What Collins's The Sociology of Philosophies Says about Sociological Theory

In Collins's latest book, we see an attempt to apply his sociological theories to the history of philosophy. While Collins's macrosociology of knowledge provides important insights into the role of conflict in an intellectual field, his microsociology is more problematic. In particular, Collins's micro theory ignores the fundamental importance of social interpretations. This leads him to use a vague and unproductive notion of emotions. Nevertheless, we can usefully apply Collins's findings to sociological theory itself. As in philosophy, we see the same competitive appropriation and elaboration of accumulated intellectual capital and the same struggle over the limited resources necessary to intellectual production, especially over what Collins calls the intellectual attention space.     

The Micro Potential for Social Change: Emotion, Consciousness, and Social Movement Formation

Can one explain both the resilience of the status quo and the possibility for resistance from a subordinate position? This paper aims to resolve these seemingly incompatible perspectives. By extending Randall Collins's interaction ritual theory, and synthesizing it with Norbert Wiley's model of the self, this paper suggests how the emotional dynamics between people and within the self can explain social inertia as well as the possibility for resistance and change. Diverging from literature on the sociology of emotions that has been concerned with individual emotional processes, this paper considers the collective level in order to explore how movement action is motivated. The emotional dynamics of subordinate positioning that limit women's options in face-to-face interactions are examined, as are the social processes of developing feminist consciousness and a willingness to participate in resistance work. Pointing toward empirical applications, I conclude by suggesting conditions where resistance is likely.     

Self‐interest in Chinese discourse and practice: temporal distinctions of self

A concept of self‐interest, through which different interests relate to distinct temporal phases of selves, is examined by considering the operation of self‐interest in a context in which it is frequently held to be absent. Chinese culture, frequently described as collectivist, developed intellectual traditions in which self‐interest is assumed. Chinese sociologists affirm the centrality of self‐interest for understanding social relationships and practices. Confucian antipathy to selfishness relates to admonishment of satisfaction of the interests of present selves against those of past selves. Variable institutional selection of distinct temporal phases of self is core to understanding major differences between Confucianism and Daoism and their respective conceptions of self‐interest.     

The message is the medium: immaterialism and McLuhan’s Poetic Excess

Against interpretations of Marshall McLuhan as philosophical materialist, I argue that Understanding Media and its tagline, the medium is the message, show McLuhan to be an immaterialist: a poetic, intuitive thinker, at least as interested in immaterial as in material aspects of the world. From a pragmatic perspective, or one requiring attention to both poetic and technical modes of understanding, McLuhan’s approach—offering a torrent of flashing insights and neglecting the process of empirically assessing these insights—is described as poetic excess. This is a double-edged sword, alienating many readers even as it inspires others. McLuhan’s poetic excess is a rhetorical reminder of the value and power of poetic thinking, and simultaneously of its insufficiency for the fullest understanding. Pleading that his poetic texts should be read rhetorically rather than literally, I argue we should forgive McLuhan’s worst affronts to technical, materialist rationality. McLuhan’s immaterialist epistemology, inseparable from the content of his insights, is a valuable part of his distinctive and foundational contribution to media studies.     

Failure is always an option: the necessity,promise & peril of radical contextualism

This essay pays tribute to Lawrence Grossberg and his influence through a consideration of radical contextualism – an analytical process that: (1) understands reality as contingently relational, complex, and always open to alteration; and (2) attempts to narratively represent the messiness and complexity of empirical reality as rigorously as possible (with an explicit recognition of the limits of our ability to do so). The piece opens by reflecting briefly on these principles with respect to the genre of intellectual tribute – that is, to contextualize what it means to talk about Larry and his work within the framework of the advisor/advisee relationship. How do you combine the care of engagement with the ethics of argumentation to make a statement that is as personal as it is intellectual? From there, I situate radical contextualism within Cultural Studies as both an ethical-intellectual commitment and an analytical practice. The goal here is to discuss both the positive and negative potential of this process. I end by reflecting on how Larry’s intellectual commitment to radical contextualism also works as a personal form of radical contextuality.     

Intellectuals in Contemporary Social Theory: A Radical Critique

Contemporary social theorists have been remarkably consistent in advocating an analytically defined ideal-type of the modern intellectual. This ideal-type presents the intellectual as a politically autonomous critic pursuing knowledge for its own sake. I argue that this concept rests on the presupposition of specific empirical and historical conditions concerning the social organization of intellectuals. To the degree that these presuppositions are "falsifiable" by a historically grounded framework of intellectual "action," one may challenge the "epistemological" claims of modern intellectuals with a "class conscious" sociology of knowledge.     

