The Effect of Anti-Abortion Legislation on Nineteenth Century Fertility

Using nineteenth century legal information combined with census information, I examine the effect of state laws that restricted American women’s access to abortion on the ratio of children to women. I estimate an increase in the birthrate of 4 % to 12 % when abortion is restricted. In the absence of anti-abortion laws, fertility would have been 5 % to 12 % lower in the early twentieth century.     

Duration of Marriage,Fertility and Women's Employment Opportunities in England and Wales in 1911

Data from the 1911 Census of England and Wales are examined for evidence of family limitation early in marriage. It is shown that a substantial number of couples used birth control for ‘spacing’ as well as for ‘stopping’ fertility. Moreover ‘spacing’ of births appears to have been more widespread in districts in which women's employment opportunities were relatively good. In general, the results obtained do not fit with the Princeton view of the European fertility transition with its stress on parity-specific family limitation spreading in response to improvements in contraceptive information and technology.     

Precision in population estimates

Summary

Given the Registrar General's estimate of the home population of a local government administrative area in England and Wales, is it possible to construct a 95 per cent. confidence interval for the true value? The author has attempted to provide an approximate answer to this question by considering estimates made before and after the 1951 census, together with such data as are available to improve the comparability of the estimates. The analysis suggests that urban and rural areas must be separately considered, and that the margin of error is of the order of five per cent, for the former and eight per cent. for the latter.     

The strange history and problematic future of the Australian census

When looking back into the first century of Australian history following white settlement we often rely on the records of musters, listings and censuses to provide information on individuals and communities. The first census of New South Wales in 1828 was little more than a directory of names of settlers and settlements, but both professional historians and genealogists regard it as invaluable. As the scientific principles of censuses were developed over the course of the nineteenth century the information collected became ever more important for social scientists and economists. In the twentieth century, professional historians in the UK and USA opened wholly new perspectives on society by looking to the census for records of common families who were not recorded in the newspapers or diaries of the time, and the community structures in which they lived. Unfortunately such innovations have not been possible in Australia. The individual records of most colonial and all Commonwealth censuses are not to be found in the libraries or archives. The destruction of original census records in Australia has been the result of misadventure and government policies reflecting great fear about the impact of popular privacy concerns on public compliance with the census operations. This paper explores the history behind the anomalous practice of destroying census records in Australia, and poses questions about the role of the census in the writing of histories of Australian people and Australian communities.     

Fertility In England: A Long-Term Perspective

This paper deals with two aspects of long-run fertility trends in England. First detailed and widely comparable fertility measures (Coale's indices) are reconstructed for England from the mid-sixteenth century to the present. Secondly the extent and nature of local and regional variation in those indices is discussed. The calculation of Coale's indices has never previously been attempted for so long a time span. Doing so requires the use of several different sources of information and a new method for combining them. The results provide significant insights into the development of the distinctive English demographic regime. The analysis of spatial patterns makes it apparent that local, rather than regional, variation was the main source of different fertility patterns in the nineteenth century. These patterns are obscured when counties or larger units are made the framework for analysis.     

Johann Peter Süssmilch: A German Prophet in Foreign Countries

The clergyman Johann Peter Süssmilch (1707–1767), chaplain to King Frederick II of Prussia, deserves to be called the father of German demography and was recognized as such in his own lifetime in his country of origin and throughout Europe, except possibly in France and Italy. In his Göttliche Ordnung (1741 and 1761–2), he attempted to explain the regularity of vital phenomena as being due to divine intervention. His conception of a ‘divine’ order soon gave way to that of a ‘natural’ order. His life tables, though incorrect, continued to be used by insurance offices well into the nineteenth century. His views about the relationships between mortality on one hand, and fertility and nuptiality on the other led to controversies between Malthus, Sadler and other scholars. Later, his ideas were given a broader economic and social interpretation. Whether as the last representative of ‘primitive’ demography, or the first scientific scholar of the subject, he contributed to the triumph of political arithmetic throughout Europe.     

