Who is early voting? An individual level examination

Objective. Early voting has been suggested as one method of increasing voter turnout. Allowing voters to cast their ballots during a longer time period may ameliorate some barriers to participation that exist. However, the question of whether early voting mobilizes previous nonvoting registrants or simply makes voting easier for those who would have participated anyway remains largely unanswered. Methods. We test these questions through the use of an individual level survey of voters in one Tennessee county. Using logistic regression, we consider the impact of demographic and attitudinal factors on the propensity to vote on election day or to use early voting. Results. We find marked differences between nonvoters and voters of either type, but we find few significant differences between early voters and traditional voters. We find little support for a mobilization effect and some evidence suggests that early voting merely conveniences those who would have voted anyway.     

A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed

In general, analyses of voting power are performed through the notion of a simple voting game (SVG) in which every voter can choose between two options: ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Felsenthal and Machover [Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1997), International Journal of Game Theory 26, 335–351.] introduced the concept of ternary voting games (TVGs) which recognizes abstention alongside. They derive appropriate generalizations of the Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices in TVGs. Braham and Steffen [Braham, M. and Steffen, F. (2002), in Holler, et al. (eds.), Power and Fairness, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 20, Mohr Siebeck, pp. 333–348.] argued that the decision-making structure of a TVG may not be justified. They propose a sequential structure in which voters first decide between participation and abstention and then between ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we compare the two approaches and show how the probabilistic interpretation of power provides a unifying characterization of analogues of the Banzhaf (Bz) measure. Second, using the probabilistic approach we shall prove a special case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem (PLT). This theorem deals with an asymptotic property in weighted voting games with an increasing number of voters. It says that under certain conditions the ratio between the voting power of any two voters (according to various measures of voting power) approaches the ratio between their weights. We show that PLT holds in TVGs for analogues of Bz measures, irrespective of the particular nature of abstention.     

Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting

Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of winning candidates rather than just a single winner, a voter’s incentives to vote sincerely will depend on what assumptions we are willing to make regarding the principles by which voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to preferences over sets of candidates. We formulate two such principles, replacement and deletion, and we show that, under approval voting, a voter who accepts those two principles and who knows how the other voters will vote will never have an incentive to vote insincerely. We then discuss the consequences of this result for a number of standard principles of preference extension in view of sincere voting under approval voting.     

Religion and Presidential Politics in Florida: A List Experiment*

Objective. Although national surveys indicate that Americans have become more accepting of the prospect of a Jewish presidential candidate, this could reflect some voters' desire to be seen as having socially correct opinions. The present study uses a survey technique known as the “list experiment” to assess public reaction to the nomination of Jewish candidates for high office. Methods. Two telephone surveys of registered voters in Florida, each employing the list‐experiment methodology, were conducted in October 2000 and May/June 2002. Results. We find only limited evidence of negative affect directed at either the vice presidential candidacy of Joseph Lieberman in 2000 or a hypothetical (unnamed) Jewish presidential candidate who might choose to run in the future. Conclusions. Although there still are enough voters with anti‐Semitic views to affect the outcome of a close election, their numbers do not appear to be as great as some observers have feared.     

Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg

The Condorcet Jury Theorem formalises the “wisdom of crowds”: binary decisions made by majority vote are asymptotically correct as the number of voters tends to infinity. This classical result assumes like-minded, expected utility maximising voters who all share a common prior belief about the right decision. Ellis (Theor Econo 11(3): 865–895, 2016) shows that when voters have ambiguous prior beliefs—a (closed, convex) set of priors—and follow maxmin expected utility (MEU), such wisdom requires that voters’ beliefs satisfy a “disjoint posteriors” condition: different private signals lead to posterior sets with disjoint interiors. Both the original theorem and Ellis’s generalisation assume symmetric penalties for wrong decisions. If, as in the jury context, errors attract asymmetric penalties then it is natural to consider voting rules that raise the hurdle for the decision carrying the heavier penalty for error (such as conviction in jury trials). In a classical model, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (Am Politi Sci Rev 92(1):23–35, 1998) have shown that, paradoxically, raising this hurdle may actually increase the likelihood of the more serious error. In particular, crowds are not wise under the unanimity rule: the probability of the more serious error does not vanish as the crowd size tends to infinity. We show that this “Jury Paradox” persists in the presence of ambiguity, whether or not juror beliefs satisfy Ellis’s “disjoint posteriors” condition. We also characterise the strictly mixed equilibria of this model and study their properties. Such equilibria cannot exist in the absence of ambiguity but may exist for arbitrarily large jury size when ambiguity is present. In addition to uninformative strictly mixed equilibria, analogous to those exhibited by Ellis (Theor Econo 11(3): 865–895, 2016), there may also exist strictly mixed equilibria which are informative about voter signals.