Merton’s Sociology 215-216 Course

For many years, Robert K. Merton taught a famous, year-long graduate course at Columbia called The Analysis of Social Structures. His lectures have been recalled for their dazzling intellectual effects by those who took the course, but none of these former students has described what Merton actually said in specific lectures. I do this now, using my extensive lecture notes from 1952–53 when I took it for credit, and from later years when I sat in on the course. The core of the course at that time was Merton’s Paradigm for Functional Analysis in Sociology. Each concept in the paradigm—subjective dispositions, objective consequences, functional requirements, structural constraints, etc.—was elaborated in its relationship to a wide variety of sociological problems in the published theoretical and empirical literature. I also recount how Merton’s relationship to Talcott Parsons appeared to us in the course.     

Ayahuasca healing beyond the Amazon: the globalization of a traditional indigenous entheogenic practice

Ayahuasca commonly refers to a psychoactive Amazonian indigenous brew traditionally used for spiritual and healing purposes (that is as an entheogen). Since the late twentieth century, ayahuasca has undergone a process of globalization through the uptake of different kinds of socio‐cultural practices, including its sacramental use in some new Brazilian religious movements and its commodified use in cross‐cultural vegetalismo practices, or indigenous‐style rituals conducted primarily for non‐indigenous participants. In this article, I explore the rise of such rituals beyond the Amazon region, and consider some philosophical and political concerns arising from this novel trend in ayahuasca use, including the status of traditional indigenous knowledge, cultural appropriation and intellectual property. I discuss a patent dispute in Unites States and allegations of biopiracy related to ayahuasca. I conclude the article with some reflections on the future of ayahuasca drinking as a transnational sociological phenomenon.     

Women Behaving Badly: Female Speakers Backstage

In this paper I explore women's (and girls') self-presentation in contexts where they seem most relaxed, most off-record, drawing on Goffman's concept of 'backstage'. In particular, I shall focus on those aspects of women's backstage performance of self which do not fit prevailing norms of femininity, in other words, women's performances of 'not-nice' selves, as well as reports of – and fantasies about – behaving 'badly'. The analysis will draw on a corpus of spontaneous conversation involving girl and women friends. It will be argued that the backstage talk possible only with close friends provides women with an arena where norms can be subverted and challenged and alternative selves explored. But it also needs to be acknowledged that in an important sense such talk helps to maintain the heteropatriarchal order, by providing an outlet for the frustrations of frontstage performance.     

Constructing Clean Dreams: Accounts,Future Selves,and Social and Structural Support as Desistance Work

This article investigates the discourse individuals use when talking about desisting from criminal offending. I analyze the links between offenders’ accounts of past negative behavior, their construction of their possible “clean” future selves, and the social and structural conditions in which they were raised and continue to be embedded. Applying Scott and Lyman's (1968) framework on accounts and Markus and Nurius's (1986) framework of possible selves to interview data with twenty‐eight criminal offenders, I illustrate how excuses for past behavior provide a way for people to distance themselves from their past selves in attempts to preserve or re‐create a possible self that is still worthy to be redeemed in the future. This discourse becomes one mechanism that motivates individuals to change their lives—but it can be short‐lived. The analysis highlights how limited structural opportunities influence individuals’ lifestyles and behaviors, how individuals approach the desistance process even in the face of structural deprivation, and how they attempt to sustain this desistance process.     

Limites et pertinence de la guerre juste face au terrorisme et aux nouvelles guerres

This article aims to examine the pertinence as well as the limits of the just war theory in order to apprehend the ethical issues raised by contemporary forms of political violence. Terrorism is undoubtedly an extreme case of political violence that puts to the test the theoretical and practical relevance of jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles. From a sociological point of view, it appears necessary to understand contemporary terrorism within the historical evolution of armed conflicts and under the light of current research devoted to the concept of ‘new wars’. Although I will argue that just war theory does not sufficiently take into account current studies on the empirical features of contemporary wars, it is nonetheless possible to salvage the theoretical and practical relevance of just war theory in a more specified sense. From a philosophical point of view, the goal of this article is to confront the theoretical and practical relevance of just war theory with the current body of research in the field of the sociology of war in order to assess both its limitations and its potential scope.     

