An economic analysis of nanofood labeling

The paper examines the economic effects of labeling food nanotechnology products using an analytical framework of heterogeneous consumers and imperfectly competitive suppliers. Labeling results in increased costs for nanofood producers (the cost effect of the labeling policy), reduced consumer uncertainty regarding the nature of the food product (certainty effect), and can affect consumer attitudes towards nanofoods by being perceived as a warning signal (stigma effect). In this context, nanofood labeling can change the perceived quality differences between nanofoods and their conventional and organic counterparts, with such changes being more salient when the stigma effect is large, when consumers have low awareness of food nanotechnology in the absence of labeling, and/or when competition among nanofood suppliers is more intense. Despite its empirical relevance, the impact of a labeling policy on consumer preferences (and the economic ramifications of such impact) has largely been ignored by the theoretical literature on the economics of labels. Our analysis shows that it matters. Specifically, our study shows that the market and welfare effects of labeling are case-specific and dependent on consumer awareness of, and attitudes towards food nanotechnology before and after the introduction of the policy as well as the relative magnitude of the cost, certainty and stigma effects of nanofood labeling. Our analytical findings also suggest that the effects of nanofood labels on consumer welfare are asymmetric with certain groups of consumers benefiting even when labeling has a stigma effect on nanofoods.     

Protectionism: Old wine in new bottles

This paper addresses some new types of arguments that have recently arisen in defense of protectionism in developing and developing countries. The new sources of protectionism in developing countries discussed are: (1) recession-debt-crisis costs; (2) protection in the world economy; (3) wages and labor markets; (4) political requirements. The new arguments for protectionism in developed countries discussed are: (1) shift to the service economy; (2) defense; (3) threat of protection to induce foreign investment.     

Price controls, trade protectionism and political business cycles in the U.S. steel industry

The U.S. steel industry is subject to a microeconomic political business cycle resulting from U.S. Presidents designing protectionist policies on behalf of the steel industry; experiencing complaints from consumers and foreign producers as a result of the policy; modifying the policy which results in complaints from the steel industry; and finally, maneuvering policy back in favor of the industry to achieve re-election. Using a cointegrating vector error correction framework, this paper tests the hypothesized political business cycle for its effect on steel prices. We find that trade protectionism does not seem to have succeeded in its primary objective of supporting prices. By expending so much political capital on ineffective trade protection, the steel industry may have lost the opportunity to focus on more substantive issues that might have restrained factor cost and enhanced its competitive ability. The devolution of the steel industry, ironically, may have resulted from it's persistent pleas for protection. Political business cycles in the steel industry, with all its attendant negative consequences, would not occur if the steel industry did not continually lobby for protection.     

A quantification of policy reform: an application to the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Agriculture

We employ an empirical general equilibrium model to quantify the welfare effects of trade policy reformation in the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Agriculture. Our approach is two-fold: first we focus on the primary players in the agricultural negotiations: the Cairns Group, the European Union, Japan, and the United States, where the players are defined as benevolent governments whose primary objective is to maximize total welfare, measured in terms of the equivalent variation (EV). Second, we take into account the divergent objectives of different interest groups within the targeted regions, namely from the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, where different weights given to these sectors depending on their political influence. Here the decision making authorities, or governments, are no longer assumed to focus solely on the maximization of the region’s EV welfare; instead they are assumed to maximize a payoff that is defined by the utilities of the agricultural and non-agricultural interest groups. This is modeled with a Political Preference Function that has a CES functional form.The results lead to several conclusions. The greater the reduction in protection, the greater the increase in welfare for most of the regions of the world. We contend that comparatively moderate reductions were enacted however, because of the relative political power that the domestic agricultural interests possessed in each region.Though the goal of the WTO/GATT is obviously to liberalize trade, only modest gains may be expected in the area of agriculture due to the internal conditions that have been advanced in this paper.     

On risk aversion,classical demand theory,and KM preferences

Building on Kihlstrom and Mirman (Journal of Economic Theory, 8(3), 361–388, 1974)’s formulation of risk aversion in the case of multidimensional utility functions, we study the effect of risk aversion on optimal behavior in a general consumer’s maximization problem under uncertainty. We completely characterize the relationship between changes in risk aversion and classical demand theory. We show that the effect of risk aversion on optimal behavior depends on the income and substitution effects. Moreover, the effect of risk aversion is determined not by the riskiness of the risky good, but rather the riskiness of the utility gamble associated with each decision.     

