Studying the fertility peak in Beijing]

Beijing, China, is experiencing a baby boom in response to 2 periods of large population increase in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. The average number of annual births was 220,000 in the first period and 269,000 in the second period. The causes of the large increase in the population in the first period were an improvement of health conditions which led to a reduction in mortality, immigration flow, and an erroneous population policy. The causes in the second period were recuperative fertility after three years of natural calamity and increased fertility among immigrants. Net migration had an important role in population growth these two periods; it also will have an important impact in future population changes. According to population projections, another baby boom is expected to occur before the end of the end of the century. During the up-coming baby boom period, 1.54 million births are expected, 190,000 per annum. The average increase in population size is expected to 127,000 per year. In the peak year, it may be around 200,000. Thanks to the family planning (FP) program the occurrence of the third baby boom in Beijing has been postponed and the duration will be shortened. From 1972 to 1982, 2.57 million births was averted due to FP, which drastically reduced pressure on the demand for resources and on the momentum of the next baby boom. Another baby booms is not expected during the early half of the 21st century, although an elevated birth rate within the range of normal fluctuation is predicted. The projection was based on the assumption of restricted migration and the enforcement of the FP program. The realization of the projected population will depend on deferred marriage, deferred child-bearing, prolonged birth spacing, the prevention of high parity fertility, the maintenance of the current population policy, and control over the reproductive behavior of the new migrant population.     

An analysis of baby boom characteristics in China

This article analyzed the 3rd Chinese baby boom and its causes by focusing on the fertility intensity of women and the number of births per year. The 3rd baby boom is expected to end in 2002 and to peak in 1995. The baby boom in urban areas will last a much shorter time than in rural areas. Particular differences are manifested between provinces: 1) The baby boom will last 3-4 years in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and will last 10 years in Liaoning, Jilin, and Jiangsu. In other provinces, the boom will last 15-23 years; 2) The peak years are different between provinces; 3) The base number of births curves are province-specific; 4) The absolute base birth numbers are different between provinces (Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, and Sichuan 700,000; Beijing, Tianjin, Qinghai, and Ningzia 100,000); and 5) The shapes of progressive increases for base number of births are province specific. The increase in the number of childbearing-age women, the unplanned higher parity births, and early marriage and childbearing have all contributed to the current baby boom. Recommendations to control the problem include controlling higher parity births, observing birth spacing, and controlling the age of marriage and childbearing.     

The Baby Boom and Its Causes: What We Know and What We Need to Know

This study analyzes the timing, magnitude, and volume of the mid‐twentieth century baby boom in European and non‐European Western countries. The baby boom is found to have been especially strong in the non‐European countries, fairly strong in some European countries, and quite weak in others. While the boom has often been linked with postwar economic growth and the recuperation of births postponed during the Depression era, we argue that this is only a limited part of the story. In most cases the recovery of the birth rate started well before the end of World War II, a fact not accounted for by existing theories. We investigate the roles played by the recovery of period as well as cohort fertility, the underlying marriage boom, and the recovery of marital fertility. We identify major puzzles for future research, including the reasons for strongly declining ages at marriage and the role played by contraceptive failure in the rise of high‐parity births.     

Sum up experience to make continuous progress

Population control in China has been very successful in combatting the extremely rapid growth in population (birth rate: 1960's 33.65/1000; 1970's 24.57/1000; 1980's 18.3/1000). The female mean age for 1st marriage has increased from 19 in the 1950's to 22.63 in the 1980's. Infant mortality has declined substantially from the 1950's to the present (200 deaths/1000 vs. 81.3/1000 (cities)). Most people have embraced family planning and population control and have emphasized quality of childrearing vs. quantity. The goals of China's policy are as follows: economic development of the nation and well-being of individuals; coordination of population growth and socioeconomic development; implementation not only in accordance with state condition, but also according to the wishes of the people; continued success of the population and family planning organization network; integration of state guidance with individual voluntariness; and strengthening the unified leadership of the state. China's 3rd baby boom began in 1986 and will last through 1995. Unplanned children will count as 30% of the annual births. Government action is attempting to strengthen family planning education and research. These measures will help control the expected population boom.     

U.S. population: where we are; where we're going

This Bulletin reviews recent trends in the dynamics and character of the U.S. population, the outlook for the remainder of the 1980s, and prospects for longterm growth. Estimated at 232 million as of mid-1982, the U.S. population is currently growing at about 1% a year, one of the developed world's highest growth rates. Natural increase (births-deaths) still adds some 1.7 million people a year, despite the rapid postbaby boom fall in fertility to a near-record low rate of 1.9 births/woman in 1981. With increasing numbers of refugees, net legal immigration averaged 600,000/year in 1979-81 and the net inflow of illegal immigrants may now be 500,000 a year. Uncertainty over potentially large numbers of immigrants complicates projections of future U.S. population size. Currently, the U.S. death rate is at an alltime low. More than 1/2 the population now resides in the South and West. Rural areas and small towns grew faster than urban areas in the 1970s for the 1st time in over a century. Educational attainment is at an alltime high, as is labor force participation, due to increasing employment among women and the baby boom generation's arrival at working ages. The age composition of the population, with the bulge of the baby boom generation surrounded by the older "depression" generation born during the 1930s and the younger "baby bust" generation born since the end of the 1960s, presents special problems for U.S. society.     

