碳情绪能否助力碳捕捉与封存项目发展?

碳捕捉与封存(CCS)项目作为解决全球气候变暖问题的一种新兴减排措施,需要从多维微观视角探究其推广机制。本文将参与主体的碳情绪影响纳入博弈分析框架中,将等级依赖期望效用理论(RDEU)与博弈理论相结合,探究碳情绪影响CCS项目发展的微观作用机制。以国华神木富氧燃烧改造项目为例,仿真模拟了5种异质情绪组合下政府和能源企业的均衡策略选择。研究结果显示：当双方处于理性状态时,能源企业和政府的CCS项目参与意愿都很低,这符合当前国际上CCS项目的发展现状;当双方处于悲观情绪时,悲观情绪越高,政府选择无作为策略和能源企业选择CCS技术改造策略的概率就越大,这是社会资源配置优化的表现;当双方处于乐观情绪时,适度乐观的情绪有利于刺激CCS项目的良性发展,过度乐观的情绪会阻碍CCS项目的发展。因此,本文从碳情绪引导方面提出了管理社会碳情绪相关对策建议,以期加快实现CCS项目的规模化和商业化运营。     

Fractional Price Matching Policies Arising from the Ocean Freight Service Industry

We consider a situation in which shippers (customers) can purchase ocean freight services either directly from a carrier (service provider)in advance or from the spot market just before the departure of an ocean liner. The price is known in the former case, while the spot price is uncertain ex‐ante in the latter case. Consequently, some shippers are reluctant to book directly from the carrier in advance unless the carrier is willing to “partially match” the realized spot price when it is lower than the regular price. This study is an initial attempt to examine if the carrier should bear some of the “price risk” by offering a “fractional” price matching contract that can be described as follows. The shipper pays the regular freight price in advance; however, the shipper will get a refund if the realized spot price is below the regular price, where the refund is a “fraction” of the difference between the regular price and the realized spot price. By modeling the dynamics between the carrier and the shippers as a sequential game, we show that the carrier can use the fractional price matching contract to generate a higher demand from the shippers compared to no price matching contract by increasing the “fraction” in equilibrium. However, as the carrier increases the “fraction,” the carrier should increase the regular price to compensate for bearing additional risk. By selecting the fractional price matching contract optimally, we show that the carrier can afford to offer this price matching mechanism without incurring revenue loss: the optimal fractional price matching contract is “revenue neutral.”     

Co‐opetition and Investment for Supply‐Chain Resilience

This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The Harsanyi–Selten–Nash bargaining framework is used to model the supply chain participants' choice of risk mitigation investments. The bargaining approach allows a framing of both joint financing of mitigation activities before the fact and loss‐sharing net of insurance payouts after the fact. The disagreement outcome in the bargaining game is assumed to be the result of the corresponding non‐cooperative game. We describe an incentive‐compatible contract that leads to First Best investment and equal “gain” for all players, when the solution is “interior” (as it almost certainly is in practice). A supplier that has superior security practices (i.e., is inherently safer) exploits its informational advantage by extracting an “information rent” in the usual spirit of incomplete information games. We also identify a special case of this contract, which is robust to moral hazard. The role of auditing in reinforcing investment incentives is also examined.     

A DECISION—RULE TECHNIQUE FOR PREDICTING ACADEMIC SUCCESS

The objective of this paper is to illustrate an application of a quantitative decision-rule strategy which incorporates the Wald classification statistic. An empirical example of this classification technique using data obtained from The University of Texas at Austin Measurement and Evaluation Center is presented. This study originated as an attempt to illustrate the usefulness of this infrequently used statistical technique as a practical tool for “predicting” academic performance. A method for measuring the operational effectiveness of the decision-rule used is also illustrated. This study emphasizes classification as an important part of statistical analysis and focuses on the Wald classification statistic to illustrate one type of problem for which it is suitable.     

