Income and reproductive motivation

Abstract It is often assumed that family size and income would be positively related if unwanted births among the less advantaged were prevented. But this assumption rests on a prior expectation that family-size preferences bear a direct relation to income in modern societies. Data on such reproductive preferences in relation to economic status from 13 studies in the United States dating between 1936 and 1966 do not support the notion of a positive association between reproductive preferences and income. Only when Catholics are considered is there even a U-shaped relation between family-size desires and income. These results cast doubt on the notion that the economic theory of demand for consumer durables is relevant to reproductive motivation. Rather, the data lend credence to the idea that significant non-economic influences associated with prosperity depress family-size desires among the well-to-do. Only if these influences are specifically weakened by a counter-force (such as Catholicism) do wealthier people show a preference for somewhat larger families. In no case, however, are the Catholic/non-Catholic differences in reproductive preference large. Moreover, no economic group, even among non-Catholics, prefers very small families.     

The prediction of completed fertility

There has been considerable interest in the relation between familysize desires and completed fertility. Longitudinal data from the Princeton Fertility Study provide a unique opportunity to compare the number of children desired after the birth of a second child to the size of completed families. The average number of children desired by women after the birth of their second child predicts very well the average size of their completed families. The average family size desired at the first interview and average estimated completed family size some eight years later are identical for the total sample, and vary hardly at all within religious or education subgroups. One-third of the variance in the completed fertility of couples is "explained" by wife's family-size desires and the proportion of explained variance increases to two-fifths when we include the husband's first interview desires and the interval between marriage and second birth. Yet in spite of the relatively high correlation between desires and achievement, only 41 percent of these women achieved exactly the number of children they desired at the first interview, while 14 percent had two children more or fewer than originally desired. Nevertheless, data on contraceptive efficiency indicate that desires after the birth of the second child constitute meaningful goals in terms of which the respondents regulate their subsequent behavior-efficacy of contraceptive practice shows substantial improvement after the desired number has been achieved.     

Family composition preferences in a developing culture: The case of Taiwan, 1973

Abstract As fertility comes increasingly under voluntary control in a developing society, it can be argued that individual desires or preferences about children will become more salient and more significant for eventual fertility. Hence, the study of preferences is increasingly important as contraceptive use is extended and results in decreasing the number of unwanted births.(1) Further changes in fertility then depend on changes in preferences. The assumption is that people will at least try to achieve the families they want, if the means to do so are available. The fact that contraception is used at all is some evidence of the soundness of this assumption, although it should be recognized that family size desires operate in a complex of preferences, under varying degrees of conflict and control. To expect a one-to-one relationship between attitudes or preferences and overt behaviour would be simplistic.     

Women's preferences for children in Shifang County,Sichuan, China

Fertility preference being related to government policy in China, women generally understate their desired family size when questioned directly. A binomial probit model is, therefore, presented to estimate the probability that family-size preferences in Shifang County, Sichuan, China, are understated. The model provides estimates on the percentage of respondent understatement along with the number of children, women of different ages and social characteristics truly desire. Women's preferences for sons versus daughters are also examined. The study found that women desire on average 1/2 more children than that which they state. Understating was in greatest evidence among urban, educated, and younger women more sensitive to the government's 1-child policy. Preference for sons was found to be weaker than expected, yet strong nonetheless in rural areas among women desiring only 1 child. Sons are considered to cause more worry for parents in China due to an aggressive, risk-taking nature. Possible explanations for the decline of son preference include increasing familial costs for sons' betrothment and marriage, changing household structures, and increasing status of and job opportunities for women in Chinese society. In closing, the paper highlights that couples restrict marital fertility out of interest for national prosperity and the welfare of future generations, not personal preference for small families. Were government policy to relax, fertility would rise to preferred levels.     

一孩与二孩家庭育龄妇女生育意愿比较

基于江苏苏南某农村790户家庭的抽样调查数据,比较一孩与二孩家庭育龄妇女的生育意愿,并运用回归模型对影响两类家庭育龄妇女生育意愿的因素进行研究。结果显示,两类家庭育龄妇女的意愿生育数量、意愿生育性别和意愿生育间隔没有显著差异,仅在对"女性生育的最大年龄"的认识上二孩妇女明显低于一孩妇女。但两类家庭育龄妇女在生育意愿的影响因素上存在着较大的差异。     

Husbands,wives, sons,and daughters: Fertility preferences and the demand for contraception in Ethiopia