Explaining Italian “exceptionalism” and its end: Minimum income from neglect to hyper-politicization

Traditionally at the margins of the political debate, minimum income protection has recently become a key issue in Italian politics. After decades of social and political “neglect” letting Italy the only European country (with Greece) still lacking an anti-poverty minimum income safety net in the 2010s, finally a national programme called Inclusion Income was introduced in 2018, then replaced by a more robustly financed scheme, the Citizenship Income in 2019. The introduction of these new programmes was the object of an intense political debate, which raises two main puzzles. Why a policy field characterized by the low political resources of would be beneficiaries and low incidence on the overall welfare budget has become so important in the political debate? How did it occur in Italy, where minimum income protection had been absent in political discourses for at least five decades after World War II? To answer these questions, this article first elaborates a novel theoretical framework which combines the main properties of socio-political demand and political supply in order to explain the scope and direction of minimum income reforms. Second, it provides an analytically oriented reconstruction of MIS policy trajectory in Italy in the three different phases: the phase of MIS “neglect” (1948–1992) characterized by inertia; the period of political “contentiousness” (1993–2012), marked by attempts of path departure followed by policy reversals; the more recent phase leading to the introduction and institutionalization of a MIS. Third, the article provides a theoretically framed interpretation of the overall MIS trajectory in Italy.     

Empirical aspects of protectionism: LINK results

General aspects of protectionism as they are revealed or treated in the LINK system are discussed in this paper. Attention is focused on the macroeconomic aspects of protection, about which relatively little is known: most of the vast body of knowledge on this subject concerns the microeconomic aspects of protection. Some simulations of trade liberalization (opposite of protectionism) and of protection within the context of the LINK system are reported. A movement away from protection would benefit the present world economy but not by a large enough extent to deal effectively with pressing international economic problems; therefore, trade liberalization within the context of a larger program of coordination policy among major industrial countries is examined. Finally, the relationship between protectionism and inflation is explored.     

Tariffs,the terms of trade,and national product differentiation

The assumption of national product differentiation is a common feature in many computable general equilibrium models currently used to evaluate trade policy. The results of these models tend to be dominated by changes in the terms of trade, rather than the efficiency effects of the policy concerned. In this paper we use a theoretical n-country general equilibrium trade model to evaluate how national product differentiation relates to the terms-of-trade effects of a tariff. We conclude that monopoly power implicit in national product differentiation is the source of the strong terms-of-trade effects in Armington-type models, and can be exercised with the imposition of a tariff. These results are independent of country size, thus yielding a nonzero optimal tariff even for a small country. Theoretical results are then illustrated using the importdisaggregated version of the Michigan model of world production and trade. We find that strong, tariff-induced terms-of-trade changes emerge over a wide range of import demand elasticities. These results suggest that the assumption of national product differentiation may prejudice the case in favor of maintaining existing levels of protection, and, therefore, may not be appropriate for commercial policy analysis.     

Economic openness and welfare state attitudes: A multilevel study across 67 countries

This article extends previous studies investigating economic globalisation and the welfare state by examining individual attitudes, ranging from a preference for individual responsibility (economic individualism) to public demand for government intervention (social equality), across a large number of countries. It formulates different hypotheses about the direct and moderating effects of economic openness on these attitudes. The multilevel analysis, investigating data from 99,663 citizens of 67 countries, leads to the following two conclusions. First, economic openness is associated with a stronger preference for economic individualism and less demand for government intervention. Second, groups benefiting from globalisation and right‐wing voters have a stronger preference for economic individualism if the economic openness of their country is higher. Key Practitioner Message: ● The results show that some vulnerable groups demand more social protection in economically more open countries.     

