Product design strategies in a manufacturer–retailer distribution channel

Product design decision has significant impacts on firm's competitive edge. In a distribution channel, product design strategy of a manufacturer depends not only on its own decisions, but also on the behaviors of its upstream and downstream partners along the channel. This paper investigates the optimal product design strategy of a manufacturer in a two-stage supply chain that consists of an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer. Customers are classified into two groups (i.e., two market segments) according to their difference on quality valuations. For each of the two potential market segments, the manufacturer needs to decide if it is beneficial to design a product with appropriate quality level to meet the demand of customers in the market segment. The retailer procures the product from the manufacturer, and then sells to customers at a retail price. By considering the interactions between the manufacturer and the retailer, this paper first describes the product design problem as a manufacturer-dominant Stackelberg game, and presents the optimal product design strategy for the manufacturer. To improve the performance of the supply chain, the revenue-sharing contract is then introduced into the product design problem. It is found that the revenue-sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the distribution channel in the product design problem. Numerical experiments illustrate the impacts of customer characteristics on the optimal product design strategies.     

Robust Structural Equations for Designing and Monitoring Strategic International Facility Networks

Using predictive global sensitivity analysis, we develop a structural equations model to abstract from the details of a large‐scale mixed integer program (MIP) to capture essential design trade‐offs of global manufacturing and distribution networks. We provide a conceptual framework that describes a firm's network structure along three dimensions: market focus, plant focus, and network dispersion. Normalized dependent variables are specified that act as proxies for a company's placement into our conceptual network classification via the calculation of just a few key independent variables. We provide robust equation sets for eight cost structure clusters. Many different product types could be classified into one of these groups, which would allow managers to use the equations directly without needing to run the MIP for themselves. Our numerical tests suggest that the formulas representing the network structure drivers—economies of scale, complexity costs, transportation costs, and tariffs—may be sufficient for managers to design their strategic network structures, and perhaps more importantly, to monitor them over time to detect potential need for adjustment.     

Effective Design of Products/Services: An Approach Based on Integration of Marketing and Operations Management Decisions*

This paper presents an integrated framework for designing profit‐maximizing products/ services, which can also be produced at reasonable operating difficulty levels. Operating difficulty is represented as a function of product and process attributes, and measures a firm's relative ease or difficulty in meeting customer demand patterns under specified operating conditions. Earlier optimum product design procedures have not considered. operational difficulty. We show that optimum profit, market share, cost, and product profiles are dependent on operating difficulty level. Empirical results from the pizza delivery industry demonstrate the value of the proposed Effective Product/Service Design approach.     

A Microeconomic Model of the Focused Factory-Vertical Integration Strategic Decision Problem

The design of a manufacturing strategy incorporates the decision of whether to focus or vertically integrate, or adopt a policy somewhere between the two extremes. Unfortunately, the literature contains few models that aid a manager in this decision process. In this paper we design a model to evaluate and compare various strategic alternatives along the focused factory-vertical integration continuum. By defining a point along this continuum as the percent of components manufactured internally that are needed to make one finished item (where 0 indicates complete focus and one manufacturing step, and 1 indicates full integration and 100 percent internal manufacturing) we are able to delineate the effects of the alternative decision strategies on flexibility and the firm's cash flow. The capital asset pricing model is invoked to assess the impact on the firm's risk and value.     

Capital Budgeting for Volume Flexible Equipment*

Recent advances in technology have created opportunities for firms to invest in expensive automated equipment designed to improve volume flexibility. Such investments are made on the basis that flexibility benefits the firm by increasing managerial control over output, reducing the risk of demand uncertainty, and improving productivity. The presumption is that these benefits will eventually translate to higher cash flows, appreciation in the firm's market value, and better return to shareholders. Yet, there is no managerially useful analytical framework for measuring this relationship. This study develops a model that uses contingent claims analysis to evaluate the effect of volume flexibility on the firm's value and to determine the optimal degree of automation that maximizes share value. The analysis is done by taking into consideration alternative demand characteristics, cost patterns, and the effectiveness of volume flexibility in increasing managerial control over output, reducing the risk of demand uncertainty, and improving productivity.     

The Effect of Product Development Restructuring on Shareholder Value

This article examines the effect of product development restructuring (PDR) on shareholder value. The results are based on a sample of 165 announcements made during 2002–2011. PDR announcements are associated with an economically and statistically significant positive stock market reaction. Over a two‐day period (the day of the announcement and the day preceding the announcement), the mean (median) market reaction is 1.63% (0.87%). The market reaction is generally positive regardless of the PDR purpose or action. Although the market reaction is more positive for higher R&D intensity firms, it is not directly affected by the firm's prior financial performance or whether the firm's primary PDR objective is to increase revenues or cut costs. However, the interaction between the firm's prior financial performance and its primary PDR objective is significant. For firms that are financial outperformers, the market reaction is more positive if the firm's primary PDR objective is to increase revenues. For financial underperformers, the market reaction is more positive if the firm's primary PDR objective is to cut costs.     

