Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotion

Simon Clarke, Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotion, pp. 145–163.
In this paper I explore the sociological study of emotion, contrasting constructionist and psychoanalytic accounts of envy as an emotion. I seek not to contra each vis-à-vis the other but to establish some kind of synthesis in a psychoanalytic sociology of emotion. I argue that although the constructionist approach to emotion gives us valuable insights into the social and moral dimensions of human encounters, it is unable to address the level of emotional intensity found for example in murderous rage against ethnic groups, or the emotional and often self destructive elements of terrorism. Psychoanalytic ideas do engage with these dynamics, and as such, a theory that synthesises both the social construction of reality and the psychodynamics of social life is necessary if we are to engage with these destructive emotions.     

The Psychological Subject and Harré's Social Psychology: An Analysis of a Constructionist Case

Taking Rom Harré's social constructionism as a focus we point to and discuss the issue of the a priori psychological subject in social constructionist theory. While Harré indicates that interacting, intending beings are necessary for conversation to occur, he assumes that the primary human reality is conversation and that psychological life emerges from this social domain. Nevertheless, we argue that a fundamental and agentive psychological subject is implicit to his constructionist works. Our critical analyses focus upon Harré's understandings of persons, human development and human agency. Our intention is neither to suggest that this latent entity must be understood in a Cartesian sense nor is it to ask for an explicit accounting of an autonomous agent. Rather, our claim is simply that psychological subjectivity is reflexively entailed in Harré's human psychology. We suggest that this pertains more generally to social constructionist theory.     

Abstracts

Taking Rom Harré's social constructionism as a focus we point to and discuss the issue of the a priori psychological subject in social constructionist theory. While Harré indicates that interacting, intending beings are necessary for conversation to occur, he assumes that the primary human reality is conversation and that psychological life emerges from this social domain. Nevertheless, we argue that a fundamental and agentive psychological subject is implicit to his constructionist works. Our critical analyses focus upon Harré's understandings of persons, human development and human agency. Our intention is neither to suggest that this latent entity must be understood in a Cartesian sense nor is it to ask for an explicit accounting of an autonomous agent. Rather, our claim is simply that psychological subjectivity is reflexively entailed in Harré's human psychology. We suggest that this pertains more generally to social constructionist theory. This paper attempts to demonstrate, at least for the passions, that while emotions are important elements of common sense psychological thought, they are not psychological, neural, or mental entities. People talk of emotions, we claim, in two sorts of cases: Firstly, when it is believed that someone has done something that she shouldn't because she has been overwhelmed by desire (a motive) and secondly, when someone is found to be compelled to devote cognitive resources to an act she knows she will never carry out. In this case motivational states command attention and cognitive and physiological resources, distract us, even though they will not issue in action. In either case pointing to an emotion is pointing to a partial, aborted, or misdirected desire. We discuss why emotions are considered important in common sense and professional psychology though they do not exist. This paper explores new avenues of research on social bases of cognition and a more adequate (than those extant) framework to conceive the phenomena of the human mind. It firstly examines Bartlett's work on social bases of cognition, from which three pertinent features are identified, namely multi-level analyses, evolutionary perspective and embodied mind approach. It then examines recent works on social origins of cognition in ethology and paleoanthropology, and various forms of the embodied mind approach recently proposed in neuroscience and cognitive science. The paper concludes that extending the embodied mind approach would provide the most potent framework to enable, amongst others, the conceptual integration of the biological, psychological and social bases of the human mind, which have in the past been treated mainly as competing alternatives. A conception of parental experience is proposed to enhance the move of the study of parenting into the interpersonal realm by describing parental subjectivity from the parent's point of view. Explanations are based on that which the parent can be accountable for, on parental dialogues with observers/clinicians about their dialogues with their infants. This conception of parental subjectivity is compared with other conceptions which define parental subjectivity as the mental apparatus of the parent and not as representing the evolving relation of the parent with the infant, and with explanations which consider parental reports in terms of the parent's psychodynamics and cognitive abilities rather than in terms of the on-going dialogues between themselves and their infants. The paper introduces a typology of parental dialogues with observers/clinicians about their dialogues with their infants, within the context of the non-verbal nature of the infant's communication. The findings from empirical examinations of this typology are presented, and their implications for the proposal that the study of parental relations with their infants should consider the parent's accountability are discussed.     