Ethiopia, with nearly 65 millionpeople, is the second most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa. Fertility levels are among the highest in the world. Using the matched wife-husband sample from the 1990 National Family and Fertility Survey of Ethiopia we investigate the fertility desires of wives and husbands and the degree to which they are similar, including whether a preference for sons exists. We model the determinants of the desire to limit or space births, and estimate unmet need. Results indicate high levels of concurrence among husbands and wives on reproductive preferences. Where differences exist, husbands are more pronatalist than their wives. Both husbands and wives prefer to have sons and daughters, but more sons overall. Approximately 22% of wives and husbands desire to limit or space births but do not use contraception. More than half of wives and husbands with an unmet need for limiting are paired with a partner who has no such need. Three implications follow from these results: (1) differences in wives' and husbands' son and daughter preferences may help to explain discordant views among couples when it comes to the desire to limit or space births; (2) husbands' overall contribution to wives' unmet need can be substantial in African societies in the early stages of fertility transition; and (3) wives' preferences regarding children and contraception can result in unmet need on the part of husbands, even in highly gender-stratified societies where men are more pronatalist.     

The influence of wives’ and husbands’ fertility preferences on progression to a third birth in Nepal, 1997–2009

As couples across the globe increasingly exercise conscious control over their reproduction, both spouses’ family-size preferences have the opportunity to influence their fertility. Using couple-level measures of rural Nepalese spouses’ family-size preferences and more than a decade of monthly panel data collected subsequently on fertility outcomes, we investigate how both spouses’ preferences influence progression to a third birth in a country where the widely professed ideal family size is two children. Contrary to expectations based on women's relative disadvantage, we find that it is wives’ preferences that drive couples’ progression to a third birth. We find also that the influence of wives’ preferences is not explained by contraceptive use but that this influence is moderated by couple communication about family planning. Wives’ preferences drive progression to a third birth among couples who had discussed how many children to have.     

Some roots of preference: Roles,activities and familial values

This paper examines some of the connecting links between modernization in a developing society, particularly urbanization and increased education for women, and preferences for number of children. Using 1973 Taiwan data, preferences for smaller families are found to be consistently related to modern attitudes and behavior in the three domains examined: intrafamilial husband-wife role relationships, extrafamilial activities of the wife, and familial and religious values relating the family to the larger institutional setting. Modernization of these attitudes, behaviors, and values has an impact on reproductive goals independent of their association with structural variables. The wife's outside activities and exposure to modern influences through the mass media are especially important linkages, having a particularly strong mediating effect in the education effect on preferences. Intrafamilial relations appear to be of less importance. Modernization of familial and religious values mediates between urbanization and family size preferences. The measure of preference used is a scale value which has been found in other research to be more predictive of reproductive behavior than the conventional single-valued statement of number of children wanted. As the level of contraceptive use rises in developing societies, family size preferences increasingly become a factor in birth rates, and understanding the sources of change in these preferences takes on added importance. The policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

The influence of income on family fertility in the light of the results of empirical studies

Based on data from the 1973-83 Polish Family Budget Survey, this study examines the influence of income as a source of maintenance and income as a determinant of childbearing on family parity. It is assumed that income influences parity as a source of maintenance and as an influence on lifestyle or reproductive behavior. As a source of maintenance, the influence will be positive. As a life-style factor, it could be positive or negative. The hypotheses are 1) that positive influences are characteristics of older couples with a lower educational level and living in villages and small towns and income is a source of maintenance, and 2) a negative influence on parity reflects younger couples with higher educational levels from larger cities and income is a life-style factor. Some examples of how the theory of income influences total fertility are given in addition to a further elaboration of the theory. Other concepts introduced, as related to childbearing, are the value of goods and services with unchanged preferences and an increase in income, with preferences changing with income increases, with income preferences for nonprocreational and for procreational needs, and income as a factor influencing procreational needs and behavior. Correlation analysis is conducted for 33 subpopulations based on duration of marriage, educational level of the household, and size of residence. The results indicate that, in years 1973, 1975, and 1978 when income and parity are significant, the sign is positive. In 1980, there was a decrease in the number of subpopulations with a significant relationship, and in 3 subpopulations the results were negative. The 13 positive subpopulations were similar to those in the 1970s. In 1983, income explained an even smaller amount of parity. The subpopulations with a postive relationship usually have longer marriage durations, which suggest income as a source of maintenance. Negative results were among subpopulations with shorter marriage durations, which suggests life-style factor effects of income.     

Conflicting Preferences: A Reason Fertility Tends to Be Too High or Too Low

Fertility has often seemed to be too high or too low, relative not only to social and economic goals, but also to reproductive preferences. In developing countries actual fertility has often been higher than desired family size, while in developed societies fertility tends to be below replacement level even though people generally say that they want at least two children. In explanations of fertility extremes, or of the discrepancies between desired and actual fertility, the effect of partners' holding different preferences has tended to be overlooked. Individual preferences expected to lead to replacement‐level reproduction may in combination generate substantially higher or lower fertility. In explaining such outcomes, a crucial question is what happens when spousal preferences diverge. Given that personal practices or social norms may systematically favor high or low preferences in the event of disagreement, chance alone will ensure that desired and actual fertility do not coincide.     

