The Application of Game Theory in Collective Behavior: A Critique of Berk's “Gaming Approach”

Abstract

The game theory approach to collective behavior is examined in this paper by critiquing Richard A. Berk's application of it (1974). Given relative payoffs for different action choices, game theory may offer certain solutions for actors; however, Berk's use of game theory falls short of these solutions. Using matrices to present actors' payoffs is the only appropriate application of game theory used by Berk. A more proper application of game theory solutions to the same payoff values from Berk's work shows how an emergent norm approach might better fit the empirical problem than Berk's contagion approach.     

COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN A TWO‐STAGE GAME

We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two‐stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head‐to‐head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict‐avoidance take turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution regardless of whether communication is unilateral or bilateral. (JEL C91, D74, L15, H71)     

Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value

A cooperative game with transferable utilities– or simply a TU-game – describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A solution concept for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of payoffs over the players in the game. Famous solution concepts for TU-games are the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value. Both solution concepts have been axiomatized in various ways. An important difference between these two solution concepts is the fact that the Shapley value always distributes the payoff that can be obtained by the `grand coalition' consisting of all players cooperating together while the Banzhaf value does not satisfy this property, i.e., the Banzhaf value is not efficient. In this paper we consider the normalized Banzhaf value which distributes the payoff that can be obtained by the `grand coalition' proportional to the Banzhaf values of the players. This value does not satisfy certain axioms underlying the Banzhaf value. In this paper we introduce some new axioms that characterize the normalized Banzhaf value. We also provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value using similar axioms. Received: 10 April 1996 / Accepted: 2 June 1997     

STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION

In models of strategic interaction, there may be important order of entry effects if one player can credibly commit to an action (e.g., entry) before other players. If one estimates a simultaneous‐move model, then the move‐order effects will be confounded with the payoffs. This article considers nonparametric identification and simulation‐based estimation of sequential games of complete information. Relative to simultaneous‐move games, these models avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and require fewer payoff normalizations. We apply the estimator in several Monte Carlo experiments and to study entry‐order effects using data from the airline industry. (JEL C57, C15, L93)     

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY AND CAREER CHOICE*

Standard economic models tend to be more specific about pecuniary payoffs than nonpecuniary payoffs to education. Based on the ideas of Akerlof and Kranton, we consider a model of career choice and identity where individuals derive nonpecuniary identity payoffs. Using factor analysis on a range of attitude questions, we find two factors related to identity (career orientation and social orientation), which are important for planned educational choices and for observed gender differences. The implication is that policy makers and institutions of higher education need to focus on identity‐related issues rather than just improved financial incentives if they aim at attracting high‐ability youths to certain careers. (JEL I21, J24)     

LIVING IN TWO NEIGHBORHOODS—SOCIAL INTERACTION EFFECTS IN THE LABORATORY

Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, that is, behavior exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us to study the behavioral logic of social interaction effects. Our novel design feature is that each subject is simultaneously a member of two randomly assigned and identical groups where only members (“neighbors”) are different. We study behavior in a coordination game with multiple equilibria and a public goods game, which has only one equilibrium in material payoffs. We speak of social interactions if the same subject at the same time makes group‐specific decisions that depend on their respective neighbors' decisions. We find that a majority of subjects exhibit social interaction effects both when the game has multiple equilibria in material payoffs and when it only has one equilibrium. (JEL C91, H41, K42, H26)     

Cognitive Claims-Making,Enclosure, and the Depoliticization of Social Problems*

One of the most important contributions of recent social problems theory is the insight that social problems are inherently political phenomena. Existing scholarship on this characteristic has not dealt systematically with (1) the degree of overt politicality of social issues, or (2) the dynamic element of this politicality. This paper first reviews recent literature in the “medicalization of deviant behavior,” and sugests that this literature illustrates how the political element of social problem phenomena can be suppressed and replaced with a seemingly apolitical and technical perspective. Then it is proposed that interpretive social problems theory might deal more adequately with this pattern by incorporating a continuum ranging from “open” to “closed” social problems and analyzing the dynamics of social problem “enclosure,” and that certain sorts of claims—cognitive as opposed to normative—are especially conducive to the depoliticization and enclosure of social problems.     

