Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans’s dilemma

We design a project funding contract that provides optimal incentives to agents, in a setting where both principal and agent enjoy the benefits of the project in a non-rival form once completed but may differ in their valuation. To do so, we study optimal incentive payments in a dynamic principal-agent framework in which the principal cannot observe the agent’s investment, but only completed projects, and faces a Samaritan’s Dilemma: he cannot commit to terminate the contract before completion of the project. The agent decides whether to undertake a (discrete) investment or consume all received funds. We find that the optimal contract is stationary, and that either transfers equal to investment cost are incentive compatible or the cost of the contract is decreasing with the agent’s valuation of the projects. Given the intrinsic valuation of the project by the agent, he is always better off signing the contract in contraposition with the general moral hazard result.     

Syntactic foundations for unawareness of theorems

We provide a syntactic model of unawareness. By introducing multiple knowledge modalities, one for each sub-language, we specifically model agents whose only mistake in reasoning (other than their unawareness) is to underestimate the knowledge of more aware agents. We show that the model is a complete and sound axiomatization of the set-theoretic model of Galanis (University of Southampton Discussion paper 709, 2007) and compare it with other unawareness models in the literature.     

Awareness and partitional information structures

This is the first of two papers where we present a formal model of unawareness. We contrast unawareness with certainty and uncertainty. A subject is certain of something when he knows that thing; he is uncertain when he does not know it, but he knows he does not: he is consciously uncertain. On the other hand, he isunaware of something when he does not know it, and he does not know he does not know, and so on ad infinitum: he does not perceive, does not have in mind, the object of knowledge. The opposite of unawareness is awareness, which includes certainty and uncertainty.This paper has three main purposes. First, we formalize the concept of awareness, and introduce a symmetry axiom which states that a subject can be aware of something, say, if and only if he is aware of its negation not-; in other words, that and not- are perceived together, or neither is. We then derive the basic properties of awareness.The second purpose is to prove a different axiomatic characterization, based on the concept of awareness of the system which underlies the model of information with partitional structures (known asS5).The third purpose of this paper is to show that without a substantial weakening of the rules of inferences normally assumed in modal logic a satisfactory model of unawareness, which includes the symmetry axiom, is impossible. This alternative approach is developed in a second paper by the same authors.     

Optimal insurance without expected utility: The dual theory and the linearity of insurance contracts

Models of the insurance markets and institutions are routinely based on expected utility. Since EU is being challenged by an increasing number of decision models, we examine whether EU-based models are robust in their predictions. To do so, we rework some basic models of optimal insurance contracts and equilibrium using the “dual” theory to EU of Yaari. When there is a single, insurable source of risk, dual theory permits only corner solutions if the contract itself is linear. This contrasts sharply with EU. Nonlinearity, and thereby the possibility of interior solutions, is introduced in two ways. First, the contract itself is nonlinear, i.e., a deductible insurance policy. Or second, the decision maker is subject to some background risk such as uninsurable risky assets or default of the insurer. When decision problems are subject to nonlinearity, the predictions on optimal insurance are more similar to, though not identical with, those generated with EU.     

Evolutionarily Stable Co-operative Commitments

If contracts cannot be fully specified Pareto optimal results may be closed off because individuals cannot rationally trust each other's promises. This paper assumes that human individuals can become internally committed not to act opportunistically and that others can detect to a certain extent whether they are dealing with an uncommitted (untrustworthy) or a committed (trustworthy) partner. Adopting an `indirect evolutionary approach' we show that co-operative commitments can survive in evolutionary competition even if conventional mechanisms like repetition, reputation, contract or promising are lacking. If detection of uncommitted individuals is neither too costly nor too unreliable there will in general be a `niche' for both committed and uncommitted actors even in one off large numbers' interactions.     

Optimal Incentive Contracting with Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazards: Theory and Evidence

Predictions concerning structure and performance for managerial incentive contracts designed to prevent accidents are developed and tested. The model predicts a step-function penalty with more costly, more reliable audits used for higher loss reports to control ex post exaggeration of the loss. In addition, the penalty induces nonreporting that is imperfectly controlled through random audits. An empirical contract implemented to control workers' compensation medical losses provides evidence consistent with these predictions. The contract reduces both accident frequency and total losses, but increases reported loss severity as managers evade approximately 40% of the accident penalty by underreporting small losses.     

