Husbands,wives, sons,and daughters: Fertility preferences and the demand for contraception in Ethiopia

Ethiopia, with nearly 65 millionpeople, is the second most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa. Fertility levels are among the highest in the world. Using the matched wife-husband sample from the 1990 National Family and Fertility Survey of Ethiopia we investigate the fertility desires of wives and husbands and the degree to which they are similar, including whether a preference for sons exists. We model the determinants of the desire to limit or space births, and estimate unmet need. Results indicate high levels of concurrence among husbands and wives on reproductive preferences. Where differences exist, husbands are more pronatalist than their wives. Both husbands and wives prefer to have sons and daughters, but more sons overall. Approximately 22% of wives and husbands desire to limit or space births but do not use contraception. More than half of wives and husbands with an unmet need for limiting are paired with a partner who has no such need. Three implications follow from these results: (1) differences in wives' and husbands' son and daughter preferences may help to explain discordant views among couples when it comes to the desire to limit or space births; (2) husbands' overall contribution to wives' unmet need can be substantial in African societies in the early stages of fertility transition; and (3) wives' preferences regarding children and contraception can result in unmet need on the part of husbands, even in highly gender-stratified societies where men are more pronatalist.     

On Postponement and Birth Intervals

Much of the literature on fertility transition presumes that birth control is practiced either to limit family size or to space births. This article argues that women also use birth control to postpone pregnancy. Postponement is not synonymous with spacing. It arises when women delay their next birth for indefinite periods for reasons unrelated to the age of their youngest child, but without deciding not to have any more children. Postponement has a distinctive impact on the shape of birth‐interval distributions that differs from the impacts of family size limitation, birth spacing, or a mixture of the two behaviors. Some populations, such as that in South Africa, have developed fertility regimes characterized by birth intervals far longer than can be accounted for by birth spacing. Postponement of further childbearing that eventually becomes permanent may be an important driver of the transition to lower fertility in sub‐Saharan Africa.     

Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

Midpregnancy Marriage and Divorce: Why the Death of Shotgun Marriage Has Been Greatly Exaggerated

Conventional wisdom holds that births following the colloquially termed “shotgun marriage”—that is, births to parents who married between conception and the birth—are nearing obsolescence. To investigate trends in shotgun marriage, we matched North Carolina administrative data on nearly 800,000 first births among white and black mothers to marriage and divorce records. We found that among married births, midpregnancy-married births (our preferred term for shotgun-married births) have been relatively stable at about 10 % over the past quarter-century while increasing substantially for vulnerable population subgroups. In 2012, among black and white less-educated and younger women, midpregnancy-married births accounted for approximately 20 % to 25 % of married first births. The increasing representation of midpregnancy-married births among married births raises concerns about well-being among at-risk families because midpregnancy marriages may be quite fragile. Our analysis revealed, however, that midpregnancy marriages were more likely to dissolve only among more advantaged groups. Of those groups considered to be most at risk of divorce—namely, black women with lower levels of education and who were younger—midpregnancy marriages had the same or lower likelihood of divorce as preconception marriages. Our results suggest an overlooked resiliency in a type of marriage that has only increased in salience.     

Asia's demographic future: the next 20 years

Even with the decline of fertility rates in most of Asia, the problem of population growth is still very serious. It is important to stress to Asian leaders and Western researchers that the problem is by no means solved just because fertility rates have declined. In many countries the number of young people is quite substantial and when they increase their numbers, certain problems will develop. Over the next 20 years, urban areas will see a marked increase in population and the resultant problems. Unemployment, increased pollution, and overcrowding will greatly decrease the quality of life for millions of people. This will happen because of natural increases and from the migration of the rural communities. In the rural areas, because of high fertility rates, population will continue to grow in spite of the large numbers of peoples moving to the city. Asia has some of the most densely populated agricultural communities and as their numbers increase, poverty and its associated problem will follow. The solutions to these problems include continued efforts in family planning, maternal and child health, and the improvement of the status of women.     

