Adam Smith on population

Abstract Adam Smith dealt with questions of population mainly in his Wealth of Nations. His discussion falls roughly under five heads and reflects in considerable measure his image of the English economy. (1) A country's population capacity, given the average level of consumption, was conditioned by the stock of land, the skill with which it was cultivated, and the degree to which division of labour could be increased and thereby augment output for domestic use and sale in external markets. (2) Growth of population was essentially in response to growth of the demand for labour and served to increase division of labour. (3) The social mechanisms underlying elevation of the scale of living are touched upon, and in an optimistic spirit. (4) The distribution of a country's population responded to its progress in opulence, with the rate of this progress conditioned by the degree to which inappropriate (e.g. mercantilist) policies were avoided. (5) Smith dealt briefly with such matters as colonies, education, size of economy, environmental influences, and public policy, all of which he recognized as significant for the quantity and quality of a country's numbers.     

Junior partners: Women's contribution to family income in Canada

This research examines the degree of financial contribution of married women to their overall family income. This phenomenon is analyzed from the point of view of sex-role/human capital orientations. The sex-role position argues that regardless of women's social, economic and education background their financial input to household economy will always be less than fifty percent because women's financial opportunities are impeded by sex-role configurations and expectations. The human capital thesis explains women's apparent inability to contribute more than half of the family income as a function of their lower human capital; that is, education, professionalization and training in the labour market. Individual data pertaining to thirty-year old married women, taken from the 1981 Canadian census, are examined. Generally, we find support for the positions: Women with relatively high human capital assmulation contribute significantly to overall household income, but invariably that contribution is less than 50 percent of total family income. On average, all women contribute 22 percent of their families annual income, while working women provide approximately 33 percent of the total. This analysis demonstrates what appears to be a pervasive phenomenon in industrial nations: married women are generally junior economic partners within the family. The extent of junior partnerships, however, is somewhat conditioned by women's human capital resources.     

Cultural Diversity and Population Policy in Nigeria

Nigeria's ambitious population policy, adopted in 1988, had its origins in the international population and development thinking of the time, set out in documents such as the World Population Plan of Action and the Kilimanjaro Programme of Action. The policy has had at most a modest effect in curbing the country's high fertility. This failure, it is argued, stems from the policy's implicit assumption of a single, monolithic cultural reality and its disregard of male reproductive motivation. Belief systems in Nigeria are extraordinarily diverse in detail but share a common interest in the fertility of crops, livestock, and people. Patterns of social organization are similarly varied. For an effective population policy, the government needs to find ways of incorporating distinct elements of the cultures of the different ethnic groups, leveraging rather than suppressing the country's cultural diversity.     

Alfred Marshall on the Growth of Population

Classical views of population, as expounded in the works of Smith, Malthus, and Mill, retained their influence through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth—until sidelined, many would argue, by the marginalist revolution in economics. Oddly, Alfred Marshall (1842–1924), the major figure in that revolution, was, when it came to population, himself firmly in the classical tradition. He diverged from it in two main respects. Writing in the late nineteenth century he had of course to take account of Darwinian theory, with the potential implications it suggested for differential fertility. And, deriving from his interests in industrial organization and efficiency and in biological analogies in economics, he gave greater attention than his forebears to the possibility that returns to labor could routinely be increasing as well as diminishing. Marshall, the preeminent economist of his time, was for most of his career professor of political economy at the University of Cambridge. His major work, Principles of Economics, was first published in 1890, and then in a series of revised editions over the rest of his life. The final—8th—edition appeared in 1920. (A “ninth” variorum edition was issued in 1961.) The Principles has been described, by G. J. Stigler, as the second greatest work in the history of economics. The contributions to theory and method warranting such praise, however, are chiefly in the later parts of the volume. Up to and including Book IV (The Agents of Production: Land, Labour, Capital and Organization), the reader is given the impression, according to Keynes, of “perusing a clear, apt and humane exposition of fairly obvious matters.” Certainly in comparison to the rest, these early sections were left fairly intact in their 1890 form over subsequent editions. But Keynes also remarks, in his lengthy obituary of Marshall, how deceptive that surface smoothness could be—and notes that Marshall “had a characteristic habit in all his writings of reserving for footnotes what was most novel or important in what he had to say.” The excerpts below are taken from Book IV, Chapters IV (§§1–2, 4–5) and XIII (§3), of the 1890 edition of the Principles. In the first, Marshall presents a brief, selective history of population doctrines up to Malthus, and then the doctrine “in its modern form”; in the second, from the concluding chapter of Book IV, he explores the applicability of the law of increasing returns—stated, earlier in the chapter, as: “An increase of labour and capital leads generally to improved organization, which increases the efficiency of the work of labour and capital.”     