金融推荐服务的渠道竞争策略研究

投资者对理财产品的认知能力有限,主要依赖外部“价值信号”形成自己对收益期望的“愿景”,从而简化投资过程。据此,本文通过构建一个新的三方博弈模型研究银行与数字金融平台之间的竞争决策,以探讨当银行有选择其销售顾问能力水平时,如何利用投资者的价值感知和对手特征来占客户对“愿景”错误理解的“便宜”,从而将这种系统性偏差转化为另一种获利来源。研究表明,金融服务强度的有效配置提升了银行的竞争力,但投资者剩余往往被完全剥夺。有趣的是,在同平台竞争中,银行增加了提供金融知识培训的额外动机,并且可能更喜欢强敌而不是弱者。此外,银行应该努力控制服务成本,以规避监管者为防止恶意竞争而禁止银行销售理财产品的风险。     

Generalized Steiner Problems and Other Variants

In this paper, we examine combinatorial optimization problems by considering the case where the set N (the ground set of elements) is expressed as a union of a finite number of m nonempty distinct subsets N ₁,...,N _m. The term we use is the generalized Steiner problems coined after the Generalized Traveling Salesman Problem. We have collected a short list of classical combinatorial optimization problems and we have recast each of these problems in this broader framework in an attempt to identify a linkage between these “generalized” problems. In the literature one finds generalized problems such as the Generalized Minimum Spanning Tree (GMST), Generalized Traveling Salesman Problem (GTSP) and Subset Bin-packing (SBP). Casting these problems into the new problem setting has important implications in terms of the time effort required to compute an optimal solution or a “good” solution to a problem. We examine questions like “is the GTSP “harder” than the TSP?” for a number of paradigmatic problems starting with “easy” problems such as the Minimal Spanning Tree, Assignment Problem, Chinese Postman, Two-machine Flow Shop, and followed by “hard” problems such as the Bin-packing, and the TSP.     

Elusive Critical Elements of Transformative Risk Assessment Practice and Interpretation: Is Alternatives Analysis the Next Step?

This article argues that “game‐changing” approaches to risk analysis must focus on “democratizing” risk analysis in the same way that information technologies have democratized access to, and production of, knowledge. This argument is motivated by the author's reading of Goble and Bier's analysis, “Risk Assessment Can Be a Game‐Changing Information Technology—But Too Often It Isn't” (Risk Analysis, 2013; 33: 1942–1951), in which living risk assessments are shown to be “game changing” in probabilistic risk analysis. In this author's opinion, Goble and Bier's article focuses on living risk assessment's potential for transforming risk analysis from the perspective of risk professionals—yet, the game‐changing nature of information technologies has typically achieved a much broader reach. Specifically, information technologies change who has access to, and who can produce, information. From this perspective, the author argues that risk assessment is not a game‐changing technology in the same way as the printing press or the Internet because transformative information technologies reduce the cost of production of, and access to, privileged knowledge bases. The author argues that risk analysis does not reduce these costs. The author applies Goble and Bier's metaphor to the chemical risk analysis context, and in doing so proposes key features that transformative risk analysis technology should possess. The author also discusses the challenges and opportunities facing risk analysis in this context. These key features include: clarity in information structure and problem representation, economical information dissemination, increased transparency to nonspecialists, democratized manufacture and transmission of knowledge, and democratic ownership, control, and interpretation of knowledge. The chemical safety decision‐making context illustrates the impact of changing the way information is produced and accessed in the risk context. Ultimately, the author concludes that although new chemical safety regulations do transform access to risk information, they do not transform the costs of producing this information—rather, they change the bearer of these costs. The need for further risk assessment transformation continues to motivate new practical and theoretical developments in risk analysis and management.     

A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats

This paper concerns the two‐stage game introduced in Nash (1953). It formalizes a suggestion made (but not pursued) by Nash regarding equilibrium selection in that game, and hence offers an arguably more solid foundation for the “Nash bargaining with endogenous threats” solution. Analogous reasoning is then applied to an infinite horizon game to provide equilibrium selection in two‐person repeated games with contracts. In this setting, issues about enforcement of threats are much less problematic than in Nash's static setting. The analysis can be extended to stochastic games with contracts.     

