Women's lives and rapid fertility decline: Some lessons from Bangladesh and Egypt

The recent experiences of Bangladesh and Egypt show thatfertility can sustain impressive declines even when women's lives remain severely constrained.Since the late 1970s, rural and urban areas in both countries have experienced steadydeclines in fertility, with recent declines in rural Bangladesh similar to those in ruralEgypt, despite lower levels of development and higher rates of poverty. This paperprovides an in-depth exploration of the demographic transition in these two societies andaddresses three basic questions: (1) have measurable improvements in economic opportunities forwomen been a factor in the fertility decline?; (2) can preexisting differences in gender systemsexplain the more rapid fertility decline in Bangladesh, despite the more modest economicachievements?; (3) can the development strategies adopted by the governments ofBangladesh and Egypt, be seen as additional factors in explaining the similar rural fertilitydeclines despite dissimilar economic circumstances? The paper concludes that neither gender systemsnor changes in women's opportunities appear to have contributed to declining fertility.Indeed, low levels of women's autonomy have posed no barrier to fertility decline in eithercountry. However, there is a case to be made that Bangladesh's distinct approach to development,with considerable emphasis on reaching the rural poor and women and a strong reliance onnongovernmental institutions, may have played a part in accelerating the transition in thatenvironment and in helping women to become more immediate beneficiaries of that process.

     

Regional paths to fertility transition

New sources of data on national fertility declines are used to examine the nature of fertility transition in major regions. These regions are defined by geographical and cultural criteria as well as by the forces attempting to shape fertility control. Particular attention is devoted to the timing of the onsets of fertility decline in the different countries of each region, and the rapidity of fertility decline within each country. The study finds greater similarities between the transitions than have sometimes been assumed.     

Fertility transition in Arab countries: A re-evaluation

During the two decades extending from the late 1970s, average TFR in Arab countries declined by more than two births per woman. The paper examines changes in the proximate determinants of Arab fertility and evaluates some of the underlying factors that are variously held to have influenced the fertility transition. The proximate and underlying determinants of fertility in Arab countries are compared with those of other regions. Among the factors examined are economic hardship, delayed marriage, and female education and labour force participation. The roles of oil revenues and of the Islamic religion are also considered. An interesting feature is that fertility declined despite continued desires for large families.     

Is mass schooling essential for fertility decline to begin?

The article explores the significance of mass schooling in fertility decline. Population Council researchers have investigated these links in 17 sub-Saharan African countries. Using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys for these countries, three indicators of the extent of mass schooling for 15-19 year olds were investigated: the percentage ever in school, the percentage completing 4 years, and the percentage completing primary education. Results showed that only six countries in which at least 90% of the 15-19 year olds have ever attended school; at least 75% in 8 of the countries had attended school for 4 years; and at least 60% in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe completed primary school. For the fertility transition, two indicators were taken into account for the 17 countries: the percent decline in fertility from 1960 or 1965 to the present, and the percent of currently unmarried women practicing contraception. 7 of the 17 countries have had fertility declines of less than 10%; 3 countries had less than 10%. In comparing the fertility data and schooling data, investigators found a strong statistical relationship between the percentage of 15-19 year olds completing 4 years of schooling and the phase of the fertility transition. However, other factors have played a role in the fertility decline in certain countries.     

A Gap in the Market

In an era of increasing globalization, women continue to be underrepresented and stereotyped in national, international and global news media. The problem is exacerbated when traditional geographic boundaries are crossed and the media in one country report on issues and events, particularly those that impact women, in another country. The question addressed in this article is how news organizations can best represent women and our diverse lives within this new global context. In an effort to bridge the local-global dichotomy, this article aims to make connections between macro-level theories of cultural globalization and micro-level theories of feminism. Three scenarios of cultural globalization, as proposed by Pieterse (2004), are extended to show their relationship with journalism, feminism, and story stances. The article shows how the clash of civilizations scenario relates to nationalistic news practices, patriarchal representations, and story stances that only include the voices of the dominant group. Similarly, it shows how the scenario of cultural homogenization relates to cultural imperialism, “global feminism,” and a story stance that homogenizes women's lives. Finally, it shows the relationships among cultural hybridization, glocalized journalism, transnational feminisms, and story stances that give voice to underrepresented groups.     

