels of marriage, while changes in women’s employment are associated with higher levels of marital fertility. The latter association outweighs the former, and results of counterfactual standardization analyses indicate that Japan’s total fertility rate would have been 10 % to 20 % lower than the observed rate after 1995 if aggregate- and individual-level employment conditions had remained unchanged from the 1980s. We discuss the implications of these results in light of ongoing policy efforts to promote family formation and research on temporal and regional variation in men’s and women’s roles within the family.     

Self-employment disadvantage in the working lives of blacks and females

Self-employment, regardless of its quality, offers the advantage of keeping individuals employed, thereby contributing to a continuous work history and earnings over the lifetime. But in the individual life cycle, how important is self-employment, particularly given evidence that self-employment spells tend to be of short duration? Also, to what extent does self-employment contribute to race and gender differences in lifetime employment? We use an increment-decrement life table to analyze the role of self-employment in differentiating the working lifetimes of blacks and women from those of white men. White men's average lifetime years spent in self-employment exceed black men's by as many as six years, thus accounting for nearly the entire difference between whiteand black men's lifetime years employed. White women's self-employment episodes,while almost as numerous as white men's, are shorter and less connected towage-employment episodes. Black women's self-employment episodes are bothinfrequent and of short duration.

     

Absent and Problematic Men: Demographic Accounts of Male Reproductive Roles

Both men and women are important actors in bringing children into life, yet demographic studies on reproduction have tended to focus on women alone. The aims of this article are: 1) to describe why men have attracted limited interest as subjects of such research; 2) to evaluate existing research on men's roles in developing countries; and 3) to suggest directions for future research on male reproductive roles. Men, once neglected, are now included in research on fertility but from a narrow, overly problem‐oriented perspective. A review of the literature, however, raises questions about the adequacy of a problem oriented approach. The authors argue that demography should focus on men not only as women's partners, but also as individuals with distinct reproductive histories. In situations, now increasingly common, where the links between marriage and childbearing erode, the differences in men's and women's reproductive experiences and the costs and benefits of parenting will become more salient for future research.     

The Economic Theory of Fertility Over Three Decades

A large proportion of cohabitors in the Statistics Norway Omnibus Surveys of 1996 reported economic reasons for their hesitation to marry, and in particular the costs of the wedding. In line with this, the Norwegian Family and Occupation Survey of 1988 revealed effects both of women's cumulated income and men's non-employment on the actual choice of union type. Also some other evidence suggests that affordability matters, although there are plausible alternative interpretations. On the other hand, several estimates suggest that economic strength does not induce marriage. Since there also has been no deterioration of young adults' economic situation in Norway, except for the delay of economic independence owing to longer college enrolment, one can hardly claim that lack of affordability is a dominating force behind the massive drift away from marriage. The analysis is anchored in a theoretical framework that may prove useful in other studies of cohabitation as an alternative to marriage.     

American families: trends and correlates

Discussion focused on the nature of the roles of the family, a review of the major demographic changes (marriage, cohabitation, nonfamily households, remarriage, fertility, teenage pregnancy, and female employment) affecting the American family in the past decades, and the nature of the impact on women, men, and children. There were four major trends identified: 1) increased proportions of children living in single-parent families due to high rates of divorce and increased childbearing outside of marriage; 2) increased proportions of adults in nontraditional living arrangements; 3) increased female labor force participation during all stages of the life cycle; and 4) decreased proportions of children and increased proportions of older people out of total population due to declining mortality and fertility rates. Family formation arises out of childbearing and childrearing roles, the need for companionship and emotional support, and the opportunities for specialization and trade, and the economies of scale. The costs of family living may include the potential for disagreement, conflict, loss of privacy, and time and money. There were a number of reasons identified for not maintaining traditional families consisting of a married couple with children. The trends were for later age at marriage: 24.4 years in 1992 for women, increased cohabitation (almost 50% cohabiting prior to first marriage in 1985-86), decreased number of married couple households, and increased number of adults in non-family households. The divorce rate has risen over the past 100 years with peaks in the 1970s; the reasons were identified as increased baby boomers and new marriages, increased labor participation of women, and changes in gender roles. The stabilization and slight decline in rates may be due to a natural leveling, the likelihood of greater stability within new marriages, and the aging of the baby boomers. An anticipated increase in divorce rates in the future was also justified. Remarriage rates varied by gender, age at separation/divorce, presence of children, race/ethnicity, and education. Fertility remained stable at 1.8 during the late 1970s and early 1980s and increased slightly to 2.0 in 1989. IN 1990, there were 25% out-of-wedlock births compared to 5% in 1960. About 12% of births in 1989 were to teenagers. There has been an increase in female-headed households, the median income of which in 1992 was $13,012, or 33% of married couple income.     

