中国女性初婚模式变动趋势研究

20世纪80年代以来我国女性的初婚模式发生了显著的变化。本文使用人口普查资料、全国1%人口抽样调查数据、人口变动情况抽样调查数据以及IPUMS数据,通过女性平均初婚年龄、曾婚比例、年龄别初婚概率、终身结婚期待率和预期单身寿命等指标探究我国女性自20世纪80年代以来的初婚模式变动情况。研究发现30多年来我国女性平均初婚年龄在波动中上升,到2017年女性平均初婚年龄已经达到25.60岁,而教育程度的提高会推迟女性进入婚姻的时间,接受过高等教育的女性平均初婚年龄明显高于未受过高等教育的女性;另外,通过对各教育程度平均初婚年龄标准化与分解看到随着时间的推移,教育对女性的平均初婚年龄影响作用增大;20-30岁年龄段女性婚姻推迟明显,曾婚比例不断降低,但女性终身未婚比例很低,其中受过高等教育的女性婚姻推迟现象最为明显,但其自身的结婚意愿并未降低,大部分女性只是推迟结婚时间,并不是不结婚。对净婚姻表各指标进行计算发现1982-2010年女性的年龄别初婚概率下降,尤其在20-30岁年龄段下降明显,初婚峰值年龄推迟,结婚年龄集中现象减弱。终身结婚期待率下降速度趋缓,随着女性初婚年龄的推迟,2010年27岁之后的终身结婚期待率要高于1990年与2000年,29-35岁女性的预期单身寿命也较前30年低,较大年龄未婚女性结婚等待时间缩短。     

Baby boomlet for older mothers?

In recent years, a number of celebrities have begun childbearing after age 35. The phenomena of older first-time mothers has received a great deal of attention in the popular press. Are these celebrities indicative of a national trend? Does the increase in fertility portend a reversal of the declines in fertility which have been occurring since the baby boom? The present paper uses central and cumulative birth rates for cohorts of American white women born between 1882 and 1953 to investigate childbearing between ages 35 and 50. While there has been a noticeable upsurge in first birth rates for cohorts in their mid to late 30s in recent years, overall central birth rates for women in their 30s are among the lowest on record, with cumulative birth rates at record low levels. A major reason for this is that these women are having relatively few third and higher order births. These cohorts will need to have a relatively high proportion of births in their older years of childbearing in order to reach replacement level. However, attaining replacement level is unlikely because such a high proportion of women have remained childless at ages 35–40 and a relatively low proportion are having three or more children.     

Understanding U.S. fertility: findings from the National Survey of Family Growth,Cycle III

The 1st overview of findings from Cycle III of the National Survey of Family Growth, the latest of 7 such surveys of US fertility since 1955 and the 1st to cover all women of childbearing age in the conterminous US is presented. Interviews between August 1982 and February 1983 with 7969 women, representative of 54 million women aged 15-44, reveal that sterilization is now the leading contraceptive method in the US, used by 33% of all contraceptors in 1982 (22%, female sterilization; 11% male sterilization), followed by the pill (29%), condom (12%), diaphragm (8%), and IUD (7%). Linked to this is the continuing decline in unwanted births since the baby boom peak in 1957, which accounted for nearly 1/2 of the drop between 1973 and 1982 in ever-married women's children ever born, from 2.2 to 1.9/woman. However, births conceived sooner than planned increased slightly among younger married women, probably due to the large drop in pill use since 1973 and increased use of the less effective diaphragm and condom among couples still intending to have more children. Black women are now more likely than white women to use the most effective female methods: female sterilization, pill, and IUD. Only 45% of women aged 15-44 in 1982 had used a contraceptive method at 1st intercourse. 4 out of 5 women married for the 1st time between 1975 and 1982 had intercourse before marriage. However, premarital sexual activity may be leveling off among white teenagers after a steep rise since the early 1970s and declining moderately among black teenagers. 16% of 1st marriages among ever-married women aged 15-44 in 1982 had been dissoved within 5 years, mostly by divorce or separation. 59% of black women with children in 1982 had their 1st birth before marriage, compared to 11% of white mothers. The proportion of babies who were breastfed more than doubled between 1970-71 and 1980-81, from 24 to 53%.     

Birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures

This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.     

American families: trends and correlates

Discussion focused on the nature of the roles of the family, a review of the major demographic changes (marriage, cohabitation, nonfamily households, remarriage, fertility, teenage pregnancy, and female employment) affecting the American family in the past decades, and the nature of the impact on women, men, and children. There were four major trends identified: 1) increased proportions of children living in single-parent families due to high rates of divorce and increased childbearing outside of marriage; 2) increased proportions of adults in nontraditional living arrangements; 3) increased female labor force participation during all stages of the life cycle; and 4) decreased proportions of children and increased proportions of older people out of total population due to declining mortality and fertility rates. Family formation arises out of childbearing and childrearing roles, the need for companionship and emotional support, and the opportunities for specialization and trade, and the economies of scale. The costs of family living may include the potential for disagreement, conflict, loss of privacy, and time and money. There were a number of reasons identified for not maintaining traditional families consisting of a married couple with children. The trends were for later age at marriage: 24.4 years in 1992 for women, increased cohabitation (almost 50% cohabiting prior to first marriage in 1985-86), decreased number of married couple households, and increased number of adults in non-family households. The divorce rate has risen over the past 100 years with peaks in the 1970s; the reasons were identified as increased baby boomers and new marriages, increased labor participation of women, and changes in gender roles. The stabilization and slight decline in rates may be due to a natural leveling, the likelihood of greater stability within new marriages, and the aging of the baby boomers. An anticipated increase in divorce rates in the future was also justified. Remarriage rates varied by gender, age at separation/divorce, presence of children, race/ethnicity, and education. Fertility remained stable at 1.8 during the late 1970s and early 1980s and increased slightly to 2.0 in 1989. IN 1990, there were 25% out-of-wedlock births compared to 5% in 1960. About 12% of births in 1989 were to teenagers. There has been an increase in female-headed households, the median income of which in 1992 was $13,012, or 33% of married couple income.     

Estimating a marriage matching model with spillover effects

We use marriage matching functions to study how marital patterns change when population supplies change. Specifically, we use a behavioral marriage matching function with spillover effects to rationalize marriage and cohabitation behavior in contemporary Canada. The model can estimate a couple's systematic gains to marriage and cohabitation relative to remaining single. These gains are invariant to changes in population supplies. Instead, changes in population supplies redistribute these gains between a couple. Although the model is behavioral, it is nonparametric. It can fit any observed cross-sectional marriage matching distribution. We use the estimated model to quantify the impacts of gender differences in mortality rates and the baby boom on observed marital behavior in Canada. The higher mortality rate of men makes men scarcer than women. We show that the scarceness of men modestly reduced the welfare of women and increased the welfare of men in the marriage market. On the other hand, the baby boom increased older men's net gains to entering the marriage market and lowered middle-aged women's net gains.     

Long-term economic consequences for women of delayed childbearing and reduced family size

Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, this study explored the association among delayed childbearing, completed family size and several measures of the economic well-being of women age 60 and older in 1976. By retirement age women who bore their first child at age 30 or older are significantly better off economically than either average-age childbearers or the childless. Economic well-being also appears to be related to family size among late childbearers. At retirement age the delayed childbearer with only one or two children appears better off than all other women. Thus, late childbearing and small family size appear associated with the highest standard of living for these women. This study also relates the experience of this early cohort of women to that of more recent birth cohorts.     