Epidemiologic transition in the United States: the health factor in population change

The general theory of epidemiologic transition is explained. The theory hypothesizes that long-term changes in health and disease patterns in any society are related to the demographic and social conditions in that country. Mortality is considered to be the major factor in population change. The theory is illustrated by a detailed consideration of birth and death trends in the U.S. Mortality decline began in the U.S. in the middle of the nineteenth century. Associated with this decline was a gradual shift from death due to infectious disease to mortality caused by degenerative, man-made, and stress-related diseases. The transition favored women, children, and whites. Medical progress was less responsible for the change than were improvement in living conditions and changes in the nature of certain diseases. The magnitude of this decline in mortality is illustrated by an analysis of 5 specific indicators of mortality. Changes in the U.S. fertility patterns were also unplanned and attributable to socioeconomic factors rather than to medical advances. Comparison of the transition in the U.S. with the same movement in England shows that the U.S. experience fits the Western or Clasical Model of the epidemiologic transition theory. This experience cannot be used as a model for the transition occurring now in the Third World. In those countries, programs organized in the context of general social development projects could be expected to influence trends in mortality and fertility.     

A review of the studies on fertility transition in China]

This article is a summary of papers and analysis in recent years on fertility transition and the association between fertility decline and socioeconomic development in China. These papers discuss the causes of fertility decline and the role of family planning programs in demographic transition. The major points are: 1. The demographic transition in China has the same characteristics as in the countries that have completed the transition. The transition had already started in the more developed areas or completed in a few large cities before family planning programs were implemented. 2. The role of family planning programs is to lead and to accelerate the demographic transition, which is the key idea of the "induced fertility transition". 3. The socioeconomic development and family planning programs worked together to affect the fertility decline, however socioeconomic development is the fundamental factor. Without the existence of the socioeconomic development, which included the changes in the function of family, traditional ideas on fertility, increased level of education, the status of women and social security system; the family planning program is not likely to make an impact.     

Effects of child mortality on subsequent fertility of women in some rural and semi-urban areas of certain Latin American countries

Abstract With the rapid decline in child mortality in developing countries there is considerable interest in understanding its effects on fertility. According to the theory of demographic transition, mortality declines are accompanied by fertility declines after a time lag, as countries go through the process of economic development. However, the immediate effects of a mortality decline on fertility have not been uniform as in many countries fertility has actually increased. For example, in many Latin American countries where mortality declines have been very rapid there have not been any appreciable changes in fertility. Only in recent years has there been a noticeable decline in the urban areas of some nations. While it is possible to examine the effects of various socio-economic factors on mortality and fertility at the macro-level, any real understanding of how mortality itself influences fertility would require information at the micro-level on couples who have experienced child mortality and who are also exposed to the risk of childbearing.     

Reply to the note by Frejka and Sardon on our paper ‘Patterns of low and lowest-low fertility in Europe’ and an erratum

The relation between socio-economic development and fertility is analysed for the Arab populations of Israel and the territories administered by Israel (i.e. the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). Retrospective survey statistics are used to reconstruct the fertility patterns of currently married Arab women, along with a variety of census information. Fertility responses to socio-economic changes are traced out in detail for the period of the British Mandate, the first 20 years of statehood 1948–67, and the contemporary post-1967 period. The figures show that both Christian and Moslem Arab populations experienced similar high levels of fertility up to the late 1920s. Subsequently, there has been a negative relation between socio-economic development and fertility. In terms of levels of development and fertility decline the sub-populations are ranked in the following order: Israeli urban Christians; Israeli urban Moslems; Israeli rural Christians; Israeli rural Moslems; Moslems in the Administered Territories. The analysis suggests that the timing and rate of fertility reduction are related to the character of specific demographic, economic, and political changes that generate conflicts at the family level.     