HISTORY DEPENDENCE AND THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We study the minimal contributing set (MCS) game, a three‐person sequential step‐level public goods game. The behavior of critical third players changes with experience in this game even though they face no strategic or payoff uncertainty. We explore why these changes occur by manipulating subjects' experience in the first half of the experiment. The treatments give subjects very different initial experiences, but all treatments move subjects' choices toward experienced subjects' play in the control sessions. Long‐run play is indistinguishable across treatments. Our results are more consistent with the “discovered preferences” hypothesis ( Plott 1996 ) than either the “constructed preference” or “reference point” hypotheses. (JEL H41, C72, C92)     

Do Commercial Debt‐for‐Nature Swaps Matter for Forests? A Cross‐National Test of World Polity Theory1

We present cross‐national models of forest loss from 1990–2005 that examine the impact of commercial debt‐for‐nature swaps. In doing so, we find substantial support for world polity theory that poor nations that implement these swaps tend to have lower rates of deforestation than poor nations that do not implement these swaps. We also find support for another aspect of world polity theory—poor nations with higher levels of international nongovernmental organizations have lower rates of forest loss. A number of other factors, including structural adjustment, debt service, democracy, population growth, and domestic economic activity, also predict deforestation. We conclude by discussing the findings, theoretical implications, methodological implications, policy suggestions, and possible directions for future research.     

SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY: THE ECONOMIC COST OF INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS

This paper extends the literature on collective rent‐seeking by introducing the possibility that a competing group may be a subset of another. We develop a model that incorporates the potential for some individuals to be party of both sides of a conflict, which creates interdependence of payoffs. Results indicate that strategic individual behavior, and the resulting rent dissipation, is affected by the relative size of the groups. We conduct an experimental test of the model and find that observed laboratory behavior corresponds well with the game‐theoretic comparative‐static predictions. (JEL C72, C9, Q5, D74)     

NETWORK STRUCTURE IN A LINK FORMATION GAME: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

In this article, we use an experiment to evaluate the performance of alternative refinements in a Myersonian link formation game with a supermodular payoff function. Our results show that a non‐cooperative refinement, the global games (GG) approach, outperforms alternative cooperative refinements (strong Nash equilibrium, coalition‐proof Nash equilibrium, and pairwise stable Nash equilibrium) in explaining the observed experimental behavior in the static game of complete information with three players. The results are robust to some comparative statics and the GG approach shows a high predictive power under incomplete information. However, under repeated interaction or with a greater number of players, the GG approach loses predictive power, but so do the cooperative refinements. The results illustrate the importance of coordination failure in practice and the need to design mechanisms to reduce this effect in practical decision‐making problems. (JEL C70, C92, D20, D44, D82)     

Who Wants a Deliberative Public Sphere?1

Democratic theorists and social scientists suggest that a deliberative public sphere would be good for democracy by maximizing emancipatory possibilities and providing broad legitimacy to political decision making. But do ordinary Americans actually want a deliberative public sphere? I examine this question in the context of four contentious “religion and science” debates. Through a multidimensional evaluation exercise with 62 ordinary respondents, I find that evaluation of public representatives in these debates tends to favor open‐mindedness and ongoing debate. Further, respondents explicitly discount elected representatives who participate in public debate precisely because they are seen as violating deliberative norms through their affiliation with electoral politics. Respondents want a deliberative public sphere. However, this desire reflects an understanding of the public sphere and institutional politics as disconnected arenas with incompatible rules and objectives, raising multiple questions for democratic theory and for political sociology.     

Implicit and Explicit Peer Evaluation: Associations With Early Adolescents’ Prosociality,Aggression, and Bullying

Implicit and explicit peer evaluations were assessed among 120 early adolescents (56 boys, 64 girls; M age = 11.1 years). Explicit peer evaluations were round‐robin ratings of likeability; implicit peer evaluations were assessed with an approach‐avoidance task, also using a round‐robin design. Prosocial behavior, aggression, and bullying were assessed with a standard peer nominations procedure. Prosocial behavior predicted explicit positive evaluations given and received. Bullying and physical aggression predicted receiving explicit negative evaluations from peers. Implicit negative biases were found for girls but not boys. Relationally aggressive girls and bullying girls showed a negative implicit bias toward their peers. Possible implications for intervention are discussed.     

Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems

We investigate the implications of balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other hand, balanced cost reduction requires that if one agent leaves a problem, then the total payoffs of the remaining agents should be affected by the amount previously assigned to the leaving agent. We show that the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with either one of our two main axioms, balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction.     

