Political–economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case

 A political–economic environment is studied in which two parties, representing different constituencies of citizens, compete over a proportional tax rate to be levied on private endowments, to finance a public good. Although parties know the distribution of citizen traits (preferences and endowments), they are uncertain about the distribution of traits among the citizens who will turn up at the polls. This uncertainty engenders an endogenously derived function π(t ₁, t ₂) giving the probability that any one tax policy t ₁ will defeat another t ₂ in the election. Equilibrium existence theorems are proved, and the nature of equilibrium is compared with the equilibrium that exists when Downsian parties (ones whose objective is to maximize the probability of victory) face uncertainty. Both constituency-representing parties and uncertainty are needed to generate equilibria in which parties propose different policies. Received: 4 April 1995/Accepted: 2 April 1996     

Parties with Policy Preferences and Uncertainty over Voter Behavior

The equilibrium redistributive policy proposals of two parties with policy preferences are studied. Each party’s ideal policy coincides with that of citizens having a particular income level, and the party’s utility function reflects its attitude to the trade-off between the choice of preferred policy and the likelihood of victory. When parties face uncertainty about citizens’ abstention from voting, divergent equilibrium proposals are derived which are more moderate than their contrasting ideal policies. Political equilibria under different prior beliefs on abstention are then compared. It is shown that a lower likelihood of abstention in a particular income group induces both parties to make proposals catering to that group, in equilibrium.An erratum to this article can be found at     

Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control

We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect information. Voting rules that focus on the opposition party sometimes dominate voting rules that focus on the incumbent party. When parties are policy motivated, they also have to be motivated to select good policies. Generally, it is easier to stimulate policy motivated parties than office motivated parties to collect information. However, in contrast to office motivated parties, policy motivated parties will sometimes select policies that conflict with the representative voter’s interest.     

A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation

 A spatial model of party competition is studied in which: (i) Parties are supposed to have ideology. By this we mean that their goal is to maximize the welfare of their constituencies. (ii) The policy implemented after the election does not need to coincide with the one proposed by the winner. The policy implemented should be a compromise that considers the proposals made by the different parties. In the case of proportional representation this compromise is modeled as a convex combination of the proposed policies with weights proportional to the number of votes obtained by each party. We provide some existence theorems and compare the equilibrium in our model with the equilibrium that exists under some probabilistic models. It is also shown that proportional representation will create incentives for the parties to announce radical platforms. Received: 17 May 1994/Accepted: 5 March 1996     

Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition

 In this paper we examine a model of electoral competition with entry costs, where several established parties compete against each other under the threat of potential entry. Assuming single-peakedness of the distribution of voters’ ideal points, we show that, if there are two established parties, an equilibrium always exists and is unique, and demonstrate that the Hotelling-Downs and the Smithies-Palfrey equilibria represent special cases of the equilibrium in our model. If there are more than two established parties, an equilibrium is always unique and there exists an upper bound on the values of entry cost which guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. Received: 3 July 1995/Accepted: 10 June 1996     

Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies

In this paper is remarked that “mixed” strategies in games of electoral competition do not need to be interpreted as random moves. There are two a priori symmetric parties, and a finite (non spatial) set of alternatives. Parties are allowed to take unclear positions, by campaining on a “platform” that is a mix of several alternatives. Each individual nevertheless identifies a party with a single alternative, the number of individuals who identify a party with a given alternative being proportional to the importance of that alternative in the party’s platform. Received: 24 March 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999     

Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules

We consider a repeated electoral competition game between two parties, each representing a constituent with a given income level. Parties are unable to commit to a policy before the election; they choose a nonlinear income tax schedule once elected. In each period, citizens cast a vote either for the incumbent or for the challenger. We first show that there exist (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibria where both parties choose the most-preferred tax schedule of their constituent, subject to the constraint that they are reelected. We characterize a specific class of these BPR (Best Policy with Reelection) equilibria in which one of the parties plays its constituent’s unconstrained optimal tax function. Equilibrium tax schedules are always piecewise linear. Depending on the income levels of the two parties’ constituents, we obtain either classical left-vs-right equilibria (where the poor vote for one party and the rich for the other one) or ends-against-the-middle equilibria (where both poor and rich vote for one party while the middle class votes for the other party). In both types of equilibria, both parties propose the same tax schedule to a subset of the population.     

Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties

We extend the citizen candidate model of electoral competition with sincere voting to allow for k ≥ 2 states of aggregate uncertainty. We discuss and characterize the equilibrium set in this framework. We provide conditions for the existence of two-party equilibria when k = 2 and show that the policies of the two parties in any such equilibrium are not only divergent but that the parties are extremist: when the political mood is left-wing, the left-wing party wins decisively with a platform that is to the left of the left-wing median voter, while when the political mood is right-wing, the right-wing party wins decisively with a platform that is to the right of the right-wing median voter. We then provide conditions under which such equilibria remain robust for an arbitrary value of k.     

The “melting pot”: A success story?

The “melting pot” policy intends to create a new generation of migrants that will assimilate with the native population. The instruments used by the policy makers are fiscal and educational policies, which are intended to eliminate disparities between the migrants and the native population. The aim of this paper is to examine the success of this policy among second generation Israelis. In other words, the question of interest is whether the second generation is more similar to the natives, or to their own parents. The methodology used is ANOGI – ANalysis Of GIni – which is similar to ANOVA except that it offers an additional parameter – stratification between groups. We compare two classifications: in the first, the second-generation Israelis were classified as Israelis, while in the second they were classified as belonging to the country of origin (of their parents). We find that the latter classification is more stratified than the former. This suggests that the melting pot policy did not achieve its declared targets.     

Framing the rabbit to snare the votes

Results in cognitive psychology and experimental economics suggest that people are prone to systematic misperception of policy. This paper embodies voters’ misperceptions of policy into a standard political economy framework with complete information, and examines whether and to what extent political parties may use this misperception to manipulate voters and derive political gains. We analyze the equilibria and welfare implications for different setups. A payroll tax incidence detailed example is used to illustrate the framework. The paper is based in part on a chapter in the second author’s Ph.D. dissertation. The authors wish to thank Elhanan Helpman, seminar participants in Silvaplana and Bonn University and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. The authors are grateful for financial assistance by the Sapir Fund.     

On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates

We study and compare equilibrium platforms in models of unidimensional electoral competition with two and four policy motivated parties. We first analyze the plurality game, where the party getting the most votes is elected and implements its proposed platform. Restrictions on the set of credible announcements are needed to get existence of equilibria. Comparing equilibria with two and four parties, we obtain that moderate parties react to the introduction of extreme parties by proposing the same or more extreme equilibrium platforms. We then study the proportional system, where the policy implemented is a weighted sum of the proposals, with the voting shares as weights. Here, the existence of extreme parties leads moderate ones to choose more centrist platforms. We finally test the robustness of our results with respect to, first, the enlargement of the strategy space to entry decisions and, second, to asymmetric distributions of voters' blisspoints.

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Ideological versus Downsian political competition

We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters' types. We assume that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians; members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on the contrary, care only about winning the election. We consider two possibilities: that members choose the political platforms and that professional politicians are the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party members is analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politicians have no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both parties to let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in which professional politicians have much better information than the members of the party about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expected utility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professional politicians choose. Received: 31 May 1999/Accepted: 1 March 2001     

A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters

We construct an equilibrium model of party competition, in which parties are especially concerned with their core and swing voters, concerns which political scientists have focused upon in their attempts to understand party behavior in general elections. Parties compete on an inifinite-dimensional space of possible income-tax policies. A policy is a function that maps pre-fisc income into post-fisc income. Only a fraction of each voter type will vote for each party, perhaps because of issues not modeled here or voter misperceptions of policies. Each party??s policy makers comprise two factions, one concerned with maximizing the welfare of its constituency, or its core, and the other with winning over swing voters. An equilibrium is a pair of parties (endogenously determined), and a pair of policies, one for each party, in which no deviation to another policy will be assented to both its core and swing factions. We characterize the equilibria: they have the property that both parties propose identical treatment of a possibly large interval of middle-income voters, while the ??left?? party gives more to the poor and the ??right?? party more to the rich. An empirical section uses the data of Piketty and Saez on taxation in the US to assess the model??s predictions. We argue that the model is roughly confirmed.     

Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals

A policy is the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash (Econometrica 18(2):155?C162, 1950) bargaining framework. With heterogeneous parties, agreements and electoral outcomes depend on the concavity of the utility functions of negotiators and on the relative location of their ideal policies, i.e., depend on the negotiators relative willingness to compromise. Agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties?? ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge.     

Electing a parliament

We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single district proportional. We prove that under both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. We compare the outcomes under the two systems.     

