Asian and Pacific population targets

2 population targets for the Asian and Pacific regions were established in 1981-82: 1) by the Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development at Beijing, China to attain 1% population growth rate for the Asian region by the year 2000, and 2) by the 3rd Asian and Pacific Population Conference at Colombo, Sri Lanka, to attain replacement level of fertility by the year 2000. In an attempt to ascertain whether these targets can be achieved and/or related, the Population Division of the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) prepared population projections in which the 2 targets are achieved. These projections were prepared by aggregating the total population of member countries. When net reproduction rate (NRR) equals 1 (replacement level fertility) it will lead to a stable population with a growth rate of zero. In the short-term a population with replacement level fertility will continue to increase if it has a young age structure due to previous higher levels of fertility. Some projections for the period 1980-2005 are: 1) population growth rate will decrease from 1.78% to 1.05%, 2) total fertility rate will decrease from 3.63-2.11, 3) male life expectancy will increase from 59.8-67.3, and 4) infant mortality rate will decrease from 67.3-34.5. For the ESCAP region, a target of NRR of 1 would be easier to achieve than a growth rate of 1%. The UN projects the total population of the region to be 3,382,000,000 in the year 2000. If the NRR can be lowered to 1 by then, however, the total population would be 3,342,000,000 and if the growth rate can be reduced to 1% by the end of the century the resulting population would be 3,300,000,000. Major demographic benefits will be attained in terms of the age structure of the population if a 1% growth rate is achieved; the proportion under age 15 was 37.1% in 1980 but will be 27.2% in 2000 with a dependency ratio of 48.8 compared to 70.8 for 1980.     

The prospects of Chinese population growth from 1978 to 2028]

The author presents two alternative projections of the future growth of the Chinese population. The first describes the probable population in 2000 based on official estimates for 1978 and assuming that national population policy goals can be implemented. The second projects population growth for the period 1978-2028 based on the 1978 age composition of the population and average birth and death rates for the period 1973-1978. Two conclusions are drawn. First, the national goal of zero population growth by 2000 will not be reached; at the earliest, the population will cease to grow in 2015. Second, in 2003 and 2028 the young population will greatly outnumber the aged, and in 50 years time half the population will be over 40 years of age.     

World population beyond six billion

This world report reviews population growth pre-1900, population change during 1900-50 and 1950-2000, causes and effects of population change and projections to 2050. World population grew from 2 billion in 1900 to almost 6 billion in 2000. Population showed more rapid growth in the 17th and 18th centuries. Better hygiene and public sanitation in the 19th century led to expanded life expectancies and quicker growth, primarily in developed countries. Demographic transition in the 19th and 20th centuries was the result of shifts from high to low mortality and fertility. The pace of change varies with culture, level of economic development, and other factors. Not all countries follow the same path of change. The reproductive revolution in the mid-20th century and modern contraception led to greater individual control of fertility and the potential for rapid fertility decline. Political and cultural barriers that limit access affect the pace of decline. Population change is also affected by migration. Migration has the largest effect on the distribution of population. Bongaarts explains differences in fertility by the proportion in unions, contraceptive prevalence, infertility, and abortion. Educational status has a strong impact on adoption of family planning. Poverty is associated with multiple risks. In 2050, population could reach 10.7 billion or remain low at 7.3 billion.     

An analysis of the 1987 population situation in China]