The impact of mortality development on the number of centenarians in England and wales

The world is ageing both at an individual and a population level, and population ageing is truly a global phenomenon. Life expectancies at birth have increased at the global level from 47 years in the mid-20th century to around 70 years today, and are expected to rise to 76 years by the mid-21st century. The proportion of the world’s population aged 60 years and over has increased from 8 % in the mid-20th century to 12 %, and by 2050 it is expected to reach 21 %. The emergence of large numbers of centenarians has accompanied this development. This paper outlines this emergence historically and the likely growth in the number of centenarians in the 21st century, in particular in England and Wales, analysing mortality trends since 1840 and the rise in the number of centenarians in the 20th and 21st centuries. The number of centenarians in England and Wales increased from around 160 in 1922 to almost 12,500 by 2012, but if mortality at all ages had remained constant from 1912 to 2012, then by 2012 the number of centenarians would only have been around 720. By 2100, the number of centenarians is expected to reach around 1.4 million, but if future mortality at all ages were to remain constant, then by 2100 the number of centenarians would be around 78,000. However, if predicted mortality for those aged 55 years and over was to decrease by an additional 5 % every 5 years until 2100, then the number of centenarians in England and Wales would reach around 1.8 million by the end of the century.     

R. F. Harrod on Reviving the Birth Rate

Continuing below‐replacement fertility and projected declines in population size are demographic features of many European countries and Japan. They are variously met with complacent acceptance, calls for higher rates of immigration, or—often last and least—proposals for increasing the birth rate. Fertility was also low in the 1930s, and some of the policy debate from that period resonates today. In England and Wales, fertility then had been declining for half a century. Over the decade 1931–40, it averaged 1.8 children per woman—moreover, with net emigration. Worries over this situation and its likely consequences led to the setting up in 1944 of a Royal Commission on Population, charged with considering “what measures, if any, should be taken in the national interest to influence the future trend in population.” In a memorandum submitted to the Commission in that year, the economist R. F. Harrod set out a detailed proposal to encourage childbearing through a scheme of family endowments. Part of the introductory section of Harrod's submission, arguing the case for state intervention and for material rather than ‘spiritual’ measures, is reproduced below. An evident problem in offering economic incentives for childbearing is that, to induce a given behavioral change, well‐off families would require much larger incentives than the poor. Hence child endowments that aspire to effectiveness across the income distribution have to be skewed toward the upper end. Harrod argues that this is as it should be, that policy should establish neutrality between large and small family sizes, and that this is a conceptually separate issue from poverty alleviation. ‘We should seek a re‐distribution of national income favourable to the parents of larger families and the plan should be put into effect whether or not another re‐distribution as between rich and poor is proceeding at the same time.’ He remarks on the implausibility of the government's being able to ‘talk up’ fertility— thereby generating some kind of costless ideational change, a ‘spiritual aufklärung.’ Later pans of the submission not reprinted here cover the specific details of the proposal. The proposed annual benefit per child (intended for every child after the second, with half‐rates payable for the second child) is paid for 18 years. It is substantial and increases with the child's age—at ages 13–18, for most of the income range it amounts to 20–30 percent of the father's income (or mother's, if hers is higher). Harrod also discusses further the rationale for making the endowments (and the compulsory contributions—a flat 5 percent of income—that finance them) proportional to income. To make his case Harrod draws on the dysgenic and population‐quality arguments popular at the time: worry about ‘race decline’ and ‘a general lowering of standards and of efficiency if the parents who are best equipped in experience, knowledge and culture are relatively infertile.’ In the event, the Commission recommended a flat schedule of family allowances, together with tax exemptions for dependent children calculated to provide some income‐based benefit. These were justified on population as well as equity and welfare grounds, ‘since the handicaps of parenthood have played a large part in the fall of average family size below replacement level.‘ Population quality issues—the subject of several other submissions—were sidestepped by calling for further research. By the time the Commission's report was finally published, in 1949, the baby boom was well underway: average fertility over 1946–50 was 2.4. Roy Forbes Harrod (1900–78) was one of the foremost economists of his day. His career was largely spent at Christ Church College, Oxford. A student and sometime colleague of Keynes, his best‐known early work was centered on identifying a dynamic equilibrium growth path for the economy—building on Keynes's static equilibrium analysis. As stylized (by others), this came to be called the Harrod‐Domar growth model, a formulation basic to growth theory. Harrod was editor of the Economic Journal for the period 1945–66. He was active in politics and as an economic adviser to both Labour and Conservative governments. He was knighted in 1959. The extract is reprinted from volume 5 of the Papers of the Royal Commission on Population (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 80–85.     