Alvin Hansen on Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth

The driving forces of economic growth, according to the mainstream of classical economic thinking, are threefold: technological innovations, the opening up of new territories and discovery of new resources, and increase in population. In interaction, in an entrepreneurial market economy, these forces generate growth not only in the aggregate but also per capita. Evidence of their power was seen in the long stretch of rising living standards in the West over the nineteenth century, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle. However, the economic experience of the interwar years, and in particular the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggested that the forces were largely spent and hence that future economic prospects were gravely imperiled. The Keynesian revolution in economics was a response to the evident malfunctioning of the capitalist economic system, although the policy recipes it offered (for increasing demand and investment to levels capable of generating an equilibrium consistent with full employment of productive resources, especially labor) by no means commanded unanimity. The most prominent American contributor to and spokesman for the new line of economic analysis—often called “the American Keynes”—was Alvin H. Hansen (1887–1975), who took up his professorship of political economy at Harvard in 1937, just after the appearance of Keynes's General Theory. In that post, which he held until his retirement in 1956, he was one of the most influential economists of the era as a theorist, policy adviser, and teacher. Hansen interpreted the economic problems of the 1930s not just as the manifestation of a particularly sharp cyclical downturn, but as evidence of secular stagnation caused by the closing of the economic frontier, sluggishness in technological innovation, and, not least, “a drastic decline in population growth.” This “stagnation thesis” is most succinctly set out in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, delivered in Detroit, 28 December 1938, under the title Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth. The address is re‐produced below from the March 1939 issue of the American Economic Review. (The opening paragraphs of the address, and two paragraphs, immediately preceding the closing paragraph, in which Hansen discusses changes in US national income in the 1930s, have been omitted.) Hansen's analysis of the effects of declining population growth in many ways echoes the thesis set out by Keynes in his seminal Galton Lecture delivered to the Eugenics Society in 1937 (reprinted in the Archives section of PDR 4, no. 3): a demographic slowdown decreases opportunities for profitable investments and increases levels of attempted saving, hence pushes the economy toward a low‐growth equilibrium at which resources are underutilized and unemployment is high. Hansen puts special emphasis on demographically induced shifts in the composition of output. He suggests that, beyond its direct positive effect on investment and output, population growth also has an indirect enhancing effect on these factors by facilitating technological progress–contrary to the “older Malthusian view.” In his policy proposals Hansen was more interventionist than Keynes, advocating a more intrusive government role in the economy as a possible means of escaping the vicious cycle of low demand and high unemployment. As to government action to reverse demographic trends seen as deleterious, neither Keynes nor Hansen argued for policies to increase fertility, presumably because they saw them as both inappropriate and, in comparison to remedial economic policy measures, inefficient or unfeasible. The demands of the war economy in the years following Hansen's address took care of the employment problem, and the immediate postwar decades brought the stimuli of pent‐up consumer demand, an outpouring of technological innovations, a reopening of the economic frontier produced by a more liberal trade regime, and, also, an acceleration of population growth. The result was rapid overall economic growth and increasing levels of per capita income. Keynesian demand management played some role in this economic success story: by the end of the 1960s even US President Richard Nixon pronounced himself a Keynesian. But it offered no remedy for the stagflation that eventually followed. The growth‐promoting recipes favored in the last decades of the century (especially in the most successful developing economies) were anything but Keynesian: limited government, fiscal restraint, and globalization. Yet recent and anticipated demographic trends, especially in Europe—notably fertility decline and population aging—make Hansen, once again, interesting reading. Commitments of the modern welfare state for health care, retirement pensions, and job security command wide approval, but they have boosted governments' weight in the economy and made labor markets inflexible, unemployment high, and retirement early—developments that may increasingly impose a brake on economic growth and on improvements of living standards. Reform measures to ease these burdens are, in principle, straightforward, but their immediate social costs are heavy and their rewards are delayed, hence resistance to reform is strong and growing. This is likely to stimulate the search for alternative policies that offer politically more palatable tradeoffs—some of which may turn out to have an unmistakably Hansenian flavor. As to future population trends, Hansen, despite his reference to a “drastic decline in population growth” based on a comparison of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century Western demographic change, envisaged a convergence to a stationary population or a tendency toward very slow decrease. Yet some economies are already locked into a demographic pattern that augurs sharper declines and more rapid population aging, enhancing the relevance of the issues posed by Hansen. In Germany, for example, in the absence of immigration, the population between ages 20 and 40 will decline from 21.6 million in 2005 to 16.3 million in 2025—a drop of 23 percent. Over the same time period, the population aged 60 and older will grow from 20.5 million to 25.8 million—an increase of 26 percent. Serious efforts to slow population decline and retard population aging by stimulating fertility would of course add another major burden to government budgets.     