Informing family policies: The uses of social research

Like the topic of family policy itself, research informing family policies is difficult to characterize. This article discusses how ideology and values influence research agendas and then describes three types of studies informing family policies: research defining social issues, evaluation research, and research about the policy-making process. Two case studies illustrate how social research informs family policy: in promoting gender equality in Scandinavia and in reforming child support in the United States. Values of individualism and the sanctity of the family have traditionally focused policy makers' and, hence, researchers' attention on individuals, not families, as the units of analysis. But dramatic shifts in family structure and functioning along with renewed public concern about family disintegration are placing families high on the policy agenda. Both “basic” and “applied” family scholars can contribute to a research agenda examining the factors promoting strong, effective families. She conducts research on gender and the life course, as well as on aging, families, and social policy. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Minnesota. Her research interests in stratification, social policy, gender, and the life course include sex segregation in occupations, fertility, and work decisions and family policy.     

Evolution of the professional contingent workforce

The market for professional contingent workers (PCW) has evolved into one of the fastest growing segments of the temporary labor force in the socalled “new economy.” To better understand the evolution and success of the professional contingent market, I utilize a new paradigm. Three dimensions are added: First, supplyside characteristics among PCW are analyzed in aggregation. Second, the role and market contribution of intermediaries, such as staffing groups, are stipulated. Finally, interaction among the parties—PCW, staffing groups, and client firms—is viewed as symbiotic. Within the structural framework established by client firms and staffing groups, PCW create value and scale economies for all parties. Empirical results confirm the hypothesis that PCW professionalism assures the vitality of the market.     

Community development and the politics of community

In a context in which ‘community empowerment’ isvirtually government policy, it is hardly surprising that thereis almost no area of social policy that is immune from the communitytreatment. Of course, this is not new, despite the zeal withwhich each new initiative is ‘rolled out’. In fact,sometimes it seems that policy development needs to reinventthe wheel of community every decade or so. The question, therefore,is what this ideological recycling of community tells us: first,about the meaning of the term itself; second, about its contemporarysignificance within the wider politics of the state. This articleargues that we need to draw on those historical and theoreticalresources which help us to think our way through to the contemporarycontext. Only an active and engaged recognition of the politicsof community will enable us to get to the root of the problematicyet promising nature of community development.     

Subjective well-being in European countries��on the age-specific impact of physical activity

As an attempt to measure the ‘experienced’ utility of individuals in economics, the investigation of individuals’ subjective well-being (SWB) was pioneered by Van Praag and Frijters (1999) and Kahneman et al. (1999). Since then, a number of studies has analysed the factors associated with SWB and policy makers are now recognising the importance of SWB as a policy target, with the implication being that one could target its factors associated with increase in the overall SWB in countries. However, despite its significance to economies, and increasing policy relevance, investigations on the impact of sport and physical activity on SWB are relatively rare [e.g. Rasciute and Downward in Kyklos 63(2):256–270, 2010]. More specifically, despite sports participation and engagement in physical activity having a strong age-specific profile (Breuer et al. in Eur Rev Aging Phys Act 7:61–70, 2010; Hinrichs et al. in Eur J Sport Soc 6(1):49–57, 2010; Mechling and Netz in European Rev Aging Physical Activity 6(2):89–97, 2009), there is no study that investigates whether the magnitude of this impact is age-specific. Consequently, this paper seeks to make a unique contribution to the existing literature by exploring the age-specific effects of physical activity on SWB for a broad cross-section of 19 European countries. Overall, the results suggest that engagement in physical activity generally contributes to the SWB of individuals on a European level but that significant age-specific differences exist.     

Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: the uni-dimensional case

This article studies the effects of bandwagon and underdog on the political equilibrium of two-party competition models. We adapt for voter conformism the generalized Wittman?CRoemer model of political competition, which views political competition as the one between parties with factions of the opportunists and the militants that Nash-bargain one another, and consider three special cases of the general model: the Hotelling?CDowns model, the classical Wittman?CRoemer model, and what we call the ideological-party model. We find that the presence of voter conformism significantly affects the nature of political competition, and its effect on political equilibrium is quite different depending on the model one uses. In the Hotelling?CDowns model, political parties put forth an identical policy at the equilibrium, regardless of the type of voter conformism, and this is the only equilibrium. In both the ideological-party and classical Wittman?CRoemer models, parties propose differentiated policies at the equilibrium, and the extent of policy differentiation depends on the degree of voter conformism.