On the historicity of social ontology

The question I raise is whether the basic features of mind, social categories, and society are unchanging or changing. Some understandings of ontology would seem to suggest that social ontology is a branch of metaphysics. However, as the history of concepts such as metaphysical and ontology indicate, our concepts and knowledge are historical. It is widely held that society is concept- and activity-dependent. I examine critically two strands of social ontology in terms of their answers to this problematic: (1) John Searle’s theory of the construction of social reality and (2) critical realist theory of mind and society as interlaced emergent layers of reality. Apart from emergence in natural systems, there is also emergence beyond nature as consciousness, agency and society cannot be completely explained in terms of biological realities; but how and when did this emergence occur? We need an account of the emergent order of language, reflectively conscious mind, and institutions not only for its own sake, but also because the process whereby new objects and properties emerge may be on-going, path-dependent, diverse, and open-ended. The main argument is that the object of study of social theorists is geo-historically specific, liable to diversity within any given world-historical epoch, and open to further changes and new forms of emergence in the future.     

The topic of subjectivity in psychology: Contradictions,paths and new alternatives

This paper draws a picture of how topics related to subjectivity have appeared in different psychological theories, such as psychoanalysis, Gestalt and post‐structuralist approaches, discussing in depth a specific proposition from a cultural‐historical standpoint. I argue that, in most of these theories, subjectivity has been used to refer to specific processes and phenomena without advancing a more general theory about it. The way in which subjectivity was treated within the Cartesian/Enlightenment tradition, taken together with the individualistic tradition of psychology, led critical psychological theories to reject the concept. In this way, such critical theories have omitted the heuristic value of subjectivity to study processes that can neither be exhausted by language, nor by discourse. A new proposal of subjectivity is highlighted, based on the cultural‐historical tradition in psychology. From this perspective, subjectivity is defined by units of emotions and symbolical processes generated throughout human experience. On the basis of such definition, I discuss how institutionalized orders can be subverted by subjective productions that represent new social pathways. Far from being a remnant of Modernity, in this way subjectivity is defined as a human production, capable of transcending the apparent objective limits of human existence.     

To rely or not to rely on common sense? Introducing critical Realism's insights to social network analysis

In this article, I aim to critically evaluate the epistemological position of social network analysis. My main point is that while the two main schools of social network analysis – formalism and relationalism – claim to be different because of their respective comprehensions of the ontology of social networks, epistemologically they both rely on network actors' commonsensical comprehension of social ties to conduct social network analysis. Following critical realists' insights into the depth ontology of the social world, I argue that social network analysts must break from their and network actors' commonsensical comprehension of social ties in order to illustrate the objective principles of social networks. I suggest that one strategy for doing so is to treat the current networks of social actors under investigation as a product of historically shaped and state-mediated contests among social actors to define hierarchical features of their social relations. I present my study of the history of social networks in Indian politics during the early postcolonial period (1947–64) in support of my points.     

The Science Behind Feminist Research Methods

Feminist science often is caricatured in oppositional terms—as a venture antagonistic to the scientific mission. Such portrayals not only misrepresent feminist science but also displace the fact that there are multiple feminist approaches toward science, each advancing particular notions of appropriate methods, objectivity, subjectivity, and the jurisdiction of scientific inquiry. Acquaintance with the variety of feminist approaches toward science will enable feminist scholars to better configure their research and strategies. Comprehending science itself as culture is crucial to these ends. A contextual perspective on science as culture will enhance our abilities to effect cultural change through our research projects. Such comprehension also will prepare us for improving the environment in which we work as well as the nature of that work.     

Towards a Lacanian Group Psychology: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Trans‐subjective

Revisiting Lacan's discussion of the puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma provides a means of elaborating a theory of the trans‐subjective. An illustration of this dilemma provides the basis for two important arguments. Firstly, that we need to grasp a logical succession of modes of subjectivity: from subjectivity to inter‐subjectivity, and from inter‐subjectivity to a form of trans‐subjective social logic. The trans‐subjective, thus conceptualized, enables forms of social objectivity that transcend the level of (inter)subjectivity, and which play a crucial role in consolidating given societal groupings. The paper advances, secondly, that various declarative and symbolic activities are important non‐psychological bases—trans‐subjective foundations—for psychological identifications of an inter‐subjective sort. These assertions link interesting to recent developments in the contemporary social psychology of interobjectivity, which likewise emphasize a type of objectivity that plays an indispensible part in co‐ordinating human relations and understanding.     