William Farr on the Economic Value of the Population

The modern theory of human capital came to prominence in economics only in recent decades, but its antecedents can be traced back to the earliest economic writings. The notion that human skills represent economic value comparable to that of capital was clearly articulated by the classical economists, notably by William Petty and Adam Smith. That improvement of skills and increase in the number of persons in whom skills are embodied are sources of economic progress follows from their conceptual clarification. Attempts to quantify the economic value of the population and assessment of the effect of mortality improvements and population growth were, however, later developments. Among the earliest contributions to such calculations, one by William Farr, published in 1877 and reprinted below, is particularly notable. Defining the economic value of a person as the discounted sum of expected future earnings, Farr arrives at a figure of £5,250 million (for 1876) “as an approximation to the value which is inherent in the people [of the United Kingdom], and may be fairly added to the capital in land, houses, cattle or stock, and other investments.” In addition to providing insightful commentary on the rationale and weaknesses of his calculations, he estimates the addition to that amount from population growth in the preceding four decades, discusses the impact of outmigration to the colonies and the United States during that time, and notes the dependence of the economic value of the population on the level of education, on the state of health of the population, and on people's longevity. William Farr (1807–1883) was perhaps the most influential British statistician of the nineteenth century. Although trained as a physician, in 1839 he accepted a post in the General Register Office and from 1842 to 1880 he served as Statistical Superintendent. During his long tenure he was the main force in the development and analysis of British vital statistics and in setting the foundations of modern epidemiology. He constructed the first British life table (based on deaths in 1841) and carried out a wide range of creative analyses of British mortality statistics, especially on mortality differentials, with an aim of promoting social reform. The most accessible route to his written output for modern readers is a posthumously published collection: Vital Statistics: A Memorial Volume of Selections from the Reports and Writings of William Parr (London: Offices of the Sanitary Institute, 1885). A reprint edition of this work was published under the auspices of the Library of the New York Academy of Medicine (Metuchen, N. J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1975). The passage reproduced below (pp. 59–64) is an excerpt from the Registrar‐General's 39th Annual Report (1877), titled The Economic Value of Population. The topic was earlier treated in Parr's paper “The income and property tax,” Quarterly Journal of the Statistical Society of London (March 1853), excerpted on pp. 531–550 of the book under the title Cost, and the Present and Future Economic Value of Man.     

Marshall on the population question. I

English economic thought was dominated for close to a half century by the system of economic analysis developed by Alfred Marshall (1842–1924) whose views relating to population are examined. The demographic and economic changes taking place within Marshall's lifetime are briefly summarised in the Introduction. There follows in Part I a review of the opinions of Marshall's predecessors and contemporaries respecting both the behaviour of the laws of returns, technical progress, etc., and the circumstances on which population growth had depended or was likely to depend. The optimum is included among the concepts here treated. Reactions to the late nineteenth-century decline in natality are noted. In Part II Marshall's treatment of the laws of returns and of capital formation, together with their significance for the population question, is examined. His treatment of technological and organisational change and of international trade as counterbalances to population growth is considered. His failure to make use of the optimum concept is remarked as is the theory of economic growth that appears to underly his analysis of demographic development.     