Product Design Awards and The Market Value of The Firm

Product design has increasingly been recognized as an important source of competitive advantage. This study empirically estimates the impact of effective design on the market value of the firm. We use a firm's receipt of a product design award as a proxy for its design effectiveness. Based on data from 264 announcements of design awards given to commercialized products between 1998 and 2011, we find that award announcements are associated with statistically significant positive stock market reactions. Depending on the benchmark model used to estimate the stock market reaction, the market reaction over a two‐day period (the day of announcement and the preceding day) ranges from 0.95% to 1.02%. The market reaction is more positive for smaller firms and for firms whose award winning products are consumer goods. However, a firm's growth potential, industry competitiveness, and whether a firm is a first time or repeated award winner do not significantly affect the market reaction.     

Investment in Facility Changeover Flexibility for Early Entry into High‐Tech Markets

A model is introduced to analyze the manufacturing‐marketing interface for a firm in a high‐tech industry that produces a series of high‐volume products with short product life cycles on a single facility. The one‐time strategic decision regarding the firm's investment in changeover flexibility establishes the link between market opportunities and manufacturing capabilities. Specifically, the optimal changeover flexibility decision is determined in the context of the firm's market entry strategy for successive product generations, the changeover cost between generations, and the production efficiency of the facility. Moreover, the dynamic pricing policy for each product generation is obtained as a function of the firm's market entry strategy and manufacturing efficiency. Our findings provide insights linking internal manufacturing capabilities with external market forces for the high‐tech and high‐volume manufacturer of products with short life cycles. We show the impact of manufacturing efficiency and a firm's ability to benefit from volume‐based learning on the dynamic pricing policy for each product generation. The results demonstrate the benefits realized by a firm that works with its manufacturing equipment suppliers to develop more efficient and flexible technology. In addition, we explore how opportunities afforded by pioneer advantage enable a firm operating a less efficient facility to realize long term competitive advantage by deploying an earlier market entry strategy.     

Optimizing Service Attributes: The Seller's Utility Problem*

Service designers predict market share and sales for their new designs by estimating consumer utilities. The service's technical features (for example, overnight parcel delivery), its price, and the nature of consumer interactions with the service delivery system influence those utilities. Price and the service's technical features are usually quite objective and readily ascertained by the consumer. However, consumer perceptions about their interactions with the service delivery system are usually far more subjective. Furthermore, service designers can only hope to influence those perceptions indirectly through their decisions about nonlinear processes such as employee recruiting, training, and scheduling policies. Like the service's technical features, these process choices affect quality perceptions, market share, revenues, costs, and profits. We propose a heuristic for the NP‐hard service design problem that integrates realistic service delivery cost models with conjoint analysis. The resulting seller's utility function links expected profits to the intensity of a service's influential attributes and also reveals an ideal setting or level for each service attribute. In tests with simulated service design problems, our proposed configurations compare quite favorably with the designs suggested by other normative service design heuristics.     

Examining the Firm's Value Creation Process: A Managerial Perspective of the Firm's Value Offering Strategy and Performance

The primary pursuit of any business is to understand what customers value and to create that value for them. While customers are the final arbiter of value, it is the firm's role to explore, interpret and deliver value based on what they believe customers are seeking. Based on this premise we adopt the firm's perspective on value creation to extend both Bowman and Ambrosini's theoretical framework and the work of DeSarbo, Jedidi and Sinha and focus on two issues. The first is the strategic emphasis firms place on the design and delivery of their value offering. The second is the extent the firm's value offering explains performance differentials at the customer‐centric performance level. We present a conceptual model of how firms gain positional advantage via their value offering and the realized outcomes they achieve. We present two approaches to modelling the firm's value offering (type II and type IV models) and articulate the theoretical underpinnings and results for these models. Our results validate the conceptualization of the firm's value offering and suggest that creating superior value offerings enables firms to achieve superiority in customer‐centric performance.     

The Influence of Stakeholders on the Environmental Strategy of Service Firms: The Moderating Effects of Complexity,Uncertainty and Munificence*

Drawing on the resource‐based view of the firm, we examine how complexity, uncertainty and munificence in the general business environment moderate the association between a firm's stakeholder integration capability and its environmental strategy. Our data were drawn from 134 ski resorts in 12 countries in western Europe and North America. Our study finds that (1) an organizational capability of stakeholder integration is associated with a service firm's adoption of a proactive environmental strategy; (2) an uncertain business environment has a direct positive influence and a complex business environment has a direct negative influence on a firm's environmental strategy; and (3) complexity has a negative moderating influence on the relationship between a firm's stakeholder integration capability and its environmental strategy.     

