Social Class Differentials During Fertility Decline: England and Wales Revisited

This paper reviews the relationship between landholdings and fertility. Two dimensions of land are identified as salient for fertility behaviour: size of operational holdings and land ownership. It is suggested that these two dimensions and the resulting income streams have disparate effects on fertility. Size of holdings is assumed to have a positive influence on fertility due to the greater labour demands of larger holdings, while land ownership is posited to exert a negative long-term effect because of the increase in old-age security associated with the income returns to equity. In addition to these effects on the demand for children, landholding is also thought to influence the supply of children. A systematic review of the literature finds support for the impact of both dimensions of landholding on fertility preferences, contraceptive behaviour, the proximate determinants and fertility. Both the demand and supply of children appear to be influenced by landholdings. The observed regularities suggest the need for further research on this connection, not the abandonment of this line of inquiry.     

The influence of wives’ and husbands’ fertility preferences on progression to a third birth in Nepal, 1997–2009

As couples across the globe increasingly exercise conscious control over their reproduction, both spouses’ family-size preferences have the opportunity to influence their fertility. Using couple-level measures of rural Nepalese spouses’ family-size preferences and more than a decade of monthly panel data collected subsequently on fertility outcomes, we investigate how both spouses’ preferences influence progression to a third birth in a country where the widely professed ideal family size is two children. Contrary to expectations based on women's relative disadvantage, we find that it is wives’ preferences that drive couples’ progression to a third birth. We find also that the influence of wives’ preferences is not explained by contraceptive use but that this influence is moderated by couple communication about family planning. Wives’ preferences drive progression to a third birth among couples who had discussed how many children to have.     

The relationship of family planning to savings and consumption in Taiwan

This study relates fertility behavior to modern economic behavior, namely, saving and consumption of modern durables, for a sample of couples in Taiwan. It uses only couples who say they want no more children, and these couples are further classified by current use of contraception and by whether or not they already had excess fertility. Couples who are successful fertility planners, i.e., those who have no unwanted children and are current users of contraception, are distinctive with regard to modern economic behavior as compared to couples who do not use contraception or have excess fertility. Successful planners are more likely to save and to have more modern durables; these differentials remain when adjustments are made for the effects of family income, wife’s age, wife’s education, and duration of marriage. It seems that the kind of planning behavior which enables a couple to successfully plan their family size also enables them to manage their economic affairs so that they can save and enjoy more modern consumption goods.     

Comparison and fairness in family planning]

There are two kinds of comparison in family planning (FP) practice. First, people compare the number of children they have with their desired family size. Second, people compare their number of children with other's. The extent of their satisfaction from the comparison often depends on their expectation. And people's expectation about their family size may have an impact on the level of fertility. One task in a FP program is to regulate people's objects for comparison and to reduce the number of children they expect to have. But, changes in people's desired number of children are largely dependent upon the socio economic charges which can not be achieved in short time. Therefore, it would be more advisable to direct people to compare their fertility behavior with those of couples who have only one child, rather than those who have 3 or 4. Satisfaction with family size also comes from a feeling of fairness. People not only look at what they get, but also at what others get. Fairness and justice in FP program implementation is important. If those who violate local birth control policies and regulations are not properly punished, other people would feel that the situation is unfair and they would regret that they did not do the same. The pressure brought by over-population to socio-economic development has been gradually felt by most people. But, it is still difficult to have them strictly observe the present fertility regulation policy. If restrictions of various kinds are enforced and education and publicity are used, people will feel that they are being treated fairly. This will facilitate the promotion of the FP program.     

The role of intergenerational transfers,land, and education in fertility transition in rural Kenya: the case of Nyeri district

This qualitative study reveals how population pressures, land availability, inheritance norms, and educational opportunities intertwine to influence fertility decline in rural Kenya. Focus group discussions with men and women whose childbearing occurred both before and after the onset of rapid, unexpected fertility transition in Nyeri, Kenya allowed individuals who actually participated in, or witnessed, the fertility transition to “voice” their perceptions as to the mechanisms underlying the transition. Findings suggest that, since land inheritance is a cultural norm, land scarcity and diminishing farm size often influence fertility decision-making and behavior via preferences for fewer children. Further, education does not appear to be the driving cause of fertility behavior change, but rather is adopted as a substitute for land inheritance when land resources are scarce. These findings have implications for our understanding of fertility behavior as well as for improving predictions of fertility transition in other rural sub-Saharan African contexts.     