Presented here is an analysis of some of the manually collected data from a 1% random sample of China's population taken on 7/1/87. 1)Population growth: The population grew 6.36% from 1982-87 to give a total population of 1,072,330,000. Even though the average annual growth rate of 1.24% during these years is slower than the growth rate of the 1950s and 1960s, this does not mean that China can be complacent about it. Due to China's large population base, every year its population increases by about 13,000,000, with serious implications for consumerism, education and labor. The natural rate of growth dropped during 1982-84, but by 1987, it had increased again to 1981 levels. If China is to limit its population to 1.25 billion by 2000, the average annual growth rate must remain below 1.23%, which is lower than the figures of recent years. 2) Sex differences: the population was 51.1% male and 48.9% female. 3) Age structure: 28.68% of the population were 14 years and younger; 65.86% were between 15-64 years; 5.46% were 65 years and older. The median age was 24.2 years. The percentage of the 0-14 year bracket dropped about 7.6% from 1953-87, while the 15-64 year olds increased 6.6% and the 65 years and older group increased 1%. On the surface, a 1% increase of the aged would not present a problem to China taken as a whole. However, when densely populated areas such as Shanghai are looked at, the situation demands immediate attention. 4) Ethnic groups: 92% of the population were Han. Minorities increased 5% annually between 1982-87 to comprise 8% of the population. This rapid growth among minorities is due in part to official permission for families to bear more than one child, and to better sanitary and medical attention. 6) Population distribution: 37.1% of the population lived in urban areas, as compared with 10% in 1949. By 1990 the urban population could reach 40%, creating serious social, economic and political pressure on cities.     

The United Nations on World Population in 2300

The Population Division of the United Nations biennially issues detailed population estimates and projections covering the period 1950–2050. The most recent revision of these estimates and projections, the 2002 assessment, was released in February 2003. At irregular intervals, the Population Division also publishes long‐range projections. The most recent of these, covering the period up to 2150, was issued in 2000, based on the 1998 assessment. On 9 December 2003, the Population Division released the preliminary report on a new set of long‐range projections, dovetailing with the 2002 assessment, that extend over a much longer time span: up to 2300 ( http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/longrange2.htm ). Unlike previous long‐range projections, which, apart from China and In‐dia, were prepared for large regional groupings only, the new projections are elaborated separately for 192 countries. Given the enormous uncertainties of the character of demographic trends over such an extended period, the information content of these projections is somewhat elusive. However, they are expected to be used to provide the demographic input for long‐range models of global climate change. Long‐range population projections also serve to demonstrate the unsustainability of certain seemingly plausible assumptions as to the future course of particular demographic parameters. In the present case, for example, the high‐fertility projection, reflecting a sustained total fertility rate at the relatively modest level of 2.35, by 2300 would yield a population of some 32 billion in the countries now classified as less developed. Or, in a yet more extreme exercise 0/reductio ad absurdum, maintaining constant fertility at present rates would result in a population size of some 120 trillion in the countries now classified as least developed. Apart from the “high fertility” and “constant fertility” models just cited, the projections are calculated for three additional instructive variants: “low fertility,”“medium fertility,” and “zero growth.” Underlying each of the five variants is a single assumption on mortality change: expectation of life at birth creeping up, country‐by‐country, to a 2300 level ranging between 88 and 106 years. International migration is set at zero throughout the period 2050‐2300 in each variant. Thus the projections are unabashedly stylized and surprise‐free, providing a simple demonstration of the consequences, in terms of population size and age structure, of clearly stated assumptions on the future course of demographic variables. Reproduced below is the Executive Summary of the preliminary report on the UN long‐range projections presented to a UN technical working group on long‐range projections at its December 2003 meeting in New York and slightly revised afterward. A full final report on this topic by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat will be published later in 2004.     

Demography in China: from zero to now

After 20 years of neglect the study of population and demography in China have come to be considered imperative. China has even accepted $50 million from the UN Fund for Population Activities to defray the cost of the 1982 census and help pay for action, training, and research programs. Institutions directed toward population studies have been established in many provinces during the 1970s. The principal types are population training and research institutes and offices within institutions of higher learning. In addition institutes outside the system of higher education and special units of population studies in various medical colleges were initiated. Between 1957-77 the large increase in population began to cause economic problems which were not admitted until the late 1970s. Since 1979 the country's efforts to lower the level of fertility have been organized in major policy statements calling for 1 child/couple and a rate of natural increase causing zero population growth by the year 2000. The Institute of Population Research was created in 1974 and it has provided population projections that have helped form population policy with a major focus on historical stages of growth in China as well as counteracting the lopsided population optimism which existed earlier. In 1978 a conference was held on the science of population theory which identified areas for study such as: 1) population and economics, 2) capitalist population theories, 3) population policies, 4) family planning and economics, and 5) population problems in foreign countries. The author describes some of the literature which was published after the 1978 conference and the reappearance of academic journals in 1979 as well as the 1979 conference. 1980 and 1981 studies dealt with such topics as debates on Malthusian theory, zero population growth, urban and rural populations, historical demography, housing, employment, health improvement of the population, minorities, and fertility determinants. Chinese scholars have also begun to cooperate with their foreign colleagues in a variety of studies. In order to illustrate the wide variety of directions which Chinese population studies are taking the author provides a bibliography of population studies from 1977-81.     