A General Framework for the Assessment of Power System Vulnerability to Malicious Attacks

The protection and safe operations of power systems heavily rely on the identification of the causes of damage and service disruption. This article presents a general framework for the assessment of power system vulnerability to malicious attacks. The concept of susceptibility to an attack is employed to quantitatively evaluate the degree of exposure of the system and its components to intentional offensive actions. A scenario with two agents having opposing objectives is proposed, i.e., a defender having multiple alternatives of protection strategies for system elements, and an attacker having multiple alternatives of attack strategies against different combinations of system elements. The defender aims to minimize the system susceptibility to the attack, subject to budget constraints; on the other hand, the attacker aims to maximize the susceptibility. The problem is defined as a zero‐sum game between the defender and the attacker. The assumption that the interests of the attacker and the defender are opposite makes it irrelevant whether or not the defender shows the strategy he/she will use. Thus, the approaches “leader–follower game” or “simultaneous game” do not provide differences as far as the results are concerned. The results show an example of such a situation, and the von Neumann theorem is applied to find the (mixed) equilibrium strategies of the attacker and of the defender.     

Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two‐player variable‐threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies, the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable. (JEL: C70, C71, C78, D70)     

有限产能直销优先策略下双渠道供应链的定价博弈模型

针对产能约束下的双渠道供应链,考虑实际中常用的直销优先分配产能的策略,基于Stackelberg博弈研究制造商(领导者)和零售商(追随者)的定价决策,刻画均衡解并深入分析直销优先策略下产能约束对双渠道供应链利润的影响。研究发现,在不同产能水平下,制造商对两个渠道的依赖程度会发生变化。当产能短缺时,其利润主要源于直销渠道;而当产能相对充足时,其愿意分享更多的产能以换取零售渠道上的批发利润,且此时增大产能可能会损害制造商的利益。对零售商而言,当产能短缺时,其采用高溢价来弥补获得较少产能的劣势;当产能相对充足时,其采用薄利多销的策略来获取更多的利润。当产能过剩时,双方的利润不再受产能的影响,且产能过剩对双方而言不一定是最好的情况。研究结论为制造商的定价与在双渠道中的产能分配策略选择提供有益的管理启示。     

AN EXTENSION OF WOLFE'S STUDY OF SIMULATION GAME COMPLEXITY*

This study is an extension of recently reported research concerning the relationships between business simulation game complexity and student perceptions of “learning,”“monotony,” and “appropriateness of challenge.” A game of intermediate-level complexity was used at two education levels. Findings from the current study are compared with findings from an earlier study's intermediate-level complexity game. A number of questions with respect to the earlier findings are raised.     

APPLICATIONS OF A RISK AVERSION CONCEPT

In decision theory the concept denoted variously as “risk aversion increment” or “risk premium” has not been fully exploited, although it is neither new nor complex. In this paper we will show how the concept of the risk aversion increment can be used for developing an alternative to the explicit use of the utility function. For most people the use of a risk aversion increment provides a better conceptual reference than does the use of a utility function. To illustrate the usefulness of the concept as a basis for gaining insight into problem statements and their analysis, the following applications are developed: 1) general results for the exponential utility function. 2) estimation of utility functions. 3) general results for various combinations of utility functions and probability distributions. 4) use in sequential decisions. 5) application in the theory of incentives.     