Family structure and and fertility behavior in Taiwan

The present analysis is based on the 1990 Taiwan Human Resources Survey to study the relationships between family structure, women's complete fertility and birth spacing. Imputed family size, as measured by either the ideal number of children expressed by a married woman or the number of actual surviving children whichever is larger, is used as a proxy of a woman's complete fertility. The results indicate a majority of married couples in Taiwan begin married life living with the husband's parents and later move out to establish a nuclear unit. This limited experience in the extended family exerts an upward pressure on imputed family size even when other relevant variables are statistically controlled. Further, the effect of living with the husband's parents on shorter duration of birth spacing is only limited to the time when the parents provide free child- care for married couples.     

The emergence of Sub-Replacement Family Size Ideals in Europe

Period fertility started to drop significantly below replacement in most Western European countries during the 1970s and 1980s, while most fertility surveys, value studies and opinion polls have found that the number of children considered ideal for society or for one's own family has remained above two children per woman. These surveys have led to the expectation that, sooner or later, period fertility would recover in Europe. The most recent data from the Eurobarometer 2001 survey, however, suggest that in the German-speaking parts of Europe the average ideal family sizes given by younger men and women have fallen as low as 1.7 children. This paper examines the consistency and the credibility of these new findings, which – if they are indeed indications of a new trend – may alter the current discussion about future fertility trends in Europe.     

Fertility and social mobility among teachers

Social mobility is defined as the teacher's present position in the professional hierarchy relative to his father's occupation, and fertility as the average number of children per married male teacher after 10 years of marriage. A sample of all male teachers in gran-earning schools in England and Wales was used for the study. The hypothesis examined is that put forward and tested in one form or another by numerous authors, that upward mobility is associated with relatively low fertility; and Berent's finding, that among persons of equal social status social origin is negatively correlated with size of family of procreation.

The study of teachers fails to reveal any relation for either of the hypotheses. This also holds when account is taken of the wife's social origin and size of family of origin of the teacher. The latter analysis suggests, however, that this was a factor in the teacher's own rise in the social scale. The question remaines why teachers do not conform to the national pattern shown to exist by Berent. It is argued that while teachers' socal origin still affects their choice of marriage partner, its influence is gradually obliterated by the overriding and homogenising influence pattern of the teacher's life. This suggests that care must be exercised in applying a general finding to selected populations and calls for more detailed study of other occupational groups to explain the forces at work in the process of social mobility.     

The prediction of completed fertility

There has been considerable interest in the relation between familysize desires and completed fertility. Longitudinal data from the Princeton Fertility Study provide a unique opportunity to compare the number of children desired after the birth of a second child to the size of completed families. The average number of children desired by women after the birth of their second child predicts very well the average size of their completed families. The average family size desired at the first interview and average estimated completed family size some eight years later are identical for the total sample, and vary hardly at all within religious or education subgroups. One-third of the variance in the completed fertility of couples is "explained" by wife's family-size desires and the proportion of explained variance increases to two-fifths when we include the husband's first interview desires and the interval between marriage and second birth. Yet in spite of the relatively high correlation between desires and achievement, only 41 percent of these women achieved exactly the number of children they desired at the first interview, while 14 percent had two children more or fewer than originally desired. Nevertheless, data on contraceptive efficiency indicate that desires after the birth of the second child constitute meaningful goals in terms of which the respondents regulate their subsequent behavior-efficacy of contraceptive practice shows substantial improvement after the desired number has been achieved.     

Antecedents to contraceptive innovation: Evidence from rural Northern Thailand

A number of different causal mechanisms have been proposed to explain the onset of fertility declines in populations with previously uncontrolled fertility, but they have never been adequately tested. The present study identifies and tests five antecedents to family limitation practices in a sample of 755 currently married couples resident in rural Northern Thailand. The loglinear multiple regression models estimated indicate that couples in more developed districts, more modern couples, couples in which wives have more equal roles, couples believing that intergenerational wealth transfers favor children rather than their parents, and more wealthy couples, were all significantly more likely to be early adopters of contraception. Local development levels appeared to have the greatest net effects on the timing of adoption of fertility control. In addition, couples in areas where contraceptive services were more readily available were also significantly more likely to be contraceptive innovators, net of these five variables.     

What's happening to U.S. family size?

