Vertrauen und Reputationseffekte bei Internet-Auktionen

In internet auctions the exchange between two anonymous actors corresponds to a one-shot prisoner’s-dilemma-like situation. In such a situation there is a high risk that both actors will cheat and that the market will collapse. The solution to attaining mutual cooperation is the simple and very efficient institution of a public rating system. By this institution sellers have an incentive to invest in reputation in order to enhance future chances of business. Using data from about 200 auctions of mobile phones we analyse the effects of the reputation system by empirical methods. In general the analysis of non-obtrusive data from auctions may help to gain a deeper understanding of basic social processes of exchange, reputation, trust, and cooperation and of the impact of institutions on the efficiency of markets. In this study we report empirical estimations of the effects of reputation on characteristics of transactions like the probability of a successful deal, the mode of payment, and the largest bid or auction price. Particularly, we ask whether sellers receive a “premium” for reputation. Results show that buyers are ready to pay higher prices for reputation to diminish the risk of exploitation. On the other hand, sellers protect themselves against cheating by choosing of a proper mode of payment. Simple institutional settings lead to cooperation, relatively rare events of fraud, and efficient markets despite the risk of mutual opportunistic behavior.     

Trust in humans and robots: Economically similar but emotionally different

Trust-based interactions with robots are increasingly common in the marketplace, workplace, on the road, and in the home. However, a valid concern is that people may not trust robots as they do humans. While trust in fellow humans has been studied extensively, little is known about how people extend trust to robots. Here we compare trust-based investments and self-reported emotions from across three nearly identical economic games: human-human trust games, human-robot trust games, and human-robot trust games where the robot decision impacts another human. Robots in our experiment mimic humans: they are programmed to make reciprocity decisions based on previously observed behaviors by humans in analogous situations. We find that people invest similarly in humans and robots. By contrast the social emotions (i.e., gratitude, anger, pride, guilt) elicited by the interactions (but not the non-social emotions) differed across human and robot trust games. Emotional reactions depended on the trust game interaction, and how another person was affected.     

Ask Prices, Offers, and Time to Sale in an Online Exchange

By examining an online computer exchange, we find that sellers who place higher nonbinding ask prices have higher outstanding offers and remain on the exchange longer, suggesting a willingness to hold out for higher offers. Additionally, higher ask prices deter buyers from making offers. The results are stronger in thinner market segments, suggesting that gains from waiting for a high price are greater when buyers' tastes are idiosyncratic. These relationships are consistent with models in which buyers engage in costly search and suggest that online exchanges may not eliminate the frictions related to bilateral transactions.     

Reputation und Kooperation

The institutionalized system of rating sellers in internet-auctions is a powerful tool to promote cooperation. This system encourages rational actors to “invest in reputation” and, consequently, to behave cooperatively. We analyze the strategic behaviour of sellers and buyers and, particularly, we investigate with empirical data whether there is a “premium on reputation”. Ulrich Brinkmann and Matthias Meifert critically comment on our article. In this rejoinder we discuss their objections and particularly the measurement of reputation. Also, we explore the question of the relevance of an institutionalized system of reputation. Is an exogeneous sanctioning mechanism a necessary prerequisite to generate a stable amount of cooperation as Brinkmann and Meifert argue or does the institution of a reputation system suffice? To answer this question further experimental or simulation studies are required.     

The structure of guanxi: Resolving problems of network assurance

Two widespread assumptions concerning networks, including guanxi networks, are that they function in terms of trust relations and that their structure is dyadic. This article subjects both assumptions to critical assessment and proposes alternative formulations. When the distinctions between trust and trustworthiness and between trust and assurance are made, then broader understandings of guanxi relationships emerge. The article shows that the assurance mechanism of guanxi is public exposure of transgressions against network norms, leading to the transgressor’s loss of face (mianzi). The necessity of third-party intervention of this type, typically but not exclusively through gossip, indicates the triadic rather than dyadic structure of guanxi relationships when sanction of reputation is included in the conceptualization of guanxi. Changes in guanxi during economic transition in China, from strong-to weaker-tie associations, require careful consideration of the changing nature of the mechanisms of face-loss.     

Religion,ethnicity and cooperation: An experimental study

We investigate how cross-cutting ethnic and religious identities as well as the strength of individual religiosity and fundamentalism affect individual cooperation. In a repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiment, information about subjects’ religious and ethnic identities was either revealed or concealed to examine the individual and joint effects of these influences on subject decisions. While subjects’ knowledge of others’ religious and ethnic difference has no net effect on their cooperativeness, the awareness of similarity increases it. Subject religiosity and fundamentalism have no independent effect on cooperation, but they enhance ethnic and religious intergroup effects.     

Do you reward and punish in the way you think others expect you to?

