A Legal Structure for Limiting the Agency Cost of Stock Rights Transfer

股权表决权能的单独处分会减损其他股东的福利，资本多数决之下限制或者禁止股权转让的合约安排可能会侵害股东的退出权，进而减损股权市场对高管的制约力量，间接推高管理层滥权谋私的代理成小。在创设股权转让的法律结构时，必须任合约自由、资本多数决与降低代理成本之间求取妥当的平衡。法官应认定投票权转让行为无效，以保证投票权与剩余索取权匹配，并保持股东投票权之于高管的约束功能。章程概括性地禁止股权转让，阻塞了股东退出权，不利于遏制控股股东与高管潜在的滥权行为，当属无效。法官必须本着长期契约与短期契约、章程初始条款及修订条款的差异化视角，区分各类限制股权转让的章程约定的效力。     

Calculable Power: A Case Study of IMF Quotas and Voting Rights Reform*

Voting procedure is an important mechanism for public choice in collective bodies such as international organizations. This paper measures and compares IMF member countries’ voting power before the 2008 reform and after the 2010 reform on the basis of datasets on IMF quotas and voting rights distribution provided by IMF. Our study verifies that IMF’s quotas and voting rights reforms do help to reduce the voting power gap among member countries. The 2008 and 2010 reforms produce a greater improvement in emerging members’ voting power under the 70 percent majority rule than the 85 percent rule; the 70 percent majority rule means the United States would lose its absolute veto. Moreover, the paper disproves the underlying assumption that regards a member’s voting power as proportional to its voting rights. Countries with different amounts of voting rights can still have the same voting power.     

论代理问题与公司治理安排

本文在综述前人公司治理理论的基础上，分析了公司代理问题和世界上现有的三种主要公司治理安排。我们认为任何有效的公司治理安排必须考虑一、该国的文化传统和社会现实；二、构成公司治理的权力基础；三、股东的法律保护和大股东(债权人)在公司治理中的作用。     

完善公司治理加强国有企业中小股东权益法律保护

股权结构是决定股份公司内部权力和利益的分配,影响公司治理结构和治理效率的基础性因素.资本多数决原则下国有企业国有股权一股独大决定了中小股东对公司经营管理决策的形成、贯彻能施加的影响微乎其微.行政上的超强控制、内部人控制、隧道效应、国有资产的流失等均与之难脱干系.究其实质股东的利益冲突造就了公司控制权的产生,公司治理必须通过权利制约的安排调节平衡股东的利益冲突.在国有企业改革的实践中,针对中小股东权益受损事件频发的态势,应以控制权与公司治理的相应关系为切入点,挖掘中小股东权益受损的深层原因,从公司表决机制、少数股东权以及中小股东诉权的制度设计三方面完善公司治理,规制控制权滥用,加强中小股东的权益保护.     

瑕疵出资股东的股东权利及其限制的分类研究:规范、解释与实证

股东权利虽以股东身份为基础,但取得股东身份并不当然享有完整的股东权利,如股东存在出资瑕疵,其股权应当受到限制,且这种限制具有正当性。一般来讲,比例股权与股东出资以及股东自身利益的关系较非比例股权而言要更为密切,在股东瑕疵出资的情况下,对其比例股权进行相应的限制,具有制度上的合理性、法理上的正当性与现实上的可行性。因此,对于瑕疵出资股东,其比例股权的行使应根据其瑕疵出资的实际情况而受到相应限制,原则上应按照其实缴的出资比例行使;而非比例股权则不应受到限制而均可以完整享有并行使。关于瑕疵出资股东权利限制的此等一般性标准得以确立后,具体到个案涉及的各项股权的限制及实现该限制的路径,还需要司法基于公平正义之原则分别处理。     

Strict proportional power in voting bodies

It is a widely known fact among game theorists as well as political scientists that the distribution of voting weights in a voting body is generally a poor proxy for the distribution of voting power within the body. It has been proposed to equate the distribution of a priori voting power and actual seat distribution by randomizing the decision rule of the voting body over various majority rules. In this paper, some implications of this procedure will be discussed.     