Towards a pragmatic approach: a critical examination of two assumptions of indigenization discourse

The current discourse of indigenization has been dominated by a normative approach that puts culture and social work values at the centre of discussions of social work's transference ‘from the West to the rest’. Taking a social constructionist perspective, this article argues that we need to critically examine some underlying assumptions of this normative approach, which may have led to misunderstandings of indigenization. The pragmatic approach, which I suggest as an alternative, views indigenization as a process in which various actors with various cultural lenses select the components of Western social work that can be integrated with, or replace, existing local social care practices. The purpose of this integration and replacement is to better serve the needs of the receiving society and its people.     

Theoretical Foundations for Digital Text Analysis

Much of social life now takes place online, and records of online social interactions are available for social science research in the form of massive digital text archives. But cultural social science has contributed little to the development of machine‐assisted text analysis methods. As a result few text analysis methods have been developed that link digital text data to theories about culture and discourse. This paper attempts to lay the groundwork for development of such methods by proposing metatheoretical and theoretical foundations suitable for machine‐assisted semantic text analysis. Metatheoretically I draw on the work of Elder‐Vass (2012), Kaidesoja (2013) and others to argue that digital text analysis methods ought to be (and in practice implicitly are) based on a realist constructionist ontology that treats discourses as ontologically real emergent social entities that have causal relationships with non‐discursive social and cognitive processes. Theoretically I follow Feldman (2006) and many others in arguing that language is fundamentally shaped by processes of embodied cognition. Researchers developing digital text analysis techniques must theoretically account for such processes if they wish to produce algorithms that can interpret texts in ways that supplement, and not only amplify, human interpretation. I critically survey contemporary text analysis methods that implicitly share these metatheoretical and theoretical positions and discuss some ways these can be further developed with newly available software.     

The Roles of Evolution in the Social Sciences: Is Biology Ballistic?

This paper discusses some widespread but often not fully articulated views concerning the possible roles of biology and evolution in the social sciences. Such views cluster around a set of intuitions that suggest that evolution's role is “ballistic”: it constitutes a starting point for mind that has been, and is, superseded by the role of culture and social construction. An implication is that evolved and the socially constructed aspects of mind are separable and independent, with the latter being the primary driver of mind. I outline four variants of the ballistic view. I then show how current findings and arguments in evolutionary thinking as related to mind contradict those ballistic views. The contrary view—that evolutionary and social factors are interdependent in the generation of social psychological capacities—is proposed as a consequence. This view is able to respect some insights of theories that make ballistic assumptions, whilst avoiding those assumptions.     

Assessment and Social Construction: Conflict or Co-Creation?

Assessment procedures in social work emerged within the historicalcontext of modernist empiricism. They are lodged in assumptionsof objectivity, measurement accuracy, value neutrality and scientificexpertise. Within the context of postmodern constructionism,the grounds for traditional assessment are thrown into question.While such critique may seem to threaten the assessment tradition,such a conclusion is unwarranted. Rather, one may locate withinthe assessment tradition and constructionist writings converginglines of thought. Through the collaborative extension of twoassessment exemplars—the genogram and the ecomap—wesuggest new and more promising potentials for assessment practicesin social work.     

Actors,legitimation and cultures of social work*

This article is based on my study of rationality and language games in social work. The study focuses on the actors of social welfare and health care. Included are the heads and social workers of public welfare and health care agencies and institutions, officials of voluntary organizations, and activists in social change-oriented action groups. The objects of this study also differ with respect of their official status, area of responsibility, and position at work. The study tries to increase the understanding of the basic rationalities which are guiding social work as part of the daily routines, and of how the actors articulate and legitimate themselves, one another and the others, i.e. clients etc. The empirical data were collected using questionnaries. The study shows that organizational affiliation and area of concern do not bring about a systematic variation in the views of the respondents. The results then indicate the existence of a specific culture, a code of social work. The actors legitimate themselves according to system rationality. The system is considered to be outside the immediate scene of social work practice, which is articulated according to life-world premises. In client-centered social work, the external controlling and administrating system rationality threatens life-world aspects by neglecting social work as a process based on involvement, dialogue and change.     