Birth rates decline as neighbors learn from one another how to control fertility

This article refers to a recent article (by Population Council demographer John Bongaarts and University of Pennsylvania sociology professor Susan Cotts Watkins) on strategies for promoting future global fertility decline. The article emphasizes the importance of the process of social interaction as a powerful force that accelerates the pace of demographic transition. The force of social interaction is frequently overlooked. Social interaction operates through personal networks that connect individuals; national channels of interaction connecting social and territorial communities within a country; and global channels connecting countries. Empirical evidence finds that the most important interaction for fertility change occurs in exchanges between personal networks of small communities. When innovative fertility behavior is adopted by a group within a community, then changes are communicated in an ever widening band. It is expected that countries with multiple channels of linked transportation and communication networks and extensive media facilities would experience more rapid fertility decline. Bongaarts and Watkins argue that the extent of a country's links with a global society help determine the timing of its transition to lower fertility. All countries are connected to some extent by ideas, information, or social influence and are at some level of development. When some countries in a region begin their fertility transition, neighboring countries soon follow. Fertility transition occurs even at low levels of development. Fertility decline can occur rapidly, even if socioeconomic development is modest, once the onset of the transition has occurred.     

The Middle East population puzzle

An overview is provided of Middle Eastern countries on the following topics; population change, epidemiological transition theory and 4 patterns of transition in the middle East, transition in causes of death, infant mortality declines, war mortality, fertility, family planning, age and sex composition, ethnicity, educational status, urbanization, labor force, international labor migration, refugees, Jewish immigration, families, marriage patterns, and future growth. The Middle East is geographically defined as Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Gaza and the West Bank, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. The Middle East's population grew very little until 1990 when the population was 43 million. Population was about doubled in the mid-1950s at 80 million. Rapid growth occurred after 1950 with declines in mortality due to widespread disease control and sanitation efforts. Countries are grouped in the following ways: persistent high fertility and declining mortality with low to medium socioeconomic conditions (Jordan, Oman, Syria, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza), declining fertility and mortality in intermediate socioeconomic development (Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran), high fertility and declining mortality in high socioeconomic conditions (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), and low fertility and mortality in average socioeconomic conditions (Israel). As birth and death rates decline, there is an accompanying shift from communicable diseases to degenerative diseases and increases in life expectancy; this pattern is reflected in the available data from Egypt, Kuwait, and Israel. High infant and child mortality tends to remain a problem throughout the Middle East, with the exception of Israel and the Gulf States. War casualties are undetermined, yet have not impeded the fastest growing population growth rate in the world. The average fertility is 5 births/woman by the age of 45. Muslim countries tend to have larger families. Contraceptive use is low in the region, with the exception of Turkey and Egypt and among urban and educated populations. More than 40% of the population is under 15 years of age. The region is about 50% Arabic (140 million). Educational status has increased, particularly for men; the lowest literacy rates for women are in Yemen and Egypt. The largest countries are Iran, Turkey, and Egypt.     

Does Global Fertility and Cultural Transition Affect Human Development? The Neglected Role of the Demographic Transition

This study approaches the potential influence of the demographic transition on outcomes of human development. By re-conceptualizing demographic transition as global fertility and cultural transition and combining all distal macro forces including modernization, techno-economic heritage, and economic dependency, an integrated model for explaining human development outcomes can be theoretically formulated and subjected to empirical test. A panel regression analysis of available data from all developing countries supports the influence of the distal macro forces and the intervening role played by global fertility and cultural transition in affecting human development. In particular, a four-indicator index of global fertility and cultural transition shows the strongest effect on human development index, even controlling for the lagged dependent variable and the latest most competing explanatory variables. Following the long continuing process of the demographic transition, the empirical implication of this newly constructed index of global fertility and cultural transition for exploring alternative measures of human development and policy implications for third world human development are discussed.     

