Social Influence: Representation, Imagination and Facts

Studies on social influence bring us to fear that influence may alienate us and turn us into an agent of the will and desire of the other. This fear relies on a representation of the relationship of influence: it would be an asymmetrical relationship involving two basically opposite and complementary entities, the source (who has a desire, a will, a power or, failing that, a technique) and the target (who is subjected, subordinate). If some experiments in social psychology demonstrate the effectiveness of some techniques of influence and manipulation, they must however be analysed in detail. Many experiments and theories show that influence is not basically nonreciprocal. These works are neglected because they are too different from the imaginary representation of influence that dominates both social psychology and common sense.     

The Fallacy of Misplaced Intentionality in Social Representation Research

This paper argues that social representations cannot be used as independent variables in causal explanations of social behaviour. It is shown that the structure of investigations often follows a causally explanatory design despite explicit statements to the contrary by the researchers. This fact is analyzed with three investigations. It is argued that verbal data used to assess the contents of a representation as independent variable are logically equivalent to data obtained from the "dependent" overt behaviour. Therefore these two kinds of data must be seen as two illustrations of the same representational contents. The researchers'preference for using verbal data to assess the independent variable and the tendency to introduce a causal relationship between representation and behaviour is shown to result from misplacing folk-beliefs. Folk-beliefs about intentional causality, it is shown, pertain to the same level as other beliefs about the world on the part of the subjects. Hence they are part of the folk-representation itself and must be treated as such; their use in scientific accounts of the belief-action relationship is not implied by data on rational belief systems. It is suggested to conceptualize social representations as integral units of beliefs and action which may be used to explain causally subsequent contingent social events. The function of folk-beliefs in intentional causality for the self-concept of rational people and for social accountability is discussed.     

"African American" as a new Social Representation

The use of African American as a new denomination for a group previously referred to as Black has rapidly become standard practice in American society. This paper analyzes how the introduction of African American in our ordinary language marks the elaboration of a new social reality. As the concept becomes part of our social life, it is transformed into a real "phenomenon" of social representation that formalizes behaviour and orients communication. Such a transformation requires that the new term infiltrates people's everyday lives sufficiently to concretize it into a common reality. The analysis presented here outlines three key processes in the emergence and formation of the social representation of African American. The first one is anchoring which familiarizes the new object by linking it with preexisting categories in our minds. The second process is objectification which assures the crystallization of the object. A figurative core is created to allow the projection of images. At this point people can talk about the object, and through communication the object takes on meaning. This naturalization is the third process to conclude the transformation of the object into a social reality. These steps have allowed African American to become the carrier for a modification of cognitions and broadening of attitudes concerning the group.     

Social Origins of Cognition: Bartlett, Evolutionary Perspective and Embodied Mind Approach

This paper explores new avenues of research on social bases of cognition and a more adequate (than those extant) framework to conceive the phenomena of the human mind. It firstly examines Bartlett's work on social bases of cognition, from which three pertinent features are identified, namely multi-level analyses, evolutionary perspective and embodied mind approach. It then examines recent works on social origins of cognition in ethology and paleoanthropology, and various forms of the embodied mind approach recently proposed in neuroscience and cognitive science. The paper concludes that extending the embodied mind approach would provide the most potent framework to enable, amongst others, the conceptual integration of the biological, psychological and social bases of the human mind, which have in the past been treated mainly as competing alternatives.     

旅游目的地影视社会表象与影视旅游——基于传媒学的研究

旅游目的地形象作为一种特殊的社会表象,是刺激旅游行为产生的重要因素之一。在旅游目的地社会表象形成过程中,影视传媒起着十分重要的作用。影视传媒区别于其它媒体的特点、议程设置功能、受众文化心理结构等特点以及大众传媒背景等都会影响旅游目的地影视社会表象的形成。影视社会表象的＂社会共享性＂与＂行为说明性＂决定了影视旅游是一种必然的大众旅游行为。     

