U.S. population: where we are; where we're going

This Bulletin reviews recent trends in the dynamics and character of the U.S. population, the outlook for the remainder of the 1980s, and prospects for longterm growth. Estimated at 232 million as of mid-1982, the U.S. population is currently growing at about 1% a year, one of the developed world's highest growth rates. Natural increase (births-deaths) still adds some 1.7 million people a year, despite the rapid postbaby boom fall in fertility to a near-record low rate of 1.9 births/woman in 1981. With increasing numbers of refugees, net legal immigration averaged 600,000/year in 1979-81 and the net inflow of illegal immigrants may now be 500,000 a year. Uncertainty over potentially large numbers of immigrants complicates projections of future U.S. population size. Currently, the U.S. death rate is at an alltime low. More than 1/2 the population now resides in the South and West. Rural areas and small towns grew faster than urban areas in the 1970s for the 1st time in over a century. Educational attainment is at an alltime high, as is labor force participation, due to increasing employment among women and the baby boom generation's arrival at working ages. The age composition of the population, with the bulge of the baby boom generation surrounded by the older "depression" generation born during the 1930s and the younger "baby bust" generation born since the end of the 1960s, presents special problems for U.S. society.     

Household structure and housing needs

This paper is mainly derived from the material presented in the preceding article by S. P. Brown. Indeed, while the previous analysis is of considerable intrinsic interest, the hypothetical population was constructed and its family distribution was shown for the purpose of providing a basis for estimates of housing needs. For several reasons it appeared to be essential to have such a basis. First, any housing programme has to take the future, as well as the present, distribution of households by type and size into account. Secondly, such a programme has to be designed so as not to prevent household formation—there should be dwellings for all potential households, so that involuntary doubling-up need not occur. Thirdly, most residential areas should have dwellings for an eventually stable population, that is, for one which has variety of age groups and of household types, and also fair stability of housing demand. Estimates of the distribution of potential ‘households’ could be derived from the ‘family’ distribution of the hypothetical population which reflects current demographic trends. Thus although this population is a ‘hypothetical’ one, it provides a realistic premise for considering housing needs, and because it is a ‘stationary’ one, it provides an especially suitable premise. Moreover, since the demographic characteristics of its ‘families’ and therefore of its potential households were established in far greater detail than has ever been the case in sample surveys of existing households, it was possible to classify households in the terms which appear to be most appropriate for the first draft of a housing programme, irrespective of social and economic variations in demand.

The first stage in following up Mr Brown's analysis was the conversion of ‘families’ into ‘households’. Two examples of the possible household distribution of the hypothetical population are presented. Example A, which gives a realistic, but not extreme, picture of the conversion of families into households, is used for the subsequent detailed analysis, while broader figures for distribution B are also included.

In the second stage the various types of household had to be distinguished. For estimating housing needs, two interrelated criteria of household classification are relevant—first, the stage in the life of a household, especially appropriate in considering space requirements; secondly, the age composition of households, which largely determines the type of dwelling needed.

The detailed distribution of households by size and type, based on this classification, is further translated into a distribution of dwellings by type and size. For this purpose, additional assumptions about the number of rooms and the type of dwelling needed by households of various types are introduced and applied to the hypothetical population, both to household distributions A and B. These assumptions are not based on accepted standards, nor do they suggest standards. They are merely used for the purpose of illustrating a possible method of estimating housing needs on the basis of a detailed picture of household structure. They are further designed to represent one possible compromise between economy in dwelling distribution, on the one hand, and flexibility of space for individual households, on the other.

In the final sections of the paper, the implications of the dwelling distributions here presented are discussed in relation to household mobility, and also with reference to the necessity for reconciling short-term and long-term housing needs in any housing programme.     

components of change in the number of households: 1970–1980

There was an increase from 62.8 to 79.1 million households in the United States during the 1970s. The number of households increased much more rapidly than the population. This paper decomposes this growth in the number of households into components associated with changing age and marital status composition and changing age by marital status-specific propensities to form households. About one-third of the increase in the number of households was due to increased age by marital status propensity to form households, and two-thirds was due to shifts in the age by marital status distribution and population growth. The increased propensity to form households had its major impact at ages under 35, and primarily among never-married persons. The composition component had its primary impact at ages 25–44 as a result of the baby boom, and also because of the increased fractions never married and separated and divorced.     

