Toward a sociological theory of social pain

A serious consideration of pain has largely been absent in sociology, especially physical pain's close neurobiological relative, social pain. Social pain is the process by which rejection and exclusion recruits similar neural circuits as physical pain, generating an affectual response that mirrors the response one feels from physical trauma. Pain is essential to any sociological analysis of motivation and action because, like many affective responses, it is a necessary ingredient in cognition and behavior; and, in many cases, it preconsciously commands and even controls how we think and act. While exploring this concept, it becomes apparent that sociology has an entire set of distantly related concepts that can be classified as different processes of social pain that reveal the structural, cultural, and situational conditions shaping the distribution of social pain. The paper concludes by thinking through the implications social pain portends for neuroscience and sociology.     

On the historicity of social ontology

The question I raise is whether the basic features of mind, social categories, and society are unchanging or changing. Some understandings of ontology would seem to suggest that social ontology is a branch of metaphysics. However, as the history of concepts such as metaphysical and ontology indicate, our concepts and knowledge are historical. It is widely held that society is concept- and activity-dependent. I examine critically two strands of social ontology in terms of their answers to this problematic: (1) John Searle’s theory of the construction of social reality and (2) critical realist theory of mind and society as interlaced emergent layers of reality. Apart from emergence in natural systems, there is also emergence beyond nature as consciousness, agency and society cannot be completely explained in terms of biological realities; but how and when did this emergence occur? We need an account of the emergent order of language, reflectively conscious mind, and institutions not only for its own sake, but also because the process whereby new objects and properties emerge may be on-going, path-dependent, diverse, and open-ended. The main argument is that the object of study of social theorists is geo-historically specific, liable to diversity within any given world-historical epoch, and open to further changes and new forms of emergence in the future.     

An ontology of power and leadership

In this article I draw upon the social ontologies developed by John Searle, Roy Bhaskar, Margaret Archer and Tony Lawson in order to distinguish between power and leadership. To do so, I distinguish the different organizing principles behind natural phenomena, collective phenomena and institutional phenomena, and argue that an understanding of those different organizing principles is essential to a clearer conceptualization of power and leadership. Natural power and cultural power, as I argue, depend upon the organizing principles of natural phenomena, and differ depending on whether those organizing principles have been transformed by humans, in which case it becomes cultural power, or not, in which case it simply is natural power. Leadership emerges with the ability of making other humans share mental states through collective intentionality. Institutional power, in contrast, is connected to the creation of a deontology of rights and obligations that provide what Searle calls desire‐independent reasons for action.     

Social ontology,practical reasonableness,and collective reasons for action

I argue that the ontology of human social institutions and collective intentionality could be anchored in the normative notion of ‘practical reasonableness’ as collective reason for action. This involves the deontic idea of mutuality, accepted rules, and shared attitudes of other‐regardedness. I examine John Searle's three primitive notions of social ontology: collective intentionality, assignment of social functions, and constitutive rules and procedures. I use these notions to provide a plausible basis for understanding how people reason, in order to arrive at practically reasonable decisions and collective agency. Searle argues that social reality, institutions, processes, and facts are grounded in collective intentionality and the acceptance of social rules, procedures, and functions. I argue that collective intentionality and socially accepted rules are anchored in the need for human interdependence that engenders the social rules and norms or attitudes of ‘practical reasonableness’. I analyze the concept of ‘practical reasonableness’ as a representation of human mode of reasoning that involves collective intentionality.     

The right tool for the job: problems and solutions in visualizing sociological theory

The visualization of social theory is an important part of the development and communication of our theoretical ideas. While most theorists use figures of some kind, few if any have formal training, or guiding rules or principles for the representation of theory. This has often led to poor visualization efforts, and the visual culture of sociology continues to lag behind the natural sciences. The intent of this paper is to serve as a practical and empirically aided guide for social theorists, by providing insights surrounding the cognitive and perceptual properties of certain elements and figures. Through these properties we identify four major problems in theory visualization: vagueness, reduction, unwanted spatial inferences and unwanted metaphorical inferences. We offer solutions to these problems, and to improving theory visualization more generally. Our hope is that this paper will serve as a resource for more thoughtful and informed visualization for practicing social theorists.     

The mind–body problem and social science: Motivating a quantum social theory

This comment addresses some of the critiques of “Quantum Mind and Social Science” by the other contributors, with special reference to the challenge that the mind‐body problem poses to conventional, classical thinking about social science. A quantum social ontology transcends those challenges, and in the process could transform social scientific thinking across the board. As an example the essay concludes with a consideration of the physics of social structure.     