Chinese population prospects projection]

Production of population and goods are closely related, mutually restricted, and should be included in our economic plan. Population projection is important in implementation and study of population policy. It is also the foundation of population regulations. Assuming 2 children per couple the population growth rate will be 1% in 1985 and .6% in the year 2000. Therefore, we cannot realize our goal of .5% population growth rate by 1985 and 0% by 2000. A 9% annual growth rate of national production will be required to reach our goal of $1000 U.S. per capita income by the year 2000, a goal that history proves is difficult to achieve. 2 children per couple, therefore, cannot meet our urgent requirements of modernization and educational improvement. A 2nd assumption of 90% single child families after 1 year would yield an average annual population growth rate of .38% in 1985 and .012% in the year 2000. This assumption leads to a rapid population decrease, too rapid for most to accept the change. The 3rd assumption is a gradual increase in single child families to 50% in 1985 and 90% in the year 2000. The resulting growth rates will be .5% in 1983 and near 0% in the year 2000. The projected population boom from 1987 to 1996 will be decreased to an annual increase of .4-.5%. This assumption provides time for people to understand and recognize the importance of the policy. It meets the requirements of modernization and will help improve China's educational and living standards. All 3 assumptions were based on 3 children per couple for minorities.     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

The outlook of China's population after the stabilization of birth policy

A professor of the Institute of Population Research of the People's University of China attempts to project the future population development of China so that stabilization of the birth policy can be assessed. He divides China into the economically developed and population-controlled area (29% of the population), the economically subdeveloped and population fairly-controlled areas (59% of the population), and the economically less-developed areas where fertility is high (12% of the population). China's population is expected to increase because of the baby boom to 1.25-1.3 billion by the year 2000. Between 1996 and 2000, the growth rate is expected to decelerate and reach zero growth. After 2010, if growth is held at the replacement rate of 2.1, the population will still continue to grow slowly. Around 2100, China's population should be around 1.45-1.59 billion. This would cause a decrease of 27% of arable land. With a decline in fertility rate comes a rise in the amount of the aged population (4.9% in 1982 vs. 5.5% in 1987). The proportion of aged citizens is expected to rise with the stabilization policy until around 2040 where it can be held at about 18%. China's GNP by the year 2000 is expected to be US$1183.8 billion with the per capita GNP about US$934 (providing the population is controlled). Compare this figure with the per capita GNP of the world (US$30,100) and of developed countries (US$10,700) in 1988, and one can see that China is far behind the rest of the world in economic growth.     

On the situation and tasks of current birth planning work]

This is the text of the closing speech delivered by the author at the 2nd Chinese National Symposium on Population Theories held on December 13, 1979. The meeting had been successful for several reasons, including the concern, support, and leadership of the State Council, provincial, and revolutionary committees. Under the leadership of the State Council, targets of natural population growth rates were established for 1980 and 1981. Financial rewards for couples producing only 1 child had been planned. Contraception, adequate child care, and eugenics were stressed. Attendants were urged to learn from Sichuan's successful experience. During 1979, a policy was established that advocates 1 child/couple and penalizes couples producing 3 children. Agreements were signed with the UN whereby China would receive US $50 million during 1980-1983 for equipment upgrading, education, and other related purposes. The goal for a 1% growth rate could not be achieved in 1979; the actual rate was probably about 1.2%. The major reasons for this failure could be attributed to traditional feudal concepts still prevalent among many Chinese as well as to organizational problems among birth planning units and technical problems in birth control. With goals of population growth set for 1980, and 1985 and zero growth at 2000, China would encounter tremendous difficulties in its efforts to achieve them. However, under the determination and leadership of the central government coupled with valuable experience over the past 30 years, these goals would be attainable.     