民国时期的“郊区型农业”--以北京［1］西北郊为例

文章以民国时期北平西北郊区的农村为考察对象,其范围在距北平城墙20里以内,也就是今天海淀区西北二至五环之间的区域,例如北面的清河、西面的四季青、西北的昆明湖下游流域。文章综合参照当时的社会调查和报刊、档案,从郊区民众的角度解读郊区型农业。这种农业形态打破了自给自足的传统农业,农产品商品化程度较高,土地集约化经营,是劳动、资本和技术密集型的农业,是农民创收的途径之一。一方面满足了北京城的消费需求;另一方面增强了农业的防灾抗灾能力。但是,郊区型农业在民国时期并未得到发展。在战乱不断的历史环境下,农业成为各时期政府竞相搜刮的对象和饥民的避难所。     

Money demand stability: A case study of Nigeria

Monetary policy in Nigeria aims is to achieve price and monetary stability. During the 1980s and 1990s, monetary targeting was the dominant monetary policy framework in Nigeria. However, in 2006 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) adopted the new monetary policy framework through which short-term interest rates are adjusted to achieve stability in the value of the domestic currency. This paper has presented an empirical investigation into the demand for Nigerian real narrow money (M1) over the period 1960–2008 in an attempt to identify whether the CBN were right to adopt the new monetary policy framework. In doing so, we estimate alternative (canonical and extended) specifications of M1 demand using structural change methods. Our results suggest that the canonical specification is well-determined. Although the money demand relationship went through a regime shift in 1986, it is largely stable. These findings favour the use of supply of money as an instrument of monetary policy, thus lending limited support for the new monetary policy framework.     

Regulation in Child Protection--Policy Failure?

Correspondence to Mai Walton, Department of Applied Social Studies and Social Work, University of Keele, Keele, Staffs. ST5 5BG Summary This paper examines child protection policy formulation andimplementation. It suggests that policy has been incrementallyformed in an expedient fashion to suit the political and organizationalstatus quo. It draws upon models of issue ascendancy, policyanalysis and inspection, and argues that child protection policyis regulatory in nature yet lacks the prerequisites normallyfound in regulation. It examines perceived policy failure anddemonstrates that this results from partial policy formulationand lack of clarity in objectives.     

Rules rather than discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina

This paper explores options for programs to be put in place prior to a disaster to avoid large and often poorly-managed expenditures following a catastrophe and to provide appropriate protection against the risk of those large losses which do occur. The lack of interest in insurance protection and mitigation by property owners and by public sector agencies prior to a disaster often creates major problems following a catastrophic event for victims and the government. Property owners who suffer severe damage may not have the financial resources easily at hand to rebuild their property and hence will demand relief. The government is then likely to respond with costly but poorly targeted disaster assistance. To avoid these large and often uneven ex post expenditures, we consider the option of mandatory comprehensive private disaster insurance with risk-based rates. It may be more efficient to have an ex ante public program to ensure coverage of catastrophic losses and to subsidize low income residents who cannot afford coverage rather than the current largely ex post public disaster relief program.     

Market Forces for the Unemployed? Training Vouchers in Germany and the USA

Vouchers are meant to increase competition and consumer choice in public service markets. Using the example of training vouchers for the unemployed in the USA and Germany, we show, however, that deficits, both on the demand and the supply side of the market, create problems with preference alignment and market formation. Information asymmetries undermine choice by the unemployed and reduce government control over the training system. Ironically, restrictions meant to compensate for these information deficits further inhibit competitive market formation. Evaluation data on training vouchers from both countries show that voucher systems do not increase choice, but weaken the partnerships public employment agencies previously had with training providers, and may lead to a shortage of high‐quality and specialized training, as well as creaming in the selection of training participants. Theoretical justification for vouchers is based on the notion of choice and consumer sovereignty. Using this framework to analyse the changed relationship between government, private training providers, and jobseekers, we challenge the efficacy of vouchers as a delivery mechanism in complex public service markets such as job training.     

Political trust,young people and institutions in Europe. A multilevel analysis

The constant decline of political trust has been shown in political sociology. Young people in particular seem to display lower levels of political trust, which is a challenge for the sustainability of democracy. Still, these levels of political trust among youth differ greatly from one country to another. This article therefore seeks to answer the following question: How can we account for cross‐national diversity with regard to young people’s political trust? To answer this question, I performed multilevel analyses based on data from the European Social Survey. I show in the article that cross‐national diversity stems from the institutional arrangements that structure entry into adulthood, i.e., what I call ‘youth welfare citizenship regimes’: The more inclusive is the youth economic citizenship and the more individualised is their social citizenship, the higher is young people’s political trust – which could buffer the decline in political trust.     