This paper addresses three questions: (1) When deciding on whether to reward or punish someone, how does how you think others expect you to behave affect your decision? (2) Does it depend upon whether others expect you to reward them vs. punish them? (3) What is the interpretation of such a causal effect? We investigate these questions using a modification of the lost wallet trust game (a simplified version of the trust game) that permits punishment. Like previous studies, we collect data on what second-movers think that first-movers expect them to do by directly eliciting the second-movers’ expectations. Unlike previous studies, we ensure exogeneity of these expectations by instrumenting for them. The instrument is the expectations of neutral observers which are disclosed to second-movers prior to the elicitation of second-movers’ expectations. We find that what you think others expect you to do has a zero causal effect on both reward and punishment decisions. We also find that it is important to instrument for second-order expectations because they are endogenous. We interpret these findings in terms of models of guilt-aversion and intentional reciprocity.     

Conceptualizing trust: a holistic Chinese view to bridge divergences and dichotomies

This research study seeks to understand and describe how people in a Chinese society define trust in daily life. Employing a qualitative phenomenological method, data were obtained through in-depth interviews with 14 adult Chinese individuals in northern Taiwan. This research pinpoints prior misconceptions of trust, examines competing approaches to trust that have led to diverse definitions, adopts a holistic Chinese view of trust that bridges prior divergent views, mediates the agency-structure and trust-distrust dichotomies, and focuses on trust strategies applicable to different situations. The findings reveal that trust is a dyadic relationship in which how the trustee demonstrates his or her trustworthiness to gain trust and how the trustor decides to trust are likely to be affected not only by personal choices based on prior knowledge and experiences but also the external social and cultural norms of the society. The findings advance the existing knowledge of trust conceptualization and extend its applicability to broader Chinese societies. They have implications for strategies for relationship and trust-building for Westerners as they engage in global socio-economic discourse with Chinese.     

TRACKING CUSTOMER SEARCH TO PRICE DISCRIMINATE

The electronic technologies of the Internet make it possible for sellers to track potential customers and discriminate between the informed and uninformed. In this article, we report an experiment that investigates the market impact of firms tracking customers and offering discriminatory prices based on search history. We find that consumers, on average, face the same prices when sellers have the ability to track customers and price discriminate as when sellers post a single price for all buyers. However, informed buyers receive lower prices when sellers can detect buyer search, whereas uninformed buyers receive lower prices when firms cannot track customers. (JEL D43 , L13 , C92 )     

A THEORY OF BILATERAL OLIGOPOLY

In horizontal mergers, concentration is often measured with the Hirschman–Herfindahl Index (HHI). This index yields the price–cost margins in Cournot competition. In many modern merger cases, both buyers and sellers have market power, and indeed, the buyers and sellers may be the same set of firms. In such cases, the HHI is inapplicable. We develop an alternative theory that has similar data requirements as the HHI, applies to intermediate good industries with arbitrary numbers of firms on both sides, and specializes to the HHI when buyers have no market power. The more inelastic is the downstream demand, the more captive production and consumption (not traded in the intermediate market) affects price–cost margins. The analysis is applied to the merger of the gasoline refining and retail assets of Exxon and Mobil in the western United States. (JEL L13, L41)     

Balancing the balance: Self-control mechanisms and compulsive buying

Previous research has mainly focused on identifying why compulsive buyers engage in excessive buying, while their attempts to control problematic buying behavior have largely been ignored. The present research examines the self-control attempts of compulsive buyers. Study 1 uses qualitative in-depth interviews to provide initial insights into the self-control attempts of compulsive buyers. Study 2 adopts a quantitative survey approach, and examines how prudent and compulsive buyers differ in their self-control attempts. The studies demonstrate that compulsive buyers engage in self-control, but differ from prudent buyers in how they apply self-control measures. These differences have implications for interventions that aim to enhance the success of compulsive buyers’ self-control.     

BILATERAL OLIGOPOLY IN POLLUTION PERMIT MARKETS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We experimentally investigate behavior in a bilateral oligopoly using a supply function equilibria model discussed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Hendricks and McAfee (2010), and Malueg and Yates (2009). We focus on the role that market size and the degree of firm heterogeneity have on the market equilibrium. Our results indicate that subjects within the experiment recognize the strategic incentives in a bilateral oligopoly, but they do not exploit these incentives to the exact magnitude predicted by theory. We find weaker support for predicted market outcomes, as market efficiency does not depend on market size, and in some cases buyers or sellers are more successful at extracting the rents from the market. (JEL L13, Q5, C9)     

Combining the Social Relations Model and Behavioral Genetics to Explore the Etiology of Familial Interactions

SUMMARY

This review focuses on the Social Relations Model (SRM) and a genetic extension of this model as one approach for identifying the processes by which genetic factors influence familial exchanges (Kenny & La Voie, 1984). The basic SRM and its ability to decompose dyadic measures of family interaction into actor, partner and dyadic relationship effects is described followed by findings from 3 recent studies. Results indicate that much of familial interaction is in fact relationship specific, and not due to individual-level effects. We also discuss why and how the basic SRM is enriched through the incorporation of genetically sensitive designs and present results that suggest the importance of nonshared environmental contributions for both individual and dyadic level effects. Finally, directions for future family research are proposed including the use of genetically informative designs, the collection of round-robin robin data, and the incorporation of more diverse samples.     

