World population beyond six billion

This world report reviews population growth pre-1900, population change during 1900-50 and 1950-2000, causes and effects of population change and projections to 2050. World population grew from 2 billion in 1900 to almost 6 billion in 2000. Population showed more rapid growth in the 17th and 18th centuries. Better hygiene and public sanitation in the 19th century led to expanded life expectancies and quicker growth, primarily in developed countries. Demographic transition in the 19th and 20th centuries was the result of shifts from high to low mortality and fertility. The pace of change varies with culture, level of economic development, and other factors. Not all countries follow the same path of change. The reproductive revolution in the mid-20th century and modern contraception led to greater individual control of fertility and the potential for rapid fertility decline. Political and cultural barriers that limit access affect the pace of decline. Population change is also affected by migration. Migration has the largest effect on the distribution of population. Bongaarts explains differences in fertility by the proportion in unions, contraceptive prevalence, infertility, and abortion. Educational status has a strong impact on adoption of family planning. Poverty is associated with multiple risks. In 2050, population could reach 10.7 billion or remain low at 7.3 billion.     

Our population predicament: a new look

Issued to mark the Population Reference Bureau's 50th anniversary, this issue updates the story of world population presented in its popular predecessor of 1971, "Man's Population Predicament." Estimated at 1/2 billion in 1650, world population reached about 2 billion in 1930, 4 billion in 1975, and is projected to be about 6 billion in 2000. Most of today's rapid growth is occurring among the 3/4 of the world's peoples living in less developed countries where the post-World War II gap between high birth rates and falling death rates has only recently begun to narrow. This growth, coupled with high consumption in developing countries, is putting tremendous pressures on the Earth's resources, environment, and social fabric. New evidence on Europe's population transition and from China, Indonesia, and Thailand in the 1970s suggests that well-designed family planning programs can speed fertility decline but rapid worldwide attainment of replacement level fertility will also require special development efforts and measures that go beyond family planning. Current projections of the world's ultimate peak population range from 8 billion in the mid 21st century to 11 billion in about 2125, depending on when replacement-level fertility is reached. China's drive for a drastic birth rate reduction and the oil crisis might change fertility behavior more rapidly than most demographers have heretofore thought likely.     

The future of world population

Analysis of future population trends reveals a regional pattern of continued growth, dependent upon basic assumptions about demographic factors and the priority given to human rights, socioeconomic development, and global interdependence. Developing countries will account for 85-87% of world population growth, and the most rapid increase will occur in Africa. The optimum size of population remains debatable. Ecologist argue for a reduction to 1-2 billion people in order to be in balance with nature and maintain a high quality of life. A rapid, but plausible, fertility decline would result in a population of 10 billion by 2070. The lowest feasible UN projection is 8 billion. A 1-2 billion world population would not be feasible without drastic mortality increases and fertility declines. Population control is a highly charged and complex issue; feminists are not about to place responsibility for environmental degradation on women's excess fertility. The spirit of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is that women have the right to determine family size with personal integrity and freedom rather than suffer coercion for the rights of society. Family planning is a necessary ingredient for achieving the goal of desired family size. The quality of life may be undermined by upholding human rights, without recognition of the context of socioeconomic development and global interdependencies. Global economic conditions, political crises, and environmental degradation can undermine even the best national development efforts. The most difficult task ahead is addressing priorities and forming a consensus. Human rights, socioeconomic conditions, and global interdependencies must be satisfied in a mutually beneficial way. When national and global goals conflict, a compromise must be reached. There are many unknowns. The challenge is to "identify a set of policies that will stabilize world climatic conditions, promote economic development, enhance the quality of life, and respect human rights." Investment in human capital, such as education and health, will help women to avoid unwanted pregnancies. Improving the status of women is key to socioeconomic development, human rights, and global interdependencies.     