Where the Sidewalk Ends: The Limits of Social Constructionism

The sociology of knowledge is a heterogeneous set of theories which generally focuses on the social origins of meaning. Strong arguments, epitomized by Durkheim's late work, have hypothesized that the very concepts our minds use to structure experience are constructed through social processes. This view has come under attack from theorists influenced by recent work in developmental psychology that has demonstrated some awareness of these categories in pre‐socialized infants. However, further studies have shown that the innate abilities infants display differ in systematic and theoretically significant ways from adults' explicit knowledge. This paper moves beyond the constructionist/nativist dichotomy by outlining the complex relationships between innate intelligence and explicit knowledge. I end by suggesting that there are four, distinct ways the social world influences thought‐ facilitation, division, specification, and construction.     

The Contextual Specificity of Masculinity and Femininity in Early Adolescence

Using a social constructionist perspective, we investigated the flexibility of early adolescents' (N = 80, 40 boys, 40 girls; M age = 13.14; SD = .65) masculinity and femininity as a function of the interpersonal context (same- or other-sex partner) and situational demands (co-operation or competition). Participants played a block-building game with a girl and a boy peer and were instructed either to play the game co-operatively or competitively. Boys' and girls' femininity scores were greater when working with a girl peer rather than a boy peer. Stereotypical gender differences in masculinity were most apparent when instructions emphasized co-operation. These findings provide empirical support for a social constructionist theory of gender development by demonstrating how the proximal situation changes adolescents' views of gendered aspects of their identity. A conceptualization of masculinity and femininity as flexible states is discussed as supplementing the idea that masculinity and femininity are enduring personality traits. Implications of the study for understanding how social situations maximize or minimize gender differences and similarities are discussed.     

The cultural wantons of the new millennium

In Culture and Agency (1988/1996, CUP), I made the distinction between the ‘Cultural System’ (C.S.), that is all items logged into the universal cultural archive, and ‘Socio-Cultural’ (S-C) interaction, namely how we persuade others to accept our views. The two are distinct; but any adequate explanation in social science involving ‘culture’ must respect this distinction and needs must come in a SAC, namely always entailing ‘Structure’, ‘Agency’ and ‘Culture’. Although not accepting that culture (C.S) was or is ever fully coherent or shared by definition, I charter a precipitous decline in its free accessibility as part of the Commons everywhere, but most markedly when and where morphogenesis predominates today – adding new variety to the (C.S.) and fostering divergent (S-C) aims. Together, their ideational opportunism greatly augments Fake News as opponents lock in conflict, particularly when social integration is already low. Such Fake News is especially harmful to personal and collective Reflexivity and the ‘data smog’ of social media induces a ‘presentism’ that generates cultural wantons (Harry Frankfurt's term) amongst both those lying and in receipt of their lies.     

Integrating political activism and a professional career

Psychodynaniic theories, once an essential part of social work education but recently neglected, have been reinvigorated in recent years through contributions from social constructionism, infant research, and intersub‐jectivity. These theories, with their emphasis on multiple perspectives, context, and collaborative relationships allow for important considerations of diversity as well as clients’ strengths and resilience, and can serve as formats for the broadest forms of change. In its contemporary form, psychodynamic theory offers a complex and rich understanding of human behavior and a direction for practice that is utterly consistent with social work values and interests.     

Can welfare reform make disability disappear?

I argue here that, while welfare reform policy and the disability rights movement appear to share a common agenda based on the belief that disability is a social creation which can be remedied by way of increased access to employment and social resources, their world views and objectives could not be more at odds. By demonstrating how welfare reform policy makers have opportunistically appropriated the language which frames the disability rights movement and, in the style of Orwell's Newspeak, used it to conceal an agenda which actually aims for the reverse of what it promises, I seek to show that what is being promoted as a means for increased access to a better life for disabled people could be more aptly described as a gateway to poverty.     