A simple measure of fertility control

We describe a simple measure of fertility control: the proportion of all births from the age-specific fertility schedule that occurs among women by age 35. This measure has broad applicability because it does not require information on marital fertility rates. When both the proportion of births by age 35 and the most commonly used measure of fertility control, m, are calculated for a population over time, they are correlated very highly. Because of increasing levels of nonmarital fertility in several developed countries, measures of fertility control that are based on marital fertility are less appropriate now than in the past.     

Effects of various factors on selection for family planning status and natural fecundability: A simulation study

The effect of various factors on selection for family planning status and for natural fecund ability is studied in a simulation that incorporates a beta distribution of fecundability among women. The mean fecundabilities of current spacers, current limiters, current nonusers, and pregnant women are compared. These ratios are influenced by duration of marriage and by desired number of children. Effects of different levels of contraception are measured. Another strategy, spacing the last two wanted births, is also studied. It is found that breast-feeding status has little effect on fecundability selection. The women usually found to have greatest fecundability are not those recently pregnant at durations of marriage five and ten years, unless they wanted fewer than two children, but rather those who are using contraception to limit the number of children.     

Comparative study on population transition in Japan and in Europe]

Over 6,000,000 Japanese military personnel and their families returned to Japan after WWII. Within 5 years, Japan's population increased by 11,000,000. However, within 10 years of Japan's 1949 removal of restrictions on abortions and sterilization, her birth rate dropped by half. At the same time, her economy stabilized and prospered. Japan's population had made the transition from a traditional pattern of reproduction to a modern pattern. Demographers saw it as unique, calling it a "population revolution." In reality, however, Japan's "population revolution" was not unique; it belonged to the same category as Europe's population transition. The birth rate in both Europe and Japan 1st reached a peak in the 1920s before declining rapidly through the decades to the 1960s. Japan's mortality rate showed a steady decline from 1860-80, when it began a sharp decline to the 1960s. In Europe, the mortality rate remained relatively level from 1860-1900, when its rapid decline began. While Japan's population transition was very similar to Europe's, it took less time for Japan, in large part because the Japanese government played a dominant role in its nation's industrialization. Once Japan became an industrialized and capitalistic nation, birth rates began to decline. But other factors contributed to this phenomenon as well: high literacy, urbanization, modern life styles, widespread knowledge of birth control, a strong government population policy, and an attitude that fewer births was better.     

Unmarried Motherhood: Recent Trends,Composition, and Black-White Differences

The National Survey of Family Growth (1982) is used to examine the extent to which racial differences in premarital birth rates can be explained by differences in parents' socioeconomic status, family structure, and residential characteristics. The findings document a large diversity in premarital births within both populations. Black women from high-risk backgrounds are three times more likely to have a premarital birth than black women from low-risk backgrounds. Racial differences in premarital births arise because (1) black women are more likely to come from high-risk backgrounds and (2) black women from low-risk backgrounds are more likely to have a premarital birth than white women with similar characteristics. There are similar rates of premarital births by race among persons from high-risk backgrounds.     

Our population predicament: a new look

Issued to mark the Population Reference Bureau's 50th anniversary, this issue updates the story of world population presented in its popular predecessor of 1971, "Man's Population Predicament." Estimated at 1/2 billion in 1650, world population reached about 2 billion in 1930, 4 billion in 1975, and is projected to be about 6 billion in 2000. Most of today's rapid growth is occurring among the 3/4 of the world's peoples living in less developed countries where the post-World War II gap between high birth rates and falling death rates has only recently begun to narrow. This growth, coupled with high consumption in developing countries, is putting tremendous pressures on the Earth's resources, environment, and social fabric. New evidence on Europe's population transition and from China, Indonesia, and Thailand in the 1970s suggests that well-designed family planning programs can speed fertility decline but rapid worldwide attainment of replacement level fertility will also require special development efforts and measures that go beyond family planning. Current projections of the world's ultimate peak population range from 8 billion in the mid 21st century to 11 billion in about 2125, depending on when replacement-level fertility is reached. China's drive for a drastic birth rate reduction and the oil crisis might change fertility behavior more rapidly than most demographers have heretofore thought likely.     

