America's baby boom generation: the fateful bulge

From 1955-64 nearly 42 million births occurred in the U.S., an unprecedented expansion. The roots of the baby boom lie in the universal rush to early marriage and favorable economic climate for the relatively scarce young men born of the Depression cohort. The impact of the boom interrupted a century-long fertility decline. Pro-marriage, pronatalist norms were revived by the Depression cohort who formed families of at least 2 children or more. During the 1960-70's schools, colleges, and universities were built to accomodate the boom and are now excessive for the baby bust cohort. Unemployment and crime rates rose and fell with the passing of the boom babies through late adolescence and early adulthood. In the 1980's, boom babies will be aged 20-30. Demands for housing will be high. Annual birth numbers will increase even if the rate of childbearing hovers below replacement level at about 1.8 per woman. Per capita earnings and overall labor productivity should improve as the boom baby cohort reaches middle age in the 1990s. However, chances for advancement will be fewer. As the cohort reaches retirement age, the over 65 population will double from 31 million in 2000 to almost 60 million in 2030. Although the burden will be somewhat offset by reduced proportions of under 18-year-olds, the ratio of active workers paying Social Security will fall drastically.     

What will 1984 be like? Socioeconomic implications of recent twists in age structure

Since 1940, under conditions of restricted immigration and high and sustained growth in aggregate demand, shifts in the relative number of younger versus older adults have had a pervasive impact on American life. Before 1960, younger males were in increasingly short supply and their relative economic position substantially improved; after 1960, the opposite was true. Since the early sixties, as the relative condition of young adults has deteriorated, marriage has been increasingly deferred and fertility reduced. The labor force participation of young women has risen at above average rates, and that of older women has risen at below average rates. Changes in the age structure of the working age population have also contributed to a combination of rising unemployment and accelerating inflation. Cohort divorce rates, suicide among young males, crime rates, and political alienation have worsened. The rise in college enrollment rates has been interrupted, and SAT scores have declined. In contrast, in the period 1940–1960, changes in these various magnitudes were typically of a more favorable sort. The United States is now at the start of a new period of growing scarcity of young adults as a result of the birth rate decline that set in after 1960. This implies that the 1980s will see a turnaround or amelioration in a wide variety of these social, political, and economic conditions, some of which have been taken as symptomatic of a hardening social malaise.     

Sixty years of change in Tibetan fertility: An assessment

Existing knowledge of Tibetan historical population development is mostly based on ‘best-guess’ estimates and is heavily politicized. Using census data, I reconstruct the development of Tibetan fertility in China since the 1940s, with the objective of providing an independent assessment that can be used as benchmark for future studies and debates on Tibetan demography. Following major social and economic transformations starting in the 1950s, Tibetan fertility unexpectedly increased from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. As noted in several existing studies, Tibetan fertility in China then declined swiftly from the early 1980s onwards and has now reached values close to replacement level. Focusing on the 1950–70 period, I examine factors that contributed to shaping the Tibetan fertility increase in more detail. This confirms that changes in nuptiality and disease-related infertility both played a role in pushing up fertility rates among Tibetan women in China.     

Family Life History and Late Mid‐Life Mortality in Norway

Using data on all Norwegians born 1935–68, we analyze the associations between mortality and a combined indicator of fertility and marital or partnership status and history. The focus is on ages 40–73 and the years 1980–2008 (30 million person‐years of observations and 117,000 deaths). Among men in first marriages, the childless have 36 percent higher mortality than those with two or more children. The corresponding figure for women is 61 percent. The never‐married have higher mortality and are differentiated even more by parenthood status. Thus, childless never‐married men and women have mortality three times as high as those who are married and have two or more children. The apparent advantage associated with having at least two children is smallest among men who divorced before their oldest child's tenth birthday. Having step‐children has no association with mortality for those without natural children but is associated with higher mortality among the parous.     