The evolution in China's fertility and an analysis of population development]

There have been numerous projections on China's population at the end of century. Their differences are due to different estimations on the effects of fertility determinants. 2 simulation models have been developed, both from micro and macro levels, to estimate the population at the end of the century on the basis of 6 different fertility patterns. 3 possible options for fertility patterns are discussed. 1.) The 1 child per family option means that every couple has 1 child by the year 1989, the population of China will be 1.2 billion in the year 2000. Even if this is a ideal situation, it would not be a feasible policy, as the pressure from the rural population to have more than 1 child has been increasing in recent years. Nevertheless, it is still possible for urban couples to accept having only 1 child. Therefore, encouraging more people to have 1 child should be held as a basic policy. 2.) Under the option of 2 children per family with 2 or 3 years of spacing, the total population in the year 2000 would be 1.2 - 1.4 billion, which is unacceptable in terms of the development situation. 3.) Following a differential fertility policy towards urban, rural, and minority populations would mean that urban couples would have 1 child, rural couples whose first child is a girl or those who are in special circumstance would have 2 children. Minorities would have 2 or 3 children. AMong the above options, number 3 is more likely to be achieved in view of current socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic factors.     

Alternative Projections of the U.S. population

The U.S. Bureau of the Census recently released a set of population projections that include middle and high projections that we argue are too conservative. The projections discount the possibility of future baby booms and assume slow rates of mortality decline and low levels of immigration. In this article we explore the impact on the size and age composition of the U.S. population of alternative scenarios of plausible fertility, mortality, and immigration assumptions. We conclude that (1) the Census Bureau's highest projection might be interpreted as a reasonable middle projection, (2) a reasonable high projection would yield a U.S. population in 2080 some 300 million persons larger than the Bureau's highest projection, with the population 85 and older more than twice the Bureau's greatest estimate, and (3) uncertainty about the pace of population growth is substantially greater than the Bureau's projections suggest.     

Voodoo forecasting: Technical,political and ethical issues regarding the projection of local population growth

The case of an energy production community in Colorado is used to illustrate a) the great need for reliable subnational population forecasts, especially in communities expecting rapid population growth, and b) why such projections, as currently performed, cannot be reliable. Explanations for failure in forecasting are found in the methods themselves, the unavailability and unreliability of key data, politics, and the intrusion of the designers' and users' values into the forecasting models. As one solution it is proposed that forecasting be reconceptualized from a technical to an ethical issue and that it be based upon an active rather than a passive planning/forecasting philosophy. As such, the community and industry would set a desired, realistic goal, and forecasting models would be run backwards to determine the economic-demographic paths by which this goal could be achieved.     

Urban Growth in Developing Countries: A Review of Projections and Predictions

Comparison of the United Nations' earliest and most recent projections to the year 2000 suggests that urban and city growth in developing regions has occurred much more slowly than was anticipated as recently as 1980. A modified “urban population explosion” in developing countries since the 1970s conforms to explanatory models of urban growth developed by economists around 1980. Trends in productivity and terms of trade, in particular, have been highly favorable to agriculture as compared to manufacturing, presumably slowing migration to urban centers. Increases in national population growth rates have produced less than commensurate increases in rates of city growth, further supporting an economic and migration-related explanation for unexpectedly slow recent urban growth. Despite the efforts of the United Nations to maintain reliable statistics on urban and city populations, urban population projections should be interpreted with caution because of inadequacies of the data on which they are based. Moreover, current projections that virtually all world population growth in the future will occur in urban areas of developing countries may be misconstrued, if the forces that have retarded urban growth in recent years persist.     