“The Way That I Look at Things [Is] Different Because It's Me”: Constructing and Deconstructing Narratives About Racialized Sexual Selves

Many gender scholars have abandoned the notion that we can explore women's experiences without attention to other identities such as race, class, and/or sexual orientation. Until now, the ways race influences the development of sexual selves has been underexplored. In this paper, I focus on heterosexual women's accounts of the interplay of race, gender, and sexualities. Based on in‐depth interviews with sixty‐two white and African American heterosexual women between the ages of twenty and sixty‐eight, I examine the ways in which narrative work tells a story about the presentation of public sexual selves. I also explore how women's personal narratives are impacted by larger cultural narratives about race. Specifically, through a study of sexuality, I focus on the social construction of “postracialism.”     

Why Postmodern Theory may be a Problematic Basis for Therapeutic Practice: A Feminist Perspective

Both poststructural and social constructionist thinking are imbued with a masculine bias. First, I demonstrate that Foucault's theory of power and knowledge fails to take into account the female experience of power and the gendered nature of knowledge production. With the support of psychoanalytic theory I also claim that Foucault's theory of the ‘social’, ‘discursive’ production of ‘selves’ omits the contribution of the prelinguistic but no less ‘social’ mother–infant relationship, and in so doing obscures the prelinguistic foundations of emotionality. This poststructural reduction of ‘selves’ to, and subsequent subsuming of emotionality within, the instance of ‘language’, ‘discourse’ or ‘narrative’, is, I claim, replicated in the social constructionist thinking of Gergen and Bruner. Finally, I consider some of the consequences of a therapeutic practice which has its foundations in these two interrelated bodies of thought, suggesting, from a feminist perspective, that a major shortcoming of this narrative practice is its failure to attend to emotionality.     

Symbolic Interactionism in Canada: Shared Meaning and the Perpetuation of Ideas

In this paper I critically discuss Helmes‐Hayes and Milne's institutional perspective, as well as Neil McLaughlin's emphasis on scientific intellectual movements and Coserian intellectual sects, in explaining the emergence and potential future of symbolic interactionist theory in Canada. I contest claims that the interactionism is on the verge of disappearing and instead offer an explanation grounded in insights about shared meaning. I conclude that it is ironic that debates over the presumed demise of symbolic interaction may well contribute to its continued existence within the canon of Canadian sociology.     

The sudden rise of French existentialism: a case-study in the sociology of intellectual life

This article offers a new explanation for the sudden rise in popularity of French existentialism, in particular of Sartre’s version, in the mid-1940s. It develops a multidimensional account that recognizes both structural and cultural factors. The explanation differs from, and more fully addresses the complexity of the situation than, the two most prominent existing explanations: namely Anna Boschetti’s Bourdieu-inspired account and Randall Collins’s network-based approach. It is argued that, because of specific socio-political circumstances, the intellectual establishment became tainted and lost legitimacy, with its aesthetic and philosophical views now regarded as outdated if not politically dangerous. This hiatus brought unprecedented publishing opportunities for a new philosophical current, and skilful public performances by the main protagonists helped its ascendancy. Most importantly, existentialist writers colluded with de Gaulle in portraying a cohesive and defiant French nation; and their philosophy, especially in its notion of responsibility, enabled sections of French society to assimilate and make sense of the recent past, whilst drawing a line underneath it so as to move forward.     

