EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING: IS GOVERNMENT SIZE IMPORTANT?

The efects of government spending on employment and output may depend on government size and the persistence of spending. The empirical results suggest that permanent (or persistent) changes in government consumption have a greater impact on output and employment than temporary (or cyclical) changes. This implies a negative wealth effect and reduces the stabilization potency of government spending. The findings also support the hypothesis that the output elasticity of government consumption is positive but declines with increases in government size. Using the estimated equations, I calculate the optimal government size for the representative country as around 20 percent of GDP.     

The influence of accountability for the crisis and type of crisis communication on people’s behavior,feelings and relationship with the government

In this paper we investigated to what extent the willingness of people to take advice from the local government, people’s feelings of collective efficacy and empowerment, and their relationship with the local government, is dependent on whether the local government was accountable for the crisis or not. In addition, we were interested in the influence of empathic versus neutral crisis information on people’s behavior, feelings and their relationship with the local government. The results indicate that people’s intention to follow the advice of the local government is generally high, even when the local government is held accountable for the crisis. However, accountability negatively influenced people’s relationship with the local government, as well as collective efficacy. Our research shows that this negative outcome for people’s relationship with the local government cannot be countered by empathic crisis information. However, conveying empathic concern in the crisis information did enhance level of collective efficacy.     

政府主导型社区建设研究

近年来,政府力推社区建设,大有社区建设非政府主导莫属之势。在此背景下系统梳理"政府主导型"的社区建设,具有特殊意义。政府垄断性地把持着所有关键社会资源,并能藉此营造社区发展的制度环境与支持系统,建构超越社区自身局限的发展条件。但政府社区建设中的强势介入,一定程度上亦成为社区发展的主要制约,可能造成对社区谋取自主发展空间的一种挤压。总体而言,我国目前的社区建设,暂时还难以离开政府的主导性参与,但需以发展社区自治为前提,需根据不同的社区发展阶段,适时进行职能调整,以求政府与社区关系的动态平衡。     

AN EQUILIBRIUM POLITICO-ECONOMIC MODEL

A politico-economic model is developed in which rationally formed forecasts are available to all traders. Systematic government policy is neutral, but a large majority of the electorate, those who adopt rationally formed forecasts but do not know the model, hold the government responsible for the economy's performance. Real and political shocks generate novel feedback effects due to anticipated regime changes. These feedback effects may amplify or dampen the initial shocks; this depends on whether the government follows a high or low monetary growth rate rule and whether inflation or unemployment is the main concern of the electorate.     

Government Subsidies and Household Debt Burden After the Great Recession

During the recent Great Recession, US households, especially those with low incomes, faced severe financial distress. Households experiencing economic hardship may turn to receiving government assistance to alleviate the hardship or distress. Receiving government assistance may improve a household’s financial situation as it could be decreasing its reliance on debt or even improving a household’s ability to repay their current debt. We investigated how households’ financial debt obligations were affected by receiving government assistance, as has not been previously analyzed. Given the focus of this research, we included households under 185 % of poverty threshold released by the 2012 US Census Bureau. Results from the 2010 and 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances indicate that government assistance was positively related to the odds of meeting debt-to-income ratio guidelines, implying that government assistance plays an important role in financial security of low-income households. This study provides important insights for researchers and policymakers in the areas of poverty and household finance.     

FRIEDMAN TAX CUTS VS. BUCHANAN DEFICIT REDUCTION AS THE BEST WAY OF CONSTRAINING GOVERNMENT

Does a tax cut reduce government spending by reducing government revenue or does it increase government spending by lowering the perceived price of government services? Some economists, including Milton Friedman, take the former position, while others, including James Buchanan, think the latter is true. The question seems to resist an empirical answer, with some studies supporting Friedman's view and others supporting Buchanan's. In this paper, each position is shown to be a special case in a simple model of taxation and deficit determination.     

Linking government social media usage to public perceptions of government performance: an empirical study from China

Based on an online survey of 1042 Beijing residents, this study links the usage of government social media tools, including WeChat, microblogs, and apps, to public perceptions of the government’s performance. The results indicated that young people are more likely to use government microblogs. In contrast, an inverted U-shaped relationship was found between age and the utilization of government WeChat and apps. The findings also showed that people with high education, high economic status, and a local hukou were more likely to use all three government social media tools. In controlling for the demographic variables, the results showed that the most important predictor of the use of a government social media tool was the use of any other government social media tool. The general use of social media significantly influenced the use of government social media tools, whereas the direction of this influence depended on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of these behaviors. Moreover, the results revealed a linkage between government social media use and public perceptions of government performance. Functional use, especially information acquisition and participation, was a significant predictor of perceived government transparency, responsiveness, and citizen satisfaction, while the public service function significantly increased perceived government responsiveness.     

