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企业间经历了价格竞争、质量竞争、服务竞争等几个竞争阶段后,进入到一个全新的声誉竞争,并且市场上的竞争已从战术竞争为主导跃升为以战略竞争为主导的地位,声誉竞争也已经成为了市场竞争的制高点。声誉是否能够促进企业价值的提高已经成为国内外企业声誉理论研究中的一个重要的课题。 相似文献
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基于成熟资本市场的研究表明,高声誉券商会抑制IPO公司的盈余管理.本文以2001-2011年处于中国制度环境下的IPO公司为样本,重新考察了券商声誉与IPO公司盈余管理之间的关系.研究发现,券商声誉越高,其所承销IPO公司的盈余管理程度也就越高,但券商声誉与IPO公司盈余管理程度之间的正向关系只有在投资者法律保护较差的地区才显著.进一步的研究还发现,高声誉券商纵容或协助IPO公司盈余管理的重要动因在于获取更高的经济收益.尽管高声誉券商确实能够降低IPO公司的抑价率,但这是通过提高IPO公司盈余管理程度的途径来实现的.本文的结论表明,要使我国资本市场中的券商声誉机制发挥作用,还需要大力提高券商机会主义行为所面临的法律风险. 相似文献
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基于搜寻理论,探讨了当网上交易市场中卖家声誉以及买家保留价格之间存在差异时,搜寻成本对均衡价格水平和离散程度的影响,进而研究了声誉同搜寻成本之间的相互作用.研究表明:较高的搜寻成本使得不同声誉水平的卖家可以同时存在于网上交易市场;为了同高声誉卖家展开竞争,低声誉卖家不得不将产品的价格降低,从而导致网上交易市场产品价格的离散化;不同保留价格的买家付出不同的搜寻活动,并随着搜寻效率的提高,市场均衡价格不断降低;最终,低声誉卖家将被逐出网上交易市场.此外,高声誉卖家通过提供广告推广活动提高了买家的搜寻效率,使得买家搜寻活动有所减少,从而买家愿意为高声誉卖家支付较高的价格,导致市场价格离散加剧. 相似文献
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公司声誉管理模型探讨 总被引:11,自引:0,他引:11
全球化和知识经济时代的到来使公司声誉管理在企业管理中的地位上升。本文研究了公司声誉的形成、功能及其管理的原则,提出了基于公司公民行为的公司声誉管理模型框架,并对我国企业如何进行有效的声誉管理提出了具体建议。 相似文献
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中国公司声誉测量指标构建的实证研究 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
作为一种特殊的无形资产,公司声誉能够帮助企业有效整合企业内外的资源,但是由于认知的不同,公司声誉在不同的文化体系下有很大的差异.美国的公司声誉研究所通过多年的研究认为,美国人从产品和服务、工作环境、社会责任、愿景和领导、财务绩效、情感吸引等六个因子去衡量公司声誉,并把这六个因子的指标体系称为"誉商","誉商"的指标体系已经在世界许多国家得到了认同.本文首先对美国"誉商"指标在中国的适应性进行了研究,得到了一个五因子的指标体系;然后根据中国企业的现实情况,寻找与中国公司声誉密切相关的补充指标,对中国公司的声誉构成进行了探索,得到了一个七因子的指标体系,并认为社会背景因子和跨国经营能力因子是中国公司声誉的专用因子. 相似文献
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文章阐明了跨国公司在华"声誉革命"的成因,展示了"声誉网络"的内在结构.并对相关利益者效用目标的多元化对声誉效应的影响和跨国公司在华企业声誉的两面性等问题进行了分析.最后,指出跨国公司在华企业声誉发展前景. 相似文献
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将"面子"文化作为中国管理生态分析的一个维度,从中国人"面子"的行为本质、运行机理、内在动因、功能效果、文化本源5个方面,探讨"面子"文化生态中管理的"黄金法则".管理者要善于进行"印象整饰",选择有利于良性互动的管理风格和调控策略;管理者要掌握"迂回之道",化不利为有利,变危机为生机;管理者要学会"给人以求",实行情感管理、生涯管理和民主管理;管理者要灵活运用"面子"的规范作用对组织进行整合与激励,采取措施谨防组织中的"面子功夫";管理者要积极引导和建设具有现代精神的组织文化,纠正虚伪、狭隘和不公正的"面子观",通过文化管理促进人与组织的和谐发展. 相似文献
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基于成熟资本市场的研究表明,高声誉券商会抑制 IPO 公司的盈余管理. 本文以 2001 - 2011 年处于中国制度环境下的 IPO 公司为样本,重新考察了券商声誉与 IPO 公司盈余管理之间的关系. 研究发现,券商声誉越高,其所承销 IPO 公司的盈余管理程度也就越高,但券商声誉与 IPO 公司盈余管理程度之间的正向关系只有在投资者法律保护较差的地区才显著. 进一步的研究还发现,高声誉券商纵容或协助 IPO 公司盈余管理的重要动因在于获取更高的经济收益. 尽管高声誉券商确实能够降低 IPO 公司的抑价率,但这是通过提高 IPO 公司盈余管理程度的途径来实现的. 本文的结论表明,要使我国资本市场中的券商声誉机制发挥作用,还需要大力提高券商机会主义行为所面临的法律风险. 相似文献
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Simon Board Moritz Meyer‐ter‐Vehn 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2013,81(6):2381-2462
We propose a model of firm reputation in which a firm can invest or disinvest in product quality and the firm's reputation is defined as the market's belief about this quality. We analyze the relationship between a firm's reputation and its investment incentives, and derive implications for reputational dynamics. Reputational incentives depend on the specification of market learning. When consumers learn about quality through perfect good news signals, incentives decrease in reputation and there is a unique work–shirk equilibrium with ergodic dynamics. When learning is through perfect bad news signals, incentives increase in reputation and there is a continuum of shirk–work equilibria with path‐dependent dynamics. For a class of imperfect Poisson learning processes and low investment costs, we show that there exists a work–shirk equilibrium with ergodic dynamics. For a subclass of these learning processes, any equilibrium must feature working at all low and intermediate levels of reputation and shirking at the top. 相似文献