The changing American family

This Bulletin documents recent changes in American family patterns resulting both from longterm trends in urbanization, industrialization, and economic growth and the disruption of the Great Depression and World War 2, as well as changed attitudes toward marriage, parenthood, divorce, and the roles of women. Following a postwar boom in the 1950s and 1960s, marriage rates have now fallen to levels observed in the early 20th century. Since 1970, the number of unmarried couples living together has more than tripled to 1.9 million in 1983. The divorce rate has now stabilized after more than doubling since 1960, but at the current level, 1/2 of all recent marriages will end in divorce. Most divorced persons remarry fairly quickly, often creating complex families of "step-relatives." With 19% of households with minor children now headed by a women with no husband present, up to 1/2 of all children will live for sometime in a fatherless family before age 18. Over 1/2 of all married women, including 49% of married mothers of preschool children, now hold a paid job outside the home. Working wives boost a family's income by an average 40% but still are expected to shoulder most responsiblility for home and childcare. White women now in their 20s say they expect to have an average of 2 children, but are delaying childbearing to such an extent that 29% could end up childless. Most of the elderly live on their own but usually near children whom they see frequently. Despite changes in traditional family patterns, Americans consistently report that a happy marriage and good family are the most important aspects of life. And though most Americans now live with few or no family members, they maintain active contact with a large network of family.     

What are the determinants of delayed childbearing and permanent childlessness in the United States?

This paper presents estimates of delayed childbearing and permanent childlessness in the United States and the determinants of those phenomena. The estimates are derived by fitting the Coale-McNeil marriage model to survey data on age at first birth and by letting the parameters of the model depend on covariates. Substantively, the results provide evidence that the low first birth fertility rates experienced in the 1970s were due to both delayed childbearing and to increasing levels of permanent childlessness. The results also indicate that (a) delayed childbearing is less prevalent among black women than among nonblack women; (b) education is an important determinant of delayed childbearing whose influence on this phenomenon seems to be increasing across cohorts; (c) education is positively associated with heterogeneity among women in their age at first birth; (d) the dispersion of age at first birth is increasing across cohorts; (e) race has an insignificant effect on childlessness; and (f) education is positively associated with childlessness, with the effect of education increasing and reaching strikingly high levels for the most recent cohorts.     

America's baby boom generation: the fateful bulge

From 1955-64 nearly 42 million births occurred in the U.S., an unprecedented expansion. The roots of the baby boom lie in the universal rush to early marriage and favorable economic climate for the relatively scarce young men born of the Depression cohort. The impact of the boom interrupted a century-long fertility decline. Pro-marriage, pronatalist norms were revived by the Depression cohort who formed families of at least 2 children or more. During the 1960-70's schools, colleges, and universities were built to accomodate the boom and are now excessive for the baby bust cohort. Unemployment and crime rates rose and fell with the passing of the boom babies through late adolescence and early adulthood. In the 1980's, boom babies will be aged 20-30. Demands for housing will be high. Annual birth numbers will increase even if the rate of childbearing hovers below replacement level at about 1.8 per woman. Per capita earnings and overall labor productivity should improve as the boom baby cohort reaches middle age in the 1990s. However, chances for advancement will be fewer. As the cohort reaches retirement age, the over 65 population will double from 31 million in 2000 to almost 60 million in 2030. Although the burden will be somewhat offset by reduced proportions of under 18-year-olds, the ratio of active workers paying Social Security will fall drastically.     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

Parity and the expected consequences of childbearing

In this study 163 young married women with 0, 1, or 2 children described the advantages and disadvantages of having a (another) child in the next three years and the expectations of significant others regarding their childbearing behavior. Childless women were more likely than women at first and second parity to mention self-fulfillment, pleasing parents, strengthening their marriage, less time and freedom, interference with career and education, being emotionally unprepared, and creating friction in their marriage. Women with one child were most likely to mention companionship and achieving family size goals. For women with two children gender preference and less time for present children were particularly salient consequences. Women with one child report experiencing the strongest pronatalist normative pressures but the perceived preferences of significant others were most closely related to own childbearing plans for childless women. The results are discussed in terms of a parity specific approach to the study of motivations for parenthood.The research reported here was supported by Grant HD 10391-01, Center for Population Research, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. Robyn Boyer is now an independent research consultant in Sacramento, California. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Thomas J. Crawford, Program in Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine, California, 92717.     