Note on the accuracy of local population estimates

Mr. Silcock's article will be of interest to all concerned with local population data. It may be useful to supplement it by a brief account of the fuller examination of the local population estimates made in 1951 by the General Register Office, since this covered all 1472 administrative areas in England and Wales and could be made in more detail than was possible for a private investigator.

Any census, of course, provides information not available, at least in such detail, at other times or from other sources, and also serves as a base from which estimates for succeeding years can be derived. In addition, however, the General Register Office takes the opportunity of a census to try and assess the accuracy of the various types of current population estimates made by the Department. In the case of local administrative areas the comparison of actual and expected populations made after the 1931 Census is discussed in the Text Volume of the Registrar General's Statistical Review for 1930 (pages 100-102).     

Socio-economic Differentials in Infant and Child Mortality during Mortality Decline: England and Wales, 1890–1911

In this paper data from the 1911 Census of the Fertility of Marriage of England and Wales are used to study patterns of mortality decline by socio-economic characteristics, principally the occupation of husband. That census reported data on number of wives, children ever born, and children dead by marriage-duration cohorts for 190 non-overlapping occupations of husband. These results, along with those on number of rooms in the dwelling of the family are used to make indirect estimates of childhood mortality using the techniques described in United Nations, Manual X. These procedures produce values of q(a), the probability of dying before reaching some exact age ‘a’. Estimates for q(2), q(3), q(5), q(10), q(15), and q(20) are derived from data on women married 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20–24, and 25–29 years, respectively. These estimates can also be dated to a point in the past. These values can also be converted to a corresponding level of a Model West life table, which describes the ‘average’ mortality regime which the children of those women experienced. This furnishes a basis to look at mortality decline for various social classes and occupational groups. Ordinary least squares regressions of the levels of Model West life tables implied by the 1(a) values on time give one measure of mortality decline. Another is the absolute amount of the increase in the level of the Model West life tables from marriage-duration cohort 20–24 years to 0–4 years. The aggregate results indicate that social class in England and Wales during the 1890s and 1900s tended to be related to the speed of mortality decline: childhood mortality declined more rapidly in the higher and more privileged social class groups. But the results were neither nearly as strong nor as regular as those which predicted the level of mortality within any marriage-duration cohort. These outcomes are not particularly sensitive to the three different social-class stratification schemes used: the 1911 English Registrar General's classification; the 1951 English Registrar General's classification; and the 1950 U.S. Census classification. There was also a fairly regular and predictable gradient for the number of rooms in the home: child mortality was higher in families who lived in larger dwellings. Analysis of 190 detailed male occupational groups revealed that considerably more of the variation in mortality levels than of trends could be explained by social-class categories. Between 20 and 40 per cent of variation in mortality trend could be accounted for by social class alone, as opposed to 50 to 80 per cent of mortality levels for different marriage-duration cohorts. Results for a more restricted sample of 116 occupations for which income estimates could be made revealed a similar pattern. In addition, income was virtually unrelated to the pattern of mortality decline, and improvement was more rapid in groups who were more urban. This reflects the role of rapidly improving urban sanitation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in England. In contrast, income was significantly related to childhood morality levels for various marriage-duration cohorts (with higher income associated with lower mortality), while urbanization was inversely correlated with mortality levels (more urban groups experienced higher mortality). Overall, social class (or occupation group), income, and urbanization were more successful in explaining mortality levels than time trends across occupations, although social class and the extent of urbanization did reasonably well in accounting for trends. Over a longer period, the transition in child mortality was under way by the 1890s, but its pace and timing varied in different occupations and social class groupings. Although absolute differences in infant mortality were reduced after about 1911, relative inequality persisted even as infant and child survival improved for all groups.     