American families: trends and correlates

Discussion focused on the nature of the roles of the family, a review of the major demographic changes (marriage, cohabitation, nonfamily households, remarriage, fertility, teenage pregnancy, and female employment) affecting the American family in the past decades, and the nature of the impact on women, men, and children. There were four major trends identified: 1) increased proportions of children living in single-parent families due to high rates of divorce and increased childbearing outside of marriage; 2) increased proportions of adults in nontraditional living arrangements; 3) increased female labor force participation during all stages of the life cycle; and 4) decreased proportions of children and increased proportions of older people out of total population due to declining mortality and fertility rates. Family formation arises out of childbearing and childrearing roles, the need for companionship and emotional support, and the opportunities for specialization and trade, and the economies of scale. The costs of family living may include the potential for disagreement, conflict, loss of privacy, and time and money. There were a number of reasons identified for not maintaining traditional families consisting of a married couple with children. The trends were for later age at marriage: 24.4 years in 1992 for women, increased cohabitation (almost 50% cohabiting prior to first marriage in 1985-86), decreased number of married couple households, and increased number of adults in non-family households. The divorce rate has risen over the past 100 years with peaks in the 1970s; the reasons were identified as increased baby boomers and new marriages, increased labor participation of women, and changes in gender roles. The stabilization and slight decline in rates may be due to a natural leveling, the likelihood of greater stability within new marriages, and the aging of the baby boomers. An anticipated increase in divorce rates in the future was also justified. Remarriage rates varied by gender, age at separation/divorce, presence of children, race/ethnicity, and education. Fertility remained stable at 1.8 during the late 1970s and early 1980s and increased slightly to 2.0 in 1989. IN 1990, there were 25% out-of-wedlock births compared to 5% in 1960. About 12% of births in 1989 were to teenagers. There has been an increase in female-headed households, the median income of which in 1992 was $13,012, or 33% of married couple income.     

Transfer programs and aggregate household formations

The number of households in the United States increased by over fifty percent in the 1960s and 1970s, nearly double the rate of population growth. Part of the increase is explained by the movement of large cohort groups of the population into prime household-forming age categories, but higher headship rates also contribute. Age-specific headship rate increases result from non-demographic factors, and this paper focuses on the role of government transfer payment programs. Specifically considered are Social Security, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and Food Stamps. These programs are found to have accounted for as many as 4 million net household formations between 1961 and 1984. The findings have implications for expected households formations in the 1990s.     

Cohort Succession in the US Housing Market: New Houses, the Baby Boom, and Income Stratification

Federal housing policy in the US across the postwar period supported the construction of new houses more than public provision or renovation of older structures as a means of ensuring a sufficient supply of quality dwellings. Understanding trends in new housing in particular is thus crucial to understanding the housing regime. Following Myers (Housing demography: Linking demographic structure and housing markets. University of Wisconsin Press, 1990; Housing Studies, 14, 473–490,1999), this paper conceptualizes historical change in the housing stock within a demographic framework as the movement of cohorts of households through cohorts of housing stock. Recent evidence suggests that a new cohort of houses arose in the 1980s and 1990s (larger with more amenities than past vintages), and that buyers of those new houses were increasingly affluent. In this paper, I link the succession to a new cohort of houses to household cohort succession and examine the increasing affluence of new house buyers by age and cohort, focusing especially on the entry of the Baby Boom generation exactly when the new cohort of houses arrived. I use US Census microdata for 1960–2000 to develop a cohort longitudinal dataset, and analyze historical change in stratification in new house ownership. I find significant shifts between cohorts in income inequality among new house buyers, with implications for the capacity of the housing regime to meet the future needs of an increasingly diverse population.