The Not Altogether Social Construction of Emotions: A Critique of Harré and Gillett

Are emotions like sneezes, unwilled, mechanical, or are they like judgments; are they entirely social constructions? Harré and Gillett believe that emotions are exclusively judgments. We argue that their view misses something important. Imagine a person quaking in anger. Both we and Harré and Gillett believe that he is angry only if he has made an implicit judgment, such as I have been transgressed against. But it is the quaking, not the judgment, that gives authenticity and force to the expression of anger. The quaking does not clarify what the actor means but rather it clarifies the relation of the actor to the meaning of his display. What makes it a genuine expression of anger and not a joke or performance is that the quaking is beyond the will. Bodily displays are not necessary to make expressions authentic; anything that shows that the expression is beyond the will will do, for instance, obsessive thoughts, intrusions, or an inability to concentrate. For Harré and Gillett emotions both as displays and feelings do not merely embody judgments but are also speech acts. We argue that an expression, a feeling or flitting through the mind, cannot be a speech act since only the overt can fit into the convention, the strictures of a community. Nor is the display merely a speech act. Since for an emotional display to be genuine it must slip from the lips unbidden. Further, a speech act account makes the emotions arbitrary; they imply that the set of possible emotions is open. We think, on the other hand, that only some sorts of judgments can become part of an emotion; judgments that relate to things that are important enough in a particular culture that judgment display and feeling are linked together involuntarily.     

The Emotional Climate of Nations and Their Culture of Peace

Societies seem to have emotional climates that affect how people feel and act in public situations. Unlike the emotions experienced in an individual's personal life, these modal feelings reflect a collective response to the socio-economic-political situation of the society and influence how most people behave toward one another and their government. A government may foster a climate of fear to ensure social control, or it may encourage the formation of heterogeneous social groups to facilitate a climate of trust between people from different groups. On one hand, emotional climates may be viewed as reflecting the relative peacefulness or violence of a society. Thus, an assessment of emotional climate may provide a subjective index of human security to complement objective measures of democracy, human rights, equality, and other factors that we presume are beneficial to human welfare. On the other hand, we may view emotional climates as influences that act to further or to impede the development of the culture of peace advocated by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Thus, their assessment may have predictive power, and measuring a society's emotional climate may help us to create desirable policy. In this article we show that it is possible to measure some important aspects of the emotional climates of three nations that have different degrees of a culture of peace: Norway, the United States, and India. We show that estimates of the collective emotions that constitute climate can be distinguished from reports of personal emotions in that the former are more influenced by nation and the latter by social class. It is the subjective experience of national emotional climate, rather than personal emotional experience, that appears most related to objective indices for the culture of peace in the different nations.     

Collective Emotions in Conflict Situations: Societal Implications

It is well established today that emotions are an important part of most societal dynamics. The current article focuses on the role of different collective emotional elements in creating, preserving, and resolving conflicts. The main premise is that collective emotions play a pivotal role in shaping individual and societal responses to conflicting events and in contributing to the evolvement of a social context that maintains the emotional climate and collective emotional orientation that have developed. The first part of the article provides a conceptual framework to discuss the relations between conflict, context, and collective emotions. The second part uses the conceptual framework to discuss the societal implications of the articles presented in this issue. Taken together, the parts create a platform for future research on the role of collective emotions in conflict resolution and the construction of cultures of peace.     

What's Social About Social Emotions?

This paper presents a new approach to the demarcation of social emotions, based on their dependence on social appraisals that are designed to assess events bearing on social concerns. Previous theoretical attempts to characterize social emotions are compared, and their inconsistencies highlighted. Evidence for the present formulation is derived from theory and research into links between appraisals and emotions. Emotions identified as social using our criteria are also shown to bring more consistent consequences for social behavior than nonsocial emotions. We conclude by considering ways of validating and refining our classification.     

Structures of seeing: blindness,race, and gender in visual culture

This essay draws on critical disability studies and blindness studies to rethink our commonsense understanding of vision and unsettle the normative sensory subject that is lodged in visual culture studies. Through a disability studies critique of visual culture studies and a juxtaposition of blind studies alongside the canonical images of the “male gaze” and the “white gaze” this paper argues that (visual) difference does not exist in the world waiting to be seen, but that difference is produced in visual power relations. This essay proposes that the possibilities of visual culture are determined by structures of seeing, rather than physiology or optics, arguing that as long as visual culture and social justice studies are lodged within a Cartesian conception of the subject, they falter in conceptualizing the social construction of perception and difference, for they have not destabilized the “distribution of the sensible” (Rancière) of their own epistemic tradition. Race, gender, and disability are apprehended here not primarily as identity categories, but as possibilities of the body that develop(ed) in tandem in complex socio-historical formations.