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The paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining. The idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining ‘postures’ on bargaining outcomes. A complete information bargaining model a la Rubinstein is amended to accommodate ‘irrational types’ who are obstinate, and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands. A strong ‘independence of procedures’ result is derived: after initial postures have been adopted, the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently. The latter analysis yields a unique continuous‐time limit with a war of attrition structure. In the continuous‐time game, equilibrium is unique, and entails delay, consequently inefficiency. The equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types. As the probability of irrationality goes to zero, delay and inefficiency disappear; furthermore, if there is a rich set of types for both agents, the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference. 相似文献
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Olivier Gossner 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2011,79(5):1627-1641
We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long‐run player faces a series of short‐run players. The long‐run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long‐run player. 相似文献
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In this paper, we investigate the determinants of corporate reputation, derived from the assessments of managers and market analysts, of a sample of large UK firms. Along with the influences of a variety of firm attributes, we find a reputational effect associated with a female presence at board level. This effect varies across sectors and demonstrates the influence of a firm's stakeholder environment in determining whether a female presence on the board enhances or harms the reputation of the firm. The pattern that emerges indicates that the presence of women on the board is favourably viewed in only those sectors that operate close to final consumers. We argue that the nature of this effect reflects an imperative for equality of representation that highlights the need to reflect gender diversity among customers. 相似文献
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Stelios C. Zyglidopoulos 《英国管理杂志》2005,16(3):253-259
This study investigates the impact that downsizing has on corporate reputation. Drawing on the relevant literatures, two hypotheses are developed and tested. The findings of the study are as follows. First, downsizing has a negative impact on corporate reputation. Second downsizing is more damaging to corporate reputation than 'downscoping'–the sale of a division. 相似文献
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