A worldwide view of population trends

The UN Population Commission held its 20th session in New York from 29 January to 9 February, with an agenda that included reviews of UN action to implement recommendations of the 1974 World Population Conference; of progress in population work by the UN Population Division; and of the medium-term plan, 1980-1983. Of a total of 29 countries and 22 organizations participating, 5 countries were Asian--India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. The report on monitoring of trends and policies was the most detailed examination of the global demographic situation yet available, and revealed the following facts: 1) 80% of the population of the developing countries are in countries which the governments have considered that a slower rate of population growth would be desirable; 2) among developed countries, nearly all governments preferred their rate of population growth to remain as high as or become higher than at present; 3) among the developing countries, 6 of the 8 nations having a population greater than 50 million wished to reduce their rate of growth; 4) 80% of all countries considered the rate of population growth the be of basic importance for development; and 5) with respect to mortality, about 75% of all governments of developing countries considered the prevailing level to be unsatisfactory; while among developed countries the same proportion considered the prevailing level to be acceptable. As a result of its deliberations on the report, the Population Commission endorsed the Population Information Network concept of a decentralized network for the coordination of regional, national, and nongovernmental population information activities.     

Asia's population and development in retrospect and prospect

By 1989 Asia's population will reach 3 billion. That Asia's countries can change the course of population development has been shown by China, whose population growth rate has decreased to 1.2%. 58% of the world's population in 1985 was Asian, and 53% of it was concentrated in 11 Asian countries, of which 37.6% was accounted for by India and China. Asia's population density is 3 times the world average, and the number of persons sustained by a square kilometer of land in Asia is 2.5 times the world average. Asia's population is young (median age 20.3), which means a high dependency burden, a large number of women of childbearing age, and low quality of life, as measured by infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy. Rapid population growth ensures a low rate of development. Asia's goals are to achieve a 1% growth rate by year 2000, zero population growth and replacement level by 2015 for East Asia and 2020 for South Asia. The World Bank estimates that Asia's population will not stabilize until the end of the 21st century, by which time it will have reached 6 billion. Asia must find a way of achieving both population control and economic development. 5 recommendations are made to the Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (AFPPD): 1) that the AFPPD sponsor the activities of "the Day of 3 billion"; 2) that seminars and conferences on population be held among Asian nations; 3) that high-fertility countries adopt late marriages, few births, and programs for maternal and child health; 4) that organizations for family planning be strengthened and given the resources to upgrade the status of women; and 5) that international cooperation in the area of population be intensified.     

Family planning and fertility decline: a global overview

Family planning and development policy concerns are not incompatible. The emphasis on development policies at the 1974 World Population Conference at Bucharest did not mean that world governments had lost interest in the population and family planning issue. Although worldwide attitudes toward family planning have become more and more favorable, this has not yet meant great impact on world demographic trends. The "inertia factor," i.e., the effects of high birthrates in the previous generation, will camouflage declining birthrates for some time to come. The trend of fertility reduction which was perceptible only among small populations a few years ago is also becoming manifest in larger Third World countries. Mortality rate declines have slowed down but there is no rising mortality due to starvation in any country. At present, food demand exceeds availability for 80% of the Third World population. It is predicted that the food deficit will increase 70% by the year 2000.     

The outlook of China's population after the stabilization of birth policy

A professor of the Institute of Population Research of the People's University of China attempts to project the future population development of China so that stabilization of the birth policy can be assessed. He divides China into the economically developed and population-controlled area (29% of the population), the economically subdeveloped and population fairly-controlled areas (59% of the population), and the economically less-developed areas where fertility is high (12% of the population). China's population is expected to increase because of the baby boom to 1.25-1.3 billion by the year 2000. Between 1996 and 2000, the growth rate is expected to decelerate and reach zero growth. After 2010, if growth is held at the replacement rate of 2.1, the population will still continue to grow slowly. Around 2100, China's population should be around 1.45-1.59 billion. This would cause a decrease of 27% of arable land. With a decline in fertility rate comes a rise in the amount of the aged population (4.9% in 1982 vs. 5.5% in 1987). The proportion of aged citizens is expected to rise with the stabilization policy until around 2040 where it can be held at about 18%. China's GNP by the year 2000 is expected to be US$1183.8 billion with the per capita GNP about US$934 (providing the population is controlled). Compare this figure with the per capita GNP of the world (US$30,100) and of developed countries (US$10,700) in 1988, and one can see that China is far behind the rest of the world in economic growth.     