Acceptability of Information Management Strategies: Adolescents' and Parents' Judgments and Links With Adjustment and Relationships

Parents' and adolescents' (M_age = 15.7) acceptability ratings of four information management strategies and associations between these ratings and adjustment, relationship quality, and strategy use were examined in 174 middle‐class families over 1 year. Acceptance of information management was greater for adolescents than for parents and for personal than for prudential issues; acceptance decreased across telling only if asked, avoidance, omitting details, and lying. Strategy acceptance and use were associated for lying and avoiding the topic. Controlling for strategy use, teens' acceptance of lying, omitting details, and avoidance was associated with poorer parent–adolescent relationships and more problem behavior 1 year later; acceptance of lying was associated with increases in depressed mood. Associations in the opposite direction were rare.     

RANK‐ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS

Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free‐riding in impure public goods. In our Rank‐Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank‐Order‐VCM) group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good; high contributors receive preferential access (a larger share), while low contributors receive restricted access (a lower share). In a laboratory experiment, Rank‐Order‐VCM elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups. In the control treatment, with randomly assigned ranks, the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time. We thus provide evidence of rank competition, in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible, being efficiency enhancing. (JEL C91, H41)     

Longitudinal Associations Between Adolescents' Bullying‐Related Indirect Defending,Outsider Behavior,and Peer‐Group Status

During adolescence, youth become more likely to avoid involvement in witnessed bullying and less likely to support victims. It is unknown whether—and how—these bystander behaviors (i.e., outsider behavior and indirect defending) are associated with adolescents' peer‐group status (i.e., popularity and social acceptance) over time. Cross‐lagged path modeling was used to examine these longitudinal associations in a sample of 313 Dutch adolescents (M_age‐T1 = 10.3 years). The results showed that status longitudinally predicted behavior, rather than that behavior predicted status. Specifically, unpopularity predicted outsider behavior and social acceptance predicted indirect defending. These findings suggest that a positive peer‐group status can trigger adolescents' provictim stance. However, adolescents may also strategically avoid involvement in witnessed bullying to keep a low social profile.     

CHEATING IN CONTESTS

Wherever competition is used to motivate a desirable activity or productive effort it may also motivate undesirable and therefore prohibited behavior—that is, cheating—that the organizer of the contest attempts to police. For example, when workers compete for promotion, bonuses, or other rewards, they may misrepresent their output (i.e., commit fraud) or increase their output by unacceptable means (e.g., violate regulations). We show how the extent of cheating is determined by the payoffs at stake in the contest, the random component of output, probability of cheating being detected, number of contestants, and the penalty associated with being found to have cheated. We find that while greater enforcement reduces cheating, it may also reduce productive effort. We also identify how two particular aspects of enforcement, the awarding of default victories and use of correlated rather than independent audits, affect cheating behavior. (JEL J33, K42)     

Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions

We analyze rent-seeking for a public good with two groups, where the provision of a public good is decided in the all-pay contest where “the winner takes all”. We assume that the valuation of the public good varies across groups, but is the same for all members within a group. Free-riding in such situation was predicted by Baik et al. (J Public Econ 82(3):415–429, 2001). We describe a continuum of equilibria where all players make contributions. There is room for substantial payoff asymmetry, which ranges from equal payoffs to all group members to a zero payoff for the player who makes a contribution and positive payoffs for free-riders. The results generalize for the case where the prize has both a private and a public component.     

Sensational signs,authority and the public sphere: Settler colonial rhetoric in times of change

The article explores the emotional regimes of settler colonialism in post‐apartheid South Africa. The focus is on apocalyptic fears of the imagined eradication of whiteness. These fears are articulated in response to postcolonial/decolonial interpellations of abject whiteness, and are made visible in a range of sensational signs that circulate online and offline. The signs cluster around two themes that are central to the ideologies of settler colonialism: land (and its feared loss), and (white) bodies (and their feared disappearance). Following Sarah Ahmed (2004a,b), emotionally charged signs can be seen as actions (akin to words in speech act theory). In contrast to Jürgen Habermas’ conception of the public sphere as an idealized place of rational debate, the article argues that a combination of affect‐emotion‐feeling and the performance of ‘reason’—what Aristotelian rhetoric refers to as pathos and ethos—are integral for understanding public‐political discourses of whiteness at a time when white privilege has been called out globally (and locally), and white dominance has lost its stronghold.