Family support services buffer the effect of child welfare notifications on child removals

Previous studies have found mixed results about the effects of family support services within the child protection system. The purpose of the study is to examine whether family support services are associated with the need for child removals at the community level. The material of the study consists of Finnish municipalities (N = 292) and their child protection indicators. Linear regression analysis was conducted to analyse the associations between the dependent variable (child removals) and the main predictors (child welfare notifications and family support services). It was found that family support services are associated with child removals. The more children there are in family support services, the more there are also child removals in a municipality. The key finding of the analysis is that a higher rather than lower proportion of clients in family support services buffers the increased effect of demand (child welfare notifications) on child removals better. In this sense, the demand for child removals is not only associated with the characteristics of children and families but may be partly explained by the role of family support services in a municipality. The present study underlines the significance of a system-level approach to child protection.     

The origins of the public debt of Italy: Geographically dispersed interests?

In this paper we reconstruct the macro regional government deficits of Italy and find that the aggregate deficit resulting from our estimates captures quite well the entire dynamics of the Italian national public deficit. This new data set shows that the ultimate cause of the accumulation of public debt of Italy lies in the extraordinary fiscal imbalance of the Southern regions. The new data allow us to test empirically a simple Common Pool model, augmented by a variable measuring the political influence of each macro region in the Government, to verify the existence of a geographically dispersed interests issue for the Italian case. Our measure of political influence turns out to significantly explain the regions’ deficits also when controlling for population and income gaps. In addition, using a J-test approach, we find that including the predictions of the Common Pool–Pork Barrel regional model into a general model of the Italian national deficit turns out to greatly increase its explanatory power. The results call for deep institutional reforms of the fiscal decentralization so far implemented in Italy.     

The impact of government spending on Ireland’s housing and residential market – Targeted vs economy-wide stimulus

The Irish residential property market is currently characterized by a considerable structural deficiency in housing supply compared to the underlying level of demand. The lack of housing has led to several economic and social problems in Ireland. The imbalance between supply and demand has led to both house prices and rents increasing faster than household incomes. Recent policy initiatives by the Irish Government have outlined plans for significant spending aimed at increasing the numbers of housing completions to tackle these issues. This paper examines the impact of government spending on housing supply using a structural econometric model of the Irish economy with a specific construction block. Within our econometric analysis, we compare the results of an economy wide versus a sector specific government stimulus on the property market. Our simulations suggest that, in order to achieve social and economic goals like increasing the number of dwellings and making housing more affordable by containing house price inflation, a targeted policy such as that described in the Irish Government's Housing for All plan may be preferable to an economy-wide stimulus.     

Decision analysis using lottery-dependent utility

In this article we show how the lottery-dependent expected utility (LDEU) model can be used in decision analysis. The LDEU model is an extension of the classical expected utility (EU) model and yet permits preference patterns that are infeasible in the EU model. We propose a framework for constructing decision trees in a particular way that permits us to use the principle of optimality and thus the divide and conquer strategy for analyzing complex problems using the LDEU model. Our approach may be applicable to some other nonlinear utility models as well. The result is that, if desired, decision analysis can be conducted without assuming the restrictive substitution principle/independence axiom.     

Political demand and policy advice: a framework for analysis

ABSTRACT

In the policy advice literature, there has been two main “waves” of research focus. In the first wave, the focus of scholarly attention tended to focus on single policy advice actors. A key innovation was offered by Halligan, who sought to frame policy advice within a policy advisory system, with a focus on government control and location. In later research, Craft and Wilder called for a “second wave” of research which also sought to integrate factors such as policy content, context, ideational compatibility but also reflect the increasingly polycentric advice landscape. This article contributes to the second wave drawing attention to a key element of the institutional dynamics of policy advice systems, namely the issue of political “demand”. A core argument offered in this article is that the dynamics of demand need to be interrogated more fully, and be given greater prominence in current understandings of PAS dynamics. The net effect of marginalizing “demand” factors is that it can de-politicize the extent and nature of advice-giving, and reduce it to a seeming technocratic exchange. To expand our understanding of demand, this paper offers a framework for understanding the dynamics of demand within policy advice systems.