Asian and Pacific population targets

2 population targets for the Asian and Pacific regions were established in 1981-82: 1) by the Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development at Beijing, China to attain 1% population growth rate for the Asian region by the year 2000, and 2) by the 3rd Asian and Pacific Population Conference at Colombo, Sri Lanka, to attain replacement level of fertility by the year 2000. In an attempt to ascertain whether these targets can be achieved and/or related, the Population Division of the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) prepared population projections in which the 2 targets are achieved. These projections were prepared by aggregating the total population of member countries. When net reproduction rate (NRR) equals 1 (replacement level fertility) it will lead to a stable population with a growth rate of zero. In the short-term a population with replacement level fertility will continue to increase if it has a young age structure due to previous higher levels of fertility. Some projections for the period 1980-2005 are: 1) population growth rate will decrease from 1.78% to 1.05%, 2) total fertility rate will decrease from 3.63-2.11, 3) male life expectancy will increase from 59.8-67.3, and 4) infant mortality rate will decrease from 67.3-34.5. For the ESCAP region, a target of NRR of 1 would be easier to achieve than a growth rate of 1%. The UN projects the total population of the region to be 3,382,000,000 in the year 2000. If the NRR can be lowered to 1 by then, however, the total population would be 3,342,000,000 and if the growth rate can be reduced to 1% by the end of the century the resulting population would be 3,300,000,000. Major demographic benefits will be attained in terms of the age structure of the population if a 1% growth rate is achieved; the proportion under age 15 was 37.1% in 1980 but will be 27.2% in 2000 with a dependency ratio of 48.8 compared to 70.8 for 1980.     

The global and regional impact of mortality and fertility transitions, 1950-2000

During the second half of the twentieth century, world population grew at a record pace, both in absolute and relative terms, from 2.5 billion to 6 billion (or 1.75 percent annually). Demographers have long identified rapid mortality declines as the main explanation. This article finds that one-fourth of today's world population is alive because of mortality improvements since mid-century. Very rapid growth is unlikely to continue as substantial fertility declines also occurred in recent decades. This article finds that already by the year 2000, these fertility declines have almost exactly compensated for the impact of mortality declines from mid-century levels. This result may suggest homeostasis, but analyses of underlying trends contradict this impression. First, the impact of fertility declines will soon and significantly exceed that of mortality declines. Second, that mortality and fertility declines jointly affect the size of the world population by less than one percent conceals a significant impact on the population's age composition as well as on regional population sizes.     

Completing the Demographic Transition

Despite ongoing declines in fertility in many countries, the population of the world is experiencing a period of rapid expansion, and its size is expected to reach 10 billion by the end of the demographic transition. Three causes of this growth are identified and quantified: 1) fertility above the replacement level of two surviving children per woman, 2) continuing declines in mortality, and 3) population momentum resulting from a young age structure. A set of simple analytic expressions is proposed for estimating these factors from standard demographic indicators. Population momentum is shown to be the main cause of future growth in most countries and regions.     

New strategies for slowing population growth

Growth of world population over the next 100 years, until the year 2100, will produce an estimated 11.5 billion people. The past focus on reducing rapid population growth exclusively through family planning has not been sufficient. Population policy needs to be broadened to include health care, education, and poverty reduction. The population policy recommendations of Population Council Vice-President John Bongaarts and Senior Associate Judith Bruce were to reduce unwanted pregnancies by expanding services that promote reproductive choice and better health, to reduce the demand for large families by creating favorable conditions for small families, and to invest in adolescents. The Population Council 1994 publication "Population Growth and Our Caring Capacity" outlined these issues. Another similar article by John Bongaarts appeared in the journal "Science" in 1994. In developing countries, excluding China, about 25% of all births are unwanted; 25 million abortions are performed for unwanted pregnancies. The provision of comprehensive family planning programs will go a long way toward achieving a reduction in unwanted pregnancies. In addition, changes are needed in male control over female sexuality and fertility and in cultural beliefs that are obstacles to use of contraception. Stabilization of population at 2 children per family will not occur unless there is a desire for small families. In most less developed countries, large family sizes are preferred. Governments have an opportunity to adopt policies that reduce economic and social risks of having small families. This can be accomplished through the widespread education of children, a reduction in infant and child mortality, improvement in the economic and social and legal status of women, and provision of equitable gender relations in marriage and child rearing. The rights of children to be wanted, planned, and adequately cared for need to be supported. These aforementioned measures will help to reduce fertility, provide support for small families, and justify investment in social development. Population momentum will keep population growing for some time even with replacement level fertility. Investment in adolescents through enhancement of self-esteem and promotion of later childbearing can lengthen the span between generations and slow population momentum. Population policies will be more effective when human rights are protected.     

