Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: A search for commonalities

Near‐global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post‐industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English‐speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German‐speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer‐term factors that may be common to all.     

New insights into the fertility patterns of recent Polish migrants in the United Kingdom

There have been important changes in the United Kingdom’s fertility and immigration in the past decade, with a large share contributed by migrants from Poland. A detailed understanding of Polish migrant fertility is lacking, however, because the relevant data are not routinely collected. This paper provides new insights into the fertility patterns of Polish migrants in the UK, and compares these patterns with those of other large immigrant groups, the UK-born population and in Poland. We use the UK Labour Force Survey with the Own Children Method, illustrating the potential of survey data for estimating immigrant fertility in settings where other data are unavailable. We first compare the fertility patterns of recent Polish migrants with those of other key recent immigrant groups and the UK-born population; estimating Age-Specific Fertility Rates (ASFRs), and Total Fertility Rates (TFRs), by country of birth for the 2004–2012 period; the proportions in each immigrant group that arrive without children; and of those childless at arrival the proportions of women who go on to have births within a short period after arrival. Next, we compare the ASFRs and TFR for Polish migrant women with those observed in Poland. Our results show that the fertility of Polish migrants is among the lowest for all population subgroups in the UK, and that Polish migrants are less likely to have children soon after arrival than other immigrant groups. The findings are consistent with migration not being so closely linked to family formation for Polish migrants as it is for immigrants in the comparison groups. We also find that the fertility patterns of Polish migrants are different from those observed in Poland with a later childbearing profile and a slightly higher TFR.     

Latest-Late Fertility? Decline and Resurgence of Late Parenthood Across the Low-Fertility Countries

After decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parenthood across low-fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use long series of age-specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950–2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990–2016 for men. In 1950, the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from 2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the prevalence of late first births increased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was initially lowest. This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, occurring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.     

Recent European fertility patterns: Fitting curves to ‘distorted’ distributions

Recent patterns of fertility in Europe show marked differences between countries. Recent United Kingdom and Irish fertility curves show ‘distortions’ in terms of a ‘bulge’ in early age fertility, distinct from the smoother curves of other European countries. These patterns may not be adequately described by mathematical functions used by previous studies to model fertility curves. A mixture model with two component distributions may be more appropriate. The suitability of the simple and mixture Hadwiger functions is examined in relation to the fertility curves of a number of European countries. While the simple Hadwiger model fits recent period age-specific fertility distributions for some countries, others which display a ‘bulge’ in early age fertility require a mixture Hadwiger model. Some of the parameters of the Hadwiger models appear to be related to familiar demographic indices. The simple and mixture Hadwiger models appear useful in describing and comparing fertility patterns across European countries.     

The objectives of government policies on fertility control in Eastern Europe

Although demographers from the communist countries continue to maintain that overpopulation in the Malthusian sense Is possible only under capitalism, some East European demographers now concede that a form of overpopulation may, at times and under certain conditions, exist In a communist society. In this connection the ideological framework for an optimum population policy under communism has been developed, and demographers have been given the task of determining what the optimum population is and how it is to be attained. There has been considerable ferment on the Issue of fertility control in both the literature and action programmes of Poland, Chechoslovakia, and Hungary. The latter two countries have conducted surveys on family planning, including the use and effectiveness of contraceptives, and have established demographic journals.

All the communist countries of Eastern Europe except Albania and East Germany have relaxed laws restricting abortions and conducted campaigns for the spread of contraceptives. At the same time family allowances have been continued. These paradoxically divergent policies can be rationalized as attempts to sustain existing families while providing the basis for regulating future fertility to achieve an optimum population in relation to the resources of the respective countries.     

The limited effect of increasing educational attainment on childlessness trends in twentieth-century Europe,women born 1916–65

During the twentieth century, trends in childlessness varied strongly across European countries while educational attainment grew continuously across them. Using census and large-scale survey data from 13 European countries, we investigated the relationship between these two factors among women born between 1916 and 1965. Up to the 1940 birth cohort, the share of women childless at age 40+ decreased universally. Afterwards, the trends diverged across countries. The results suggest that the overall trends were related mainly to changing rates of childlessness within educational groups and only marginally to changes in the educational composition of the population. Over time, childlessness levels of the medium-educated and high-educated became closer to those of the low-educated, but the difference in level between the two better educated groups remained stable in Western and Southern Europe and increased slightly in the East.     