Social Change and the Relationships Between Education and Employment

The relationships between education and employment have long been of interest to social scientists. During the transition from a completely agricultural economy to one that is developing nonfarm opportunities, however, the relationships between education and employment may dramatically change. We examine how two components of education—schooling enrollment and attainment—affect the transition to employment for men and women in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal. Using discrete-time event history models, we find that school enrollment tends to delay employment, while school attainment accelerates employment. We also test how these effects may have changed across successive cohorts. Over time, the effects of enrollment have become stronger, while the effects of attainment appear to have weakened. These shifts in the nature of education may be related to increasing conflict between student and employee roles, as well as changes in the types and availability of employment.     

Masculinity,Money, and the Postponement of Parenthood in Nigeria

In southeastern Nigeria, several interconnected processes of social change are combining to delay parenthood. Most of the demographic and social sciences literature examining the postponement of parenthood has paid primary attention to women. To address this gap, this article foregrounds the changing social landscape of masculinity as a significant context within which to situate these demographic changes. At the core of Nigerian men's perceptions, decisions, and behaviors with regard to delaying fatherhood is a fundamental contradiction, one that seems to be common in many settings—at least many African settings—of contemporary demographic transition. The contradiction is that while the postponement of parenthood is associated historically with positive social and economic indicators, when Nigerian men articulate their rationales for delaying fatherhood (and marriage) they commonly describe feelings of uncertainty connected to a sense of struggle and deprivation. This article connects men's anxieties about—and delays embarking on—marriage and parenthood to their experiences of economic uncertainty, and specifically to the perceived need for money as the foundation for successful reproduction.     

Early teen marriage and future poverty

Both early teen marriage and dropping out of high school have historically been associated with a variety of negative outcomes, including higher poverty rates throughout life. Are these negative outcomes due to preexisting differences, or do they represent the causal effect of marriage and schooling choices? To better understand the true personal and societal consequences, in this article, I use an instrumental variables (IV) approach that takes advantage of variation in state laws regulating the age at which individuals are allowed to marry, drop out of school, and begin work. The baseline IV estimate indicates that a woman who marries young is 31 percentage points more likely to live in poverty when she is older. Similarly, a woman who drops out of school is 11 percentage points more likely to be poor. The results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications and estimation methods, including limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation and a control function approach. While grouped ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for the early teen marriage variable are also large, OLS estimates based on individual-level data are small, consistent with a large amount of measurement error.Historically, individuals were allowed to enter into a marriage contract at a very young age. In Ancient Rome, the appropriate minimum age was regarded as 14 for males and 12 for females. When Rome became Christianized, these age minimums were adopted into the ecclesiastical law of the Catholic Church. This canon law governed most marriages in Western Europe until the Reformation. When England broke away from the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church carried with it the same minimum age requirements for the prospective bride and groom. The minimum age requirements of 12 and 14 were eventually written into English civil law. By default, these provisions became the minimum marriage ages in colonial America. These common laws inherited from the British remained in force in America unless a specific state law was enacted to replace them (see “Marriage Law,” Encyclopædia Britannica 2005; http://www.britannica.com).While Roman, Catholic, English, and early American law may have allowed marriage at 12 for girls and 14 for boys, many questioned the advisability of such early unions. Researchers and policymakers around the turn of the twentieth century recognized that teens may be especially ill-prepared to assume the familial responsibilities and financial pressures associated with marriage.¹ As a result of the changing economic and social landscape of the United States, in the latter part of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century, individual states began to slowly raise the minimum legal age at which individuals were allowed to marry. In the United States, as in most developed countries, age restrictions have been revised upward so that they are now between 15 and 21 years of age.During this same time period, dramatic changes were also occurring in the educational system of the United States (see Goldin 1998, 1999; Goldin and Katz 1997, 2003; Lleras-Muney 2002). Free public schooling at the elementary level spread across the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century, and free secondary schooling proliferated in the early part of the twentieth century. As secondary schooling became more commonplace, states began to pass compulsory schooling laws. States often also passed child labor laws that stipulated minimum age or schooling requirements before a work permit would be granted. These state-specific compulsory schooling and child labor laws are correlated with the legal restrictions on marriage age, indicating that it might be important to consider the impact of all the laws simultaneously.There are at least two rationales often given for the use of state laws as policy instruments to limit teenagers’ choices. The first argument is that teens do not accurately compare short-run benefits versus long-run costs. If teens are making myopic decisions, restrictive state laws could prevent decisions they will later regret. It is also argued that the adverse effects associated with teenagers’ choices impose external costs on the rest of society. If these effects can be prevented, external costs (such as higher welfare expenditures) would also argue for restrictive state laws. Both teenage marriage and dropping out of high school are closely associated with a variety of negative outcomes, including poverty later in life. To assess the relevance of either argument, however, it is important to know whether the observed effects are causal.Any observed negative effects may be due to preexisting differences rather than a causal relationship between teen marriage (or schooling choices) and adverse adult outcomes. Women who marry as teens or drop out of school may come from more disadvantaged backgrounds or possess other unobserved characteristics that would naturally lead to worse outcomes. For example, teens choosing to marry young might have lower unobserved earnings ability, making it hard to draw conclusions about the causal relationship between teenage marriage and poverty.To identify the effect of a teenager’s marriage and schooling choices on future poverty, I use state-specific marriage, schooling, and child labor laws as instruments. Variation in these laws across states and over time can be used to identify the causal impact that teen marriage and high school completion have on future economic well-being. Although compulsory schooling laws have been used as instruments in a variety of settings, this appears to be the first time marriage laws have been used as instruments. The idea of the marriage law instrument is that states with restrictive marriage laws will prevent some teenagers from marrying who would have married young had they lived in a state with more permissive laws.Using the marriage, schooling, and labor laws affecting teens as instruments for early marriage and high school completion, I find strong negative effects for both variables on future poverty status. The baseline instrumental variables (IV) estimates imply that a woman who marries young is 31 percentage points more likely to live in poverty when she is older. Similarly, a woman who drops out of school is 11 percentage points more likely to be living in a family whose income is below the poverty line. The IV results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications and estimation methods, including limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation and a control function approach. In comparison, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are very sensitive to how the data is aggregated, particularly for the early marriage variable. OLS estimates using grouped data are also large, while OLS estimates using individual-level data indicate a small effect for early teen marriage. Auxiliary data indicate a large amount of measurement error in the early marriage variable, suggesting the presence of attenuation bias in the individual-level OLS estimates.The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. I first briefly review the negative outcomes associated with teenage marriage and dropping out of school and discuss alternative perspectives on why teens might make these decisions. The following section describes the data and presents OLS estimates. The next section discusses the early marriage, compulsory schooling, and child labor laws that will be used as instruments. I then present the instrumental variable estimates and conduct several specification and robustness checks, including a discussion of measurement error issues and a reconciliation with the literature on teenage childbearing.     