An analysis of marital status]

In the 1980 census, a special investigation was conducted in Wuxi City on the marital status of the local population above the age of fifteen. The investigation covered detailed information concerning those married, divorced, single, and widowed. Results from this investigation show that more men are single than women, and more men are also widowed. In part this is because the average age for husband is older than his wife and the death rate higher is for men than women. Data show that the popular marriage age is between 25 and 29, evidence of a general trend toward late marr iage. In the area of the divorce rate, the rate for women in the city is higher than that in the countryside. The divorce rate for men is higher in the countryside than in the city. In the rate of being single through a lifetime, the rate for men in the countryside is higher than that in the city. This situation shows that in the countryside, because of the poor geographical and economic condition, men suffer from their marriage status. Generally speaking, the divorce rate in China is still lower than that of Western countries and the marital status in China remains more stable. The marital status is influenced by many factors, such as the social and economic situation, customs and habits, religious beliefs, profession, and educational and cultural levels. The collection of information regarding the marital status is useful for analysis of the birthrate and population forecast.     

Child support awards: Differentials and trends by race and marital status

This study has analyzed data from combined 1979 and 1982 April supplements to the Current Population Survey to study differences in the award of child support by race and marital status. The following findings emerge from this study: The percentage of women with children present from an absent father who are awarded child support varies greatly by race and marital status. Among all women, nonblacks are more than twice as likely as blacks to have a child support award, and the ever-married are almost six times as likely as the never-married to have an award. Among the ever-married, currently separated women are approximately half as likely as the ever-divorced to have secured an award. The lower probability of child support awards among blacks can be attributed in part to their disproportionate membership in marital status groups with lower award probabilities. Blacks are four and one-half times as likely as nonblacks to be among the never-married and almost twice as likely to be among the currently separated. Racial differences in award probabilities exist within all marital status groups except the never-married. Among the currently separated, blacks are one-third less likely than nonblacks to have an award. Among the ever-divorced, blacks are almost one-fourth less likely than nonblacks to have an award. Among the never-married, unlike the ever-married, virtually no statistically significant socioeconomic characteristics appear to distinguish mothers who have a child support award from those who do not. Among all women, 50 to 60 percent of the gross racial differential in award rates can be explained by observed differences in such economic and demographic characteristics as marital status, educational attainment, age, place of residence, and number of children. Among the ever-married, 50 percent of the gross racial difference can be explained by these factors. Among the ever-married, the likelihood of being awarded child support at marital disruption has increased over time, but this upward trend has been different for blacks and nonblacks. Among nonblacks, the proportion of women obtaining a child support award increased 1.3 percent per year between 1960 and 1975 and then declined 0.4 percent per year since then. Among blacks, the proportion increased 0.8 percent per year between 1960 and 1975 and then accelerated to 1.6 percent per year since then.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Trends in the Economic Independence of Young Adults in the United States: 1973–2007

One of the major milestones of adulthood is achieving economic independence. Without sufficient income, young people have difficulty leaving their childhood home, establishing a union, or having children—or they do so at great peril. Using the National Longitudinal Survey, this article compares the employment and economic circumstances of young adults aged 22–30 in 1973, 1987, and 2007, and their possible determinants. The results show that achieving economic independence is more difficult now than it was in the late 1980s and especially in the 1970s, even for the older age groups (age 27–28). The deterioration is more evident among men. From the 1970s there has been convergence in the trajectories for the achievement of economic self‐sufficiency between men and women, suggesting that the increase in gender parity, especially in education and labor market outcomes, is making their opportunities to be employed and to earn good wages more similar. This convergence also suggests that union formation increasingly may depend on a capacity to combine men's and women's wages.     

Marriage and divorce in twentieth century American cohorts

Marital status life tables have provided a basis for describing the marriage, divorce, and mortality experience of U.S. cohorts born 1888-1950. In brief, marriage occurred earlier and became more universal from the earliest cohorts to those of the late 1930s. More recent cohorts show declines in the proportion ever marrying and increases in the mean age at marriage. Period data for 1980 and cumulative cohort data by age suggest the likelihood of a continuing retreat from first marriage. Divorce has been rising steadily, with the latest cohorts indicating that 46 percent of male marriages and 42 percent of female marriages will end in divorce. Period data for males in 1980 raise the possibility that levels of divorce may have reached a peak, but cumulative cohort data by age show no such pattern. The present results are consistent with the view that a fundamental change in the traditional concept of marriage is underway. Traditional marriage involved the husband providing the wife with economic support and protection in return for her companionship and maternal services. Strong social pressures urged men and women to marry, and made the coveted services married persons provided each other difficult to obtain elsewhere. Recent economic changes have undermined the social and economic forces that maintained the institution of marriage. The U.S. economy has grown to include a large service sector in its labor force, and that growth has produced a dramatic increase in female labor force opportunities (Oppenheimer, 1970). The resultant large scale participation of women in economic activity blurs the traditional division of labor by sex, and goes to the very heart of the traditional marriage "bargain." At the same time, economic changes have weakened family ties by encouraging lower fertility, stressing achieved as opposed to ascribed characteristics, and fostering geographical mobility (Goode, 1970). The "marital union" of the past may be giving way to the "marital partnership" of the future, which will accommodate informal as well as formal marriages, less dependence between spouses, greater egalitarianism, lower fertility, and higher levels of divorce.     