CORRUPTION: TOP DOWN OR BOTTOM UP?

This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.     

The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government

This paper examines the segregative properties of Tiebout-type process of jurisdiction formation by freely mobile households in the presence of a central government which makes equalization transfers across jurisdictions so as to maximize a generalized utilitarian or a max–min objective. It is shown that the introduction of such a central government significantly affects the set of stable jurisdiction structures. It is also shown that the class of households additively separable preferences that guarantees the wealth segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure is unaffected by the presence of a central government if this government uses a generalized utilitarian objective.     

The Affordability of Social Protection in the Light of International Spending Commitments

In recent years a number of international sector‐specific agreements have been developed by the international community and ratified by developing countries – some with specific spending targets. This article offers an empirical analysis of the individual and aggregate affordability of six sectoral targets and, based on the actual or estimated cost of each of the targets, compares target spending levels with actual government expenditure in five African countries. Most targets are not met and, while individually ‘affordable’, the estimated cost of meeting the six targets simultaneously indicates that they are not jointly affordable, with an estimated cost of more than 100% of total government expenditure in four of the five countries. Meeting any of the sectoral targets in full would require either sectoral trade‐offs, or significant increases in donor or government expenditure.     

城市更新治理模式的比较与选择

城市更新是城市改造、重建、再生和延续的过程。从广州城市改造的经验观察,实践中所运用的政府、市场以及混合改造模式都存在治理困境。政府改造模式导致“角色”错位,市场改造模式导致公共利益受损,混合改造模式导致成本外溢。传统的改造模式由于没有将改造成本内部化,不论是政府行为还是市场行为都会产生负外部性。笔者由此提出新的治理模式——利益共同体模式。这种模式区分行动者的不同角色,以产权为纽带,以外部性成本内部化为基础,通过合约安排使政府、开发商和原住地居民组成利益共享、风险共担的共同体。在这样一个“利益共享、风险共担”的新模式运作下,旧城改造不再是单一的政府和市场行为,而是一个兼顾公共利益和私人利益的社区集体行为。这种治理模式符合社会发展与和谐社会的理念,能将旧城改造的成本内部化,使产权人享有真正意义的决策权,有利于社区的可持续性发展。‘     

From concerned citizens to activists: a case study of 2015 South Korean MERS outbreak and the role of dialogic government communication and citizens’ emotions on public activism

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the cognitive-affective-behavioral sequence of public activism by examining the role of citizens’ perception of government dialogic communication during a national pandemic crisis. Through a case study of the 2015 Middle-East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in South Korea, the results of a survey of 400 South Korean citizens showed that distrust in government and a high level of situational uncertainty were significantly mitigated by citizens’ perceptions of government efforts for dialogic communication during the crisis. Conversely, when the perception of dialogic government communication was low, high distrust in government increased cynicism, anger, and anxiety among citizens; high situational uncertainty led to higher levels of anger and anxiety, but not cynicism. Consequently, the findings showed that anger, anxiety, and cynicism significantly motivated citizens’ intentions to take actions against the government. Direct and positive effects of anger, anxiety, and cynicism on activism participation were not found and were mediated by the citizens’ activism intentions.     

Net impact of government funding on nonprofit fiscal health: burden or benefit?

This study examines the impact of federal grant awards on the financial health of recipient nonprofits. Although a modest body of research finds that government grants are beneficial to nonprofit fiscal health, a large Urban Institute study (2010, 2013, 2015) found that nonprofit managers receiving government grants consistently report fiscal harm due to awards that do not cover all program costs, late payments, and significant administrative burden. Those findings raise the question of whether government funding leads to net benefits or net harm for organizations given the administrative and fiscal burdens identified. This study tests that question using a large panel of federal grants to estimate the impact of government awards on three measures of nonprofit financial health. We find that government grants promote an increase in nonprofit size, improve operating margins, and increase financial reserves for recipient organizations. These benefits endure after the receipt of the award.     

The election of Jewish deputies in Vilna in 1818: government projects and Jewish claims

This article focuses on the election of the so-called deputies of the Jewish people in Vil'na (Vilnius) in 1818. At the time, the Russian government perceived Jewish society as a “state within a state” with its own secret government. Russian rule tried to legalise and control that imagined government or to neutralise and repress it. The Jewish elite used these mental constructs of the Russian ruling circles and positioned themselves as the holders of the “Jewish rule,” demanding the usual prerogatives of nobility.     