Multi‐Product Quality Competition: Impact of Resource Constraints

We study a multi‐product firm with limited capacity where the products are vertically (quality) differentiated and the customer base is heterogeneous in their valuation of quality. While the demand structure creates opportunities through proliferation, the firm should avoid cannibalization between its own products. Moreover, the oligopolistic market structure puts competitive pressure and limits the firm's market share. On the other hand, the firm has limited resources that cause a supply‐side fight for adequate and profitable production. We explicitly characterize the conditions where each force dominates. Our focus is on understanding how capacity constraints and competition affect a firm's product‐mix decisions. We find that considering capacity constraints could significantly change traditional insights (that ignore capacity) related to product‐line design and the role of competition therein. In particular, we show that when the resources are limited, the firm should offer only the product that has the highest margin per unit capacity. We find that this product could be the diametrically opposite product suggested by the existing literature. In addition, we show that for intermediate capacity levels, whereas the margin per unit capacity effect dominates in a less competitive market, proliferation and cannibalization effects dominate in a more competitive market.     

Entry Deterrence of Capacitated Competition Using Price and Non‐Price Strategies

We analyze the role of pricing and branding in an incumbent firm's decision when facing competition from an entrant firm with limited capacity. We do so by studying two price competition models (Stackelberg and Nash), where we consider the incumbent's entry‐deterrence pricing strategy based on a potential entrant's capacity size. In an extension, we also study a branding model, where the incumbent firm, in addition to pricing, can also invest in influencing market preference for its product. With these models, we study conditions under which the incumbent firm may block the entrant (i.e., prevent entry without any market actions), deter the entrant (i.e., stop entry with suitable market actions) or accommodate the entrant (i.e., allow entry and compete), and how the entrant will allocate its limited capacity across its own and the new market, if entry occurs. We also study the timing difference between the two different dynamics of the price competition models and find that the incumbent's first‐mover advantage benefits both the incumbent and the entrant. Interestingly, the entrant firm's profits are not monotonically increasing in its capacity even when it is costless to build capacity. In the branding model, we show that in some cases, the incumbent may even increase its price and successfully deter entry by investing in consumer's preference for its product. Finally, we incorporate demand uncertainty into our model and show that the incumbent benefits from demand uncertainty while the entrant may be worse off depending on the magnitude of demand uncertainty and its capacity.     

How are Methodologies and Tools Framing Managers' Strategizing Practice in Competitive Strategy Development?

Criticisms have been levelled at the use of traditional strategic tools such as SWOT, PEST and BCG in contemporary business environments. In light of these criticisms, the objective of this research is to understand how senior executives engage with methodologies and tools as they develop competitive strategy. Within a broader strategy‐as‐practice approach, we use an activity theory framework to capture strategizing insights of senior executives in the UK responsible for competitive strategy. Our sample includes executives leading manufacturing organizations embedded in networks and CEOs reported in the financial press as adopting innovative business models. Our data suggest there is no one preferred practice approach by these highly regarded executives. Rather, methods and tools are adapted as they are contextualized in alternative practices. Three dominant strategizing practice models emerged from the data reflecting alternative applications of methodologies and tools. The first model captures routinized behaviour adopted by those who view their future as predictable, and an extension of the current environment. The second model posits reflective interaction between the strategist, organizational processes, culture, relationships and practice, and the final model shows an imposed engagement with strategizing methodologies and tools that bypass the organization's collective structures. These practice models suggest strategy leaders' activities depend upon their interpretation of the operating environment.     

Mitigating Supply Uncertainty: The Interplay Between Diversification and Pricing

We consider a firm's sourcing problem from one reliable supplier and one unreliable supplier in two price‐setting scenarios. In the committed pricing scenario, the firm makes the pricing decision before the supply uncertainty is resolved. In the responsive pricing scenario, the firm's pricing decision is made after the supply uncertainty is resolved. For the committed pricing scenario, we develop a condition on supply uncertainty that guarantees the unimodality of the firm's objective function. By comparing the firm's optimal diversification decisions in the two pricing scenarios, we examine the interplay of supply diversification strategy and responsive pricing strategy in mitigating supply uncertainty. While both strategies are effective in mitigating supply uncertainty, we show that they are not necessarily substitutes. The relationship between these two strategies depends on two adverse effects caused by supply uncertainty: the lost‐revenue effect and the lost‐goodwill effect. More specifically, when the lost‐revenue effect dominates the lost‐goodwill effect, these two strategies are complements; otherwise, they are substitutes. Furthermore, we examine the impact of market size, price sensitivity, supplier reliability, and failure rebate on the interplay between these two strategies, and discuss the implications of our results. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case of two unreliable suppliers and show that the insights regarding the interplay between diversification and pricing continue to hold.     