Delayed childbearing in the U.S.: facts and fictions

Between 1970-82, the proportion of 1st births in the US to women 25 and older rose from 19-36% and the proportion of women still childless at ages 25-34 increased by 56% at about the same time. Although a sharp contrast with the baby boom era of the 1950s and 1960s, todays's epidemic of delayed childbearing is similar to patterns earlier in the 20th century. As then, much is due to delayed age at marriage, but baby boomers now in the their late 20s and early 30s are also delaying childbirth after marriage. The trend stems in part from their economic difficulties as they compete in a tight job market caused both by their large numbers and a turbulent economy. But it is also related to women's increasing education and, in turn, increasing opportunities in and commitment to the labor force, which can be expected to encourage a delayed childbearing even after prospects brighten for young people. Although a diverse group, most of today's delayed childbearers are white, highly educated, 2-career couples. Adequate daytime care for preschool children is a prime concern. Although more employers now offer childcare assistance and flexible work schedules to working parents, the juggle between jobs and childraising can be a strain. On the plus side are delayed childbearers' greater maturity and generally higher incomes, which can ease potential problems created by parent-child age differences as their children grow up. Businesses have been quick to respond to the new market of older, affluent, 1st-time mothers. New methods of treating of circumventing infertility and prenatal detection of chromosomal birth defects can now help overcome potential biological problems that may concern women who choose to delay childbearing past age 30.     

Income Rich and Asset Poor: A Multilevel Analysis of Racial and Ethnic Differences in Housing Values among Baby Boomers

Race and ethnicity, as well as cohort status are strong predictors of asset ownership including home ownership and housing values. Yet, seldom have the two concepts been linked. Additionally, potentially important determinants such as business income have often times been excluded from the analyses despite findings suggesting that business income may be an important indicator for racial and ethnic minorities who would otherwise be relegated to employment in low status jobs in the secondary labor market. Using the most recent data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample, this study examines: (1) How Asian, Black, Hispanic and white baby boomers compare in terms of housing values; and (2) What role business income and interest, dividends and rental income have on housing values for Asian, Black, Hispanic and white baby boomers. Significant racial and ethnic differences in housing values exist, and business income and interest, dividends and rental income are all significant indicators of housing values for all groups.     

Urban segregation in Sweden housing policy,housing markets,and the spacial distribution of households in metropolitan areas

The postwar Swedish housing standard has been raised considerably. But there were also unforeseen and undesired side effects in the form of increasing segregation. Between 1965–1975 a great number of rental apartments were built in the periphery of the metropolitan areas. They originally received an overrepresentation of the poor, immigrants, social welfare recipients, and members of the working class. Today these areas face long distances, increasing deterioration and the lower socioeconomic level of their population is accentuated. The following wave of rebuilding in the central metropolitan areas also reinforced residential segregation. As the dwellings became larger and totally modern, the rents rose. Ownership forms often changed to tenant-owned dwellings which drove up the prices of tenant-owned dwellings. The older working-class population was replaced by wealthy families with middle-class backgrounds. The rebuilding in the city centers has in all likelihood been the motor in the overall relocations and migrations of the metropolitan populations during the 1980s. The movement of the middle-class towards the centers corresponds to an increased concentration of workers and various resource-weak groups on the peripheries. This analysis uses a new large micro data base integrating Swedish census and level-of-living survey data on individuals, households and neighbourhoods.Housing segregation has not been seen as a very serious problem in Sweden. Attention has primarily been aimed at providing spatial and modern dwellings for everyone. The construction of housing was explosive through the middle of the 1970s, and it has been supported by substantial general subsidies. Today, Sweden, together with Norway, has Europe's highest and most evenly distributed housing standard. Overcrowding and unmodern housing have for all practical purposes been abolished.     

Trajectories of Fertility and Household Composition in the Demographic Profile of the Czech Republic

The household composition matrix is a representation of the demographic structure of households, specific to age groups of household members and household heads. As such, the matrix reflects also the environmental conditions, housing in particular, that mould households' demographic structure. By specifically depicting the presence of children in households, household composition could be viewed as gauging fertility within the context of housing conditions. This stance is examined in an application to Czech census data for the year 1991, at the commencement of an intense process of socio-economic transformation that accompanied the collapse of communism across Eastern Europe. Within this process, housing had an inadvertent impact upon the structure of households in general, and upon fertility decline in particular. By using the standard matrix representation of household composition, correspondence between trajectories of age-specific fertility and household composition emerge throughout the Czech Republic. This correspondence illustrates the potential household composition analysis carries for fertility measurement and estimation in rapidly changing economic environments.     