African urban life: Components of satisfaction in Sierra Leone

This comparative study finds relatively high satisfaction with the quality of life in three Sierra Leonean towns, but there are notable differences between men and women and between the towns in which domains support this satisfaction. The standard of living achieved, and the job and income which make it possible, are the most important factors in satisfaction with the quality of urban life, but the limits on women's mobility are indicated by the greater emphasis they place on housing and neighborhood. Dissatisfaction among the relatively advantaged, with their own position and with the country's progress in development, reflects the political disaffection of some members of this group.     

J. R. Hicks on the Economics of Population

Sir John Hicks (1904–89), professor of political economy at Oxford University from 1952 to 1965, was one of the foremost economists of his time, making notable contributions to the theory of wages, general equilibrium theory, and welfare economics. He received (jointly with Kenneth Arrow) the 1972 Nobel prize in economics. Value and Capital (1939), his best-known book, is held as a classic; his 1937 exegesis of Keynes's General Theory has long been a staple of undergraduate economics. Population does not figure appreciably in his writings, although an almost offhand footnote attached to the concluding paragraph of Value and Capital suggests that it could have: “[0]ne cannot repress the thought that perhaps the whole Industrial Revolution of the last two hundred years has been nothing else but a vast secular boom, largely induced by the unparalleled rise in population.” (He added: “If this is so, it would help to explain why, as the wisest hold, it has been such a disappointing episode in human history.”) In his late work, A Theory of Economic History (1969), however, the principal driving force in economic development is depicted as the expansion of markets. A sustained discussion of the topic of population by Hicks is contained in one of his earlier books. The Social Framework: An Introduction to Economics (Oxford University Press, 1942). Chapters 4 and 5 of this book treat “Population and Its History” and “The Economics of Population”; one of the appendixes is “On the Idea of an Optimum Population.” Chapter 5 and this appendix are reprinted below. The Social Framework was written as an introductory text, although its lucid style characterized all of Hicks's work. It covered both theory and applications with particular attention to the then novel subject of national accounting. Hicks described the book as “economic anatomy” in contrast to the “economic physiology” of how the economy works. Chapter 5 gives equal attention to under- and overpopulation, both seen as posing dangers. The Preface to the 1971 (fourth) edition of The Social Framework notes that the population and labor force chapters “have been rather substantially altered—to take account of the curious things that have happened in these fields (which one might have expected to be slow moving).” In 1971 he is more cautious than in 1942 about suggesting that slowing population growth might have been a factor in the 1930s depression, and readier to admit of countries where “a continuing rise in population, even while there is some continuing agricultural improvement, is likely to lead in the end to unemployment and destitution.” The appendix on optimum population was retained through all editions.     

James Mill on the Growth and Limitation of Population

The brief passages reproduced below from James Mill's 1821 work, Elements of Political Economy, present an early analysis of total and net fecundity, a discussion of the scope and limits of government influence on fertility, and a reflection on the goal of a stationary population. In his preface Mill describes the Elements as “a school‐book in political economy”—it was in fact based on the lessons he gave to his then barely teenaged son—and he disavows any claim to originality. Moreover, the chapter on wages, from which the excerpts come, has been generally disdained because of its espousal of the discredited wage‐fund theory of wage determination. But Mill's treatment of population is as fresh and stimulating as it is concise. James Mill (1773–1836) is now known more as the father of John Stuart Mill—and as the designer of the latter's famously rigorous education—than for his own writing. Born and educated in Scotland, Mill moved to England, making his living as a journalist. On the side, he was writing what became a three‐volume History of British India (1817), which led to long‐term employment in the London office of the East India Company. Mill's thinking on economics was strongly influenced by his friendship with David Ricardo and on public policy by Jeremy Bentham. The group of reformist thinkers that surrounded him, known as the philosophical radicals, were protégés in the main of Bentham. Mill, like others in this group, was a proponent of family planning, albeit far more cautious on the subject than the propagandist Francis Place. “Prudence,” which for Malthus meant only delay of marriage, Mill took equally to cover control of marital fertility: it should comprise measures “by which either marriages are sparingly contracted, or care is taken that children, beyond a certain number, shall not be the fruit.” In the last of the excerpts, offering an unapologetic vision of bourgeois leisure and affluence, he anticipates J. S. Mill's notable chapter on the stationary state (Book IV, Chapter 6) in the Principles of Political Economy (1848)—see the Archives item in PDR 12, no. 2. The text is reproduced from the 3rd edition of the Elements (London, 1826), this part of which is virtually the same as the first edition aside from some minor improvements in expression. The excerpts are from Chapter 2, Section 2, pp. 46–50, 57–59, and 63–66.     