Do transnational brokers always win? A multilevel analysis of social support

Migrants often maintain relationships with significant others located in their countries of origin, which results in having transnational interpersonal ties in addition to local ones. The majority of previous studies indicate that financial and social remittances flow from countries of immigration to the countries of emigration through migrants and their networks. However, less is known about who is involved in those exchanges, what kind of supportive resources flow within and across nation-state borders, and what level of individual cross-border engagement of migrants is related to those flows. We ask whether and how transnationality as an individual attribute, together with other personal, dyadic, and supradyadic characteristics, explain received social support. Drawing on data from 100 ego-centric networks collected from Turkish migrants in Germany, the results indicate that not only the dyadic level but also network structure, the position occupied by individuals in the network and their level of transnationality explain supportive resource flows within and across borders.     

Do buyers and sellers evaluate air pollution reduction differently? Experimental evidence from China

This paper is the first study to investigate the good dealness account of the endowment effect in non-market goods. We designed a within-subjects experiment to measure the value of air pollution reduction through the evaluation of a market good, PM 2.5 filters. We divided the subjects into buyers and sellers and asked them to trade four PM 2.5 filters using the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auction under two treatments: a) a drop in air quality, which served to increase the market price of the filters; and b) the receipt of information on the relationship between death rates and air pollution, which served to increase the intrinsic value of the filters. Our results show that buyers’ willingness to pay for pollution reduction did not increase when air pollution worsened but did increase when informed of the possibility of health damage from air pollution. Sellers’ willingness to accept for air quality deterioration increased when pollution worsened but remained the same upon receiving information about health damage. We conclude that sellers are more sensitive to changes in market price, while buyers are more sensitive to changes in intrinsic value. Our findings support the theory of seeking a good deal in explaining the endowment effect.     

Does players’ identification affect trust and reciprocity in the lab?

Reputation mechanisms are mainly based on information sharing by traders about private trading experience. Each trader can therefore rely on his own past experience as a trader and on other traders’ past experience. The former is the direct component of the reputation mechanism and the latter the indirect component ( [Bolton et al., 2004a] and [Bolton et al., 2004b]). We design an experiment for isolating the direct component of the reputation system and studying its effect on the level of trust and reciprocity in a population where agents play both roles (trustor and trustee). Our experiment consists on three treatments of a finitely repeated investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In the reference treatment there is no reputation mechanism at all, in treatment 1 trustees can build up a direct reputation, and in treatment two players can build up a direct reputation for both roles. We find that trustees’ direct reputation has a positive effect on reciprocity, but does not affect the average trust in the population. Trust is significantly higher only when players can build up a reputation in both roles. We show that the increase in trust is mainly linked to the formation of mutual trust-reciprocity relations.     

Motives and Decisions for and Against Having Children Among Nonheterosexuals and the Impact of Experiences of Discrimination,Internalized Stigma,and Social Acceptance

Same-sex parents are increasingly a topic of public discourse. A growing number of homosexuals openly speak about their desire to have children or are already living together in different family constellations. The current study examined the decisions for or against having children and the motivations behind those decisions among nonheterosexuals living in Germany. A sample of 1,283 nonheterosexuals participated by means of an online survey. As some nonheterosexual individuals do not identify themselves with a male or female gender identity, a third category, “gender different,” was generated. Motives for (not) having children, perceptions of social acceptance, experiences of discrimination in relation to one's sexual orientation, and levels of internalized stigma were taken into account regarding their influence on the decision about parenthood. Most respondents (80%) reported that they did not have children. However, among this group, 43% stated that they had decided to have children later in their lives, 24% were undecided, and 11% had already decided against having children. The most important influences on the decision of whether to have children were respondents’ age and their desire for emotional stabilization. Negative experiences as a result of sexual orientation and internalized stigma had no impact on the decisions regarding parenthood.     

The impact of negotiated exchange on trust and trustworthiness

Negotiated exchanges and trust problems can be regarded as two different forms of exchange, the former representing exchanges with negotiation and binding contracts, the latter representing asymmetric transactions in which one actor has the opportunity to deceive the other. Both forms of exchange have been extensively studied, but the two respective research traditions exhibit very little overlap. In this paper, we investigate the effects of negotiated exchanges in different network structures on the development of mutual trust. We derive hypotheses from various theories and test them by means of an experiment in which subjects first undertake a series of negotiated exchanges under different power conditions, and then face a trust problem with one of the actors that have been involved in the previous exchanges. The trust problem is operationalized by means of the Investment Game which allows us to look separately at trust and trustworthiness. Our results demonstrate that negotiated exchanges increase mutual trust, but not trustworthiness.