     

The Political Attitudes of Australian Voters and Candidates

Modern theories of political representation assume that there will be little congruence between the views of political elites and the voters they govern. This paper uses survey data collected among candidates and voters at the 1987 Australian federal election to examine the extent of elite-mass differences on a range of 33 issues. The results show that Labor candidates and Labor voters are more likely to disagree on political issues, while Liberal-National candidates and voters are more likely to agree. Candidates of all parties are more liberal on issues such as Asian immigration, law enforcement and the protection of the environment, compared to their voters, while Senate candidates are more liberal than House of Representatives candidates. Finally, as other studies have found, candidates with constituency responsibilities, in this case those standing for the House of Representatives and incumbents, are more likely to be closer to the views of their party's voters than Senate and non-incumbent candidates.     

The Pareto rule and strategic voting

This paper uses a particular choice rule over sets of alternatives under the Pareto rule. Starting from the sincere situation every strategic misrevelation of preference is shown to be an improvement for all voters. The existence of an equilibrium under successive misrepresentations by sincere voters is demonstrated.     

Targets and Taxes: Explaining the Welfare Orientations of the Australian Public

Australia's welfare model – targeted payments alongside low but progressive taxation – exemplifies the targeted approach, prioritizing the needs of poorer citizens within the constraints of low taxation. But does this approach match the welfare orientations of Australia's voters? Does the public hold other views about welfare, emerging out of competing interests in welfare debates? We consider results of two questions included in the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2005. The first question asks respondents about four welfare goals that outline competing welfare orientations: targeting poverty, expanding health and education, enforcing the welfare rules and reducing welfare. The second question asks about four taxation goals drawing on similar orientations as established for welfare: targeting tax cuts, taxing for welfare, enforcing tax rules and reducing overall tax. Asking about both enables us to tell whether voters approach tax and welfare ‘consistently’ and to see whether, in Australia's case, there is a preference for Australia's targeting model. We reach three conclusions: (1) voters hold diverse preferences about welfare and taxes, but the targeted model has a relatively strong voter base; (2) voters hold ‘pro‐welfare’ orientations, choosing poverty reduction and expanding public services over both paternalism and cutting welfare, and (3) multivariate analysis indicates a level of consistency in welfare and tax orientations among voters.     

Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?

Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n→∞, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over profiles), the probability that the Condorcet candidate wins the election, given that a Condorcet candidate exists? We produce an analytic solution, which is not the Borda Count. Our result agrees with recent numerical results from two independent studies, and contradicts a published result of Van Newenhizen (Economic Theory 2, 69–83. (1992)).     

A new theory of voting: Why vote when millions of others do

Conclusion I believe to have shown that a signalling model of voter behavior is bothconsistent with neo-classical economic theory, and in agreement withmany of the important features of the political system. I cannot provethat the theory is a correct one, only that the assumptions appearreasonable, that these assumptions lead to some testable predictions, andthat many of these predictions agree with the available evidence.The argument may appear to be discomforting to some; I often findit so. For the view here is that important decisions - war, peace, civil rights- are not made on the basis of considered judgment by the citizens.Instead, citizens realize that their votes will not matter and they there-fore do not vote to affect policy. Voters view politics as a game orentertainment; it is only one of many ways to impress one's friends orassociates, and fulfills the same function for many voters that designerjeans do.     

Losing to nobody? Nevada's “none of these candidates” ballot reform

Since 1975, Nevada voters have had the option of voting for “none of these candidates” in all statewide elections—a reform that one-third of the American states have since considered copying. It remains unclear, however, what effects this reform has had. By testing several arguments made by proponents and opponents of this reform, I find, first, that voters who actually choose “none of these” are motivated by a mixture of ignorance and protest; second, that most voters who choose “none” would probably have left parts of their ballot blank in the absence of the “none” option; and third, that “none” does not drain votes from third-party candidates, as some have feared.     

Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness

The paper works with a formal model of referenda, where a finite number of voters can choose between two options and abstention. A referendum will be invalid if too many voters abstain, otherwise the referendum will return one of the two options. We consider quorum rules where an option is chosen if it is preferred by the majority of voters and if at least a certain number of voters (the quorum) votes for the alternative. The paper characterizes these rules as the only referenda which are strategy-proof over certain preferences.     

The Political Economy of City Formation in California: Limits to Tiebout Sorting

Objective . This paper analyzes the extent to which voter behavior in city formation elections supports Tiebout's (1956) hypothesis that residential sorting facilitates efficiency of local service provision. It develops a two-stage model of city formation to distinguish agenda setting from voter outcomes on city formation proposals. Methods . Logit analysis is used to analyze voting in 71 city formation elections, incorporating Heckman's two-stage procedure to correct for self-selection of local referenda. Results . Community fiscal and demographic factors influence agenda setting more than voting behavior. Wealthier communities in high-growth counties are more likely to propose formation of a city. In contrast, community characteristics have little influence on electoral outcomes, suggesting that boundedly rational voters rely on information heuristics. Conclusions . Although reduction of diversity did not appear to motivate city formation, sorting around residential income, land use preferences, and other demographic variables may facilitate relative efficiency of service provision.     