Does It Matter What She Wants? The Role of Individual Preferences Against Unmarried Motherhood in Young Women’s Likelihood of a Nonmarital First Birth

Most young people in the United States express the desire to marry. Norms at all socioeconomic levels posit marriage as the optimal context for childbearing. At the same time, nonmarital fertility accounts for approximately 40 % of U.S. births, experienced disproportionately by women with educational attainment less than a bachelor’s degree. Research has shown that women’s intentions for the number and timing of children and couples’ intent to marry are strong predictors of realized fertility and marriage. The present study investigates whether U.S. young women’s preferences about nonmarital fertility, as stated before childbearing begins, predict their likelihood of having a nonmarital first birth. I track marriage and fertility histories through ages 24–30 of women asked at ages 11–16 whether they would consider unmarried childbearing. One-quarter of women who responded “no” in fact had a nonmarital birth by age 24–30. The ability of women and their partners to access material resources in adulthood were, as expected, the strongest predictors of the likelihood of nonmarital childbearing. Nonetheless, I find that women who said they would not consider nonmarital childbearing had substantially higher hazards of fertility postponement and especially of marital fertility, even after controlling for race/ethnicity, mother’s educational attainment, family of origin intactness, self-efficacy and planning ability, perceived future prospects, and markers of own educational attainment and work experience into early adulthood.     

育龄妇女生育经历与其意愿生育孩子数的关系分析

文章从妇女自身意愿,也就是妇女对子女需求的角度实证分析了年龄、受教育年限、初婚年龄、户口、工作、居住地和所属地区、生育经历等对妇女意愿生育孩子数的影响,特别是考察了妇女自身的生育经历对妇女生育意愿的影响,并将年龄与生育经历的交互作用考虑进去。生育经历作为一个与年龄密切相关的变量,与年龄的交互作用共同影响了妇女的生育意愿选择。     

The influence of nonmarital childbearing on the formation of first marriages

We document a negative association between nonmarital childbearing and the subsequent likelihood of first marriage in the United States, controlling for a variety of potentially confounding influences. Nonmarital childbearing does not appear to be driven by low expectations of future marriage. Rather, it tends to be an unexpected and unwanted event, whose effects on a woman’s subsequent likelihood of first marriage are negative on balance. We find that women who bear a child outside marriage and who receive welfare have a particularly low probability of marrying subsequently, although there is no evidence that AFDC recipients have lower expectations of marriage. In addition, we find no evidence that stigma associated with nonmarital childbearing plays an important role in this process or that the demands of children significantly reduce unmarried mothers’ time for marriage market activities.     

An analysis of baby boom characteristics in China

This article analyzed the 3rd Chinese baby boom and its causes by focusing on the fertility intensity of women and the number of births per year. The 3rd baby boom is expected to end in 2002 and to peak in 1995. The baby boom in urban areas will last a much shorter time than in rural areas. Particular differences are manifested between provinces: 1) The baby boom will last 3-4 years in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and will last 10 years in Liaoning, Jilin, and Jiangsu. In other provinces, the boom will last 15-23 years; 2) The peak years are different between provinces; 3) The base number of births curves are province-specific; 4) The absolute base birth numbers are different between provinces (Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, and Sichuan 700,000; Beijing, Tianjin, Qinghai, and Ningzia 100,000); and 5) The shapes of progressive increases for base number of births are province specific. The increase in the number of childbearing-age women, the unplanned higher parity births, and early marriage and childbearing have all contributed to the current baby boom. Recommendations to control the problem include controlling higher parity births, observing birth spacing, and controlling the age of marriage and childbearing.     

The family planning work in Yiyang prefecture as suggested by part of the data of the sample fertility survey]

The National Committee on Family Planning conducted a sample survey of fertility in the Yi-yang area in September 1982. The survey was focused on the marriage and fertility status of women between the ages of 15 and 67. Results from this survey show that early marriage is still very popular. Only 40% of those surveyed delayed their marriage to a later age. There is a need to educate the people on the benefits of late marriage. In addition, statistics show that the average fertility rate for a woman was 6.8 children in 1970 and 2.35 children in 1982. This recent figure is still too high when compared with the under 1.2 figure suggested by the central government. Among the total number surveyed, only 77% have taken birth control measures, and the other 23% still have not taken any birth control measures. The phenomenon shows that popular education on late marriage and having children at a later age is still urgently needed in order to further reduce the fertility rate. Married couples of childbearing age should be taught effective birth control measures and knowledge of eugenics with better education for the next generation. In this way, the masses may participate actively and positively in the national family planning campaign.     