For a sociological philosophy

Conclusion Sociology, then, should prove to be relevant to a host of issues within the traditional purview of philosophy: Epistemology and philosophy of science, of course; the issue of solipsism and other minds (as Habermas has already seen, invoking Mead); ontological issues of the mind/body relation, of person/self/identity (on which there is a wealth of untapped materials, from Goffman, Mead, and in the lineage of Durkheim and Mauss now being rediscovered); and more deeply the questions of materialism/idealism, realism and anti-realism. All questions in the philosophy of ethics, ranging from conceptual analysis to critical and constructive ethics, make sense realistically only if handled with a sociological understanding of where moral ideals and feelings emerge from. The extent of possible success of sociological explanations is a crucial point for any discussion of determinism and indeterminism, and relatedly for the notion of will, free or otherwise. (Obviously the sociology of the self is implicated in the free-will issue as well.) The micro/ macro issue is a wonderful ground on which to consider questions of universals and particulars, of the different orders of causality, of reification and reductionism.Though it may seem presumptious to say so, sociology has implications right across the board in philosophy, even in its stronghold of metaphysics: space and time, existence and non-existence, the Ideal and the immediacy of lived experience are all parts of our current sociological controversies. As yet we have not been very bold in bringing such implications of sociology to attention. But there is recent work such as that of Preston on the sociology of Zen practice, which is relevant to a philosophy of ontology at its deepest levels. Furthermore, I feel optimistic about sociology's capacity to contribute to these issues philosophically, that is to say within the problem-space of philosophy itself.Tools like Goffmanian frame analysis, with a nested and grounded relation among levels, should cast light even on tricky issues such as infinities and logical indeterminacies, ontological foundations and unfoundedness. After all, if reality is socially constructed, why shouldn't our professional understanding of society reveal something central about the universe? As of now, these implications remain only potential. But to buttress my claim for the relevance of sociology in just one area, epistemology and the reflexive issues that arise within it, let me close with a brief reflection on what the sociology of science implies about the nature of philosophy itself. We can hardly expect that sociology will give a final and definitive answer to philosophy's problems. I say that, not because of any pessimism about our intellectual tools, but because of the very nature of intellectual communities. Intellectuals make careers by gaining fame for their original contributions; there must be problems to solve if there is to be something to contribute. This of course is true of all areas of science and scholarship. But whereas the empirical disciplines can go on to create new specialties and research areas, philosophers do not have the same way out of the professional problem posed by a field's own past success.Philosophy has handled this problem in a deeper way. For philosophers have taken as their turf precisely those problems that are themselves inherently deep and, in some sense, intractable. Philosophers have traditionally been concerned with the understanding of knowledge itself, with the most fundamental categories of existence and experience, with the bases of value. These are the boundary problems of all the other fields of intellectual inquiry, and of human life itself. They are intractable, not because significant things cannot be said about them, but because they are located at the open edges of everything; they reveal themselves full of reflexivities, which constantly reemerge at a new level whenever a conceptual solution is proposed, much as in Gödel's incompleteness theorem - and in the most highly transformed level of Goffmanian frames.It is for this reason that the history of philosophy is full of complaints that previous philosophers have come to no agreement, along with new beginnings that attempt to finish its business at last. There is a striking repetitiveness to these claims: we hear them from Descartes, and again from Kant, from the Logical Positivists, from Wittgenstein, in their different ways; there is more than an echo of this intellectual strategy in today's extremists, such as Rorty and Derrida, who again are abolishing philosophy. But philosophy has not been abolished; each previous claim to bring the uselessly warring sects of the past into a final resolution has failed to stifle philosophy's perennial inquiries. Just as strikingly, each such effort at ending philosophy has given rise to a period of renewed philosophical creativity.I think this is not an accident. It is because the structure of the intellectual field in general (across the disciplines, not only philosophy) is being restructured at a particular historical time that figures like Descartes, Kant, and others appear; the crisis of intellectual restructuring is what gives them the intellectual capital (and the creative energy) to reconceptualize the fundamental boundary problems in a new way. In this sense, philosophy is indeed foundational; it concerns itself with the ultimate questions, the borderlines of all inquiry and all of life. But there is another sense of foundational, the claim that philosophy is the discipline necessary for putting all other knowledge upon a secure foundation. This is certainly not true in a practical and historical sense; the other disciplines have gone ahead quite well without guidance from philosophy. Kant's claim to provide a secure foundation for the physical sciences against Hume's scepticism was really a rhetorical ploy, a way of building up the importance of what philosophy is doing; it really made no difference to the growth of science in Hume's day, or in Kant's, just what the philosophers said about the foundations of their knowledge. The same is true for all such claims about the significance of foundational issues.But this is not to dismiss the importance of what philosophers are doing. Theirs is the great intellectual adventure into the edges of things. The rest of the disciplines, the rest of what we consider to be knowledge, nestled in a pragmatic acceptance of whatever seems to work for us as intellectual practitioners, do not rest upon philosophy. The structural relation among intellectual fields is more the other way around, as far as the dynamics of intellectual change are concerned. But philosophy has nevertheless positioned itself in the intellectual space where the deepest explorations are launched. This will continue to be so, even as sociology adds its own impetus to the philosophical project.

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The Critical Theorist's Labour: Empirical or Philosophical Historiography for International Relations?

Abstract

Robert Cox developed a potent approach to studying world orders that is premised on the capacities of a special intellectual, the critical theorist, to discern social structures and the possibilities for their radical change in the future. While acknowledging the ethical appeal of adopting this intellectual persona, in this paper we are concerned with the style of historiography that it requires. In particular, we argue that the imperative to discover and foster the beginnings of social change leads to a version of philosophical history that will likely produce systematic anachronism. This is not uncommon in the discipline of International Relations, but in the case of Cox it stands in tension with some of his avowed intellectual sources, especially the work of Giambattista Vico, and with the aim of providing critical historical perspective on the present. We argue that Vico stands as an example of an alternative historical-empirical line of research that would better serve Coxian ambitions.