A telephone survey by Zero Population Growth demographers found that birthrates have risen slightly for the 1st quarter of 1977. Average estimated family size is now 1.85 children per women compared with 1.77 for the 1st quarter of 1976. For all of 1976 the total fertility rate was 1.76 children per woman. It is predicted, on the basis of the informal survey, that the total fertility rate will rise to 2.0 or 2.1 children by the early or mid-1980s. In 1976, married women expected an average of 2.4 children each. Wives 18-24 expected 2.1 children each while older women (35-39) expected 3.0. Many women are delaying births. Wives 18-24 have an average of .8 children each, wives 25-29 have 1.6 children each. Campbell Gibson, former chief of the projections branch of the Census Bureau, believes births will not reach levels of expectations becuase of the financial, employment, and social problems the huge Baby Boom age group faces throughout its lifetime. The undecided women in the surveys reduce the predictive value. 18% of single women aged 14-39 and 8% of married women in the same age group said they were uncertain about how many children they would have. Since the personalitites and motivations of this undecided group are similar to those who expect to remain childless, it is possible that this group will have fewer children. Such nondemographic factors as media publicity about low fertility rates may inspire some couples to have children. Conversely, the postponement of births may enable couples to become comfortable with a certain lifestyle and these couples may not have as many children as they expect. Social norms are already changing. The percent of wives expecting to be childless rose from 1.3 to 4.1% between 1967-1975. Those expecting only 1 child rose from 6.1 to 11.2%.     

Two and a half centuries of demographic history in a Bavarian village

Abstract A village genealogy containing family histories of couples married between 1692 and 1939 serves as the basis for a study of the demographic history of a Bavarian village. The past patterns of marriage, re-marriage, widowhood, illegitimacy, bridal pregnancy, marital fertility, family size, and birth intervals are examined. Both the age at marriage and illegitimacy increased and then declined during the nineteenth century, apparently in response to changes in restrictive marriage legislation. Differences in fertility for occupational groups were insignificant. Marital fertility remained extremely high before 1900 suggesting the absence of any substantial family limitation within marriage. A rise in marital fertility that occurred during the last half of the nineteenth century appears to result from a change in breast-feeding customs. The actual number of children surviving to maturity for most couples was kept quite low, however, through late marriage and high infant mortality. Only during the twentieth century are substantial declines in infant mortality and fertility evident.     

Costs and benefits of children: implications for population policy

Family size preferences are strongly affected by parents' perceptions of the value, economic contributions, and costs of children. Better understanding of these factors can help policy-makers to improve the effectiveness of population IEC campaigns, design strategies to persuade couples to have smaller families, assess the relationship between economic development and family size preferences, and devise national population policies and family planning programs that reflect individual choices. Parents in high-fertility countries are more likely to perceive children as productive investments than those in low-fertility countries. Parents in the former countries maintain children are an economic advantage or provide practical assistance in the household; they are less likely to emphasize the psychological advantages of children. As economic development occurs, and parents no longer value children for their economic contributions, psychological and social reasons become more important. Changing fertility preferences is more complex than providing couples with family planning services. Similarly, efforts to persuade families that large families are a burden are successful only when families are already interested in reducing their family size. Efforts to persuade couples to have smaller families are likely to be more successful if there are alternative sources of old-age support available, for example, from increased household savings, public or private pensions, or greater contributions from 1st and 2nd children. Investments in education and training, especially for women and children, would also support these goals.     

Family size and the quality of children

If couples decide to have fewer children in order to achieve higher “quality” offspring, are they correct in assuming that the quality of children bears an important and inverse relation to family size? If they are correct, how does number of children operate to affect individual quality? This research (using U.S. whites primarily) takes educational attainment (among adults) and college plans (among youngsters) as the principal indicators of quality, but also directs some attention to measures of intelligence. The analysis supports the “dilution model” (on average, the more children the lower the quality of each child) and indicates that only children do not suffer from lack of siblings, and that other last-borns are not handicapped by a “teaching deficit.” Number of siblings (relative to other background variables) is found to have an important detrimental impact on child quality—an impact compounded by the fact that, when couples are at a stage in life to make family-size decisions, most background factors (however important to the quality of their children) are no longer readily manipulable. A special path analysis of college plans among boys uses a modification of Sewell’s Wisconsin Model as its base. The results show that number of siblings is a negative influence on intervening variables affecting college plans. In general, the research documents the unfavorable consequences for individual siblings of high fertility, even in a country that is (at least for whites) as socially, economically, and politically advantaged as the United States.     