社会表征理论述评——一种旨在整合心理与社会的理论视角

本文梳理了社会表征理论的历史脉络及其内涵,评述了其理论创新之处及其相关研究,认为社会表征理论作为一种重返人文主义话语形态的新生理论,对美国社会心理学话语霸权具有不可低估的解构作用,但有待于进一步精致化。     

Analysing Social Values in Identification; A Framework for Research on the Representation and Implementation of Values

This article contributes to the concept of social values by presenting analytical tools that explore how social values are classified, re‐presented and interpersonally performed in the construction of identities. I approach social values as classificatory systems of acceptability and desirability that are collectively generated. The meanings of social values are embedded in culture and in power imbalanced social relations; they constantly undergo reformulation in identification processes and are also used to define the social order. I suggest that social values can be analysed in relation to aspects of representation and interpersonal positioning that are also involved in the construction of identities: Value classifications involve compartmentalising moral orders into e.g. good, desirable, important, necessary; value projects are concerned with how value classifications and content occupy roles and become oriented to action; and value positioning is concerned with how narrators align with value classifications and projects as well as with individuals and groups seen to share or reject such classifications and projects.     

语言具身认知原理及其理论基础

具身认知是认知科学研究领域的最新范式与前沿主题之一,引起多学科的研究兴趣。具身认知与语言认知结合的研究方法是一种新的认知研究范式,即语言具身认知,它从认识论、心理学和认知神经学层面研究其认识论基础、心脑机制以及认知神经学基础,为理解语言内化、语言体验、语言处理、语言生成等符号文化的创造性加工机制提供了新颖的思想启示,也为探讨语言认知的理论与实践研究的新路径、提升语言研究与教学的社会效能提供了参考。     

范式论视域中的语言具身认知

语言具身认知（ELC）作为认知语言学的一种独立的研究范式已经见诸学界,但从范式理论的角度审视ELC尚未有效展开。ELC范式在学术传统、理论论证、理论内涵、应用价值、实践研究的原则与方法论方面还需要进一步厘清。ELC研究还应坚持理论与实践相结合、宏观与微观研究相结合原则,坚持明确的学术立场,创新基于ELC的教学理念,培育ELC研究的学术共同体和学术平台。     

具身模仿:从神经元到现象体验

影响我们对空间中运动的身体进行无意识建模的神经结构同样与我们觉知世界所包含的主动身体和对象有关.神经科学的研究也表明,在我们感受到自己主动身体的多层个人体验,和我们同时持有的对于他人内隐确定事件的感知之间,存在着起调节作用的神经机制.这种个人的和与身体有关的经验性知识使得我们能够理解他人做出的动作,从而理解他们所体验的情绪和感情.无论是身体意识还是社会理解的基本形式,都有一个共同的功能性机制作为其基础,即具身模仿.这些假设和现象学所提出的一些看法非常一致.     

语言具身认知与结构主义语言学的关联性研究

语言具身认知具有语言学的思想渊源,与近代语言学重要的流派结构主义语言学有着内在关联。语言具身认知的主张和观念与结构主义语言学所遵守的整体主义方法论有着内在的传承性。系统的整体主义观念影响着语言认知的最为突出的体现就是将身体、环境、脑纳入语言认知系统中,强调身体、环境、心脑之间的交互作用。     

"代表"的概念理解

代表理论是政治学重要的理论之一.本文从代表概念的内部元素以及代表同民主的外部关系两方面对代表概念进行考察,并探讨了代表理论发展过程中出现的矛盾与问题.基此,作者认为,我们需要对民主代表制而非代议制民主进行反思.     

水与彩的魅力陈述——毛得墚画作印象

毛得墚(德良),1962年生人,辽宁省东港市人,1985年毕业于鲁迅美术学院美术教育系,中国美协会员、辽宁省美协理事、辽河画院专职画家。作品多次获奖,其中水彩画作《倾城乐》获第二届中国美术金彩奖,《瓷盘与干鱼》入选中国水彩百年画展,《苍宇永恒》获首届中国美术创作奖及第十一届全国美展优秀奖。多幅作品被中国美术馆和上海刘海粟美术馆等机构收藏。