A note on some vital statistics of a primitive peasant community in Sierra Leone

In the course of some work in which a community of 1400 primitive Sierra Leone peasants were being re-examined at two-monthly intervals over a period of a year opportunity was taken to record births, deaths and pregnancies. A birth-rate of 32·9 (P.E. ± 3·27), and a death-rate of 38·4 (P.E. ± 3·52) per thousand per annum were obtained. The infant mortality rate was found to be 417 (P.E. · 48) per thousand live births, and the ratio of miscarriages and stillbirths to live births to be 22·9: 100. Since the community was small the figures are subject to a high statistical error, but they are offered because the data are believed to be accurate, and accurate vital statistics of primitive West African communities are practically non-existent.

The most interesting features in regard to deaths were that deaths in children aged 3 years or under accounted for almost half the total deaths at all ages, and that of these deaths in young children 38·5 % were attributed to an acute febrile illness.     

Birth spacing and fertility limitation: a behavioral analysis of a nineteenth century frontier population

Our analysis of changing birth interval distributions over the course of a fertility transition from natural to controlled fertility has examined three closely related propositions. First, within both natural fertility populations (identified at the aggregate level) and cohorts following the onset of fertility limitation, we hypothesized that substantial groups of women with long birth intervals across the individually specified childbearing careers could be identified. That is, even during periods when fertility behavior at the aggregate level is consistent with a natural fertility regime, birth intervals at all parities are inversely related to completed family size. Our tabular analysis enables us to conclude that birth spacing patterns are parity dependent; there is stability in CEB-parity specific mean and birth interval variance over the entire transition. Our evidence does not suggest that the early group of women limiting and spacing births was marked by infecundity. Secondly, the transition appears to be associated with an increasingly larger proportion of women shifting to the same spacing schedules associated with smaller families in earlier cohorts. Thirdly, variations in birth spacing by age of marriage indicate that changes in birth intervals over time are at least indirectly associated with age of marriage, indicating an additional compositional effect. The evidence we have presented on spacing behavior does not negate the argument that parity-dependent stopping behavior was a powerful factor in the fertility transition. Our data also provide evidence of attempts to truncate childbearing. Specifically, the smaller the completed family size, the longer the ultimate birth interval; and ultimate birth intervals increase across cohorts controlling CEB and parity. But spacing appears to represent an additional strategy of fertility limitation. Thus, it may be necessary to distinguish spacing and stopping behavior if one wishes to clarify behavioral patterns within a population (Edlefsen, 1981; Friedlander et al., 1980; Rodriguez and Hobcraft, 1980). Because fertility transition theories imply increased attempts to limit family sizes, it is important to examine differential behavior within subgroups achieving different family sizes. It is this level of analysis which we have attempted to achieve in utilizing parity-specific birth intervals controlled by children ever born.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Does low fertility call for new policies in some Asian countries?

Over the past 2 decades, Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea have completed a demographic transition from high birth and death rates and runaway population growth to reduced fertility and mortality and population growth approaching replacement levels. Among the outcomes of fertility decline, 3 have particularly far reaching effects: 1) Changes in family types and structures. Marriage and family formation are postponed, childbearing is compressed into a narrow reproductive span that begins later and ends earlier, and higher-order births become rare. Large families are replaced by small ones, and joint and extended families tend to be replaced by nuclear families. 2) Shifts in the proportions of young and old. Declining fertility means that the population as a whole becomes older. Decreases in the proportion of children provides an opportunity to increase the coverage of education. Increases in the proportion of the elderly means higher medical costs and social and economic problems about care of the aged. 3) Changes in the work force. There is concern that low fertility and shortages of workers will cause investment labor-intensive industries to shift to countries with labor surpluses. Another outcome may be an increase in female participation in the work force. The potential consequences of rapid fertility decline have sparked debate among population experts and policy makers throughout Asia. Current family planning programs will emphasize: 1) offering a choice of methods to fit individual preferences; 2) strengthening programs for sexually active unmarried people; 3) encouraging child spacing and reproductive choice rather than simply limiting the number of births; 4) making information available on the side effects of various family planning methods; 5) providing special information and services to introduce new methods; and 6) promoting the maternal and child health benefits of breast feeding and birth spacing.     