Why is Housing Always Satisfactory? A Study into the Impact of Preference and Experience on Housing Appreciation

This study focuses on residents’ perceptions of residential quality concerning 23 different dwelling aspects. Respondents were asked to indicate their appreciation of these dwelling aspects on a scale ranging from 0 (“extremely unattractive”) to 100 (“extremely attractive”). The influence of two potential factors on the appreciation of dwelling aspects is examined: (1) preference and (2) experience. It was hypothesized that residents who live according to their preferences give higher appreciation scores than residents who do not. This should even apply to low-quality housing. Furthermore, it was argued that residents appreciate their current housing situation more than residents who do not live in that particular housing situation. This effect should be independent of preference. The impact of both preference and of experience could be confirmed. The results also showed an interaction effect between preference and experience: the positive effect of experience on appreciation is larger in residents who live in a housing situation that they do not prefer. This result would be expected if the impact of experience works to decrease the ‘gap’ in residential satisfaction due to the discrepancy between what residents have and what they want. In conclusion, why is housing always satisfactory? In this paper, housing is satisfactory because the ‘gap’ between what residents want and what they have is small; residents seem to have realistic aspirations. Furthermore, residents appreciate what they already have, even if this is not what they prefer.     

Income,deprivation and economic stress in the enlarged European Union

At risk of poverty indicators based on relative income measures suggest that within the enlarged EU societies located at quite different points on a continuum of affluence have similar levels of poverty. Substantial differences in levels of income between societies do not in themselves invalidate this approach. However, the relative income approach fails to capture the fact that, if countries are grouped in terms of level of GDP, between economic cluster differences in life-style deprivation are sharper at lower income levels. Support for the argument relating to restricted reference groups is found in relation to the contrast between the twelve most affluent EU countries and all others. The limitations of relative income poverty lines have little to do with the process of enlargement as such. Instead the major problem involves the weak association between income and deprivation in the more affluent countries. However, as a consequence of such difficulties, such indicators do not provide entirely meaningful comparisons of levels of disadvantage across economic clusters. The current analysis, rather than supporting the alternative of a focus on absolute income or an EU wide poverty line, suggests that we should take the argument for adopting a multidimensional approach to the measurement of poverty more seriously.     

Residential preferences and population redistribution: 1972–1988

In seeking to explain recent trends in population distribution, there has been increased interest in residential preferences. This study is a comparison of preferences based on 1972 and 1988 national surveys, years that bracket a period of considerable change in distribution patterns. Over time there has been a small shift in preference toward cities less than 500,000 in size, primarily by those already living there. Rural settings, especially near cities, continue to be very attractive. At both times studied, more than half of those preferring a smaller or more remote place would retain this preference even if it meant 10% less income. Nevertheless, the proportion preferring to live more than 30 miles from a large city was unchanged and approximately equal to the proportion already living there at both times, indicating that a discrepancy between where people live and where they want to live is not an important basis for the upturn in nonmetropolitan growth away from large cities in the 1970s or the downturn in the 1980s.     

性别偏好如何影响家庭生育数量?——来自中国城市家庭的实证研究

家庭生育数量会受到性别偏好的影响,但影响方向和作用机制还未达成共识。文章利用全国城市青年调查数据,对性别偏好和家庭生育数量之间的关系进行实证研究。结果表明,性别偏好并不等同于男孩偏好,其内容呈现出多元化特点;无性别偏好在城市已婚已育青年中所占比重最高。不同性别偏好对家庭生育数量的作用方向和强度有所差异:性别数量双偏好会显著提升家庭生育数量;与无性别偏好相比较,单性别偏好也会提升家庭生育数量,但女孩偏好对家庭生育数量的提升作用更强也更显著。     

Gendering family composition: Sex preferences for children and childbearing behavior in the Nordic countries

It has been argued that a society's gender system may influence parents' sex preferences for children. If this is true, one should expect to find no evidence of such preferences in countries with a high level of gender equality. In this article, we exploit data from population registers from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden to examine continuities and changes in parental sex preferences in the Nordic countries during the past three to four decades. First, we do not observe an effect of the sex of the first born child on second-birth risks. Second, we detect a distinct preference for at least one child of each sex among parents of two children. For third births, Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish parents seem to develop a preference for having a daughter, while Finns exhibit a significant preference for having a son. These findings show that modernization and more equal opportunities for women and men do not necessarily lead to parental gender indifference. On the contrary, they may even result in new sex preferences.     