Black legislative politics: Examining the issue of voting rights in the post-Hurricane Katrina period

Following Hurricane Katrina, a significant number of black voters were displaced from the New Orleans metropolitan area. With the 2006 New Orleans municipal elections forthcoming, especially the mayoral election, a significant portion of displaced black voters were faced with being disenfranchised, which was a violation of their civil rights and posed a threat to black political leadership in the city. This article examines whether black legislators provided substantive representation to these voters during the post-Hurricane Katrina period. That is, did black legislators advocate a legislative agenda to facilitate access to the ballot for displaced black New Orleans voters? Using a multi-methodological approach, evidence is presented indicating that black legislators did provide substantive representation to black voters by introducing key voting rights bills and voting in a way that was responsive to black concerns which facilitated access to the ballot.     

Efficacy and Estrangement: Effects of Voting

This study examined changes in political efficacy and feelings of estrangement as a function of voting behavior in the 2008 presidential election in the U.S. Participants (n = 224), recruited from an online marketing company's representative panel of U.S. adults, completed a survey 4-6 weeks before the election and again 2-4 weeks after the election. Changes in internal and external political efficacy and feelings of estrangement were examined for three groups of voters (McCain voters, Obama voters, and non-voters) as well as by party affiliation. Internal political efficacy was and remained relatively high among Obama and McCain voters pre-election to post-election, but decreased for non-voters. Among Democrats, there was a significant increase in internal political efficacy, among Republicans, there was no change, and among those with no or a different party affiliation, there was a significant decrease. External political efficacy significantly increased pre-election to post-election among Obama voters and non-voters, but decreased for McCain voters. Additionally, post-election cultural estrangement was significantly higher among non-voters than voters. The results are discussed in terms of theoretical implications for understanding the potential impact of different forms of political participation. Several of the specific and distinctive aspects of the 2008 election and President Obama's campaign are also highlighted as they relate to voting behavior and potential changes in the American electorate.     

Rethinking electoral reform in New Zealand: the benefits of citizens' assemblies

In 2011, New Zealanders decided by referendum to retain the mixed member proportional representation voting system. This article investigates the benefits of including a deliberative, participatory process in electoral reform to encourage collective debate and an informed choice by voters. In the last decade, Canada and the Netherlands have used citizens' assemblies, a form of participatory democracy, for electoral reform. This paper argues that a similar process would have been appropriate and valuable for New Zealand. Moreover, the discussion highlights the value of citizens' assemblies for minorities who can be outvoted in a referendum. This is considered with specific reference to voters in the Māori seats who had much at stake in the electoral reform. In addition to the general benefit of citizens' assemblies for electoral reform, a New Zealand assembly would have allowed for collective deliberation that ensured the inclusion of the perspectives of voters in the Māori seats.     

Nader voters in the 2000 Presidential Election: what would they have done without him?

This research estimates the likely voting behavior of Nader voters if he had not been a candidate in the presidential race. Bivariate analysis of ANES data suggests that Nader voters fit the profile of likely voters and have a distinct preference for Democratic candidates. We utilize multinomial logit analysis to include the possibility of abstention as well as the option of voting for Gore, Bush, or another third-party candidate. The results suggest that Nader voters closely resembled the typical voter in educational achievement, and therefore it is likely that a majority of these individuals would have participated in the 2000 election if Nader had not been a candidate. In addition, it is likely that these individuals would have voted for Al Gore over George Bush. However, these Nader voters were younger, less partisan, and were more likely to express feelings of political alienation, so it is quite possible that the absence of the Nader candidacy would have kept a sizeable minority of them at home on election day.     

Strategic and Sincere Voting in a One‐Sided Election: The Canadian Federal Election of 1997*

Objective. We are interested in whether and how voters make strategic decisions in a race that is, according to the polls, expected to be very one sided. Looking specifically at the choices available to ideologically right‐of‐center voters in the 1997 Canadian federal election, we argue that strategic considerations will be filtered by voters' assessments of the competitiveness of the race both locally and nationally. Methods. We estimate logistic regression models measuring support for the two right‐of‐center Canadian political parties. Our models focus on the relationship between assessments of district‐ and national‐level party prospects on voting for the Progressive Conservative Party. Results. We find that voters who consider the race competitive emphasize district‐level data in their strategic calculations. However, those who consider the election to be all but over look more closely at national‐level concerns when deciding which right‐wing party to support. Conclusions. We conclude that earlier understandings of tactical voting should be updated to take into consideration the circumstances under which voters will use national‐level evaluations of relative party viability in casting their ballots.     

A panacea for Latino and Black voters? Elevated turnout in vote by mail elections

This study analyzes U.S. Census data from citywide elections in Denver, Colorado from 2004 to 2007 in order to determine if a vote by mail format facilitated participation by Latino and Black voters. The multivariate results suggest that both Latino and Black voters participated more often in vote by mail elections, although the Black turnout increase was also affected by the recent change in Colorado's registration policies.     

Bribing voters without verification

This article distinguishes between two types of vote buying mechanisms. If vote choices can be monitored, vote buyers will not discriminate amongst prospective voters, regardless of how they are expected to vote. If voting is secret, a vote buyer will pay opposition voters not to vote which forces the opposition to pay its own voters to ensure they do vote. This implies the secret ballot may be less effective in curbing bribery than originally thought.