欧盟人口老龄化与劳动力不足

20世纪后半期以后,由于欧盟各国的总和生育率的不断下降和死亡率的下降,导致人口老龄化的速度加快和劳动力不足。本文从人口经济学角度论述了欧盟渐进过程中的人口老龄化和劳动力不足的问题．提出应积极吸收大量的经济移民,特别是高科技人才的引入,从而提高欧洲经济的竞争力。     

Does Society Matter? Life Satisfaction in the Enlarged Europe

Life satisfaction is quite heterogeneously distributed across countries of the enlarged European Union. Previous research has shown how living conditions within individual countries, such as access to material and emotional resources, are important for personal well-being, but it has been less successful in explaining differences between countries. This article investigates whether it matters in which political and economic circumstances people live, as well as whether their particular perception of the quality of their societal environment plays a role. People are well aware that the institutional and cultural settings in which their lives are embedded create opportunities and limitations: within individual countries, perceptions of society influence life satisfaction outcomes irrespective of access to resources. However, their importance for well-being differs across Europe: perceptions of societies are highly decisive in countries that provide only a minimum of social security and in which the reliability of political institutions is poor. In rich and stable countries, the impact is weaker and private social support becomes more important. In addition to these country-specific weights of life satisfaction determinants, life satisfaction variations between countries can be explained to a large extent by taking into consideration the economic performance, the social security level, and the political culture in a country—all in all, general conditions that enable people to live a respectable life.     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: a search for commonalities

Near-global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post-industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English-speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German-speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer-term factors that may be common to all.     

欧洲生育支持政策效果的评估及启示——基于模糊集定性比较的分析

采用组态比较方法中的模糊集定性比较分析,系统性检验了2000—2018年29个欧洲典型国家社会情境和现行生育支持政策的条件组合与生育率变化的关系,试图为我国借鉴欧洲国家生育支持政策提供新的研究思路。通过欧洲各国三类生育支持政策(育儿津贴、生育假期和儿童照料设施供给)与三类社会情境的条件(经济发展水平、性别平等及家庭重视文化)进行必要条件检验,得到五类影响生育率的组态方案。通过将不同社会情境下各国生育支持政策的实施效果与我国国情的比较和讨论,本研究提出,我国生育支持政策的出台要充分考虑地区差异:对于性别较为平等的经济发达地区,大力发展儿童照料设施和有针对性的育儿津贴可以稳定生育率;对于性别平等较差的西部欠发达地区,育儿津贴更能提高生育率;在性别差距较大、重视后代的经济发达地区,较慷慨的生育假期和提供儿童照料设施双管齐下会有助于提升生育水平。     

Below-replacement fertility in east and southeast asia: Consequences and policy responses

Fourteen countries in Asia have total fertility rates at or below replacement level. This is more pronounced in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The implications are far-reaching and profound as they affect the age structure of the population, giving rise to population ageing, labour force shortages, increased elderly dependency ratios and feminization of the aged population. Evidence from European countries suggests that although fertility may rebound, in most countries it is highly unlikely that fertility will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the near future. Mortality reduction will continue to be an overriding policy goal, which would further enhance the ageing process. Therefore, the greatest challenge will be to pension systems, old-age care systems, and health systems or health insurance. This paper first examines the fertility transition in five low-fertility countries. It then discusses the policy measures that these countries have adopted in response to low fertility and population ageing. The paper concludes with the policy implications for healthcare, social care, income security and caregiving facility, and the scope for further study.     