Coopetition Strategy – When is it Successful? Empirical Evidence on Innovation and Market Performance

Coopetition (collaboration between competing firms) has been viewed as a potentially beneficial but also a risky relationship for a firm. Earlier literature provides inconclusive evidence in terms of the effects of a firm's coopetition strategy on innovation and market performance, suggesting both positive and negative implications. Some of this variation could be attributed to the fact that coopetition is successful only in certain types of business environment. In order to take the research further, this study examines the effect of a coopetition strategy on the firm's innovation and market performance, focusing on the moderating effects of market uncertainty, network externalities and competitive intensity. The results from a cross‐industry survey of 209 Finnish firms provide novel evidence on the conditions under which coopetition is successful and when it is not.     

How Does Centrality in Coopetition Networks Matter? An Empirical Investigation in the Mobile Telephone Industry

This research examines how a firm's position in a coopetitive network (formed through cooperation among firms within an industry) influences the extent of the firm's competitive aggressiveness and market performance. The authors collected data on the competitive and cooperative actions of firms in the mobile telephone industry from 2000 to 2006, using structured content analysis of news reports. The results show that the centrality of a firm in a coopetitive network contributes to the firm's competitive aggressiveness through increased volume and variety of competitive actions. Further, the more central a firm is in the network, the greater is its market performance. Firms that undertake more volume and variety of competitive actions improve their market performance. Overall, these results show that being in a central position in a coopetition network is quite advantageous for the firm.     

A MARKET UTILITY‐BASED MODEL FOR CAPACITY SCHEDULING IN MASS SERVICES

Only a small set of employee scheduling articles have considered an objective of profit or contribution maximization, as opposed to the traditional objective of cost (including opportunity costs) minimization. In this article, we present one such formulation that is a market utility‐based model for planning and scheduling in mass services (MUMS). MUMS is a holistic approach to market‐based service capacity scheduling. The MUMS framework provides the structure for modeling the consequences of aligning competitive priorities and service attributes with an element of the firm's service infrastructure. We developed a new linear programming formulation for the shift‐scheduling problem that uses market share information generated by customer preferences for service attributes. The shift‐scheduling formulation within the framework of MUMS provides a business‐level model that predicts the economic impact of the employee schedule. We illustrated the shift‐scheduling model with empirical data, and then compared its results with models using service standard and productivity standard approaches. The result of the empirical analysis provides further justification for the development of the market‐based approach. Last, we discuss implications of this methodology for future research.     

Acquisition and Disclosure of Operational Information*

We study a firm's strategy for acquisition and disclosure of operational information by establishing linkages among information quality, managerial self‐interest, and production planning. We develop a multistage model in which a manager of a publicly traded firm first receives private information about the product demand and then uses it to make production and disclosure decisions. We consider two prevalent disclosure models employed in the accounting literature: all‐or‐nothing and cheap‐talk models. In the all‐or‐nothing model, it is assumed that any disclosure must be truthful, but the manager can strategically withhold information. We show that the manager commits to acquire the value‐added operational information if (i) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is low or (ii) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is high, but the fixed disclosure cost is either sufficiently low or sufficiently high. We demonstrate that the firm is better off if the production level is observable to the financial market because multidimensional signaling reduces costs. In the cheap‐talk model, we assume that the manager's disclosure may not be truthful. We show that the manager's incentive to acquire value‐added operational information increases along with the penalty cost for misleading investors. Therefore, a high penalty cost for misleading investors can encourage the manager to obtain more precise information, which in turn improves the firm's cash flow.     

DEMAND MANAGEMENT: THE EVALUATION OF PRICE AND DUE DATE NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES USING SIMULATION

The research considers the problem of demand management in a firm where the firm's historical delivery service level reputation influences the number of quotation requests from its potential customers. Customers have a maximum and the firm has a minimum net price to due date tradeoff curve for each job. The demand management function bargains with the customer over price and promised due date. Bargaining finishes either with an agreed price and delivery date or with the customer refusing the firm's bid and placing the order elsewhere. The firm's objective is to maximize its long-term net revenue. The firm's demand management negotiation strategy guides this bidding process. The research demonstrates the use of simulation to test different demand management bidding and negotiation strategies for different market and firm scenarios. The demonstration uses 16 scenarios to test the different demand management negotiation strategies with a model of a classical job shop in a classical market. The investigation examines finite scheduling-based due date estimation methods, as well as the more traditional parameter-based methods. This demonstration shows that it is possible to test different bidding policies, using a simulation model of a firm and its customers, and to obtain usable results.