Sex preference versus number preference: the case of Korea

The author argues that the effect of sex preference must be disentangled from the effect of number preference in Korea. This study tests--with hazard models--the effect of the number of previous children on the next birth according to the sex composition of previous children. Data were obtained from the 1974 Korean Fertility Survey. This paper also analyzes the timing of childbearing in recent periods in order to determine whether replacement-level fertility is temporary or permanent. The ideal number of children declined from 3.9 children in 1965 to 2.1 in 1991. The age-specific fertility rates for ages 20-24 years declined rapidly during the late 1980s. The fertility rates among women aged 25-29 years and 30-34 years increased during 1985-90. The proportion of fertility among women aged 20-29 years increased from 67.9% in 1975 to 86.6% in 1984. Women born in the late baby boom period of the late 1950s to mid-1960s reached prime reproductive age during the late 1980s and 1990s, but the crude birth rate remained about the same during 1985-92. A higher percentage of women (22.4%) born during 1955-59 remained single in 1990. During 1960-90, the percentage of women aged 20-24 years who were married declined. These trends indicate later age at childbearing and an explanation for the temporary nature of below-replacement fertility in the late 1980s. Korean women did not want to have more than 2 children, and the interval between first and second births increased since 1985. Among pregnancies of parity 2 conceived since 1985, over 90% of women with at least one son ended subsequent pregnancies by abortion compared to only 59% without sons. Hazard models of 1974 data reveal that son preference had an important effect on fertility. Fertility was higher among women with only daughters. Findings suggest that the value of sons must be measured at the societal and not at the individual level.     

Childbearing within Marriage and Consensual Union in Latin America, 1980–2010

This article compares the fertility patterns of women in consensual union and marriage in 13 Latin American countries, using census microdata from the four most recent census rounds and a methodological approach that combines the own‐children method and Poisson regression. Results show that in all these countries, fertility is slightly higher within consensual union than marriage and that the age pattern of fertility is very similar in marital and non‐marital unions. Further analyses show that over the period considered, childbearing within a consensual union has changed from rare to increasingly common, although not yet mainstream, for highly educated women in most countries examined. Results show that in Latin America, at least since the 1980s, women's childbearing patterns depend on their age and on their being in a conjugal relationship, but not on the legal nature of this relationship. The similarities in reproductive behavior between marital and non‐marital unions are not confined to the socially disadvantaged groups, but apply as well to the better off.     

U.S. women at work

Women made up 43% of the U.S. labor force in 1980, up from 29% in 1950, and 52% of all women 16 and over were working or looking for work compared to 34% in 1950. The surge in women's employment is linked to more delayed marriage, divorce, and separation, women's increased education, lower fertility, rapid growth in clerical and service jobs, inflation, and changing attitudes toward "woman's place." Employment has risen fastest among married women, especially married mothers of children under 6, 45% of whom are now in the labor force. Some 44% of employed women now work fulltime the year round, but still average only $6 for every $10 earned by men working that amount. This is partly because most women remain segregated in low paying "women's jobs" with few chances for advancement. Among fulltime workers, women college graduates earn less than male high school dropouts. Working wives were still spending 6 times more time on housework than married men in 1975 and working mothers of preschool children are also hampered by a severe lack of daycare facilities. Children of working women, however, appear to develop normally. Equal employment opportunity and affirmative action measures have improved the climate for working women but not as much as for minorities. The federal income tax and social security systems still discriminate against 2 income families. Woman's position in the U.S. labor force should eventually improve with the inroads women are making in some male-dominated occupations and gains in job experience and seniority among younger women who now tend to stay in the labor force through the years of childbearing and early childrearing, unlike women in the 1950s and 1960s.