Dynamics of some special populations with NRR = 1

We discuss two special cases of population dynamics with changing vital rates subject to the constraint NRR = I and consider the specifics of ergodicity and stationarity. By restricting the number of age groups to two, we can make explicit the way weak ergodicity works. When mortality is constant and the period NRR = I, a life-table stationary population eventually results; everything of demographic interest (except age-specific fertility and the cohort NRR) is asymptotically constant. With changing mortality, but both period and cohort NRR = 1, only weak ergodicity holds, and everything changes over time.     

More people - more energy: it seems obvious enough,but Carter plan ignores population

In President Carter's National Energy Plan, there are variable factors, including the coal production rate, standards for home insulation and auto mileage, various taxes, but not the population growth rate. The latter factor is considered to be beyond the influence of public policy; it is a constant. This seems irrational to zero population growth proponents, for there are alternatives to continued U.S. population growth, and these alternatives are more readily attainable than some of the elements in Carter's plan. With some national initiatives in population planning, energy use would be considerably less. Thus, the question remains - Why would Carter not deal with the population factor? 1 reason for this is the fact that population planning is a long-term approach; the results are indirect and not reflected immediately in energy comsumption. Yet, a start must be made in the short-term if there are ever to be long-term benefits. Russell Peterson has suggested that Carter could be ignoring the population factor because of "political sensitivity." Carter's people have ignored the population issue, and press coverage following Carter's energy pronouncements has excluded the population factor. In a situation such as this there seems little hope for increased public awareness of the population factor in energy or other public concerns.     

Demographic Prospects 2000–2050 According to the 2000 Revision of the United Nations Population Projections

The Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat biennially issues revised versions of detailed population estimates and projections for over 200 countries, territories, and regional aggregates of the world. Highlights of the latest set, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision, were released 28 February 2001 (Draft ESA/P/WP.165). This 76‐page document is available at « http://www.un.org/esa/population/wpp2000.htm ». The full results of the projections will be published in a series of three volumes, currently under preparation. Key findings of the projections, as presented in the Executive Summary of the document, are reproduced below.     

China’s Demographic Future Under the New Two-Child Policy

China implemented the two-child policy in 2016, however, potential impacts of this new policy on its population reality have not been adequately understood. Using population census data and 1% population sampling data during the period of 1982–2015, this study develops a fertility simulation model to explore the effects of the two-child policy on women’s total fertility rate, and employs Cohort Component Method in population projections to examine China’s demographic future with different fertility regimes. The fertility simulation results reveal that the two-child policy will make significantly positive effects on China’s total fertility rate through increasing second births, leading to a sharp but temporary increase in the first 5 years after the implementation of the new policy. In addition, population projections using simulated total fertility rates show that the Chinese population would reach its peak value around the middle 2020s and be faced with the reduction of labor force supply and rapid aging process, featured with remarkable increases in both size and share of the elderly population. The findings suggest that the two-child policy would undoubtedly affect China’s fertility rates and demographic future; however, the effects are mild and temporary.

     

Economic blessings seen in Z.P.G

According to S.F. Singer and Bradley W. Perry in their study published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, the U.S. and its individual workers will be better off economically if population growth is reduced to zero. Making use of a computer, the researchers tested 3 fertility rates in mathematical models simulating the U.S. economy, population, and resources. They found that decreased childbearing would lead eventually to a smaller overall Gross National Product, but the share of economic welfare per person would increase. Lower fertility would have the following advantages according to Singer and Perry: 1) reduced requirements for business investment to keep up with an expanding labor force; 2) reduced depletion of and demand for the finite amounts of natural resources, resulting in lower costs and less need for marginal resources; 3) smaller expenditures for pollution control and less degradation of the environment; 4) a higher proportion of Americans in the usual working ages; and 5) smaller expenditures therefore, for schooling and child care, but without significantly increased medical expenditures for the elderly. The lower fertility option tested by computer was a completed fertility rate of 1.7 children/woman, along with net immigration of 400,000. This option would lead to an end of population growth in 50 years.