Study on Asia's growing cities: Republic of Korea

Focus in this discussion of migration and urbanization in Korea is on the following: historical perspective, implications of urban growth, urbanization trends and population distribution, patterns of migration, socioeconomic differences, and population redistribution policies. Korea is one of the most densely populated countries in Asia. Attempts to deal successfully with this phenomenon have met with varying degrees of success. Population concentration in the capital region continues to be a problem and has resulted in acute housing shortages, rapidly rising land prices, and on encroachment of urban land use into prime agricultural land surrounding the Seoul metropolitan region. Between 1955-1975 the population of Seoul increased from 1.6 million to 6.9 million for the capital city proper and to 9.4 million for its metropolitan region, including 5 satellite cities. This fringe spillover began in the late 1960s. The metropolitan area, comprising 4 cities around the fast growing city of Busan in the south, was formed in the mid-1970s with 3.2 million people. At this time major policy concerns center on the demographic phenomenon of continued concentrations in the Seoul and Busan regions. Problem issues which persist include nonfarm polarization, regional imbalance, diverging intra-sectoral incomes, and the aging rural labor force. Despite its nearness to the demilitarized zone, Seoul was and continues to be the focal point of economic and educational opportunity. The early 1960s brought little variation in migration and urbanization trends. In 1961 family planning and planned economic development were initiated but their impact came several years later. The overall urban growth rate dropped from 5.4 to 4.6% in the 1960-1966 period, and Seoul's pace of expansion slowed down to an annual average of 6.5%. Yet, the capital continued its urbanizing dominance. By 1975 Korea had 3 cities with a population of over 3 million: Seoul, Busan, and Daegu. In 1975 48.4% of the country's population of 34.7 million lived in the 35 cities designated as urban. Migrants comprised 21.5% of the 1970 national population, and the shift was rural-urban for almost 3/4 of them. Korea's industrial takeoff during the mid-1960s had 2 noteworthy effects: rising urban wages doubled rural income levels in real terms by 1970; and the exodus from the countryside was so intense that the rural population shrank between 1965-1970, for the 1st time since the Korean War. A successful family planning program had helped to lower the annual population growth rate to 1.9% by the late 1970s, but heavy out-migration from rural areas was the major factor.     

Shifts in household demographics herald economic changes for Thailand

In Thailand, dramatic changes in households and the health status of the population have led to important implications for the economic sector. These changes affect health, education, housing, employment and transportation. A new book on the economic impact of demographic change by Andrew Mason and Burnham O. Campbell is referred to as a full discussion of the issues. National planning and projections must include household characteristics as well as numerical projections. The analysis of Mason and Campbell is summarized in this article. Important changes are occurring in the size, rate of growth, and age structure of Thailand's population. Life expectancy has risen to 63 years for men and 68 years for women. Fertility has fallen to 2 children/woman. Population growth was 1.9% in 1990. In 1990, there were only 1 in 3 under the age of 15, and these numbers are expected to shrink to 1 in 4 by the year 2000. 60% of the population is of working age; this is expected to increase to 65% by the year 2000. The 60 years old population is expected to be 7.5% of the total in the year 2000. The average household has 1.6 children. 96% of households live with a relative. The expectation is that household size will continue to decrease and the number of households will continue to grow. The number of elderly heads of households is expected to rise to 11% by 2010. Households will become "adultified." The policy implications for education are that the school age population will gradually decreases but the number enrolled will increase. Primary school enrollment will stabilize and then decline after 1995. Secondary school enrollment will increase and level off in 2005. Total enrollment will increase from 10.5 million in 1990 to 11.4 million in 2000 and decline to 10.7 in 2015. These changes will allow for improvements in the quality of education and expand educational attainment. In health care, the demand for maternal and child health services will decline; changes will occur in the kinds of medical care needed.     