滕尼斯的“新科学”:“1880/1881年手稿”及其基本问题

在早期的1880/1881年手稿《共同体与社会--文化哲学的原理》中,滕尼斯奠定了一门经验的文化科学及其未来理论体系的基础。通过对这部作品的考察,本文揭示了滕尼斯的“文化科学”内含的三个辩证运动着的维度:(1)洞察经验事实;(2)在对事实进行反思的基础上形成生活理想;(3)寻求在经验中实现理想。对滕尼斯来说,“文化科学”的奠基工作同他对德国现实命运的关切紧密联系,面对抽象个人主义与国家专制主义的双重困境,滕尼斯产生了重塑伦理生活的理想。通过“文化科学”对人性的重新解读,他提出了一种可能的“共同体”的生活模式。在1887年出版的第一版《共同体与社会》里,滕尼斯将历史的维度加入“文化科学”之中,继承并发展了1880/1881年手稿的基本问题。本文尝试指出,考察滕尼斯所奠基的文化科学传统,对于反思当今的社会科学研究仍然具有启发意义。     

生活世界与审美对象意义世界的本源

现象学的生活世界既不是与人无涉的客观世界,也不是与客观世界相脱离的主观世界,而是主客相亲相融的意义世界;生活世界具有非课题性、奠基性、主观性和直观性的特征;生活世界是人的原初经验世界,它构成了审美对象意义世界的本源;审美对象的意义世界是对生活世界这一原初世界的具象呈现,是对人的存在意义的一种感性体验和把握.     

Groups in contact: Meta‐representations,interobjectivity, and cultural incompatibilities

This analysis departs from social identity being part and parcel of the system of social representations a group holds. Additionally, social identity is seen as being affectively laden with religious or other deeply ingrained ideological beliefs. These systems delimit the space of norms and behaviours where people socially construct the objects defining the local world as an objectively given. The local objectifications differ between groups and cultures and pose a problem for interaction and communication between members of different groups. Inter‐group discrepancies must be bridged by establishing a shared representational space and interobjective understanding. This understanding can be reached if both interactants mutually develop meta‐representations that allow them to grossly anticipate what to expect from the other and to orient their actions accordingly. But there is a catch in establishing interobjectivity: even if the interactants manage to overcome semantic and cognitive barriers, their interaction and open‐minded communication will be blocked if the two objectivities are ethically or affectively incommensurable. I illustrate this process by suggesting that native Europeans will feel blocked to establish interobjective acceptance for example with proponents of a slave holder culture whose values are incommensurable with European ideas of human equality. Accepting a slave holder's worldview would threaten the European's identity. A similar process seems to govern devout conservative Muslims living in 'gated communities' and enclaves in European cities who try to maintain their identity by avoiding regular contact with the non‐Muslim majority. Such contact would threaten their identity if their worldview and sharia rules were measured by the standards of human rights. Native Europeans on the other hand, will feel their own cultural objectivity to be incompatible with traditional Islam that does not equally observe human rights. The implications of such processes are discussed in terms of migrants' integration, multiculturalism, and socio‐political psychology.     

Abstracts

Taking Rom Harré's social constructionism as a focus we point to and discuss the issue of the a priori psychological subject in social constructionist theory. While Harré indicates that interacting, intending beings are necessary for conversation to occur, he assumes that the primary human reality is conversation and that psychological life emerges from this social domain. Nevertheless, we argue that a fundamental and agentive psychological subject is implicit to his constructionist works. Our critical analyses focus upon Harré's understandings of persons, human development and human agency. Our intention is neither to suggest that this latent entity must be understood in a Cartesian sense nor is it to ask for an explicit accounting of an autonomous agent. Rather, our claim is simply that psychological subjectivity is reflexively entailed in Harré's human psychology. We suggest that this pertains more generally to social constructionist theory. This paper attempts to demonstrate, at least for the passions, that while emotions are important elements of common sense psychological thought, they are not psychological, neural, or mental entities. People talk of emotions, we claim, in two sorts of cases: Firstly, when it is believed that someone has done something that she shouldn't because she has been overwhelmed by desire (a motive) and secondly, when someone is found to be compelled to devote cognitive resources to an act she knows she will never carry out. In this case motivational states command attention and cognitive and physiological resources, distract us, even though they will not issue in action. In either case pointing to an emotion is pointing to a partial, aborted, or misdirected desire. We discuss why emotions are considered important in common sense and professional psychology though they do not exist. This paper explores new avenues of research on social bases of cognition and a more adequate (than those extant) framework to conceive the phenomena of the human mind. It firstly examines Bartlett's work on social bases of cognition, from which three pertinent features are identified, namely multi-level analyses, evolutionary perspective and embodied mind approach. It then examines recent works on social origins of cognition in ethology and paleoanthropology, and various forms of the embodied mind approach recently proposed in neuroscience and cognitive science. The paper concludes that extending the embodied mind approach would provide the most potent framework to enable, amongst others, the conceptual integration of the biological, psychological and social bases of the human mind, which have in the past been treated mainly as competing alternatives. A conception of parental experience is proposed to enhance the move of the study of parenting into the interpersonal realm by describing parental subjectivity from the parent's point of view. Explanations are based on that which the parent can be accountable for, on parental dialogues with observers/clinicians about their dialogues with their infants. This conception of parental subjectivity is compared with other conceptions which define parental subjectivity as the mental apparatus of the parent and not as representing the evolving relation of the parent with the infant, and with explanations which consider parental reports in terms of the parent's psychodynamics and cognitive abilities rather than in terms of the on-going dialogues between themselves and their infants. The paper introduces a typology of parental dialogues with observers/clinicians about their dialogues with their infants, within the context of the non-verbal nature of the infant's communication. The findings from empirical examinations of this typology are presented, and their implications for the proposal that the study of parental relations with their infants should consider the parent's accountability are discussed.     