Children and marital disruption: A replication and update

Data from the 1980 June Current Population Survey are used to estimate the incidence and duration of marital disruption as experienced by children. Rates during the 1977-1979 period suggest that about two-fifths of children born to married mothers will experience the disruption of that marriage while they are children. When children born before their mothers' first marriage are included, half of recent cohorts are likely to spend some time in a single parent family. These rates increased consistently over the 1970s. For the majority of those who experience a marital disruption, over five years are likely to elapse before the mother remarries. Furthermore, about half of the children who go through a divorce and remarriage will experience the breakup of the new family as well. At the same time, the interval between separation and divorce is less than a year for most children involved. There are major differences in these rates by race and important differences as well by education and age of mother. Replication of our earlier estimates for comparable periods was quite good for the estimates of the experience of marital dissolution, but somewhat less so for the analysis of mother's subsequent remarriage.     

The Contribution of Assisted Reproduction to Completed Fertility: An Analysis of Danish Data

Assisted reproduction has a minor but increasing influence on childbearing trends in advanced societies. In Denmark, the use of assisted reproduction technology (ART) has become particularly widespread. At the same time, Danish women born in the late 1950s and the 1960s experienced stabilization or even a slight increase in their mean number of children. Broad availability and widespread use of assisted reproduction may become important factors contributing to maintaining relatively high completed fertility among the younger cohorts of Danish women. To explore this idea, we analyze and project cohort trends in fertility rates among native Danish women born in 1960‐78 and examine the likely contribution of assisted reproduction to these trends. The projected proportion of children born after ART treatment shows a substantial increase from 2.1 percent among women born in 1965 to 4‐5 percent among women born in 1978, with an estimated net impact of ART (as compared with the hypothetical situation where no ART treatment was available) on the order of 3‐4 percent. When intrauterine inseminations are included, this implies that up to 7 percent of children of those native Danish women born in 1975 and later will likely be conceived by infertility treatment.     

The negligible influence of premarital cohabitation on marital fertility in current danish cohorts, 1975

This paper studies the influence of premarital cohabitation on marital fertility by applying life table methods to data for cohorts of Danish women born in 1926–1955, collected in retrospective interviews made in 1975. For each five-year cohort, the data have been analyzed by duration of marriage or by duration since previous birth, for women who had no reported births before marriage. Our main empirical results are: (a) that women who married at age 15–19 had higher rates of marital first and second births than those married at ages 20–24, and (b) that premarital cohabitation had very little influence on births of these two first orders in our data.     

Sex preference versus number preference: the case of Korea

The author argues that the effect of sex preference must be disentangled from the effect of number preference in Korea. This study tests--with hazard models--the effect of the number of previous children on the next birth according to the sex composition of previous children. Data were obtained from the 1974 Korean Fertility Survey. This paper also analyzes the timing of childbearing in recent periods in order to determine whether replacement-level fertility is temporary or permanent. The ideal number of children declined from 3.9 children in 1965 to 2.1 in 1991. The age-specific fertility rates for ages 20-24 years declined rapidly during the late 1980s. The fertility rates among women aged 25-29 years and 30-34 years increased during 1985-90. The proportion of fertility among women aged 20-29 years increased from 67.9% in 1975 to 86.6% in 1984. Women born in the late baby boom period of the late 1950s to mid-1960s reached prime reproductive age during the late 1980s and 1990s, but the crude birth rate remained about the same during 1985-92. A higher percentage of women (22.4%) born during 1955-59 remained single in 1990. During 1960-90, the percentage of women aged 20-24 years who were married declined. These trends indicate later age at childbearing and an explanation for the temporary nature of below-replacement fertility in the late 1980s. Korean women did not want to have more than 2 children, and the interval between first and second births increased since 1985. Among pregnancies of parity 2 conceived since 1985, over 90% of women with at least one son ended subsequent pregnancies by abortion compared to only 59% without sons. Hazard models of 1974 data reveal that son preference had an important effect on fertility. Fertility was higher among women with only daughters. Findings suggest that the value of sons must be measured at the societal and not at the individual level.     