论我国公司法人内部监督制度的完善

公司法人监督机构的建立和完善,从而降低代理成本已成为公司治理的核心问题所在。公司法人内部监督制度的设立和完善是降低代理成本的途径之一。而公司法人内部监督制度的设立和完善,应该在公平与效率的深层次统一层面上,以平衡股东、经营者和职工之间的利益为旨归。所以,完善我国公司法人内部监督主要路径是:提高、扩大中小股东在公司中的地位和权利;加强、扩大职工的参与管理权;提升监事会地位,扩大监事会职权,完善对监事义务之规定。     

Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers

A dichotomous decision-making context in committees is considered where potential partisan members with predetermined votes can generate inefficient decisions and buy neutral votes. The optimal voting rule minimizing the expected costs of inefficient decisions for the case of a three-member committee is analyzed. It is shown that the optimal voting rule can be non-monotonic with respect to side-transfers: in the symmetric case, majority voting is optimal under either zero, mild or full side-transfer possibilities, whereas unanimity voting may be optimal under an intermediate side-transfer possibility. The side-transfer possibilities depend on the power of partisans (their ability or willingness to pay for neutral votes) relative to the corruptibility of neutral members (personal cost of deliberately casting a `wrong' vote).     

从两个公式看累积投票制的适用

2006年1月1日开始实施的《公司法》明确规定股份公司在选举董事、监事时可实行累积投票制,原意是更好地维护中小股东的权益,然而从两个简单的公式即可看出累积投票制的实施必然会遇到一些困难。     

浅析股东知情权制度

随着公司所有权与经营权分离治理结构的出现,使得公司管理层凭借信息优势侵犯股东权利的现象时有发生,若想恢复经营和管理信息在管理层和普通股东间的对称和平衡,构建和完善股东知情权制度显得尤为必要.股东知情权的确立是基于股东平等原则、公司履行对社会的责任等法理基础之上;股东知情权具有固有权利、基础性权利等性质.我国的股东知情权的完善要从以下方面着手:扩大股东查阅的范围,允许股东选任代理人,隐名股东被确认有股东资格的情况下具有知情权,而隐名股东资格的认定可以从公司章程和股东名册记载、实际出资及工商机关的登记内容等方面来加以认定;未履行出资义务的股东是否剥夺其知情权要视股东未履行出资的主观恶性及客观后果综合认定.     

从《名公书判清明集》看南宋女儿的财产继承权

南宋时期,女儿的财产继承权无论在法律上还是在实践中,均得到了承认和保护。虽然在古代宗法制下,由于女儿不具有宗祧继承权,使得其财产继承权受到很大限制。但是,法律原则性地赋予了户绝之家与非户绝之家的在室女、归宗女和出嫁女以不同的财产继承权限。在具体的司法实践中,法官们往往在法定原则的基础上,参酌宗法伦理与儒家道义来灵活处断女儿的财产继承份额,针对一些特殊的情况,会综合考虑血缘亲疏、被继承人意愿﹙遗嘱﹚、孝悌道德等因素加以衡量裁断,给予女儿相对合理的财产继承权利。《名公书判清明集》所收录的关于南宋时期女儿财产继承的相关判例即体现了古代情理法框架下,司法中这种原则性与灵活性并存、法律与情理并重的特点。     

Order in Transitional China and Its Institutional Logic

The development of order in transitional China is not merely a matter of institutional supply, but also a matter of defining the state’s special roles and functions in the transition period. Since reform and opening up, China has sought to realize the twin governance aims of high speed development of the socialist economy and maintenance of stability, which require that the state simultaneously undertake the dual roles of modern government and national capital. The consequent adjustments to the governance structure are expressed in the state’s devolution of power to the market while reserving government pricing power; devolution of power to local governments while reserving power over central tasks; and affirming social rights while reserving the power to approve social organizations. At the institutional level, the externalities produced by this “quasi-decentralized governance structure” are marked by the shrinkage of arrangements for collective welfare, the absence of mechanisms for routine security in ordinary life, and the development of mechanisms that allow the government to profit from the market. This may result in the instrumentalization of government functions and the capitalization of public power, producing imbalances in the distribution of social rights, wealth and risk, or in other words, social instability.     

