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基于Rubinstein讨价还价的激励契约研究 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
传统的激励契约理论通过假设委托人提供一个"要么接受,要么走人"的契约给代理人,从而搁置了委托人与代理人就契约进行的讨价还价问题.这种假设下,委托人能获得最大收入,但代理人只能获得保留收入.本文假设代理人可以与委托人就激励契约进行Rubinstein讨价还价,从而得到一份均衡的契约.在均衡契约中,代理人的收益往往会高于传统契约. 相似文献
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分类回收是提高资源利用效率的重要路径,但回收渠道会受分类回收费用承担模式的影响。为了厘清其内在关系以更好地开展分类回收活动,基于分类回收费用不同承担模式,构建由一个回收商和一个处理商参与的分散决策与集中决策博弈模型。研究结果表明:(1)分类回收可以同时增加回收商和处理商收益,但是,只有当消费者对废旧产品价格的敏感度小于某一阈值时,处理商和回收商才愿意进行分类回收。(2)分散决策模式下,处理商和回收商共同承担分类回收费用模式优于只有其中一方承担分类回收费用模式;集中决策模式下,分类回收努力程度、废旧产品回收数量和回收渠道收益均优于分散决策情形。(3)基于纳什讨价还价成本分摊契约设计协调机制,有利于增加处理商和整个回收渠道整体收益,但该契约中回收商收益受损。(4)两部收费制契约和收益共享契约通过对纳什讨价还价成本分摊契约模型下回收渠道均衡利润进行重新分配,使得当处理商承诺支付给回收商的固定费用和分享利润的比例处于一定范围时,处理商和回收商利润均增加,也即实现供应链帕累托改善,但是回收渠道整体利润未达到集中决策水平;(5)收益共享-成本分摊契约不仅可以增加处理商和回收商利润,还使得回收渠道整... 相似文献
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基于讨价还价博弈下的供应链回购合同研究 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
分析了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的系统.不确定性需求实现之后,系统成员能够对交易合同参数进行讨价还价,从而确定双方之间的收益分配比例.研究得出,首先,相对于分散控制系统,基于讨价还价下的分散控制系统中,成员之间讨价还价会对供应商收益产生负面影响;而对于供应链系统和零售商而言,收益变化趋势取决于双方之间的讨价还价能力的大小.其次,相对于回购控制系统中,在对回购价格进行讨价还价的回购控制系统中,供应商和零售商在期初所签订的回购合同具有抗讨价还价性;而在对批发价格进行讨价还价的回购控制系统中,回购合同是否具有抗讨价还价性,取决于零售商和供应商之间的相对谈判权利. 相似文献
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与代理人类型有一定程度相关性的信号能够改变委托人的初始信息结构并因此影响委托人的契约设计.现有文献很少讨论事前不可验证的信号对契约参与者事前福利的影响.相比对事后福利的研究,对事前福利的研究在契约设计中更具有现实意义.文章研究了信号对契约参与者事前福利的影响.结果表明:委托人通过对信号的观察改进契约会提高委托人的事前期望剩余;委托人的初始信息结构和信号的信息量是影响代理人事前期望剩余的关键因素;在一定的严格条件下,委托人对信号的观察能够增加代理人的事前期望剩余,即实现事前期望福利的帕累托改进. 相似文献
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针对产出和需求不确定性导致的残值或补货问题,考虑单个制造商和零售商所组成的双边随机供应链,双方采取事前订单形式,构建两种不同现货市场补货策略模型,研究随机环境下最优原材料投入量-成品订货量决策行为及供应链协调。研究表明:零售商自行补货时,收益共享合同不能分担上游产出不确定性风险,制造商为避免产出过剩会减小投入量导致合同失效,但融合了缺货惩罚-余货补偿双向机制的收益共享契约能够进行有效协调。当由制造商补货时,现货市场降低了产出不确定性风险且提高了系统产出投入比,并能重新使收益共享契约生效。此外,有效契约协调后的各方收益均为系统最优收益的仿射函数,并由协商后的收益共享比例控制着分配系数。理论分析和数值仿真说明了合同协调的有效性。算例分析还发现,设计的收益共享风险共担契约相比单一的收益共享契约能够更好地降低不确定性对收益的影响。 相似文献
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在救灾物资管理中,购买方在物资采购策略上常陷入两难的境地。从零售商处即时采购物资虽然可以减少库存成本,但物资单价高。从生产商处预先采购物资虽然物资单价低,但会面临风险损失。为解决这一问题,本文将供应链管理引入救灾物资管理体系中,将其视为一个单购买方、单供应方的供应链系统。本研究给出了,带期权契约机制的生产商采购策略中的救灾物资供应链整体期望利润,大于带退货机制的零售商采购策略中的救灾物资供应链总体期望利润的存在条件。在该存在条件满足的情况下,期权契约机制可以协调救灾物资供应链并达到Pareto均衡。此外在考虑了风险水平和风险偏好的情况下,提出了一种基于Nash讨价还价模型的效用函数,以确定能够被供应和购买双方同时接受的期权契约。 相似文献
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信息不对称下委托代理契约纳什实施性研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
针对代理人逆向选择导致委托人无法将契约与代理人类型状态直接关联的矛盾,研究了信息不对称下委托代理契约的纳什实施性问题。通过建立信号空间上的纳什均衡与有效配置的映射关系,将委托人契约与代理人状态联系起来,并以完全信息下委托人的最优契约和逆向选择下的次优契约为例,研究分析委托人契约纳什实施的性质,当且仅当委托契约满足激励相容约束时,才具备纳什实施的惟一性,该结果为实务契约设计逼近激励可行契约提供了新的途径。 相似文献
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雇佣契约对心理契约破坏影响的实证研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
以中国某国有银行支行222名员工为样本,应用结构方程模型和分步骤多元回归等统计分析方法,研究雇佣契约对员工心理契约破坏反应的影响,即心理契约破坏与员工工作态度(工作满意度和离职倾向)间关系中雇佣契约(雇佣契约类型和持续承诺)具有的调节作用.实证结果表明,企业心理契约破坏与员工工作满意度负相关,与离职倾向正相关;雇佣契约类型调节心理契约破坏与员工工作满意度间关系,即与长期雇员相比,短期雇员工作满意度水平的变化程度更大,雇佣契约类型对心理契约破坏与离职倾向间关系不具有调节作用;持续承诺弱化了心理契约破坏与工作满意度、离职倾向间的关系,即与持续承诺低的员工相比,持续承诺高的员工对心理契约破坏的反应更为平和. 相似文献
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激励合约线性结构的行为合约理论解释 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
合约理论继承了经济学传统自利偏好假设,却忽略了公平偏好等行为心理因素。为此,在借鉴行为经济学描述公平偏好的FS模型基础上,把公平偏好引入最优激励合约设计的标准框架,以行为合约理论为工具,通过建立离散产出和离散努力模型,研究设计公平偏好下的最优激励合约。分析结果发现,引入公平偏好之后的一级最优和二级最优激励合约都是线性结构的,并且其斜率会随着公平偏好增强而增大,但不会超过0.5。这不但得到了线性结构的激励合约,而且得到了与实证研究结论相一致的关于激励合约斜率性质的理论分析结果,从而为激励合约线性结构提供了一种较合理的理论解释。 相似文献
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Ernst Fehr Alexander Klein Klaus M Schmidt 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2007,75(1):121-154
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair‐minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives. 相似文献
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Carl R. Schultz 《决策科学》1997,28(1):213-224