论操作化：当代社会科学哲学的启示

“操作化”是实证主义社会学研究方法的核心概念,目前许多社会学家对它的理解都源于以语言图像论为代表的传统社会科学哲学。语用学转向后的当代社会科学哲学则推翻了语言图像论,指出语词的意义并不在于它所对应的客观对象,而在于语词自身的实践用法及其相应的生活形式。这种观点为社会学家们提供了对于操作化的重新理解,也为超越目前社会学方法论的二元对立提供了可能。     

How I am Constructing Culture‐inclusive Theories of Social‐psychological Process in our Age of Globalization

Accepting Cole's the premise that, “cultural‐inclusive psychology has been … an elusive goal” (1996, pp. 7–8) but one worth striving to attain, I first set out to identify my domain of interest and competence as an intellectual. Deciding it to be social interaction between individuals, I then searched out theoretical approaches to this domain that encompassed as many approaches to this trans‐historical concern that have emerged from cultural traditions bequeathing us their legacies. Doing this search comprehensively required me to move outside my Judeo‐Christian, Greco‐Roman, Renaissance heritage and its international diffusion via the European Empires since the 1500's, embodied most recently the American dominance of intellectual discourse since the Second World War. In my case, this journey has taken me in to Chinese culture and psychology where I have worked towards integrating the Chinese worldview and its psychological measures into the discipline of social psychology. Striving for a more inclusive culture‐view, I am now using multi‐cultural data bases to transcend this two‐cultural focus and incorporate wider measures of cultural variation into our theorizing and empirical validation of universal models for social interaction. This paper describes my current procedures for such culture‐mapping.     

政治向人性的复归与主体自由--人学政治理论引论

社会主义市场经济向纵深发展使主体意识崛起并对政治系统提出多层次多向度的要求,因而客观上要求政治关注与满足作为主体的人的本质的获得,实现政治对人的现实关切,使主体的自由在社会文明进步的框架内获得.当前要建设属人的政治,就必须从人的主体性和客观性视野出发,构筑解决价值和实践矛盾的人学政治理论;同时要避免抽象人性论、主体中心主义以及其他错误的政治观.     

多元文化社会中的宽容精神

全球化时代的国际政治关系的基础仍然是对人性的全面理解 ,这种理解体现为不同文化传统的存在论融通。当代西方哲学用主体性丰富了客体性 ,因此加强了自我认同感和文化认同感。全球时代增进了人们对多元文化的认识 ,宽容成为基本要求。这不仅是认识论任务 ,同时也是要通过对日常生活的反思达至生存的意识。     

道德统计学的社会观:塔尔德与涂尔干之争再考察

鲜有人考察19世纪法国的两位重要社会学家塔尔德和涂尔干之间的争论。本文以两人都倚重的统计学方法为切入口,深入考察两人论辩的实质问题,并力图呈现论辩背后的社会观差异以及各自对社会秩序之基础的思考。塔尔德试图以客观概率的方式去捕捉作为主观变量的社会秩序的生成过程,涂尔干则秉承以凯特莱为代表的道德统计学传统,试图通过纯粹客观的统计数据来捕捉具体社会结构及其功能的正常状态。通过对两人统计学基础的不断追索,本文认为,两人的实质差异在于：塔尔德试图超越社会本体论思考,用单子论的方式把握和理解现代社会特征和秩序的基础,而涂尔干仍然从社会本体的角度做社会学式思考,探寻现代社会的秩序基础。     

论当代中国文化的价值定位

文化最基本的、最核心的价值应定位于建构民族心理、形成民族性格、锻铸民族之魂,即塑造与自己时代相适应的社会主体.面对中国现代化的现实境遇,中国文化建设面临着十分复杂而又艰巨的任务从历时态上看,它要超越传统农耕文化,实现社会主体的现代化;从共时态上看,它要跨越后现代主义文化危机,塑造科学理性与人文精神相统一的新型的社会主体.     