论生育控制个人成本的社会补偿:一个理论分析框架

生育控制成本的社会补偿是我国目前而临的一个非常重要的现实问题。本文将以两种不同性质生育率下降条件下的家庭效用函数为分析的逻辑基础,建立生育控制成本估算及其补偿模型。并在此基础上分析我国的生育控制成本的补偿机制、补偿内容和补偿方式等。     

A rejoinder to S. K. Datta and J. B. Nugent

Extract

The question of old-age security as a motivation for fertility in less-developed rural areas can be put in clearer perspective by pausing to consider the changing roles of land and offspring under the influence of fundamental demographic upheaval. Under the pre-transition regime, one generation approximately replaced the preceding one, particularly once unused but usable land became scarce and the possibility of expanding farm operations became remote. Judging from the settlement patterns and the history of the Maharashtrian study area, such a circumstance probably obtained long before the secular drop in mortality began. During this period, a single son, typically, would survive to adulthood, gradually assuming control of the father's land (or the father's trade, among non-agriculturalists) and, if the father lived long enough, would eventually be a source of security in the father's old age. It is not inappropriate to mention that this generational cycle no doubt fostered a strong urge to leave the family land to a son, so that a sonless farmer would keenly feel a lack of fulfilment. In fact, responses to certain survey questions suggest that ancestral land and male progeny are still somehow connected, according to the way village men think, to their sense of immortality. It would be hard, consequently, to separate old-age security, the idea of ‘continuing a lineage’, and the sense of immortality conferred by owning land into distinct motives for conceiving children.     

An Econometric Investigation of Easterlin's ‘Synthesis Framework’: The Philippines and the United States

In this paper we estimate a fertility model based on Easterlin's synthesis framework. The model assumes that not all couples are able to achieve their desired number of living children because of supply constraints and that, for other couples, the number of living children may exceed desired fertility, depending upon child mortality, the level of fertility in the absence of control, and the degree of contraceptive regulation practised. Estimates of the model for samples of women with completed fertility taken from the Philippines (1973) and the United States (1965) indicated that a higher proportion of Filipino women than women in the U.S. were unable to achieve desired fertility because of supply constraints, that levels of fertility control of Filipino women not supply-constrained were lower, and that excess fertility of Filipino women was much higher. Demand-for-children equations based on the constraints model were quite different from those not taking into account the possibility that some women were supply-constrained, or that some women may have had more children than desired.     

Economic considerations in family growth decisions

Abstract Examination of the fertility patterns of a sample of white Detroit couples at selected stages of the family life cycle indicates that, in a large American metropolis, family income is more closely related to the time when a family is formed and has its children than to the number of children it expects to have. In a longitudinal study, current income is strongly related to the timing of demographic events-the age at marriage, whether pre-maritally pregnant, the time interval from marriage to a given parity, and fertility during a two-year follow-up period. This paper also explores the hypothesis that a family's evaluation of its economic position and the choices it makes about important family expenditures has a relation to fertility apart from the family's objective current income level. Couples who consider their income adequate for their needs or relatively greater than that of their friends or peers, and those who expect substantial increases in the future, tend to expect more children than those who do not. Small but consistent differences obtain over the parities studied. Variables indexing alternative family expenditure patterns, such as cars, or savings for college education for children, are associated with lower family size expectations and longer spacing patterns.     

The Effect of Childhood Family Size on Fertility in Adulthood: New Evidence From IV Estimation

Although fertility is positively correlated across generations, the causal effect of children’s experience with larger sibships on their own fertility in adulthood is poorly understood. With the sex composition of the two firstborn children as an instrumental variable, we estimate the effect of sibship size on adult fertility using high-quality data from Norwegian administrative registers. Our study sample is all firstborns or second-borns during the 1960s in Norwegian families with at least two children (approximately 110,000 men and 104,000 women). An additional sibling has a positive effect on male fertility, mainly causing them to have three children themselves, but has a negative effect on female fertility at the same margin. Investigation into mediators reveals that mothers of girls shift relatively less time from market to family work when an additional child is born. We speculate that this scarcity in parents’ time makes girls aware of the strains of life in large families, leading them to limit their own number of children in adulthood.     

How parenthood experiences influence desire for more children in Australia: A qualitative study

The low-fertility debate in developed countries has focused on the limits to family size posed by the financial costs of raising children, and difficulties combining work and family. Little attention has been given to the physical and socio-psychological experiences of conception, pregnancy, birth and early parenthood, and their potential effect on parity progression. Womens rising education and workforce participation rates are often seen as key factors in fertility decline, offering attractive alternatives to motherhood, but research suggests that they also undermine levels of knowledge, confidence and interest in motherhood. Demographers have made almost no link between people having fewer children than they might otherwise have had and their previous childbearing and childrearing experiences. Interviews conducted in South Australia in 2003–04 with parents of both small and large families show that fertility and family size are influenced both negatively and positively by experiences of having had children. The paper argues that if low fertility rates are to be stabilized or raised in developed countries, then researchers and policymakers must consider the physical and socio-psychological costs of having children for parents, and provide support mechanisms so that experiences of parenthood contribute as little as possible to fertility gaps and delayed fertility.