宪法宽容精神下的少数人权利保护研究

宪法发展的历史表明,人权可能在民主的名义下遭受到严重的侵害,多数决定的民主原则本身就隐含着对少数人权利的现实危害可能性。为了使社会的每个成员都能切实享受到基本权利带来的利益,不仅要保护绝大多数人的基本权利,也要保护少数人的基本权利。而要实现这一目标,必须践行宪法宽容的精神。现代宪法所体现的宽容精神是少数人权利保障的伦理基础,宪法文本的规定是少数人权利保障的法制前提,而少数人权利保障则是法治国家实现宽容的必然要求。     

On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the ‘chaos theorems’ in a laboratory experiment

In light of the so-called ‘chaos theorems’ from social choice theory, William Riker (W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1982) argues that the indeterminacy of majority rule leads to voting cycles making democratic decisions arbitrary and meaningless. Moreover, when the core is empty, majority instability correlates with the level of conflict among actors. This study uses laboratory committee decision-making experiments to provide an empirical test of both aspects of Riker’s argument. Committees make repeated majority decisions over 20 periods picking points from a two-dimensional policy space. The experiment manipulates committee members’ preferences and thus varies the existence of a core and the level of conflict between group members. The experimental results contradict Riker’s interpretation of the chaos theorems’ implications. Thus, the core exhibits less attraction than generally assumed. Moreover, an empty core is not associated with increased majority rule instability. Instead, conflicting preferences lead to more instability irrespective of the existence of an equilibrium.

     

我国资本市场的发展战略和市场构建

中国的崛起离不开一个强大的资本市场,而我国在走向资本大国的过程中,必须克服体制机制缺陷,尤其缓解行政权力对市场的过度干预。只有我国股市建立了一个市场化的运行机制,优秀的上市公司成为市场主流,监管者审时度势依法进行管理,投资者理智而成熟,股指和市值才可能和宏观经济琴瑟相谐,中国资本市场也才能真正进入黄金发展期。     

Bribes,power, and managerial control in corporate voting games

Proxy fights have received comparatively little attention relative to the more popular methods for corporate control transfer: merger and tender offers. This paper presents an analytic model of the proxy contest as a cooperative game with four players: management, passive shareholders, insurgent shareholders and a trust fund. The power of the players and the effectiveness of certain managerial actions is discussed.     

Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes

In a homogeneous jury, in which each vote is correct with the same probability, and each pair of votes correlates with the same correlation coefficient, there exists a correlation-robust voting quota, such that the probability of a correct verdict is independent of the correlation coefficient. For positive correlation, an increase in the correlation coefficient decreases the probability of a correct verdict for any voting rule below the correlation-robust quota, and increases that probability for any above the correlation-robust quota. The jury may be less competent under the correlation-robust rule than under simple majority rule and less competent under simple majority rule than a single juror alone. The jury is always less competent than a single juror under unanimity rule.     

中介组织介入土地承包经营权流转分析

中介组织介入土地承包经营权流转的实践在各地已经不为鲜见.本文考察了中介组织的衍生和介入交易的机理问题,分析了中介组织对土地承包经营权流转的具体影响;以浙江省海盐县土地流转和产权交易服务中心的调查为典型案例,分析了中介组织介入土地承包经营权流转的机制和实施效果.     

Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach

Many voting rules and, in particular, the plurality rule and Condorcet-consistent voting rules satisfy the simple-majority decisiveness property. The problem implied by such decisiveness, namely, the universal disregard of the preferences of the minority, can be ameliorated by applying unbiased scoring rules such as the classical Borda rule, but such amelioration has a price; it implies erosion in the implementation of the widely accepted “majority principle”. Furthermore, the problems of majority decisiveness and of the erosion in the majority principle are not necessarily severe when one takes into account the likelihood of their occurrence. This paper focuses on the evaluation of the severity of the two problems, comparing simple-majoritarian voting rules that allow the decisiveness of the smallest majority larger than 1/2 and the classical Borda method of counts. Our analysis culminates in the derivation of the conditions that determine, in terms of the number of alternatives k, the number of voters n, and the relative (subjective) weight assigned to the severity of the two problems, which of these rules is superior in light of the dual majoritarian approach.     

国有中小企业效率低下的体制原因及其道路分析

国有中小企业在竞争中不断败北 ,其原因是它们无法克服多重代理导致的代理成本高昂。“放开搞活”的改革思路 ,是要克服国有产权制度对中小企业建立灵活经营机制所存在的体制障碍 ,实现消除或者减少中小企业的代理成本。国有中小企业的产权制度必须满足市场对企业经营管理制度所提出的要求。