父母与自然：“知母不知父”的西方谱系（下）

本文紧接《母权神话》,是对母权社会的文化根源的分析。文章认为,在现代思想家中,霍布斯已经谈到过母权论者的主要观点,巴霍芬的《母权论》是对霍布斯的继承,其中给出的诠释,即母亲代表自然,父亲代表文化,是母权论人类学家的基本假定,而这种假定又来自亚里士多德关于父亲提供形式、母亲提供质料的古典观念。现代女性主义者试图以种种方式化解亚里士多德以来的性别问题,却使自己陷入了新的困境。     

The utilitarian contract: A generalization of Rawls' theory of justice

In a series of major papers culminating in A Theory of Justice, John Rawls constructs an alternative to utilitarianism by developing a social contract theory of moral and political philosophy. Unfortunately, Rawls formulates the two basic principles upon which the theory rests in such a way as to restrict (unduly) the contract theory's applicability (see Section I). In this paper we present a more general discussion of the theory of justice that avoids the problems of Rawls' formulation and yet retains the important idea of justice as fairness and the contractarian approach (Section II). Later it is argued that this more general theory constitutes a bridge between the pure utilitarian theories and the social contract doctrines (Sections V and VI). The theory's advantages are demonstrated by applying it to a problem discussed by Rawls, intergenerational equity, and comparing the two solutions (Section III). Further comparisons are made and inferences drawn in the concluding three sections.Without implicating them, we would like to thank James M. Buchanan and David Lyons for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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试论根本违约制度

根本违约是指当事人一方完全不履行合同义务或不完全履行合同主要义务或预期违约致使履行不能 ,其结果严重影响到另一方根据合同有权期待的经济利益的情形。根本违约责任或补救方法主要可采取赔偿损失、解除合同、宣告合同无效等三种。根本违约的免责理由主要是不可抗力。在根本违约问题上 ,我国《合同法》规定的不够具体、明确 ,要对之区别规定并进行立法上的完善     

Premium Risk and Managed Care

This paper analyzes how individuals can insure premium risk and obtain high quality health insurance in a managed care environment. Insurers choose health care providers. Only a fraction of high risk individuals is unambiguously identifiable in front of a court. Premium insurance is not able to reach a first-best risk allocation while health insurers have an incentive to stint on quality under guaranteed renewable contracts. It is shown that a contract exists which can implement the first-best. This contract specifies payments to individuals and a third party upon switching to create a credible self-commitment by the insurer to provide high quality.     

从英美国家保险利益原则的理论发展看我国立法之完善

英美保险法至保险利益原则确立以来,对其法理有着“法定关系理论”、“实际利益理论”、“存在合法关系的实际利益”这三大理论。而“法定关系理论”、“实际利益理论”并不能解决保险的应有目的,“存在合法关系的实际利益”理论更符合历史潮流。我国现有保险法在人身保险合同中采用的是“法定关系理论”,在财产保险合同中,保险法未明确规定,在实践中适用的是“法定关系理论”。从英美国家理论发展的现状及国情,我国保险法在人身保险合同中不应适用经济利益理论,在财产保险合同中,应适当运用经济利益理论。     

Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result

One fundamental assumption often made in the literature on unawareness is that risk preferences are invariant to changes of awareness. We study how exposure to unawareness affects choices under risk. Participants in our experiment choose repeatedly between varying sure outcomes and a lottery in three phases. All treatments are exactly identical in phase 1 and phase 3, but differ in phase 2. There are five different treatments pertaining to the lottery faced in phase 2: The control treatment (i.e., a standard lottery), the treatment with awareness of unawareness of lottery outcomes but known number of outcomes, the treatment with awareness of unawareness of outcomes but with unknown number of outcomes, the treatment with unawareness of unawareness of some outcomes, and the treatment with an ambiguous lottery. We study both whether behavior differs in phase 3 across treatments (between subjects effect) and whether differences of subjects’ behavior between phases 1 and phase 3 differ across treatments (within subject effects). We observe no significant treatment effects.     

Information evaluation under nonadditive expected utility

We examine the choice-of-single-stage-experiment problem (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961) under the assumption that the decider's (weak) preference relation satisfies Schmeidler's (1989) or Gilboa's (1987) axiomatization and is thus representable by a nonadditive expected-utility functional as a Choquet integral w.r.t. a monotone probability measure on events. The basic properties of information value, certainty equivalent of information cost, net gain of information, and optimal choice of experiment that obtain (La Valle, 1968) when satisfies the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) or Savage (1954) axiomatizations continue to obtain in the more general Schmeidler-Gilboa context-provided that there is no incentive to randomize the choice of experiment. When this proviso fails, information value can in general be assigned only to the set of available experiments.     