Changes in childlessness in the United States: A demographic path analysis

Summary This paper describes changes in the incidence of marital childlessness among United States women since 1940 and tests a model to explain recent observed trends toward increasing childlessness. Based on U.S. Bureau of the Census sources, data are presented that indicate a substantial increase in childlessness for married women under 30 years of age since 1960. A path model is developed based on previous research on childlessness, in an attempt to explain this change. The model is composed of 1960-70 changes in (1) mean age at first marriage, (2) mean educational attainment, (3) the proportion of women in the labour force, (4) the proportion of women enrolled as students, (5) the incidence of marital disruption, and (6) the proportion of women living in urban environments. Using quarter-year age cohort data derived from the 1960 and 1970 1/100 Public Use Samples the results indicate that a substantial part of the increase in childlessness csn be explained by this model. Particularly important were increased enrolment of married women in education, labour force participation, and mean age of first marriage. The results suggest the relevance of structural changes along with birth expectation attitudes in predicting trends in childlessness in the United States.     

Does the way maternity care is provided affect maternal and neonatal outcomes for young women? A review of the research literature

BackgroundYoung pregnant women who continue a pregnancy are primarily from a socioeconomically deprived background. The risk factors associated with low socio-economic status may independently affect perinatal and neonatal morbidity to a greater extent than the young age of the woman. Young pregnant women are frequently sceptical about health care providers who they can perceive to be judgemental. This may lead to late booking for pregnancy care, attending few appointments, or not attending the health service for any antenatal care.QuestionDoes the way maternity care is provided affect maternal and neonatal outcomes for young women?MethodA systematic search of the major health databases.ResultsNine research articles met the eligibility criteria: one randomised controlled trial, three prospective cohort studies, two comparative studies with concurrent controls, two comparative studies with historical controls, and one case series.DiscussionProviding young women with a non-standard model of maternity care has some beneficial and no known detrimental effects on childbirth outcomes. While there is a dearth of evidence on the effectiveness of a Midwifery Group Practice model of care for young women, there is strong evidence to suggest that a Group Antenatal Care model increases antenatal visit attendance and breastfeeding initiation, and decreases the risk of preterm birth. There is research to indicate that a Young Women's Clinic model may also increase antenatal visit attendance and decrease the incidence of preterm birth.ConclusionMore well-designed and resourced midwifery models of care for young women should be implemented and rigorously researched.     

The disappearing link between premarital cohabitation and subsequent marital stability, 1970–2001

Previous research has demonstrated that marriages preceded by premarital cohabitation have higher rates of dissolution than those in which the couple marry without first living together. Most of this research relies on data generated by couples who cohabited in the 1970s and early 1980s when premarital cohabitation was relatively uncommon and usually of brief duration. Since then, premarital cohabitation in Australia has become normative and thus less prone to selection effects. The period of premarital cohabitation has also lengthened and is thus more likely to provide opportunities to screen out unviable matches. This paper uses national survey data from Australia to explore whether, in the light of these changes, the previously observed higher level of marital dissolution among those who live together before marrying has persisted. It demonstrates that the higher risk of marital dissolution among those who cohabited before marriage has declined substantially in the 1990s marriage cohort and, after controlling for selection factors, has disappeared altogether.     

Cohort size and age-specific suicide rates: A contingent relationship

Trends in age-specific suicide rates relate to debates about the consequences of population aging and changes in cohort size for social well-being. Easterlin argues that large cohort size increases suicide rates by reducing relative income; Preston claims that suicide rates fall in large cohorts with high levels of political and social power. To integrate these competing arguments, this paper uses aggregate data on 18 high-income nations from 1953 to 1986 to demonstrate that the direction and strength of the relationship between cohort size and suicide depend on (1) age of the cohort, (2) gender, (3) national context, and (4) time period. The results show that large cohort size raises suicide for the young and middle-aged, but reduces it for the elderly. Also, the effects of cohort size prove stronger for men than for women, for nations with less collectivist institutions than for nations with more collectivist institutions, and for the 1950s and 1960s than for the 1970s and 1980s.     