America's baby boom generation: the fateful bulge

From 1955-64 nearly 42 million births occurred in the U.S., an unprecedented expansion. The roots of the baby boom lie in the universal rush to early marriage and favorable economic climate for the relatively scarce young men born of the Depression cohort. The impact of the boom interrupted a century-long fertility decline. Pro-marriage, pronatalist norms were revived by the Depression cohort who formed families of at least 2 children or more. During the 1960-70's schools, colleges, and universities were built to accomodate the boom and are now excessive for the baby bust cohort. Unemployment and crime rates rose and fell with the passing of the boom babies through late adolescence and early adulthood. In the 1980's, boom babies will be aged 20-30. Demands for housing will be high. Annual birth numbers will increase even if the rate of childbearing hovers below replacement level at about 1.8 per woman. Per capita earnings and overall labor productivity should improve as the boom baby cohort reaches middle age in the 1990s. However, chances for advancement will be fewer. As the cohort reaches retirement age, the over 65 population will double from 31 million in 2000 to almost 60 million in 2030. Although the burden will be somewhat offset by reduced proportions of under 18-year-olds, the ratio of active workers paying Social Security will fall drastically.     

Cuba: the demography of revolution

Cuba's post-revolution demographic trends, especially in regard to fertility and emigration, and the causes and consequences of these trends, were examined using available statistical data. The authors maintain that both fertility and emigration trends were highly infuenced by economic factors. The trends are described in the context of the social and economic changes instituted by the revolutionary government. Government policies were aimed at 1) eradicating inequalities in housing, income, education, and health; 2) improving the status of women; and 3) upgrading the living standards of the rural population. Government policies did alleviate many social problems and greatly improved the health and educational status of the population; however, these policies had a marked adverse effect on economic performance. The demographic transition began in Cuba earlier than in most other developing countries and it began long before the 1959 revolution. These earlier changes must be taken into account when assessing the impact of post-revolution policies on demographic trends. Cuba's birthrate declined from 26-14.8/1000 population between 1959-1979 and the total fertility rate declined from 3.7-1.9 between 1970-1978; however, during the 1960s there was a baby boom and the birth rate for 1963 exceeded 35/1000 population. The baby boom was largely a response to the temporary improvement in economic conditions which occurred shortly after the revolution. The decline in fertility during the 1970s was due in part to the increased availability of abortion and contraceptive services and to a decline in the marriage rate; however, Cuba's deteriorating economy was also a major contributing factor. The baby boom of the 1960s is negativley affecting the current economy of the country. Individuals born during the baby boom are entering adulthood and are contributing toward Cuba's current unemployment problems. Prior to the revolution, Cuba experienced a high rate of in-migration. Immediately after the revolution this pattern was reversed and between 1959-1980 more than 800,000 Cubans emigrated. Most of these emigrants went to the U.S. A large proportion of the earlier emigrants were members of the upper and middle socioeconomic classes. Recent emigrants were more evenly representative of all segments of Cuba's population. The socioeconomic characteristics of the emigrants are described and their adjustment in the U.S. is discussed. Tables provide statistical data on Cuba's demographic trends.     

Estimates of coverage of the population by sex,race, and age in the 1970 census

Several estimates of total net underenumeration and of net census errors by sex, race (white, Negro-and-other-races, Negro), and age (five-year groups) in the 1960 and 1970 Censuses, for the total population of the United States, derived by the methods of demographic analysis, are presented. The different data, procedures, and assumptions employed in developing the various estimates are described briefly, and the findings are then discussed in terms of a”preferred” set of estimates. The preferred set of estimates of corrected population for 1970 combines estimates for persons under age 35 based directly on birth, death, and migration statistics, estimates for females aged 35 to 64 based on the Coale-Zelnik estimates (white) for 1950 or the Coale-Rives estimates (Negro) for 1960, estimates for males aged 35 to 64 based on the use of expected sex ratios, and estimates for the population 65 and over based on”Medicare” enrollments and expected sex ratios. These estimates indicate an overall net underenumeration of 5.3 million persons or 2.5 percent in 1970, as compared with 5.1 million or 2.7 percent in 1960, and a net underenumeration of 1.9 percent for whites and of 7.7 percent for Negroes in 1970, as compared with 2.0 percent and 8.0 percent, respectively, in 1960. As in 1960, undercoverage in 1970 was greatest for Negro males (9.9 percent); net error rates exceeded 12 percent in each age group 20 to 49 and reached 17 to 19 percent at ages 25 to 44. All sex-race groups showed marked increases between 1960 and 1970 for children under ten and marked declines at ages ten to 24. Equally reliable estimates of population coverage cannot be prepared for states and smaller geographic units or for the population of Spanish ancestry.     