The Philippines: country statement prepared for the International Conference on Population,Mexico City,August 1984

This statement, prepared for the 1984 International Conference on Population, summarizes the demographic situation in the Philippines, the Philippine position regarding implementation of the World Population Plan of Action, and current population policies. In 1980, the population of the Philippines stood at 48.1 million. The country's current population growth rate reflects the interplay between decreasing mortality and still high but declining fertility. The 1984-87 Philippine Development Plan aims to achieve sustainable economic growth, equitable distribution of the gains of development, and personal development. A net reproduction rate of unity by the year 2000 is sought, and preschool-age children, youth, premarriage-age groups, and married couples of reproductive age have been targeted for special outreach efforts. The national population program will concentrate on developing a network of public and private community-based organizations, strengthening the capacity of local government and community organizations to plan and manage the population program, developing community capacity to finance family planning services, upgrading the quality of natural family planning practice, continuing the promotion of effective contraceptive methods, developing a population data bank, and upgrading the technical and management capabilities of population program personnel. Increasing attention is being paid to regional development and spatial distribution. The average annual population growth rate is expected to decline from 2.8% in 1970-75 to 2.2% by 1987. The crude birth rate is expected to drop from 34/1000 in 1980 to 31/1000 in 1987. To help achieve this goal, the contraceptive prevalence rate should increase from 34% in 1983 to 41% in 1987 and 50% by 1993. In addition, attempts will be made to reduce the proportion of women marrying below the age of 20 years and to improve women's access to educational and employment opportunities.     

Toward a national population policy

Canada has notexplicit national population policy although various policies do have an effect on the size, rate of growth, distribution, and composition of the nation's population. Traditionally, Canada has been pronoatalist, particularly favoring immigration. In response to the 1974 Bucharest World Population Conference, the Canadian government solicited public testimony regarding a population policy for the nation. Environmentalists urged population limitation with a view to maintaining the ecosystem. Social justice and reallocation of resources were urged by an 2nd group. The quality of life argument was used by both proponents and opponents of population limitation. Canada has increased its world assistance for economic and population activities. With 1 of the highest growth rates of the developed countries, (in 1976-1977, 1.3% vs. .8% for the U.S. and .4% for France), Canada needs to propound a slow growth ethic. With future fertility at replacement level, Canada will look to immigration for population input.     

The Role of Relative Cohort Size and Relative Income in the Demographic Transition

This paper summarizes the results of other analyses by the author with regard to the importance of relative cohort size (RCS) in determining male relative income (the income of young adults relative to prime-age workers) and general patterns of economic growth, and in turn influencing fertility in the currently more-developed nations. It then goes on to demonstrate that these same effects appear to have been operating in all of the one hundred-odd nations which have experienced the fertility transition since 1950. Parameter estimates based on the experience of all 189 countries identified by the United Nations between 1950 and 1995 are used to simulate the effects on fertility of migration from Third to First World countries. This exercise suggests that we get the best of all possible outcomes with migration: population is reduced in “overcrowded” Third World nations, total world population growth is substantially reduced, and scores of children are given the opportunity of growing up with all the educational and health advantages of U.S. residents.     

Declining world fertility: trends,causes, implications

This Bulletin examines the evidence that the world's fertility has declined in recent years, the factors that appear to have accounted for the decline, and the implications for fertility and population growth rates to the end of the century. On the basis of a compilation of estimates available for all nations of the world, the authors derive estimates which indicate that the world's total fertility rate dropped from 4.6 to 4.1 births per woman between 1968 and 1975, thanks largely to an earlier and more rapid and universal decline in the fertility of less developed countries (LDCs) than had been anticipated. Statistical analysis of available data suggests that the socioeconomic progress made by LDCs in this period was not great enough to account for more than a proportion of the fertility decline and that organized family planning programs were a major contributing factor. The authors' projections, which are compared to similar projections from the World Bank, the United Nations, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census, indicate that, by the year 2000, less than 1/5 of the world's population will be in the "red danger" circle of explosive population growth (2.1% or more annually); most LDCs will be in a phase of fertility decline; and many of them -- along with most now developed countries -- will be at or near replacement level of fertility. The authors warn that "our optimistic prediction is premised upon a big IF -- if (organized) family planning (in LDCs) continues. It remains imperative that all of the developed nations of the world continue their contribution to this program undiminished."     