The Shape of South African Society and its Challenges

South Africa's negotiated settlement and its transition to democracy reads like a modern fairy tale. A brief review of South Africa's social indicators serves to temper some of optimism about the country's future. The indicators reflect the society's quality of life which has been shaped by its turbulent history. Political “caste formation”, changing political alliances, the reforms intended to forestall the demise of apartheid, and the race for global competitiveness have left indelible marks on the society's social indicators. A comparison of living conditions in South Africa with those of roughly comparable economies indicates that the country lags behind in securing overall and widespread socio-economic upgrading of the population at large. A review of a cross-section of South African indicators and their trends over time shows that South Africa is still a very deeply divided society with a very large backlog in socio-economic development. There is evidence of breakdown in the society's social cohesion. Popular expectations of future quality of life indicate that the euphoria following on the first democratic elections has been replaced by a sense of realism among all sectors of the population. It is concluded that quality of life as reflected in South Africa's social indicators may get worse before it improves. The challenge will be to avoid new forms of economic “apartheid” which would depress the quality of life of marginal sectors of the population at the expense of the economically privileged.     

August Lösch on Population and Business Cycles

The German economist August Losch (1906–45) earned a permanent place in the history of economic ideas through his work on general equilibrium theory applied to a spatially distributed economy. His pathbreaking contribution in that field is synthesized in The Economics of Location (English translation 1954, first edition Die raumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft, published in 1939). Lb'sch's early theoretical and empirical work, however, was focused on the interaction of demographic and economic change, in particular the effect of population on economic fluctuations—in traditional terminology, the business cycle. His statistical investigations of the preindustrial era, reaching back to the seventeenth century, indicated that the dominant causal relationship went from the economy to population, a connection that much subsequent work also confirms. But his research on the history of German economic development under capitalist conditions showed primarily a reverse set of influences at work: from population, in particular from fluctuations in the rate of population growth, to the business cycle. This theoretical and empirical contribution, first published in German in 1936, is most accessible to readers of English in a paper presented in December of the same year at the annual meeting of the Econometric Society in Chicago and published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in August 1937 under the title “Population cycles as a cause of business cycles.” Excerpts from this article—the opening paragraphs and the closing section titled “Explanation”—are reproduced below. Losch sees the relationship as mediated by changes in labor supply and consequent responses in building activity, demand for consumer goods, and, in particular, stimulus or else depressing influence on the capital goods industries as the rate of population growth increases or falls. He cautions that his empirical work supporting his proposition was limited to Germany and may not apply everywhere. He suggests, however, that the effect of immigration on the United States economy is probably congruent with the thesis.     

Marshall on the population question. Part II

Marshall's treatment of the laws of returns, technical progress, capital formation, and international trade having been reviewed in Part II of this paper, included in the first instalment, his treatment of the genesis of living standards and of the circumstances whereon depend mortality, nuptiality, natality, and natural increase is examined in Part III, the first in the present instalment. Marshall's analysis of the behaviour of living standards reflects his “sociology” and helps to explain why he made no use of the optimum concept; it also reflects his conception of economic development. In Part IV his treatment of natural selection, competition, migration, location theory, and poverty and its cure is reviewed. It is concluded that Marshall's views respecting population represent both a continuation of those of his predecessors and a break therewith and serve nicely, in some instances, to bridge the gap between the demographic theories of the classical economists and those expressed in the second quarter of the present century.     