生育率演变的生态学逻辑及人口增长的长期趋势

人口增长的长期过程一直是充满困惑与引发争论的话题,将人类复归到生态系统的普通成员,按照生态学逻辑构建一个由替代生育率内生引导、人口容量外生制约的人口增长新模型,以代替用具体社会经济因子解释短周期人口变动的传统思路,探讨生育率转变的一般模式及人口发展的长期趋势。工业革命以来,全球人口已经或正在经历着第一次、第二次生育率转变,全球生育率演变可以聚类为欧美、亚非拉、撒哈拉以南非洲和东亚四种区域模式;在计划生育政策的推动下,我国在短短的三十年内完整经历了两次生育率转变。极限替代生育率是生育率演变的长期目标,但当前已有一些国家跌破更替水平,这也许会成为各个国家的普遍经历,预示着人口容量约束的日益显性化;世界及主要国家的人口规模正在日益逼近其容量极限,并会在惯性驱动下突破容量限制,达到峰值后再以负增长方式趋近人口容量,同期的生育率也将向极限替代生育率递增复归。按趋势模拟世界和中国的可持续人口容量分别约为65亿人和12亿人。研究设计出测量人口增长惯性的新指标——人口增长惯性系数,它是生育率与实时替代生育率之比或出生率与死亡率之比,相比常用的人口惯性因子更为简便易行。     

Low Fertility Trap:Theories,Facts and Implications

The low Fertility Trap Hypothesis proposes that there are three self-reinforcing mechanism--demographic,sociological and economic,working towards a downward spiral in future fertility.Once TFR drops below 1.5,it will be difficult to recover.The fertility recovery emerging in many countries across the world has changed the lowfertility trap theory and also the justification of the theory itself.So low-fertility trap is more likely a pattern summarized from a short-time phenomenon than a generalized social law.As with China,the current fertility level is above 1.5 births per woman,and China is not in the "Low-fertility trap".Moreover,most recent surveys suggests that current fertility intention in China is above 1.8 births per woman and more than60 percent of people would have a second child if there is an adjustment of fertility policy.In addition,birth postponement is still playing an important role in reducing TFR in China.Thus,with the high fertility intention,adjustment of family planning policy and decreasing tempo effect,TFR in China will experience upturn but not further decline in the near future.It is lack of evidence to conclude that China has already been or is going to be trapped in low fertility.     

Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

Effects of population policy and economic reform on the trend in fertility in Guangdong province,China, 1975–2005

An analysis of data mainly from China's 1990 and 2000 censuses and 2005 mini-census shows how fertility decline between 1975 and 2005 in the province of Guangdong has been influenced by both fertility policy and economic and social development. Guangdong's development since 1975 has been very rapid and has attracted huge numbers of migrants from other provinces. The analysis of the province's fertility trend from 1975 shows clearly the influence of fertility policy on the trend. The analysis also shows that economic development has brought about large changes in population composition by urban/rural residence, education, occupation, and migration status, which, together with large fertility differentials by these characteristics, have contributed substantially to Guangdong's fertility decline, in large part through changes in proportions currently married.     

Eastern Europe: pronatalist policies and private behavior

Fertility trends in the 9 Eastern European socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia) are reviewed. Official policy in all these countries but Yugoslavia is explicitly pronatalist to varying degrees. Attention is directed to the following areas: similarities and differences; fertility trends (historical trends, post World War 2 trends, and family size); abortion trends (abortion legislation history, current legislation, abortion data, impact on birth rates, abortion seekers, health risks, and psychological aftereffects); contraceptive availability and practice; pronatal economic incentives (impact on fertility); women's position; and marriage, divorce, and sexual attitudes. The fact that fertility was generally higher in the Eastern European socialist countries than in Western Europe in the mid-1970s is credited to pronatalist measures undertaken when fertility fell or threatened to fall below replacement level (2.1 births/woman) after abortion was liberalized in all countries but Albania, following the lead of the USSR in 1955. Fertility increased where access to abortion was again restricted (mildly in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary at various times, and severely in Romania in 1966) and/or economic incentives such as birth grants, paid maternity leave, family and child care allowances, and low interest loans to newlyweds were substantially increased (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to some extent, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the German Democratic Republic in 1976). Subsequent declines in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania suggest that policy induced increases in fertility are short-lived. Couples respond to abortion restrictions by practicing more efficient contraception or resorting to illegal abortion. It is evident that the region's low birth rate is realized mainly with abortion, for withdrawal remains the primary contraceptive method in all countries but Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. It seems that cash incentives have advanced the timing of 1st and 2nd births without substantially increasing the 3rd births required to keep national fertility above replacement level. Demographic factors alone will most likely keep birth rates low in several Eastern European countries during the 1980s and the 1990s. Due to the low birth rates in the 1960s, there will be fewer women in the prime childbearing ages of 20-29 in at least Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. It becomes clear that policy efforts to influence private reproductive behavior can only be moderately successful if the living conditions are such that women are determined not to have more than 1 or 2 children.     