The Effects of Post-marital Childbearing on Divorce and Remarriage: An Application of Hazards Models with Time-dependent Covariates

In this paper we examine the effects of having a baby during a period of separation on the probability of divorce, and the impact of bearing a child while divorced on the likelihood of remarriage in the United States. Among whites, neither a first nor a second birth during separation had any significant effect on the probability of divorce. Among blacks, either a first or second birth significantly increased the chance of divorce. The function of post-marital childbearing among black women as an incentive to obtaining divorces (presumably to allow them to establish new unions formally) is important, because a large proportion remain separated indefinitely. Whereas the occurrence of both first and second births during divorce significantly increased the probability of remarriage among whites, only a second birth did so among blacks. Further analysis suggests that while the legitimization of births was an important factor among whites, there was little evidence of a comparable effect among blacks.     

Duration of Marriage,Fertility and Women's Employment Opportunities in England and Wales in 1911

Data from the 1911 Census of England and Wales are examined for evidence of family limitation early in marriage. It is shown that a substantial number of couples used birth control for ‘spacing’ as well as for ‘stopping’ fertility. Moreover ‘spacing’ of births appears to have been more widespread in districts in which women's employment opportunities were relatively good. In general, the results obtained do not fit with the Princeton view of the European fertility transition with its stress on parity-specific family limitation spreading in response to improvements in contraceptive information and technology.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

Sources of Population Aging in More and Less Developed Countries

We provide the first global assessment of the sources of population aging by tracing its origins to the demographic histories of more and less developed countries. In more developed countries, improvements in survival among successive cohorts have accounted for the large majority of the recent increase in the population's mean age. Improved survivorship and declines in the growth rate of births have made roughly equal contributions to the aging that is occurring in less developed countries. Aging is more rapid in less developed countries because the number of births has declined faster, with China and India making large contributions. Use of the proportion of the population above age 65, 70, or 75 as measures of aging produces results similar to those using the mean age. Mortality decline becomes an even larger contributor to aging using all these measures, and its contribution grows as age advances.     

The relationships between population and economy, and between population and education]

The relationship between population and economy is regarded seriously by China and other countries. This problem can be analyzed and studied under 2 aspects: 1) the influence of economic development on changes in population, and 2) the influence of population increases on economic development. Under the 1st aspect, improved living conditions, hygiene, and health care generally result in lowered mortality rates. Improved economic conditions in China also increased the birthrate and at the same time increased birth control among the people; the increased birthrate was due to more marriages after liberation. In economically advanced countries, due to high expenses in raising children, people tend to limit family sizes to 2 children/family. Under the 2nd aspect, population increases place strains on the food supply and nutritional requirements, especially when increases are too rapid. They also demand more educational resources and influence quality of education. As there are currently 210 million students in China, the quality of education suffers, particularly at the college level, since most of Chinese manpower, physical and financial resources are spent on primary and secondary education. In terms of housing, transportation, health care, and natural resources, they are all intimately related to and influenced by increases in population. Consequently, the living standard would be difficult to raise if population increases are too rapid. Since 1971, population increases have been incorporated into 5-yearly and later yearly national economic plans in China. The large Chinese population is a major obstacle in raising the Chinese economic level, hence a well-planned population control program is essential.     

Countries with Rapid Population Growth and Resource Constraints: Issues of Food,Agriculture, and Development

Recent long‐term demographic projections suggest a fast deceleration of global population growth and the eventual peaking of world population later in this century at about 9.2 billion, roughly 50 percent above the present level. Some low‐income and food‐insecure countries, however, have projected populations in 2050 that are multiples of present ones. In some of these countries agriculture must play a leading role in their development efforts because they have high economic dependence on that sector. For those among them that have scarce agricultural resources, a prima facie case can be made that the high population growth rates projected may not be compatible with the development potential offered by such resources. Their demographic projections may need to be revisited, taking into account such inadequate potential. The global demographic slowdown notwithstanding, the “population explosion”‐related issues pertaining to food and agriculture will not become irrelevant but will be become increasingly localized.