Change and Continuity in the Formation of First Marital Unions in Australia

Marriage rates have now been falling in all Western countries for more than 20 years. Rising levels of women's education and employment, extra-marital cohabitation, and separation and divorce both preceded, and continue to accompany, this trend. We apply hazards models to a data-set rich in event-history information in order to study the links between these movements at the level of the individual in Australia. Contra the New Home Economists it transpires that longer education lowers women's propensity to marry, not by providing them with alternative careers to marriage, but by delaying their entry into the marriage market. Again, contra the New Home Economists, employment actually increases women's marriage probabilities. Cohabitation serves variously as an alternative and a prelude to formal marriage. Finally, in contrast with a study of marriage dissolution in Australia, the strengths of factors that variously inhibit or promote marriage, such as women's education and employment, have neither weakened nor strengthened during the recent past.     

Female Employment and Divorce: Taking Into Account a Social Multiplier

A model of interactions of marriage and labor markets, taking into account a feedback process from aggregate divorce rates on individuals' decisions, explains why small changes in men's attitudes towards sharing the breadwinner role with their wives may change female labor force participation rates and divorce rates considerably.     

Impact of Tuition-Free Education Policy on Child Marriage and Early Childbearing: Does Secondary Matter More?

Child marriage and early childbearing severely impact maternal and child health as well as long-term economic outcomes. Given their continued high incidence, analyzing the feasibility of effective national interventions remains crucial. While cross-sectional surveys and a few small-scale randomized experiments suggest delays in marriage and childbearing associated with secondary schooling, the impact of policies that advance secondary school at a national scale is largely unknown. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we examine whether making secondary school tuition-free delayed marriage and childbearing. We use a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits the natural variation in the timing of policy rollout in five sub-Saharan African countries. Using the Demographic and Health Surveys, we estimate the impact of the policy change by comparing changes in outcomes over the study period between girls who were exposed to the policy to those who were not. We find that tuition-free secondary reduced the probability of marriage and childbearing before 15 and 18 years of age. We observed significantly larger effects associated with tuition-free secondary over tuition-free primary for all outcomes. Our findings show it is important to support tuition-free secondary education as a policy instrument to delay marriage and childbirth, especially given current high rates and their long-term health and economic consequences.     