World population in transition

The world's population growth rate peaked at slightly over 2%/year in the late 1960s and in 1986 is down to 1.7% and falling. Annual numbers added continue to rise because these rates apply to a very large base, 4.9 billion in 1986. According to UN medium variant projections, world population growth will peak at 89 million/year in the late 1990s and then taper off until world population stabilizes in the late decade of the 21st century at about 10.2 billion. Close to 95% of this growth is occurring in less developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Asia (minus Japan), and Latin America. LDC fertility rates are declining, except in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America and South Asia, but most have far to go to reach the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman. Fertility is below replacement in virtually all more developed countries. For LDCs, large numbers will be added before stabilization even after attainment of replacement level fertility because of the demographic momentum built into their large and young population bases. This complicates efforts to bridge gaps between living standards in LDCs and industrialized countries. From a new debate about whether rapid population growth deters or stimulates economic growth, a more integrated view has emerged. This view recognizes the complementary relationship between efforts to slow population growth and other development efforts; e.g., to improve health and education, upgrade women's status, increase productivity. Most effective in the increased contraceptive prevalence and fertility declines seen in many LDCs has been the combination of organized programs to increase access to family planning information and supplies with socioeconomic development that enhances the desire for smaller families.     

A general review of the discussion at the Beijing International Symposium on Population and Development]

A general review of papers and discussions at the Beijing International Symposium on Population and Development held December 10-14, 1984 is presented. Discussions on population and development included China's population change 1949-1982, impacts of economic change on Tianjin's population, the population factor in economic development policy-making, Japanese population and development, recent population development in Hungary, population and economy, comprehensive long-term population development in Russia, fertility rate change factors in China, Shanghai's population change, and population and economic development in Mian County, Shaanxi Province. Fertility rate changes were discussed, including multinational borderline value assumptions, recent trends in life span fertility rate in China, fertility rate in Jiangsu Province, fertility rate change in Zhejiang Province, and sterilization in Yangjiaping, Thailand. Population and employment discussions included the economic impact of world population change, the 1984 International Population Conference, changes in economically productive population and employment strategy, employed/unemployed populations in Guangdong Province, and the economic composition of China's population. Urbanization discussions covered population and development methodological problems, population growth and economic development in the Pacific region, surplus rural population transfer and economic development in China, urbanization analysis, trends and urban population distribution problems, and Laioning Province population development. Issues in migration, population distribution, and regional population included migration and development of the Great Northwest, internal migration to Beijing, Chinese population growth and economic development by major region, and current population changes of Chinese Tibetans. Under social problems of population, discussions included women's status, development and population change, Shanghai's aging trend, analysis of the aged population, analysis of educational quality in Anhui Province, and the retirement system in Chinese villages.     

世界主要国家人口与经济的发展状况分析

2000年世界人口已经达到60.5亿,80.38%集中在发展中国家,而据预测,到2025年,这一比例会进一步上升到84%,2050年上升到87%以上.世界人口的60%集中在10个人口在1亿以上的人口大国中.发展中国家人口的快速增长,已经或正在吞食着其经济发展的成果,使得人均收入水平难以提高.     

Population pressures in Latin America

In 1950 Latin America's population of 165 million was on a par with the 166 million of North America. 2 decades of growth at nearly 3% a year pushed the total to 405 million in 1985, vs. 264 million in North America. Despite substantial fertility declines since the 1960s, continued growth is ensured by the demographic momentum built into the region's large and youthful population bases. UN medium projections put the 2025 total at 779 million, compared to 345 million in North America. This Bulletin examines the main demographic changes in Latin America since World War II and their links to economic and social changes in the region as well as their implications for international and social relations. The post World War II population surge was accompanied by massive rural-ruban and international migration, rapid urbanization, large labor shifts out of agriculture into industry and services, increased education for both men and women, and higher labor force participation for females. The rural exodus was spurred by extreme land tenure inequalities and the urban bias of postwar industrialization. The labor-saving bias of this industrialization forced exploding city populations to turn to the informal sector for jobs. Population pressures on city services and housing as well as jobs have been further exacerbated by overconcentration in a few large cities and economic downturns of the 1980s. Recent fertility declines seem to be the result of both increased access to family planning and the economic and social pressures posed by the gap between young adults' aspirations and their ability to realize them. Population and economic pressures could induce faster fertility declines than now projected but in the short run are likely to mean more employment problems, continued rapid urban growth, and even larger international immigration flows within the hemisphere, particularly to the US.