我国民营企业员工激励机制的研究

系统地探讨我国民营企业员工激励机制的现状、存在的问题,以西方激励理论为依据,结合民营企业实际,提出民营企业在物质、精神和发展三方面的员工激励机制设计,对构建高效的员工激励机制具有一定的指导意义。     

心理学理论对企业薪酬管理的启示

传统心理学激励理论给企业薪酬管理以重要启示，近年来，职业利益假说、心理契约理论、管家理论、组织支持感理论等学说，对企业薪酬管理有重要影响，但是，心理学理论对薪酬问题解释的存在着局限性，它与其它薪酬理论相结合，更能对薪酬分配问题做出合理的解释。     

未完成的“自然社会”:现代社会的人性基础与规范构成

对于《自然社会》关注的现代社会的规范性秩序问题,自然状态、自然法与建国契约是三个主要环节。对该书的批评也集中在这三个方面：自然状态与人性论,自然状态的道德性质,以及政治社会与规范秩序的奠基关系。自然状态学说通过自爱与社会性建立的自然社会性是理解现代社会道德关系的出发点。在考虑现代社会丰富和充实这一道德关系的努力之前,应当先理解人是如何成为一个孤独的陌生人的。从这一自爱的社会性出发,《自然社会》将霍布斯笔下的自然状态理解为道德空间乃至法权状态,但并不同意这一空间是具有内在道德尺度或客观道德科学基础的规范性秩序。作为现代国家规范性基础的道德尺度是与政治社会同步奠立的。     

特许协议争议的条约管辖与合同管辖：冲突、典型案例及解决

传统理论认为特许合同的争议应由当事人指定的管辖机构,主要是东道国法院管辖。然而基于投资条约建立的国际仲裁庭也可因为投资仲裁的无默契性特点,合同请求与条约请求的划分以及条约中的保护伞条款主张对特许合同争议的管辖,由此引起特许协议争议的合同管辖与条约管辖之间积极的管辖冲突。在条约中限制仲裁庭的管辖权,要求投资者放弃替代管辖权以及适用司法礼让的原则可以较好地解决这种冲突。     

探索国有资产管理体制的新思路

改革国有资产管理体制是一项艰巨任务。“生产资料人格化”的理论 ,既不姓“资” ,也不姓“社” ,它是“中性”理论。公有制也可以实现生产资料“人格化” ,这为国有资产管理和国有企业的深化改革 ,提供了理论依据。为了解决这个难点 ,可通过“正结合”与“反结合”的方法。“正结合”就是直接拥有产权或使用权 ,通过经营使用 ,直接获得效益和报酬。“反结合”则是通过行使监督权、建议权间接创造效益 ,获得报酬。有了这种方法 ,企业承包制有望“起死回生”。企业的股份制改革也应向“人格化”推进。国企经营管理部门和监事会人员签订监督合同 ,二者形成制约关系。国有股份制企业的机制会最终得到完善。     

Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences In Symmetric Games

Agents in a large population are randomly matched to play a certain game, payoffs in which represent fitness. Agents may have preferences that are different from fitness. They learn strategies according to their preferences, and evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the opponent in a match, only efficient symmetric strategy profiles of the fitness game can be stable. When agents do not know the preferences of the opponent, only Nash equilibria of the fitness game can be stable. For 2 × 2 symmetric games I characterize preferences that are stable.Jel Codes: C72, A13     

社会的制造与集体表象

本文通过对涂尔干思想中的社会概念尤其是集体表象理论的解读,深入剖析现代社会自我证成上的困境。涂尔干一方面继承了契约论传统对社会的人为制造性的强调,另一方面又反对该传统将社会还原为个体之间约定行为的结果。集体表象理论针对的正是这一理论困境。涂尔干认为,集会或集体欢腾之际所产生的集体表象犹如化合作用,不能还原为个体的约定或契约,它是社会的产物,优先于个体。它不仅表达了个体对社会的情感,而且在定期的社会再造中创造这一情感。图腾标记对集体表象的具体化,既构成了个体认识社会的中介,又成为社会定期再造的依凭。涂尔干反对将法国大革命诠释为个体意志主导的结果,而试图通过集体表象将其诠释为社会定期再造的体现并强调社会之于个体的优先性。集体表象的神圣性既不依靠凌驾于社会之上的彼岸化的上帝,也不是个体意志的产物,而是社会性的,来自于社会的自我生产和再造。