Game Theory and Risk Analysis

Risk analysts often analyze adversarial risks from terrorists or other intelligent attackers without mentioning game theory. Why? One reason is that many adversarial situations—those that can be represented as attacker‐defender games, in which the defender first chooses an allocation of defensive resources to protect potential targets, and the attacker, knowing what the defender has done, then decides which targets to attack—can be modeled and analyzed successfully without using most of the concepts and terminology of game theory. However, risk analysis and game theory are also deeply complementary. Game‐theoretic analyses of conflicts require modeling the probable consequences of each choice of strategies by the players and assessing the expected utilities of these probable consequences. Decision and risk analysis methods are well suited to accomplish these tasks. Conversely, game‐theoretic formulations of attack‐defense conflicts (and other adversarial risks) can greatly improve upon some current risk analyses that attempt to model attacker decisions as random variables or uncertain attributes of targets (“threats”) and that seek to elicit their values from the defender's own experts. Game theory models that clarify the nature of the interacting decisions made by attackers and defenders and that distinguish clearly between strategic choices (decision nodes in a game tree) and random variables (chance nodes, not controlled by either attacker or defender) can produce more sensible and effective risk management recommendations for allocating defensive resources than current risk scoring models. Thus, risk analysis and game theory are (or should be) mutually reinforcing.     

Die Kultur der Macht. Die Macht der Kultur

Acting in organizations is characterized by strategies of “Bemächtigung” (repression) just as “Ermächtigung” (empowerment): Everyone tries to push through its individual interests, legitimate or not. Thereby in every organization specific rules of game and stiles of play are developed. Altogether these rules constitute the specific organizational culture. In unfair games, strategies of repression are dominant. In fair games, all players try to realize over and over again a just balance of legitimate interests of all stakeholders. Supervision aims to strengthen “Spielmächtigkeit” (ability of play and game) so that its addressees are able to change unfair games into fair games. The know-how for this is here called “technology of empowerment”.     

Revealed Altruism1

This paper develops a nonparametric theory of preferences over one's own and others' monetary payoffs. We introduce “more altruistic than” (MAT), a partial ordering over such preferences, and interpret it with known parametric models. We also introduce and illustrate “more generous than” (MGT), a partial ordering over opportunity sets. Several recent studies focus on two‐player extensive form games of complete information in which the first mover (FM) chooses a more or less generous opportunity set for the second mover (SM). Here reciprocity can be formalized as the assertion that an MGT choice by the FM will elicit MAT preferences in the SM. A further assertion is that the effect on preferences is stronger for acts of commission by FM than for acts of omission. We state and prove propositions on the observable consequences of these assertions. Finally, empirical support for the propositions is found in existing data from investment and dictator games, the carrot and stick game, and the Stackelberg duopoly game and in new data from Stackelberg mini‐games.     

考虑企业竞争的产品线延伸策略研究

越来越多的企业延伸其产品线以满足消费者不同需求,本文采用博弈论探讨了企业产品线延伸策略的有效性。在竞争情形下,两个企业均有机会进行产品线延伸抢夺市场份额。通过消费者效用理论构建了两个企业的需求函数,并得到了均衡解及其利润。研究发现：Nash博弈下,当延伸成本较高时,竞争性企业会放弃产品线延伸;当延伸成本适中时,进行产品线延伸的企业将获得更多利润,而不进行产品线延伸的竞争对手将遭受损失;当延伸成本较低时,虽然企业最优的选择是延伸其产品线,但是两个企业会陷入“囚徒困境”——产品线延伸非但没有获得更多利润反而使利润减少了;另外,当两企业进行Stackelberg博弈时,本文核心结论依然成立,但两企业陷入囚徒困境的可能性增大。     

POTENTIAL RESEARCH TOPICS IN DECISION ANALYSIS*

Robert L. Winkler's paper [1] provides a comprehensive overview of challenging research areas for decision making under uncertainty. Hence, rather than try to extend the list of research areas identified, this note will attempt to embellish some that I feel are particularly important. In these areas, I feel the value of systematic research is particularly high. For convenience, the discussion will be organized under the four research categories identified by Winkler with a couple of sugestions following in an “implementation research” category. The reader will note, however, that many of the suggested topics actually relate to more than one research category.     

Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility depends on the principal's unobservable contracts with other agents. We show that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds equilibrium outcomes in a wide class of bilateral contracting games without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the agents' beliefs. This bound yields, for example, competitive convergence as N →∞ in environments in which an appropriately‐defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists. We also examine the additional restrictions arising in two common bilateral contracting games: the “offer game” in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents, and the “bidding game” in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal.