Wealth as Security: Growth Curve Analyses of Household Income and Net Worth During a Recession

Building on evidence of increasing inequality with the 2008–2009 recession, we asked whether households experienced different financial trajectories through the recession depending on initial income and net worth. Using growth curve models of households headed by young adults in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we compared the relationship between initial income and net worth and the rate of change of income and net worth from 1989 to 2011 among households with income above and below $50,000. We found different patterns of income change and different relationships among income, net worth, and their rates of change between high- and low-income categories. Results suggest initial wealth helped to stabilize income and wealth changes among higher income households, reducing financial insecurity.     

Assessing the Relationship Between Gender,Household Structure,and Net Worth in the United States

This paper examines wealth disparities by gender and household structure in the United States using data from the 1998–2013 Survey of Consumer Finances. Following studies of economic insecurity, we placed households at the center of our analysis to highlight the interconnected nature of wealth with multiple aspects of family structure. We investigated net worth by both gender and household structure, which includes variation by partnership status and the presence of other adult relatives and their roles within the household. We found that wealth disparities were largest among single adult households, but these varied by gender. Female single adult households held some of the lowest levels of net worth, but after accounting for key explanations of wealth inequality, single male households actually held greater wealth than two-adult partnered households. This relationship further depended on the presence of extended family members, where gender disparities were smaller among households with other relatives present.     

From Soviets to oligarchs: inequality and property in Russia 1905-2016

This paper combines national accounts, survey, wealth and fiscal data (including recently released tax data on high-income taxpayers) in order to provide consistent series on the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in Russia from the Soviet period until the present day. We find that official survey-based measures vastly under-estimate the rise of inequality since 1990. According to our benchmark estimates, top income shares are now similar to (or higher than) the levels observed in the United States. We also find that inequality has increased substantially more in Russia than in China and other ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe. We relate this finding to the specific transition strategy followed in Russia. According to our benchmark estimates, the wealth held offshore by rich Russians is about three times larger than official net foreign reserves, and is comparable in magnitude to total household financial assets held in Russia.     

Missing the wealthy in the HFCS: micro problems with macro implications

Wealth aggregates implied by the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) usually yield much lower amounts than macroeconomic statistics reported in the National Accounts. An important source of this gap may be the under-representation of the wealthiest households in the HFCS. This article therefore combines a semi-parametric Pareto model estimated from top survey data and observations from rich lists with a non-parametric stratification approach to quantify the impact of the missing wealthy households on component-specific micro-macro gaps. We find that unadjusted micro data substantially underestimates wealth inequality. The largest effects are documented for equity. For other components, the missing wealthy explain less than ten percentage points of the micro-macro gap. We find that differences in oversampling strategies limit the cross-country comparability of unadjusted survey-implied wealth distributions and that our top tail adjustment leads to measures that are internationally better comparable.

     

Inheritances and the distribution of wealth or whatever happened to the great inheritance boom?

Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), we found that on average over the period from 1989 to 2007, about one fifth of American households at a given point of time reported a wealth transfer and these accounted for quite a sizeable figure, about a quarter of their net worth. Over the lifetime, about 30 percent of households could expect to receive a wealth transfer and these would account for close to 40 % of their net worth near time of death. However, there is little evidence of an inheritance “boom.” In fact, from 1989 to 2007, the share of households reporting a wealth transfer fell by 2.5 percentage points, a time trend statistically significant at the one percent level. The average value of inheritances received among all households did increase but at a slow pace, by 10 %; the time trend is not statistically significant. Wealth transfers as a proportion of current net worth fell sharply over this period, from 29 to 19 %, though the time trend once again is not statistically significant. We also found that inheritances and other wealth transfers tend to be equalizing in terms of the distribution of household wealth, though a number of caveats apply to this result.     

Household wealth and the measurement of economic well-being in the United States

We analyze the level and distribution of economic well-being in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s based on the standard measure of money income and a measure in which income from wealth is calculated as the sum of lifetime annuity from nonhome wealth and imputed rental-equivalent for owner-occupied homes. Over the 1982–2000 period, median well-being increases faster when these adjustments are made than when standard money income is used. This adjustment also widens the income gap between African-Americans and whites but increases the relative well-being of the elderly. Adding imputed rent and annuities from household wealth to household income considerably increases measured inequality and the share of income from wealth in inequality. However, both measures show about the same rise in inequality over the period. We also find an increasing share of wage and salary income in our expanded definition of income among the richest 1% over the period but do not find that the “working rich” have largely replaced rentiers at the top of the economic ladder.      

THE EFFECT OF HOUSING WEALTH LOSSES ON SPENDING IN THE GREAT RECESSION

We use panel data on a complete inventory of household spending and assets to estimate the spending response to the sharp and largely unexpected declines in house values that occurred in the Great Recession. Our study complements the existing literature on this topic by relying exclusively on longitudinal micro data on both household wealth and expenditure. Our data span the period 2002–2012, allowing us to separate trends in spending from innovations in response to unexpected wealth changes. We find the marginal propensity to consume out of an unexpected housing wealth change to be 6 cents per dollar among older American households. (JEL D12, D14, E21)     

Housing Valuation,Wealth Perception,and Homeowners’ Portfolio Composition

This study explores the link between wealth perception from an appreciation of the residential property price and homeowners’ preference toward asset categories pooled by risk. Household survey data for Portugal were used to build shares of low, medium, and high risk assets representing fractions of household’s total wealth. Data showed incomplete household portfolios along with housing capturing the largest share of households’ wealth, in line with the literature on composition puzzles. The findings indicate robust empirical evidence that the rate of housing valuation is an indicator of households’ wealth perception. When the housing price appreciates with respect to its initial cost, households suffer an endowment effect and tend to increase diversity in their portfolio, expanding the holdings of safe deposits as they raise the share of high risk assets.     

Barriers to Economic Security: Disability,Employment, and Asset Disparities in Canada

Although ample research shows that people with disabilities face significant labor market barriers, questions remain about whether and how disadvantages in employment and earnings contribute to economic insecurity. We use 1999 to 2012 Canadian Survey of Financial Security data to study disparities in nonhousing assets, which include household savings, stocks, and pensions, across households with and without disabilities. We find that households where the respondent or their spouse reported a disability held 25 percent less in nonhousing assets after accounting for key employment, education, and demographic factors. Demonstrating the more complicated relationship between disability, employment, and assets, these direct effects were further strengthened by disability's indirect effects on assets through its relationship with employment income.     

The concept and measurement of asset poverty: Levels, trends and composition for the U.S., 1983–2001

American prosperity in the second half of the 1980s together with the booming economy of the 1990s created the impression that American households have done well, particularly in terms of wealth acquisition. In this paper, we develop the concept of “asset poverty” as a measure of economic hardship, distinct from and complementary to the more commonly used concept of “income poverty.” We define a household with insufficient assets to enable it to meet basic needs (as measured by the income poverty line) for a period of three months to be asset poor. The results reveal that in the face of the large growth in overall assets in the U.S. and a fall in standard income poverty over the period from 1983 to 2001, the level of asset poverty increased from 22.4 to 24.5 percent. We also find that asset poverty rates for blacks and Hispanics are over twice those for whites; that asset poverty rates fall monotonically with both age and education; that they are much higher for renters than homeowners; and that by family type they range from a low of 5 percent for elderly couples to 71 percent for female single parents.     

Households’ Net Worth Accumulation Patterns and Young Adults’ Financial Health: Ripple Effects of the Great Recession?

We examined households’ dynamic patterns of net worth accumulation between 1999 and 2009 and asked whether these patterns related to the financial health of young adults growing up in those households. Two patterns of net worth emerged—the first remained high and stable and the second experienced a precipitous decline between 2007 and 2009. Young adults who grew up in households with high and stable net worth also experienced the greatest benefit in financial health. Given wealth losses in the wake of the Great Recession and the ripple effects those losses may have had—and may continue to have—on households and their children, policies that stimulate wealth accumulation may be feasible and timely strategies for improving financial health.     