Game theory,cheap talk and post‐truth politics: David Lewis vs. John Searle on reasons for truth‐telling

I offer two potential diagnoses of the behavioral norms governing post‐truth politics by comparing the view of language, communication, and truth‐telling put forward by David Lewis (extended by game theorists), and John Searle. My first goal is to specify the different ways in which Lewis, and game theorists more generally, in contrast to Searle (in the company of Paul Grice and Jürgen Habermas), go about explaining the normativity of truthfulness within a linguistic community. The main difference is that for Lewis and game theorists, “truthful” signaling follows from an alignment of interests, and deception follows from mixed motives leading to the calculation that sending false information is better for oneself. Following in the Enlightenment tradition, Searle argues that practical reasoning, which involves mastery of at least one language, requires that actors intend to communicate. This intention includes constraining the content of statements to uphold veracity conditions. After distinguishing between these two accounts, I will articulate the implications for explaining, and even informing actions, constitutive of post‐truth politics. I argue that the strategic view of communication is sufficient neither to model everyday conversation nor to reflect a public sphere useful for democratic government. Both the pedagogy of strategic communication as cheap talk, and its concordance with new digital information technologies, challenge norms of truthfulness that underlie modern institutions essential to an effective public sphere.     

对"是-应当"问题的现象学分析和解答

围绕"是-应当"问题,哲学家们提出了各种思考和分析.该文试图通过对胡塞尔现象学哲学的理解,来简单阐述胡塞尔现象学的思想对"是-应当"问题的分析和解答以及对经验主义伦理学的解构.     

Entangling the social: Comments on Alexander Wendt,Quantum Mind and Social Science

Alexander Wendt suggests that an emerging field of research on quantum consciousness may have important implications for our understanding of the social world as well. He wants us to consider that the operations of the brain are not “classical” but rather quantum‐mechanical, and that this sheds light on the social worker as well. This article casts doubt on these claims. First, the idea of panpsychism (all physical things possess features of consciousness) is implausible on its face. Second, the findings of “quantum decision theory” are much more limited than Wendt recognizes. Third, the biological quantum effects currently subject to investigation are limited in their application to brains and persons by unavoidable limits of time and space scale on quantum effects. The “brain as quantum computer” or “brain as wave function” theory is very implausible given current knowledge.     

维权情境中的自发性认知解放——以业主积极分子的权利意识的演进为例

本文旨在考察业主维权情景中行动者的认知过程。作者提出了理解主观认知的分析框架,并根据权利内容即财产权抑或自治权、权利性质即反应性抑或进取性两个维度,对业主权利意识进行类型学划分。对微博的分析呈现了近年来业主积极分子权利意识的分布和演变状况;访谈结果则显示积极分子对权利意识的认知解放是一个自发、互动的过程,而且抗争面临的阻力促进相似抗争的连结,社会化媒体为类似抗争的串联提供了平台,推动了认知解放过程。本文阐明了在中国情境下框架化和认知解放过程的自发性和互动性,同时指出未来的研究应该从以事件为中心的案例分析转向以议题为核心的抗议事件族的分析。     

Testing old theories in new surroundings: The timing of first social security laws in Africa

This article examines the timing of the introduction of four major social security programmes — work accident insurance, sickness benefits, pensions, and family allowances — in 43 African countries. Further, it explores whether legislative structure, dominant religion or the colonial past of the country is of importance when we control for year of independence, prosperity, degree of democracy, government stability, industrialization and the size and ethnic homogeneity of the population. On the basis of Cox hazard rate modelling it is concluded that industrialized, homogeneous and rather populous countries that were under French rule tend to be pioneers in African social security legislation.     

彼得拉任斯基心理法学说述评

彼得拉任斯基心理法学说有着特定的历史背景和理论渊源 ,其主要内容包括 :法学方法论 ,法的概念及其分类 ,法和国家 ,法与正义、道德 ,法的功能与发展等。虽然彼氏关于法是具有命令和归属性的法律冲动的定义不可能揭示法的本质 ,但他的学说却可能成为后人在法学研究中建功立业的起     

The practices of collective action: Practice theory,sustainability transitions and social change

Developing theory for understanding social transformation is essential for environmental sustainability, yet mainstream accounts of collective action neglect the dynamics of daily life. Theories of practice have proved generative for the study of sustainable consumption but struggle to accommodate the roles of collective actors, strategic action and purposive collective projects in social change. In response, this paper develops a practice theoretical account of collective action pertinent to processes of large scale social change, with specific focus on transitions towards sustainability. We consider three ideal types of collective—bureaucratic organisations, groupings and latent networks—and, drawing on existing social theoretical resources that are ontologically compatible with a practice account, explore the kinds of practices and arrangements which compose them. Processes concerning strategy, bureaucracy, management, social worlds and collective identity are identified as important combinations of practices and arrangements. We suggest a key contribution of practice theory has been to identify a type of collective action we call dispersed collective activity, and we suggest how this type of activity may give rise to collectives. We conclude by suggesting further development for the realisation of the project's contribution to the analysis of sustainability transitions.     