Educational attainment as a selective factor in marital status transitions in the United States

Data on marital status from the 1940, 1950, and 1960 censuses of the United States are organized to show (1) trends in percentages of men and women who were single, by age and education (grades of school completed); (2) relative education levels of husbands and wives for selected groups of couples in 1940 and I960 with comparisons for the two years; and (3) education levels of women in 1950 by marital status, controlling for age and year of entry into the 1950 marital status. The rate at which single persons married for the first time increased markedly during the decade of the 1940's but much less in the next decade. The 1940's increases occurred for both sexes at all educational levels and at all ages except the oldest. However, the rate of increase was greatest for both sexes in the ages from about 20 to 34 for women and 22 to S4for men (modal age for first marriage is 18 for women and 21 for men). The distribution of percents single by age was about the same in all three censuses for persons with elementary schooling.A trend toward smaller proportions of the single, both men and women, among young persons with college education continued for the entire twenty-year period, despite the lack of such a trend in the 1950's at other age and education levels. However, the available data on education of first-married husbands and wives indicate that the ratio of college-educated husbands to college-educated wives was higher in 1960 than in 1940. Part of the explanation may lie in the relatively high proportions of college-educated women found in the marital statuses "divorced" and "married more than once" in the 1950 Census, particularly at the younger ages and shorter durations; but the data are not adequate for a very satisfactory explanation. For the younger first-married for whom education of partners was cross-tabulated in 1940 and 1960, the proportions of college-educated persons were so much higher in 1960 than in 1940 that the proportions also increased of both husbands and wives at all educational levels who were married to college-educated partners. There was a marked decline in proportions of couples with only elementary schooling.Finally, based on data from the 1950 Census for women (15-59 years of age), the separated group included more with only elementary schooling, as did the widowed. Those remaining single and those married once usually included the highest proportions of college-educated women.     

Are young people leaving home earlier or later?

Although the popular view is that young people are leaving home later, a closer investigation of the data from 1979 to 1995 shows that this is not entirely true. Decreases are observed in the proportion of 15–19 year old men and women living at home at least since the mid-1980s, the increase for 20–24 year old men ceased in 1990, and only 20–24 year old women show a sustained increase. If only unattached young adults are considered instead of the conventional measure, any increases are even more subdued. The overall trend seems to be that while late leavers may be leaving home later, early leavers are leaving earlier or at the same time.     

Explaining the Gender Wealth Gap

To assess and explain the United States’ gender wealth gap, we use the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study to examine wealth accumulated by a single cohort over 50 years by gender, by marital status, and limited to the respondents who are their family’s best financial reporters. We find large gender wealth gaps between currently married men and women, and between never-married men and women. The never-married accumulate less wealth than the currently married, and there is a marital disruption cost to wealth accumulation. The status-attainment model shows the most power in explaining gender wealth gaps between these groups explaining about one-third to one-half of the gap, followed by the human-capital explanation. In other words, a lifetime of lower earnings for women translates into greatly reduced wealth accumulation. After controlling for the full model, we find that a gender wealth gap remains between married men and women that we speculate may be related to gender differences in investment strategies and selection effects.     

Debt,Cohabitation, and Marriage in Young Adulthood

Despite growing evidence that debt influences pivotal life events in early and young adulthood, the role of debt in the familial lives of young adults has received relatively little attention. Using data from the NLSY 1997 cohort (N = 6,749) and a discrete-time competing risks hazard model framework, I test whether the transition to first union is influenced by a young adult’s credit card and education loan debt above and beyond traditional educational and labor market characteristics. I find that credit card debt is positively associated with cohabitation for men and women, and that women with education loan debt are more likely than women without such debt to delay marriage and transition into cohabitation. Single life may be difficult to afford, but marital life is unaffordable as well. Cohabitation presents an alternative to single life, but not necessarily a marital substitute for these young adults.