Recognition and gendered identity constructions in labour activation

Few studies have considered how labour activation programmes affect participants’ identity construction, particularly from a gender comparison perspective. Using qualitative data and recognition theories, this exploratory study of the Norwegian Qualification Program examined how gender may affect labour activation recipients’ identity construction and sense of social value. The findings suggest that women experience labour activation as an enabling process, facilitating an enhanced sense of social value and status. In contrast, men experience either no such change or a diminution of their sense of worth and status. The study shows how cultural values regarding gender, work and employment are embedded in social work practice and activation policy implementation. Underscoring how activation may be intertwined in such cultural values and norms, the study calls for further research to understand these processes, as they may affect outcomes in labour activation policy.     

Social cognition,social neuroscience,and evolutionary social psychology: What's missing?

In this paper I argue that something important, and something social, is missing from contemporary accounts of social cognition, social neuroscience and evolutionary social psychology. Contemporary accounts of social cognition focus on cognition directed towards social objects, that is, towards persons and social groups. In contrast, early twentieth century accounts of socially engaged cognition focused upon beliefs and attitudes oriented to the represented beliefs and attitudes of members of social ‘reference groups’ and directed towards both social and non‐social objects. I argue that this earlier conception of socially engaged cognition should be integrated with contemporary research on social cognition, social neuroscience and evolutionary social psychology, since it poses a challenge but also an opportunity for these disciplines.     

Cultural evolution

In this paper I consider the problem of man's evolution - in particular the evolutionary problems raised when we consider man as a cultural animal as well as a biological one. I argue that any adequate cultural evolutionary theory must have the notion of adaptation as a central concept, where this must be construed in a fairly literal (biological) sense, that is as something which aids its possessors (i.e. men) to survive and reproduce. I argue against theories which treat adaptation in a metaphorical sense, particularly those speaking of the adaptation of cultures without reference to men. Iron tools per se are not better adapted than bronze tools - it is the men with iron tools who are better adapted than men with bronze tools. I show that by taking the approach that I do, one can apply at once in a fruitful manner some conclusions of biological evolutionary theory directly to men and their cultures. I conclude with a brief discussion of methodological issues raised by cultural evolutionary theories, particularly those of confirmation and falsification.     

试评吕坤的哲学思想

吕坤是明代商丘著名的思想家,一生独立治学,以理学著当世。其哲学思想兼容并蓄,又学有所宗,在中国哲学史上占有重要的地位。在理气关系这一本体论问题上,他在主张“气本论”的同时,又提出“理”本论,存在着深刻的内在矛盾性。他关于自然、当然和偶然、“续”与“恒”、“常”与“变”、“渐”与“顿”关系的论述,蕴含着极其丰富的辩证法思想。受其世界观矛盾的影响,其认识论存在着反映论与先验论的矛盾。他坚持可知论,认为人是可以通过向外格物来正确认识天地万物的客观世界的。但是,当面对外在的客观世界时,他主张向外格物穷理,是一个反映论者,当涉及到道德认知和修养时,主张向内反求,又成了一个先验论者。在知行问题上坚持“知先行后”、“知行并进”和“行重于知”等观点,强调知行的辩证关系,具有浓厚的思辨色彩,充满了辩证法的卓识。在历史观上主张以民为本,十分重视民的作用,并认为社会历史本身是处于不断的发展变化之中的,主张“因时顺势,皆可变通”。     

On the Link between Academia and the Practice of Social Work

The dualism of knowledge and values as well as of the objective and the subjective views has accompanied the social work profession from its inception and presents a particular dilemma for the link between academia and practice. It is either that academia is split off from the practice of social work, or that these two fields of professional activity merge into each other. Either of these solutions impoverishes the profession. The key for the understanding of this dilemma as well as its resolution rests with the particular ontological definitions adhered to by the profession. It is proposed that by fostering the moral ontology the dualism inherent in the nature of the profession may enrich it and a fruitful link between academia and the practice of social work will evolve. The arguments presented as well as the resolution proposed are illustrated by theoretical explanations, empirical studies and clinical practice in the area of the parent-infant relationship.