A post-crisis assessment of retirement income adequacy for Baby Boomers and Gen Xers

DETERMINING THOSE "AT RISK" OF INSUFFICIENT RETIREMENT INCOME: The analysis in this paper was designed to answer two questions: 1) What percentage of U.S. households became "at risk" of insufficient retirement income as a result of the financial market and real estate crisis in 2008 and 2009? 2) Of those who are at risk, what additional savings do they need to make each year until retirement age to make up for their losses from the crisis? The results are from the 2010 EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model by the Employee Benefit Research Institute. KEY FINDINGS: Range at risk: The percentage of households that would not have been "at risk" without the 2008-2009 crisis but that ended up "at risk" varies from a low of 3.8 percent to a high of 14.3 percent. 50-50 chance of adequacy: Looking at all Early Boomer households that would need to save an additional amount (over and above the savings already factored into the baseline model), the median percentage of additional compensation for these households desiring a 50 percent probability of retirement income adequacy would be 3.0 percent of compensation each year until retirement age to account for the financial and housing market crisis in 2008 and 2009. 90 percent chance of adequacy: Looking at all Early Boomer households that would need to save an additional amount (over and above the savings already factored into the baseline model), the median percentage of additional compensation for these households desiring a 90 percent probability of retirement income adequacy would be 4.3 percent of compensation. Range of adequacy: Looking only at Early Boomer households that would need to save an additional amount (over and above the savings already factored into the baseline model), that had account balances in defined contribution plans and IRAs as well as exposure to the real estate crisis in 2008 and 2009 shows a median percentage for of 5.6 percent for a 50 percent probability and 6.7 percent for a 90 percent probability of retirement income adequacy.     

Social network capital, economic mobility and poverty traps

This paper explores the role social network capital might play in facilitating poor agents?? escape from poverty traps. We model and simulate endogenous link formation among households heterogeneously endowed with both traditional and social network capital who make investment and technology choices over time in the absence of financial markets and faced with multiple production technologies featuring different fixed costs and returns. We show that social network capital can either complement or substitute for productive assets in facilitating some poor households?? escape from poverty. However, the voluntary nature of costly link formation also creates exclusionary mechanisms that impede some poor households?? use of social network capital. Through numerical simulation, we show that the ameliorative potential of social networks therefore depends fundamentally on the broader socio-economic wealth distribution in the economy, which determines the feasibility of social interactions and the net intertemporal benefits resulting from endogenous network formation. In some settings, targeted public transfers to the poor can crowd-in private resources by inducing new social links that the poor can exploit to escape from poverty.     

When the Kids Live at Home: Coresidence,Parental Assets,and Economic Insecurity

This study uses National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort data from 1994 through 2012 (N = 16,108 person‐years, 4,671 individuals) to investigate how coresidence with adult children influences asset levels among parents. It applies hybrid mixed effects regression models that partition between‐ and within‐person variation to estimate parental savings and financial assets over time and across different households. The results suggest that coresidence with adult children led to decreases in parental assets and savings. In the years in which their children lived at home, parents held 24% less in financial assets and 23% less in savings when compared with the years when adult children were not present. By expanding previous research that shows a relationship between increasing economic insecurity, limited wealth, and the rise in coresidence among young adults, this study also offers broader implications for the interconnectivity of financial hardship across generations.     

Aging With Rising Risk: Have Older Households Experienced Faster-Growing Risk Exposure Than Younger Ones Since the 1990s?

Financial markets have been characterized by boom and bust cycles since the 1980s, while the responsibility for managing retirement wealth has increasingly shifted onto individual households at the same time. Policy makers and experts have expressed concern over rising risk exposure among older householders, who appear to be increasingly exposed to the growing financial risks just as they near retirement. We consider household data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances from 1989 to 2010 to analyze the correlation between age and risk exposure. We test whether older householders’ risk exposure has indeed grown over time, whether it has increased more than that of younger householders, whether changes in the demographic composition of older householders have contributed to older households’ rising risk exposure, and the degree to which increases in risk exposure can be traced to a growing concentration of household assets held in stocks and housing and to rising householder indebtedness. Our results indicate that risk exposure has grown more for older householders than for younger ones, that demographic changes among older householders have contributed to additional increases in older householders’ risk exposure, and that the growth of older householders’ risk exposure is driven more by rising risky asset concentration and less by greater indebtedness.     