我国生育意愿及其影响因素研究综述：1980～2015

2016年1月1日起实施的全面二孩政策能否有效地鼓励民众的生育行为,这关乎到我国未来几十年合理调整人口结构、稳固新常态发展的成功与否。本文通过对我国1980-2015年有关生育意愿的国内外文献总结回顾,将生育意愿的内涵界定为数量、时间、性别、动机四个维度,并在此基础上结合国内外学者们的研究归纳得出影响生育意愿的五个方面因素：政策、经济、观念、教育、年龄,以期在新政策背景下展望未来,借鉴国外发展的经验,做好养老、医疗、就业、教育方面的准备措施来迎接全面二孩时代,并为有关生育意愿的进一步研究提供参考。     

The Death of the West: An alternative view

Much has been written about the ‘Death of the West’, a demise threatened by the low level of reproduction in Western countries. That fate is contrasted unfavourably with the rapid growth of the populations and economies of less developed countries, and the prospect of the numerical and political marginalization of the formerly dominant developed world. We believe that trends in European fertility have been misunderstood and that, with effort and some pain, their consequences for age structure are manageable. Many European societies also enjoy the advantages of demographic and social maturity, the resilience of established consensual democratic institutions, the rule of law, and civil society. The sizes of China and India raise problems of resource sustainability and vulnerability to climate change. China risks falling into a low-fertility trap, reinforced by urban working conditions unfriendly to family formation. Traditional patriarchal and familist cultures may depress fertility rates to unhelpfully low levels in other less developed countries.     

Gender egalitarianism,perceived economic insecurity,and fertility intentions in Spain: A qualitative analysis

Economic uncertainty contributes to low fertility in many European countries. On the other hand, greater gender equality may positively influence fertility. This paper examines how these two forces interact in Spain. We use in-depth interviews to analyse fertility decision-making among young and highly educated partnered adults living in urban areas. Highly gender-egalitarian interviewees are less likely to perceive economic insecurity as an obstacle to proceeding to a next birth than less egalitarian interviewees. But there is not necessarily a difference in these two groups’ overall fertility intentions, as highly egalitarian interviewees’ greater valuation of stable employment for both partners requires institutional and policy support for dual-earner couples’ childrearing. When we look only at interviewees who express economic insecurity, somewhat higher fertility intentions are expressed by those holding less gender-egalitarian attitudes. Our results underline the complexity of the interrelationships between economic insecurity, gender egalitarianism, and fertility intentions.     

Urbanization and the fertility transition in Ghana

This paper examines the way in which migration and urban residence operate to alter fertility outcomes. While urban-rural fertility differentials have long been established for most developing societies, the nature of these differences among migrants and between migrants and those of succeeding generations is not well understood. The evidence presented here suggests that rural-urban migration and urbanization may contribute positively to processes of fertility transition. Using data from the 1998 Kumasi Peri-Urban Survey, which included a 5-year retrospective monthly calendar of childbearing, we suggest that migrants adapt quickly to an urban environment. Our results also reveal generational differences in recent and cumulative fertility. While migrants exhibit higher cumulative fertility than urban residents of the second and third generation, their fertility is significantly lower than rural averages in Ghana. Children of migrants exhibit childbearing patterns quite similar to those in higher-order generations. Most noteworthy is the nature of the disparities in childbearing patterns between migrants and the succeeding generations. Migrant women have higher lifetime fertility than urban natives. Migrant women also exhibit higher fertility over the last 5 years than second generation or high-order urban natives. But these first generation women exhibit lower fertility (vs. urban natives) for the year immediately prior to the survey. These patterns lend support to an interpretation that combines rather than opposes theories of selectivity, disruption, adaptation and socialization. We conclude by discussing mechanisms that might explain these interrelated processes of fertility adjustment and suggest that policies discouraging rural-urban migration need to be revisited.