India's Falling Sex Ratios

The proportion of females in India's population, low compared to other countries, reached its lowest level this century in the 1991 census. India's low sex ratios—defined here as the number of females relative to the number of males—have been scrutinized for well over a century. The persistent decline in the twentieth century has been the subject of renewed investigation and critical comment over the past two decades. While many explanations for the decline have been offered, almost without exception these have not addressed the causes of the nearly continuous fall observed since 1901. Several possible long-term changes are investigated in this note. The author argues that India's declining sex ratio is primarily an artifact of the dynamics of India's population growth.     

The encouragement of emigration by British trade unions, 1850–1900

During the nineteenth century periodic fluctuations in industrial activity, strikes and lock-outs which accompanied the struggle of unions for recognition, and the ever increasing consciousness of the industrial worker that one serious trade setback could wipe out the savings of his lifetime, were important ‘pushes’ to emigration from the United Kingdom. The British trade unions responded to this ‘push’ from their own members and from thousands of unorganized workers for relief through emigration.

Contrary to the statements of historians of the English trade-union movement, emigration was not a project of British trade unions in the 1850 decade only; in fact, most of the unions in England's basic industries, mining, iron, textiles and engineering, as well as in many other smaller industries such as glass, cutlery and the building trades, looked upon emigration as necessary to improve the standard of life of the English workers. This viewpoint was natural to the ‘New Unionists’ of the 1850's, who accepted the principle that supply and demand regulated wages and prices. The trade unions, however, disapproved of emigration to the United States where workers would go to a rival trade; such emigration could not diminish the absolute number of workers in the industry. Instead, they advocated emigration to farms in the British colonies; but, nevertheless, most of the persons aided by English trade unions to emigrate went to the United States. The hesitancy of skilled workers to leave a familiar occupation appeared to be the most important reason for this.

Desirable as emigration was to trade unionists in times of trade crises, the leaders met overwhelming difficulties when they tried to use it as a safety valve. In the cotton famine and the iron-trade lock-outs of the sixties, for example, unions had no money to aid emigration, and were forced to seek grants from United States manufacturers to help needy workers to go to America. Although they were relatively helpless in times of crisis, the trade unions assisted emigration during good years, believing that such a policy would ease the severity of the inevitable next crisis. Most of the established unions had regularly operating emigration grants by which members in good standing could receive a sum of money in aid of emigration, usually enough to pay at least one passage to America. This benefit helped some of the most skilled workers and loyal union members to leave England for America.

The trade unions, in making these grants, had to adjust the amount of money given to the ‘state of health’ of the union treasury; thus, during crises when the treasuries were low the emigration benefits were often discontinued. As the years passed and the number of British workers in America increased, the unions hesitated to send men abroad during depressions or strikes in the United States. Not only did American workmen complain of such competition, but also English workers disliked to see men whom they had previously assisted to ‘take their labour abroad’ return home.

From 1850 until well into the 1880's, when most of the English trade unions were encouraging and aiding emigration, their influence actually was most effective toward that end in times of prosperity in the United States. It was the depression of the eighties and the rise of unions of unskilled workers and leaders who looked for improvement through Socialism rather than through adjusting the supply of labour, which finally eclipsed emigration as a panacea for the English working class.     

The Population of Centenarians in Brazil: Historical Estimates from 1900 to 2000

Since the nineteenth century, the census has provided the number of 100-year-olds in Brazil, one of the most populous countries worldwide. In 1900, 4,438 individuals reported themselves to be centenarians, a figure that increased about fivefold by the 2000 census. However, due to data quality issues, we are skeptical about the real size of the recorded population in the Brazilian census. We offer alternative estimates of the most likely number of centenarians during the twentieth century by combining variable-r relations with different mortality models. Our results indicate there was virtually no centenarian at the beginning of the twentieth century. The population has become larger than 1,000 individuals only in the 1990s, suggesting there has been an extensive, although diminishing, overenumeration of centenarians in the census records. Our results can help policymakers to plan the demands of a growing old age population in places that face stricter family and public budget constraints.     