Theory and social work: A conceptual review of the literature

This article presents a conceptual review of the literature concerning social work and theory. Based on analysis of 93 research studies, drawn from literature in English published between 1968 and 2016, the review considers the many ways that theory is conceptualised in the literature, and asks meta‐theoretical questions about how and why different conceptualisations arise. The article examines definitional questions and ambiguities concerning the use of theory, extant research on the use of theory by social workers in practice, hostility expressed regarding theory in social work, the theory/practice divide and perspectives that emphasise theory's utility or functionality. The article points at some methodological and ethical limitations concerning current research, and summarises dominant, as well as less prominent, versions of what counts as theory within the social work discipline, before finally suggesting that further meta‐theoretical research is needed.     

Social work and social problems: A contribution from systems theory and constructionism

Social work builds its identity on social problems. The goal is to generate knowledge about causes, consequences and solutions. However, there is a lack of theory of social problems. We suggest that research on social problems can benefit by ‘bringing the observer in’: Loseke's constructionist framework and Luhmann's systems theory. According to Loseke, social problems appear differently when constructed by different observers. Constructions vary in terms of morality, conditions, victims/villains and solutions. From Luhmann we learn that modern society consists of a multitude of social systems (e.g. politics, science, economy etc.), each operating with their own communicative codes. Combining both approaches, we hypothesise that any social system constructs its own (version of) social problems. Illustrating with the empirical case ‘suicide among mentally ill people’, we examine how a phenomenon is constructed differently as a social problem by four different social systems: the disability movement, politics, medicine and social work.     

A new model of the development of deception: Disentangling the role of false‐belief understanding in deceptive ability

“Deception” is defined predominantly as the intentional attempt to create false‐beliefs in others. However, the intentionality behind early acts of deception and its relation to false‐belief understanding remain unresolved. In this article, we offer a three‐stage theoretical model of the development of deception in human ontogeny. We posit that at any age, human deception is an intentional action, but its form changes according to the level of the deceiver's intentionality. As the primary function of deception is to influence the behaviour of others, we argue that first‐stage deceptions‐in‐action involves only in the analysis of behaviours and perceptual access, not beliefs. In our view, the ability to deceive and false‐belief understanding are eventually inter‐connected, but false‐belief understanding is not essential for the earliest form of deception. Based on empirical findings, which suggest that by observing the results of early deceptions children build their knowledge of mental states as causes of human actions, we claim that the second stage of deception is representational deception. Further, as the understanding of beliefs becomes more advanced, the effectiveness of children's deception increases, and new forms of reflective deception (the third stage) emerge. Future directions for research are outlined, and limitations of the current model are discussed.     

Globalisation of consciousness and new challenges for international social work

Although the notion of international social work is not new, it is only in recent times that its central premises have been in focus. Considering diverse ongoing globalisation processes and in regard to the weakening of the national welfare state, social work must tackle the challenge of redefining its role and mission if it is to remain true to its professional commitments. The emergence of new global regions and the globalisation of local social problems make the consolidation of democracy and human rights, the prevention of conflicts and the promotion of solidarity and peace through global cultural integration some of the main concerns of international social work. In this article, international social work is discussed as a project of partnership between diverse social actors such as practitioners, universities and local governments cooperating beyond the boundaries of the nation-state.     

Paradigms of measurement

In this study some conceptual developments in the theory of measurement are reframed with the use of a model-theoretic interpretation. These paradigms (physical, extended physical and representational paradigm) which emerge in the process of reconceptualization are discussed. This discussion enables us to highlight a certain logic behind a series of developments in the theory of measurement and leads to a new, more general conceptualization.     

Responding to global shifts in social work through the language of service user and service user involvement

'Service user' advisory representation is required by law and/or regulation in British social, health and educational programmes. This is similar to client counsels or consumer groups in the USA, which are required in some, but not all, US social service sectors. Often users of welfare services are excluded from citizenship – both formally and in terms of actual restraints on their citizenship rights. There remains uncertainty, however, about how best to identify and enable such individuals to participate in service user involvement without continued marginalisation. This study seeks to contribute to our emerging understanding of service user initiatives by exploring preferred terms of reference and service user involvement from the point of view of persons often categorised as service users by social policy, health and social care providers and academics, but who do not necessarily take part in self-organised service user groups.     

Responding to global shifts in social work through the language of service user and service user involvement

'Service user' advisory representation is required by law and/or regulation in British social, health and educational programmes. This is similar to client counsels or consumer groups in the USA, which are required in some, but not all, US social service sectors. Often users of welfare services are excluded from citizenship – both formally and in terms of actual restraints on their citizenship rights. There remains uncertainty, however, about how best to identify and enable such individuals to participate in service user involvement without continued marginalisation. This study seeks to contribute to our emerging understanding of service user initiatives by exploring preferred terms of reference and service user involvement from the point of view of persons often categorised as service users by social policy, health and social care providers and academics, but who do not necessarily take part in self-organised service user groups.