DISINFLATION,INEQUALITY, AND WELFARE IN A TANK MODEL

We investigate the redistributive and welfare effects of disinflation in a two-agent New Keynesian model characterized by limited asset market participation and wealth inequality. We highlight two key mechanisms driving our long-run results: (1) the cash in advance constraint on firms working capital; (2) dividends endogeneity. These two channels point in opposite directions. Lower inflation softens the cash in advance constraint and, by raising labor demand, lowers inequality. But disinflation also raises dividends and this increases inequality. The disinflation is always welfare-improving for asset holders. We obtain ambiguous results for non-asset holders, who suffer substantial consumption losses during the transition. (JEL E31, E5, D3, D6)     

Measuring employment deprivation in the EU using a household-level index

We propose an aggregate measure of employment deprivation among households that follows a methodological framework developed to measure wellbeing. This index verifies a set of reasonable axioms that other available measures do not: increases in three relevant employment deprivation elements-incidence, intensity and inequality. Incidence captures how many households in a population are touched by a lack of employment, while employment deprivation intensity reflects how far households are, on average, from being non-deprived of employment. Finally, employment deprivation inequality increases with the concentration of unemployment among few households. Based on this index, we analyze employment deprivation across the European Union using information from Labor Force Surveys during the current “Great Recession.” Our results provide evidence on the relevance of incorporating the household dimension to identify unemployment profiles, with a variety of implications, in terms of household wellbeing. Specifically, we show that countries with similar (intermediate) unemployment rates differ in their patterns of employment deprivation once the structure of employment across households is incorporated.     

Dynamics of earnings inequality among female-headed households in the United States

The labor market in the United States has gone through a number of noticeable changes, one of which is a rise participation of women in the labor force. A number of studies have investigated the consequences of these changes on wage, income, or earnings inequality in a static framework. This study investigated the consequences of these changes on earnings inequality over time. The earnings inequality among male- and female-headed households is compared. I further considered the factors that might have influenced the earnings inequality among female-headed households. Short-term and long-term inequality was measured from 1978–1986. It was found that short-term inequalities generally have a rising trend and contain transitory components; long-term inequalities declined in the early years because of a smoothing of transitory components; and within-group inequalities are the principle determinant of overall inequality. Education, race, age, and marital status were considered as possible contributors to the overall inequality. Education and race were shown to be the most influential factor explaining inequality among female-headed households and explained a third of the observed inequality. Earnings stability profiles reveal the existence of permanent and chronic inequality.     

What the 2008 stock market crash means for retirement security

The 2008 stock market crash raises concerns about retirement security, especially since the increased prevalence of 401(k) and similar retirement saving plans means that more Americans are now stakeholders in the equity market than in the past. Using a dynamic microsimulation model, this paper explores the ability of alternate future stock market scenarios to restore retirement assets. The authors find that those near retirement could fare the worst because they have no time to recoup their losses. Mid-career workers could fare better because they have more time to rebuild their wealth. They may even gain income if they buy stocks at low prices and get above-average rates of return. High-income groups will be the most affected because they are most likely to have financial assets and to be invested in the stock market.     

What the 2008 Stock Market Crash Means for Retirement Security

The 2008 stock market crash raises concerns about retirement security, especially since the increased prevalence of 401(k) and similar retirement saving plans means that more Americans are now stakeholders in the equity market than in the past. Using a dynamic microsimulation model, this paper explores the ability of alternate future stock market scenarios to restore retirement assets. The authors find that those near retirement could fare the worst because they have no time to recoup their losses. Mid-career workers could fare better because they have more time to rebuild their wealth. They may even gain income if they buy stocks at low prices and get above-average rates of return. High-income groups will be the most affected because they are most likely to have financial assets and to be invested in the stock market.