High Fertility and Children's Schooling in Ghana: Sex Differences in Parental Contributions and Educational Outcomes

This paper explores the linkages at the family level between sustained high fertility and children's schooling in Ghana, in the context of a constrained economic environment and rising school fees. The unique feature of the paper is its exploration of the operational significance of alternative definitions of “sib size” – the number of “same-mother” siblings and “same-father” siblings – in relation to enrolment, grade attainment, and school drop-out for boys and girls of primary and secondary school age. The analysis is based on the first wave of the Ghana Living Standards Measurement Survey (GLSS) data, collected in 1987–88. The results of the statistical analysis lead to the conclusion that the co-existence of high fertility, rising school costs, and economic reversals is having a negative impact on the education of girls, in terms of drop-out rates and grade attainment. Some of the costs of high fertility are borne by older siblings (particularly girls) rather than by parents, with the result that children from larger families experience greater inequality between themselves and their siblings by sex and birth order. Because fathers have more children on average than mothers, the inequality between their children appears to be even greater than between mothers' children, particularly given the importance of fathers' role in the payment of school fees. The paper concludes that the greatest cost for children in Ghana of sustained high fertility is likely to be the reinforcement of traditional sex roles, largely a product of high fertility in the past.     

Social inequality of reading literacy: A longitudinal analysis with cross-sectional data of PIRLS 2001 and PISA 2000 utilizing the pair wise matching procedure

In accordance to Boudon's structural-individualistic action model, it is the aim of this paper to investigate the casual effects of individual abilities, resources of the parental home, socially selective educational transitions as well as teaching and learning conditions in schools on the development of reading literacy and its dispersion in respect of social origin. It is assumed that the socially selective transition into the secondary school tracks contributes to the general deterioration of the mean reading literacy when controlling for social origin and individual achievement. The socially selective transition from primary to secondary school contributes to the increase of social inequality of reading literacy existing already since the start of the pupils’ schooling. Since it is not possible to isolate these causes with comparative-static cross-sectional data like PIRLS or PISA empirically, we use a design of generating quasi-longitudinal data with three time references, namely reading literacy at the point of enrolment into elementary school, at the age of 9–10 years, and at the age of 15 years by the pair wise matching of “synthetic twins” with identical status criteria. The empirical analysis of the German data of PISA 2000 and PIRLS 2001 confirm the effects of the individual abilities depending on social origin, the social selectivity of transition into the secondary schools, the sorting and selection performances of the school system, the allocation of children into different learning contexts, and the schooling of both the individual development of reading competences and the social inequality of reading literacy.     

The Gendered Double Standard of Aging in US Marriage Markets

Using data on marriages collected in most US states between 1970 and 1988, we show that the older men are when they marry, the more years senior to their brides they are, whether it is a first or higher‐order marriage. While older men with more education marry down in age slightly more than less educated older men, the pattern of men marrying further down if they marry later holds strongly for all education groups. We consider several possible explanations for the tendency of men to marry further down in age if they are older at marriage. While we have no direct measure of physical attractiveness, we argue that the most compelling interpretation is that men, more than women, evaluate potential spouses on the basis of appearance. Because the prevailing standard of beauty favors young women, the older men are when they marry, the less they find women their own age attractive relative to younger women, leading them to marry further down in age if they are older at marriage. The consequence for women of men's preference for youth is more often that they remain unmarried than that they end up married to much older or less educated men.     

Land Use and Marriage Timing in Nepal

I examine the relationship between patterns of land use and marriage timing in the Chitwan Valley, a rural area in south-central Nepal. In this setting, I conceptualize a relevant dimension of land use as the portion of land in each neighborhood devoted to agriculture. Using discrete-time event history models, I examine the relationship between the proportion of land devoted to agriculture and the rate of marriage among 811 never-married individuals aged 15–20 years. Agricultural land has a positive association with marriage rates. As potential intervening mechanisms between agricultural land and marriage rates, I propose nonfamily organizations, school and work activities, and local marriage markets. A portion of the relationship between land and marriage rates appears to be mediated through the accessibility of nonfamily employers. Respondents’ actual employment activities, however, fail to mediate the effects of agricultural land or nonfamily employers. The precise mechanisms linking land use to marriage remain unclear.