On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study

This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating conflicting claims: the constrained equal awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal losses rules. We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium allocation coincides with the recommendation of one of these three rules. In addition, we let subjects play an additional game that has the property that all (and only) strategy profiles in which players coordinate on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium. While in the first three games subjects’ play easily converges to the unique equilibrium rule, in the last game the proportional rule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device, especially when we frame the game as an hypothetical bankruptcy situation. We also administered a questionnaire to a different group of students, asking them to act as impartial arbitrators to solve (among others) the same problems played in the lab. Also in this case, respondents were sensitive to the framing of the questions, but the proportional rule was selected by the vast majority of respondents.     

Spatial competition with three firms: an experimental study

This article reports the results of an experimental study of the three firm location problem. We compare the subjects'behavior in the experiments with the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium calculated by Shaked. Overall, the findings are consistent with the equilibrium prediction. However, the subjects'locations were significantly more dispersed than predicted by the theory. Three alternative explanations of this phenomenon - inexperience, approximate equilibrium behavior and risk aversion - are suggested and evaluated for their predictive power. Special attention is paid to risk aversion.     

Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power

We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders. We also elicit responders’ willingness to pay for (un)conditional veto power. The bids reveal a large endowment effect.     

From locality to continent: A comment on the generalization of an experimental study

Kocher et al. (2008) find that conditional willingness to contribute to a public good is considerably stronger at a U.S. research site, Appalachian State University, than at sites in Europe and Asia. I find that the willingness at Brown University, in Rhode Island, is not significantly different from that in Europe and Asia in Kocher et al. (2008). Clear evidence on significantly different demographic statistics between these two U.S. research sites is provided. This implies that in the experimental study of societies, or more generally in empirical studies, we need exercise care to generalize from results at a specific research site to geographically broader conclusions.     

Employment discrimination against older workers: an experimental study of hiring practices

Pairs of resumes, one for a 57-year-old and the other for a 32-year-old, were mailed to 775 large firms and employment agencies across the United States. Although the resumes presented equal qualifications, the older job seeker received a less favorable employer response 26.5% of times when a position appeared to be vacant. Vigorous enforcement of equal opportunity laws as well as initiatives to change employer attitudes are appropriate responses to such discrimination. The technique of employment testing, demonstrated in this research, can be useful in both efforts.     

No foot in the door: an experimental study of employment discrimination against older workers

Pairs of testers, one aged 57 and one aged 32, applied for 102 entry-level sales or management jobs in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. Although their credentials described them as equally qualified, the older applicants received less favorable responses from employers 41.2% of the time. Three quarters of these differences occurred before older applicants could fully present their qualifications. The negative employer assumptions about older workers implied by these differences in outcome were seldom explicitly stated.     

Thresholds, productivity, and context: an experimental study on determinants of distributive behaviour

In our questionnaire experiment we confronted students of economics, law and medicine with distributive situations in different contexts characterised by two features inspired by medical decision problems: First, individual threshold values indicate minimal amounts needed by potential recipients of the given resource to obtain positive benefits. Second, recipients differ with respect to their ability to benefit from the given quantity, which indicates the productivity of the resource. Allocations offered in the questionnaire are theoretically grounded. However, respondents were also able to make their own proposals. Well-known allocation rules, but also new procedures, were witnessed. Two multistage principles were most prominent: After distributing all minimal amounts, in a second step one aims for resource-equality while the other principle in the second step demands the maximisation of the sum of payoffs. Besides threshold values and productivity, the acceptance of different principles also depended on the field of study, the degree of scarcity of the resources and the sequential order of situations.     

EU Enlargement: Economic-Cultural Perspective and Cross-Country Comparison

Globalization is constantly changing the appearance of the modern world. The most intense processes of integration are taking place in Europe in the framework of the European Union (EU) enlargement. Though the formal process is more or less concluded, the subtle and informal ones still have a long way to go. Social structures (institutions, organizations, norms, etc.) and actions depend on the cultural environment in the narrowest sense of the word: human perceptions and values. This poses the basic question whether the economic-cultural orientations of the new EU member states are compatible with imported social structures. We have done an empirical research using Hofstede's cultural dimensions and European Values Study database for 26 European countries (23 EU member states, 2 candidate countries, and Northern Ireland as a separate entity). We have also compared the differences and similarities by applying the Ward method (cluster analysis) on our 10 constructed variables.     

Research note: Balance of financial power in marriage: an exploratory study of breadwinning wives

This research note reports some findings of a small exploratory study of a sample of 18 women and 14 men living in the North-West in families in which the wife was the major (though not necessarily the only) breadwinner. Amongst the aspects explored in interviews were their domestic financial arrangements, which were found to be significantly different from those in studies where the husband was the main breadwinner. It was found that there was a tendency for the wives to cede some of their financial power to their husbands. At the same time they took on a sense of the burden of responsibility and worry associated with the breadwinning role.     

Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).     

Propensity scores: an introduction and experimental test

Propensity score analysis is a relatively recent statistical innovation that is useful in the analysis of data from quasi-experiments. The goal of propensity score analysis is to balance two non-equivalent groups on observed covariates to get more accurate estimates of the effects of a treatment on which the two groups differ. This article presents a general introduction to propensity score analysis, provides an example using data from a quasi-experiment compared to a benchmark randomized experiment, offers practical advice about how to do such analyses, and discusses some limitations of the approach. It also presents the first detailed instructions to appear in the literature on how to use classification tree analysis and bagging for classification trees in the construction of propensity scores. The latter two examples serve as an introduction for researchers interested in computing propensity scores using more complex classification algorithms known as ensemble methods.     

On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members

Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.     

Co-evolution of conventions and networks: An experimental study

We study the emergence of conventions in dynamic networks experimentally. Conventions are modeled in terms of coordination games in which actors can choose both their behavior and their interaction partners. We study how macro-level outcomes of the process in terms of Pareto-efficiency and heterogeneity depend on initial conditions. Moreover, we examine the underlying processes at the microlevel. Predictions are derived from a game-theoretic model which is applied to our experimental conditions by means of computer simulation. The results provide mixed support for the macro-level hypotheses, and indicate possible directions to improve the model at the micro level.