Global Demographic Convergence? A Reconsideration of Changing Intercountry Inequality in Fertility

This research challenges the notion that the second half of the twentieth century was a period of global demographic convergence. To be sure, fertility rates fell substantially during the period, but with considerable un‐evenness. The declines in total fertility across population‐weighted countries were sufficiently disproportionate that intercountry fertility inequality, estimated using standard measures of inequality, did not begin to decline until at least 1995. Regression analysis also shows that only very recently did lagging countries begin to catch up with countries that began the transition to low fertility earlier. Contrary to findings on changing intercountry health inequality, sub‐Saharan Africa has had a greater impact on changes in fertility inequality than China. The trend in fertility inequality, where convergence is a relatively new phenomenon, stands in contrast to trends in inequality in other domains, such as income, education, and health.     

Trade and fertility in the developing world: the impact of trade and trade structure

In the literature on trade and development, fertility and trade have been widely discussed as two separate economic forces. However, an important recent contribution connects these two and suggests that international trade between developed and developing countries has an asymmetric effect on the demand for human capital. The asymmetry leads to a decline in fertility rates in developed countries and an increase in these rates in developing countries. We provide additional comprehensive empirical evidence in support of this novel hypothesis. Our findings suggest that countries that export skill-intensive manufacturing goods experience a decline in fertility rates, whereas in countries that export primary, low-skill-intensive goods, fertility rates are affected positively. Further, our findings indicate that the negative influence of manufacturing exports on fertility holds primarily and most strongly for middle-income countries where structural modernization and a growing manufacturing-intensive export sector is observed.     

Demographers’ Involvement in Twentieth-Century Population Policy: Continuity or Discontinuity?

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the development of a crusading spirit and massive technical aid aimed at reducing fertility levels and rates of population growth in developing countries, and also the involvement of demographers in these events. The demographers at Princeton University’s Office of Population Research, Frank Notestein and his colleagues, have been singled out by recent authors as playing a unique role in bringing about these changes, and they have been criticized for encouraging demographers to become involved, so eroding their scientific objectivity. This paper examines the development of relevant population thought and theory in the English-language literature over the first half of the twentieth century. It concludes that in the circumstances of the second half of the twentieth century, it was inevitable that developed countries and their demographers would become involved in controlling fertility levels in developing countries. The OPR story should be seen largely in terms of how the world’s leading demographic center and its demographic transition theory were swept along by global changes. As those developments started, attitudes to population change in densely settled Asia became Malthusian, even as population growth accompanied by mortality decline in Asia demonstrated that, at least in the short term, the positive checks were disappearing.     

The demography of words: The global decline in non-numeric fertility preferences, 1993–2011

This paper examines the decline in non-numeric responses to questions about fertility preferences among women in the developing world. These types of response—such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘it’s up to God’—have often been interpreted through the lens of fertility transition theory as an indication that reproduction has not yet entered women’s ‘calculus of conscious choice’. However, this has yet to be investigated cross-nationally and over time. Using 19?years of data from 32 countries, we find that non-numeric fertility preferences decline most substantially in the early stages of a country’s fertility transition. Using country-specific and multilevel models, we explore the individual- and contextual-level characteristics associated with women’s likelihood of providing a non-numeric response to questions about their fertility preferences. Non-numeric fertility preferences are influenced by a host of social factors, with educational attainment and knowledge of contraception being the most robust and consistent predictors.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.     

Completing the fertility transition in the developing world: The role of educational differences and fertility preferences

This study summarizes patterns of educational differentials in wanted and unwanted fertility at different stages of the fertility transition. The data are from Demographic and Health Surveys in 57 less developed countries. As the transition proceeds, educational differentials in wanted fertility tend to decline and differentials in unwanted fertility tend to rise. An assessment of fertility patterns in developed and less developed countries with low fertility concludes that these differentials are likely to remain substantial when less developed countries reach the end of their transitions. This conclusion implies that the educational composition of the population remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries and that low levels of schooling can be a cause of stalling fertility.