Living same-name siblings and British historical demography

This article examines the extent to which living siblings were given identical first names. Whilst the practice of sibling name-sharing appeared to have died out in England during the eighteenth century, in northern Scotland it persisted at least until the end of the nineteenth century. Previously it has not been possible to provide quantitative evidence of this phenomenon, but an analysis of the rich census and vital registration data for the Isle of Skye reveals that this practice was widespread, with over a third of eligible families recording same-name siblings. Our results suggest that further research should focus on regional variations in sibling name-sharing and the extent to which this northern pattern occurred in other parts of Britain.     

Income-tax allowances and the family in Great Britain

Income-tax allowances for dependants in Great Britain give financial aid to family-supporting taxpayers which is similar in nature to cash payments received from the State under the family allowances programme. In effect, by differentiating between single and family-supporting taxpayers, the State is sharing the financial burden of caring for each taxpayer's family. In this article an estimate is made of the total cost of such dependants' allowances to the State in the form of lost tax revenues. Analysing the cost of income-tax allowances by income group and family size, the author attempts to point out certain inequities in the State's programme which is aimed at partially alleviating the relatively unfavourable position of the family-supporting taxpayer.     

Famine Mortality in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Evidence from a Temple Death Register

Economic and demographic historians who have studied Japan's early modern period argue that preventive checks to fertility were the primary cause of Japan's stationary population in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and that the role of ‘positive’ checks was negligible. This paper presents evidence and a claim that mortality crises – famines in particular – also played an important role in checking population growth during this period. It analyses data from the death register of Ogen-ji, a Buddhist temple in the Hida region of central Japan. These data provide a remarkably detailed picture of the short-term demographic consequences of Japan's last great famine, the Tenpō famine of the 1830s. ‘Normal’ mortality patterns, by age and sex, are compared with patterns of mortality during the famine. Mortality of males rose considerably more than that of females, with the greatest rise occurring among young boys aged 5–14 and adult men aged 30–59. A surprising finding was that mortality at ages 0–4 rose relatively little, in part a consequence of a marked fall in the number of births during the famine. The Tenpō subsistence crisis was not the sole cause of population stagnation in the Ogen-ji population, but it was a prominent feature of the ‘high mortality regime’ that this population experienced during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.     

A study of internal migration in England and Wales : Part I

Abstract Statistics ofpersons classified jointly by county of birth and county ofresidence have been published in the England and Wales census volumes since 1851 and the present study draws mainly on these data. A group of persons recorded in a census as natives of county A and residents of county Bare sometimes referred to as lifetime migrants from county A to county B. Statistics of lifetime migrants have often been used in studies of internal migration but these have one great disadvantage. The number of lifetime migrants from A to B does not relate to a specific period of time. It is impossible, for example, in such studies to consider the association between specific migration streams and differential economic activity. An attempt is made in this study to transform lifetime migration data into intercensal migration streams. Some of the results are presented and the most significant migration patterns during the period 1851-1951 are described.     

A study of internal migration in England and Wales : Part I

Statistics ofpersons classified jointly by county of birth and county ofresidence have been published in the England and Wales census volumes since 1851 and the present study draws mainly on these data. A group of persons recorded in a census as natives of county A and residents of county Bare sometimes referred to as lifetime migrants from county A to county B. Statistics of lifetime migrants have often been used in studies of internal migration but these have one great disadvantage. The number of lifetime migrants from A to B does not relate to a specific period of time. It is impossible, for example, in such studies to consider the association between specific migration streams and differential economic activity.

An attempt is made in this study to transform lifetime migration data into intercensal migration streams. Some of the results are presented and the most significant migration patterns during the period 1851–1951 are described.     

Reexamining the Dominance of Birth Cohort Effects on Mortality

The association between birth cohort and subsequent mortality has been of interest especially following publication of studies around 1930 of cohorts born up to the latter part of the nineteenth century, particularly for England and Wales. Updated results are presented for this population, together with those for two other cohorts, twentieth‐century Japanese and British populations born about 1930, which have been identified as having particularly clear‐cut birth cohort patterns, and which are used to underpin incorporation of cohort effects in both British official and actuarial mortality forecasts. Graphical methods used to identify cohort patterns are discussed. A number of limitations and difficulties are identified that mean that the conclusions about the predominance of cohort effects are less robust than often assumed. It is argued that alternative explanations should be considered and that the concentration on birth cohorts with particularly advantaged patterns may distort research priorities.