Demographics,the Third Age and partial retirement: Policy proposals to accommodate the changing picture of female retirement in Canada

Much concern has been raised around the potential impact of the retirement of the large baby boom generation. This article specifically addresses the unique issues surrounding the retirement of female baby boomers. Demographic changes, including increased labor force participation, coupled with declining fertility rates, have resulted in a social transformation of the roles women play in society. Despite these changes, women still bear much of the caregiving responsibilities in the household, which can complicate retirement choices. This article examines female retirement in the Canadian context and presents three policy proposals to expand women’s retirement choices, encourage longer-term labor force participation, and thereby extend their working lives into the Third Age.     

An analysis of the birth rate in the Soviet Union after World War II]

Changes in the birth rate in the USSR following World War II were studied in an effort to determine why such changes came about. Statistics show that immediately after the war, there was a short period with a high birth rate, after which the curve started to go down. In the 1950s, the rate was relatively stable, but it declined rapidly in the 1960s and reached a record low in the late 1960s. The rate started to go up in the 1970s and at present it is fluctuating at a low level. There are 2 major reasons for these changes. One fact is that the best childbearing ages are 20-29, and from 1960 to 1970, this age group declined due to the low birth rate during World War II. From 1970 to 1980, this age group grew because of the baby boom following the war. Another reason is the change in the childbearing rate of Russian women. This rate is declining for every age group. Reasons for this are: 1) the number of divorces has increased, with a remarriage rate of only 50%; 2) abortions have become more available; 3) there has been a drop in the number of families with several children; and 4) Russian women are becoming more edcated. As a rule, the better educated these women are, the fewer children they will bear. The birth rate in the USSR will remain low unless there is a change in the social structure.     

The rise of one-person households and their recent characteristics in Korea

"This paper explores the rise in the proportion of one-person households [in South Korea] which since 1960 was attributable largely to rural-to-urban migration of young people. The heavy migration of young people from rural to urban cities actually brought about the rural household division which contributed to the fall in household size, and contributed to the increase in one-person households of urban young singles, on the one hand, and the increase in one-person households of rural elderly widows, on the other. The rise in the aggregate propensity to live alone was also evident.... Although the rise in one-person households was evident and by 1990 about one out of every ten households was a one-person household, the findings on the recent characteristics of one-person households do not indicate any big change in the traditional family norms."     

The growth of families headed by women: 1950–1980

In recent decades, the number of families headed by women has increased dramatically. In this article, we use U.S. census data from 1950 to 1980 to consider the extent to which population growth, fertility change, decreased marriage, increased divorce, and increased household headship have contributed to the growth of female-headed families. For white women, the major source of growth during the 1960s and 1970s was an increase in the number of formerly married mothers due to increased divorce and decreased remarriage. There is a similar pattern for black women for the 1960-1970 period. During the 1970-1980 decade, however, the major source of growth for black women was an increase in the number of never-married mothers due to decreased marriage and increased fertility among nonmarried women.     

Immigrant characteristics and Hispanic-Anglo housing inequality

This paper seeks to explain why Hispanic households in the United States live in housing markedly inferior to Anglos’. I argue that immigrant characteristics of Hispanic households and the metropolitan areas in which Hispanics live play important roles in determining such inequality in the housing market. Empirical analyses of homeownership, household crowding, and housing costs demonstrate that immigration plays a role in explaining relatively low homeownership and high household crowding for each of four large Hispanic populations (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and other Hispanics). The role of immigrant characteristics in determining housing costs is much weaker.