Costs and benefits of children: implications for population policy

Family size preferences are strongly affected by parents' perceptions of the value, economic contributions, and costs of children. Better understanding of these factors can help policy-makers to improve the effectiveness of population IEC campaigns, design strategies to persuade couples to have smaller families, assess the relationship between economic development and family size preferences, and devise national population policies and family planning programs that reflect individual choices. Parents in high-fertility countries are more likely to perceive children as productive investments than those in low-fertility countries. Parents in the former countries maintain children are an economic advantage or provide practical assistance in the household; they are less likely to emphasize the psychological advantages of children. As economic development occurs, and parents no longer value children for their economic contributions, psychological and social reasons become more important. Changing fertility preferences is more complex than providing couples with family planning services. Similarly, efforts to persuade families that large families are a burden are successful only when families are already interested in reducing their family size. Efforts to persuade couples to have smaller families are likely to be more successful if there are alternative sources of old-age support available, for example, from increased household savings, public or private pensions, or greater contributions from 1st and 2nd children. Investments in education and training, especially for women and children, would also support these goals.     

医疗保险对农村居民家庭消费的影响分析--基于不同收入层级的跨地区比较

利用2009、2010农村固定观察点数据,分析了医疗保险对不同地区、不同收入层级的农村居民家庭医疗消费支出和非医疗消费支出的影响。实证结果表明：医疗保险对农村居民家庭的医疗类消费不存在显著影响,对非医疗类消费支出则存在显著的正向促进作用。分地区来看,医疗保险对东西部地区农村居民家庭医疗类消费的影响差异显著,对东中部地区农村居民家庭非医疗类消费支出的影响同样差异显著;分收入层级来看,医疗保险对家庭医疗类消费的影响在不同收入层级的农村居民家庭之间不存在显著差异,但对非医疗类消费支出的影响在不同收入层级之间差异显著。此外,商业医疗保险作为医疗保险体系的重要组成部分,对促进农村消费起到带动作用。最后,本文从加大政府补贴和完善保障机制两个方面提出政策建议以期有效降低农村居民家庭超常的预防性储蓄,促进农村居民家庭消费。     

External Shocks,Household Consumption and Fertility in Indonesia

This paper examines the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks on household consumption, educational expenditure and fertility in Indonesia, and assesses whether the investment in human capital of children and fertility are used to smooth household consumption. Using four different kinds of self-reported economic hardships, our findings indicate that coping mechanisms are rather efficient for Indonesian households that perceive an economic hardship. Only in case of unemployment do we find a significant decrease in consumption spending and educational expenditure while fertility increases. These results indicate that households that perceive an unemployment shock use children as a means for smoothing consumption. Regarding the death of a household member or natural disaster we find that consumption per person even increases. These results are consistent with the argument that coping mechanisms even over-compensate the actual consumption loss due to an economic hardship. One important lesson from our findings is that different types of income shock may lead to different economic and demographic behavioral adjustments and therefore require specific targeted social insurance programs.     

A Darwinian Account of the Fertility Opportunity Hypothesis

Reproduction is asine qua non for the continuance of any gene pool. Therefore, it would be strange if natural selectionfailed to act on reproductive patterns, even among humans where the most characteristic adaptations are cognitive and culturally-mediated. In fact, the regularity of human fertility rate responses to variation in the opportunity structure has been documented in many contexts. Humans appear to be alert to environmental signs that indicate whether conditions for childbearing and nurture are more or less optimal, given the possiblities. Specifically, a perception that economic opportunity is expanding, so that relatively many children could probably be successfully raised to maturity, is associated with early marriage and larger family size.     

Economic Migration and Happiness: Comparing Immigrants’ and Natives’ Happiness Gains From Income

Research on happiness casts doubt on the notion that increases in income generally bring greater happiness. This finding can be taken to imply that economic migration might fail to result in increased happiness for the migrants: migration as a means of increasing one’s income might be no more effective in raising happiness than other means of increasing one’s income. This implication is counterintuitive: it suggests that migrants are mistaken in believing that economic migration is a path to improving one’s well-being, at least to the extent that well-being means (or includes) happiness. This paper considers a scenario in which it is less likely that migrants are simply mistaken in this regard. The finding that increased incomes do not lead to greater happiness is an average (non)effect—and migrants might be exceptional in this regard, gaining happiness from increased incomes to a greater extent than most people. The analysis here, using data from the World Values Survey, finds that the association between income and happiness is indeed stronger for immigrants in the USA than for natives—but even for immigrants that association is still relatively weak. The discussion then considers this finding in light of the fact that immigrants also report lower levels of happiness than natives after controlling for other variables.