The return of international labour migrants in the ESCAP Region

The social phenomenon of massive temporary international labor migration from the ESCAP region has emerged extremely rapidly. Within 10 years, the number of persons from ESCAP countries grew from a negligible one to 3.5 million. Related research and government policies have lagged behind this latest surge in migration. Most research conducted has been small-scale and lacks an analytical or theoretical framework. Policy formulation for temporary labor migration is difficult because most of the rapid growth in the industry has occurred as a result of private efforts, with a minimum of government intervention. It is now difficult, for the government to provide effective regulations or measures to stimulate and assist the process. Regulations on compulsory remittances or overseas minimum wages have proved to be unrealistic and, if not rescinded, are routinely circumvented. The most effective policies to assist return migrants may not be those which are intended to do so, but those which control the earlier stages of the migration process, such as recruitment, working conditions, and banking arrangements. The most valuable policies may also include those affecting education, training, employment, and general socioeconomic growth. Governments are recommended to provide social services for migrants and their families who are experiencing problems, and to institute community programs in areas with a large number of labor migrants. Governmental efforts to promote forms of labor migration beneficial to the workers would be valuable and should include measures to identify overseas labor markets for employing its nationals, government ot government labor contracts, and government participation in joint-venture projects. International migration should be analyzed in the context of theories and social change in order for governments to formulate effective measures for the reintegration of returning workers. Labor migration on the current scale has many social implications for the sending countries; relationships between employers and employees, the government and private sectors, and white and blue collar workers are affected. Social change and technological innovation will become more rapid, women's status and family roles will change markedly, and behavior is likely to become less conformist and more individualistic.     

A new model of coalition formation

In this paper, a new model of multidimensional coalition formation in politics is presented. The model provides an opportunity to analyze a number of different kinds of issues at the same time. A policy space consists of a finite number of independent sub-spaces (policy spaces on certain issues), which can be multidimensional. Any policy sub-space on a certain sub-issue can be either a Euclidean space or (in principle) any other type of set. So, it is possible to include issues which cannot be represented by a Euclidean space or a fixed sum. A government is defined as a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The majority coalition may be not minimal winning. Each party is allowed to give one qualification to a policy on a certain issue and to a majority coalition: desirable of a certain degree, acceptable, or unacceptable. By representing party preferences the way we do, we can include both rent-seeking and idealistic motivations in one consistent model. We define the value of a policy/coalition/government to a party, and the notions of a feasible and stable policy/coalition/government. The model uses party preferences in order to predict government policy. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a stable government are investigated. Moreover, some alternative definitions of a stable government are introduced, and relations between these definitions and the chosen definition of a stable government are established.For Agnieszka Rusinowska the research for this paper was done during a stay as a Marie Curie fellow at Tilburg University, Department of Philosophy.     

The Receipt of Government Food Assistance: Differences Between Metro and Non-Metro Households

This research investigated differences in households’ receipt of government food assistance through such programs as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children; free and reduced school meals; and related local and/or federal programs. With panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation that span the Great Recession, differences in the receipt of government food assistance in metro and non-metro areas were identified. Longitudinal random effects models suggest that despite relatively similar levels of food insecurity in 2005 and 2010, a higher proportion of non-metro households received government food assistance. Results also suggest that this assistance gap widened post-recession when government resources were expanded. These results inform a continuing debate about the efficient allocation of resources intended to reduce food hardship disparities, and increase family economic well-being, in metro and non-metro areas.     

GROWTH, WELFARE, AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Using an endogenous growth model in which government purchases directly affect aggregate productivity and utility, fiscal policy experiments conducted here indicate that the macroeconomic effects of changes in fiscal policy are at least as sensitive to the mix of spending cuts as they are to the mix of tax cuts. In fact, reducing the size of the government actually reduces growth and welfare freductions in government expenditures are heavily weighted towards reductions in public capital or if the proceeds are not used to reduce capital taxation. In addition, across-the-board spending cuts are not likely to significantly improve growth and welfare. ( JEL E62, 041)     

市政建设的主体选择标准及其制度研究

城镇化对中国顺利实现小康社会和社会主义现代化具有重要的战略意义。城镇化的过程会有巨大的市政建设需求,在政府财政资金有限的情况下,政府应通过完善制度设计、激励机制充分发挥市场或社会在市政建设中的作用,以弥补市政建设财政资金的不足。在参与市政建设的过程中,政府通过引入竞争机制,对比市政建设参与主体的综合成本,选择市政建设的参与者,以解决公共产品垄断的低效率问题,提高市政建设的效率和质量。与此同时,政府应该完善相应的管理机制,以维护市政建设市场或社会参与的制度化、规范化运行。     

ELECTORAL POLITICS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

This paper considers how government size responds to a change in the influence of interest groups. First, an election model is developed that has an equilibrium and in which interest groups have unequal influence. The authors then show that an increase in a group's influence per se does not cause government size to increase but does cause its size to increase when the government (1) cannot change tax shares or (2) provides a good benefiting one (untaxed) group, whose sole interest is in maximizing its consumption of the good. The paper concludes with a discussion of some of the normative implications.