马尔萨斯“两种抑制”的观点及解脱“人口陷阱”的制度条件

马尔萨斯以推动社会进步为目的,主张采取多种预防性办法来抑制人口。马尔萨斯提出了解脱“人口陷阱”所必须的制度条件,并把有效抑制人口增长、改善人民生活的社会途径归纳为：一种充满就业机会、多样性选择的社会条件,将会最大限度地激发人们的个人努力,并在有效的法律保护下激励人们遵从一种更加理性的生活方式。马尔萨斯的一些人口经济思想至今仍然具有学术价值。     

A model on the escape from the Malthusian trap

We consider a demoeconomic model where output is produced using physical capital, human capital and technology as inputs. Human capital depends on the number of people and the level of education in the economy. The dynamics of labour, physical capital, education and technology are endogenously determined such as to reflect the interdependence between economic and demographic factors. The longrun path of the economy and in particular the possibility to escape the Malthusian trap crucially depend on technological progress, which provides for economy wide increasing returns to scale. The build up of technology is positively related to the stock of human capital. Our model predicts that positive population growth is sufficient to escape the Malthusian trap. Received: 22 August 1996 / Accepted: 11 December 1997     

Oswald Spengler on Cosmopolis and Depopulation

Historians are professionally averse to grand civilizational themes, especially where predictions may be entailed. The German historian Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), whose membership in the academic fraternity of his discipline has often been questioned, was an exception. His two‐volume magnum opus. The Decline of the West, published in 1918 and 1922 (English translation, 1928), in its time attracted much public and professional attention. (It remains in print.) It presents an enormously ambitious tableau of universal history seen as the unfolding of the fates of eight cultures, with a focus on four main strands: Indian, Classical, Arabian, and Western. In Spengler's interpretation, imbued with cultural and historical pessimism, the West was exhibiting symptoms found in earlier civilizations in decline. “Civilization,” in Spengler's vision, was a stage that follows cultural flowering—creative manifestations of the culture's unique soul expressed in art and thought. Civilization's preoccupation is with the enjoyment of material comforts; the sequence from “culture” to “civilization” represents the very antithesis of progress. Spengler saw the West as having entered that latter phase in the nineteenth century: a phase in which, in the words of the synoptic chart appended to Volume 1 of The Decline of the West, “The body of the people, now essentially urban in constitution, dissolves into formless mass.” Urbanism, the emergence of “megalopolis,” or “cosmopolis“—the world city—is a distinguishing and crucial feature of that declining civilization. A passage (section V, including some translator's notes) from the chapter titled The Soul of the City in Vol. II of The Decline of the West, which has the subtitle Perspectives of World History, is reproduced below. It offers arresting characterizations of the morphology of urban forms and of the rise of the world city. As longer‐term consequences (for the West “between 2000 and 2200”) Spengler foresaw the “formation ofCeasarism”; “victory of force‐politics over money”; “increasing primi‐tiveness of political forms”; and “inward decline of the nations into a formless population, and constitution thereof as an Imperium of gradually increasing crudity and despotism.” As to demographic consequences, Spengler highlights the emerging “sterility of civilized man“—“an essentially metaphysical turn toward death.”“Children do not happen, not because children have become impossible, but principally because intelligence at the peak of intensity can no longer find any reason for their existence.”“Prudent limitation of the number of births” eventually leads to a “stage, which lasts for centuries, of appalling depopulation.” Immigration apart, the time scale specified by Spengler for depopulation—“for centuries”—may be seen today as relatively cautious. Should Europe's current period fertility level—slightly below a TFR of 1.4—be translated into cohort performance, it would yield an intrinsic annual rate of population growth of roughly ‐1.5 percent. Within 200 years, such a growth rate would reduce a population to 5 percent of its original size. From The Decline of the West: Volume 2 by Oswald Spengler, translated by C. F. Atkinson, copyright 1928 and renewed 1956 by Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc.     

Dynamic patterning of concerns: A long-term comparison of the structure of hopes and fears of Israelis

The patterning of human concerns over time is investigated, using data from two surveys on concerns conducted in Israel in 1962 and 1975 respectively. Both studies used identical questions developed by Hadley Cantril-open-ended questions in which the respondent described either his personal or his country's future in positive and/or in negative terms. Concerns were defined by three major facets: their evaluative direction, their psychological immediateness, and the life-area to which they pertain. Time and salience were considered indirectly. A basic structure was predicted: the patterning of concerns would remain relatively stable over the years. In the event, only a patterning by life-areas emerged, primarily for the personal concerns, but is was found to remain relatively stable over time. Hopes and fears on both personal and national issues intermingled in an overall configuration of the major concerns.