Long-term purchase contracts for natural resources, such as natural gas, often contain take-or-pay provisions that penalize the buyer for not purchasing (taking) a minimum quantity of output over some period of time. In some contracts for a limited time interval, known as the make-up period, the penalty payments can be credited against future “takes” in excess of the take-or-pay level. Additionally, options to “buy down” or “buy out” existing contracts, or to initiate new contracts, may exist. The purchaser, faced with projected requirements over some planning horizon, must determine purchase levels from a selected set of take-or-pay contracts so as to minimize purchase, inventory holding, penalty costs, contract initiation, and buy-out or buy-down costs. This paper presents a mixed-integer programming model of take-or-pay decisions with and without make-up provisions. 相似文献
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The Content of the Psychological Contract 总被引:7,自引:2,他引:5
The perceived obligations of the two parties to the employment relationship, the employee and the organization, were explored using the critical incident technique. Incidents were elicited which exceeded or fell below the treatment which each party might reasonably expect from the other; obligations were then inferred from these incidents. Respondents were a representative sample of UK employees (n=184), and a sample of UK managers (n=184) (the organization group).
Twelve categories of organization obligation and seven of employee obligation were inferred from these data. While the two groups identified the same content categories as each other, they did so with different relative frequency. The organization group quoted more relational than transactional forms of organizational obligation, the employee group the reverse. This finding was attributed to a lack of trust of the organization by employees, and to their job insecurity. The groups, however, did not differ in terms of the frequency of the most commonly cited employee obligations; timekeeping, good work and honesty. This was taken to indicate the prevalence of a traditional and input-oriented view of employee obligations. Examples were discovered of a reciprocal element to the contract. It was concluded that, despite the level of agreement between the two parties regarding the elements of the psychological contract, they were in danger of holding different perceptions of its balance; and that organizations should only expect employee commitment if they themselves have fulfilled their side of the contract. 相似文献
Twelve categories of organization obligation and seven of employee obligation were inferred from these data. While the two groups identified the same content categories as each other, they did so with different relative frequency. The organization group quoted more relational than transactional forms of organizational obligation, the employee group the reverse. This finding was attributed to a lack of trust of the organization by employees, and to their job insecurity. The groups, however, did not differ in terms of the frequency of the most commonly cited employee obligations; timekeeping, good work and honesty. This was taken to indicate the prevalence of a traditional and input-oriented view of employee obligations. Examples were discovered of a reciprocal element to the contract. It was concluded that, despite the level of agreement between the two parties regarding the elements of the psychological contract, they were in danger of holding different perceptions of its balance; and that organizations should only expect employee commitment if they themselves have fulfilled their side of the contract. 相似文献
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在供应链中,零售商的努力水平系数在很大程度上决定了市场需求,但因信息的不对称,使得供应商无法观察到零售商的实际行为,进而影响到供应商的期望受益和供应链的平衡.本文利用信息经济学的委托代理理论,比较了在信息对称与信息不对称情况下的线性契约,深入研究了一类两级供应链(包括一个供应商和一个零售商)激励契约机制的设立,分析了外部的不确定性等因素对于报酬率、努力水平系数、固定收入、供应商期望收益、零售商的实际收入以及代理成本的影响. 相似文献