Demographics and housing in America

Family-building needs of the "nesting" generation and its offspring, the baby boomers born 1947-1964, dominated post-World War 2 housing demand and production to 1970. Centered on tract-house suburbia, annual housing starts averaged 1.5 million a year in the 1950s and 1960s. With growing real median family incomes, the average size of new dwellings increased and 63% of households owned their homes by 1970, compared to 44% in 1940. The baby boomers' arrival at the ages of household formation sparked the "Golden Housing Age" of the 1970s. Net household increase averaged a record 1.7 million a year and 19 million year-round dwellings were added to the national inventory compared to 11 million in the 1950s and 1960s, despite a plunge in housing starts during the 1974-75 recession. Real median family income declined after 1973 and inflation escalated housing costs but at the same time fueled demand for housing as an investment hedge against inflation. The singles and "mingles" life styles of youthful baby boomers boosted rental housing, condominiums, and compact townhouses. Married-couple households dropped from 74% of the total in 1960 to 58% in 1975. Household formation and housing starts dropped drastically with the 1980-82 recession but bounced back as the economy recovered in 1983-85 and restrained inflation braked housing cost rises. Projections show overall household increases reduced to barely a million a year in 1990-95, with renter household gains at just 175,000, compared to 1/2 a million a year in the 1970s, as the household-formation ages of 18-34 are taken over by the baby bust generation. This will be offset by the baby boomers' maturing into middle age. By 1995 most of the giant generation will be in the peak-earning, high-homeownership ages of 35-54. Married-couple households in this age bracket will account for 56% of the household gain from 1983 to 1995, boosting national affluence and the demand for upscale housing, likely to be located in the suburbs.     

从生育高峰出生同期群看我国农村养老模式的选择

第一次生育高峰期出生的人口,受到国家计划生育政策的影响,生育的孩子数目减少,是未来农村老年贫困的高发群体。国家应该对他们的老年生活给予资助。最后,对建立普享型老年津贴的可行性进行了分析。     

The economic explanation of fertility changes in the United States

Abstract It is widely assumed that fertility varies positively with economic conditions. Actually this assumption receives little support from the historical record. For a century before 1930 fertility declined while the economy expanded and real incomes rose. Then for nearly three decades fertility and incomes fell and rose together. Since 1960 they have again moved in opposite directions. Clearly, no simple generalization about their relation will hold water. More sophisticated explanations are based on relative rather than absolute incomes. Banks suggested that the downturn in English fertility in the 1870's might have occurred because standards of middle-class consumption rose faster than middle-class incomes, but he found the evidence inconclusive. To reconcile the post-war baby boom in the United States with earlier experience, Easterlin has argued that fertility is determined by the relationship between the income of couples in their twenties and the income of their parents ten to fifteen years earlier. Among the weaknesses of this theory as applied to U.S. experience are its failure to explain the sharp drop in fertility, including that of native white urban women, in the 1920's; the fact that fertility rose most in the baby boom at the higher socio-economic levels where incomes rose least; and the sharp decline of fertility after 1962 in spite of the favourable trend of incomes, including those of younger people. The broad conclusion is that while couples no doubt do consider income, employment opportunities, etc. in deciding how many children to have, such considerations have had a relatively minor influence on changes in fertility, which for the most part have been the result of changes in attitudes. Even the post-war baby boom was a result not only of higher incomes and full employment but also of a shift in attitudes toward family size, particularly among the better-educated, economically better-off sections of society.     

Baby booms,busts, and population ageing in the developed world

The key challenge facing contemporary society is a process of population ageing rooted mainly in past fertility cycles. The goals of the study reported in this paper were (i) to analyse jointly the post-1930s baby boom and the baby bust that followed, (ii) to consider the specific ways this particular combination influenced the process of ageing in different societies, and (iii) to evaluate some possible implications for policy of different historical experiences. Demographic time series for 27 nations in the developed world were used. The main results confirm the importance of the boom and bust fertility cycle of the second half of the twentieth century for population ageing. Some countries will experience ageing processes driven mainly by the growth of elderly populations while others will age largely as a result of declines in working-age populations. These differences underscore the need to tailor policy priorities for specific patterns of ageing.     

Canada's population: growth and dualism

In Canada the current 1.3% population growth rate is causing some concern. Those concerned argue that such a rate of growth in combination with high levels of consumption could jeopardize the country's resource base and its comfortable style of living. Many Canadians are questioning high levels of immigration, for now that the fertility level is below replacement level, net immigration contributes substantially to population growth (over 1/3 in 1976). The growing proportion of non-Europeans among recent immigrants is causing resentment, and, in a tight job market, immigrants are regarded as threats to the World War 2 baby boom cohort who are now at working ages. The baby boom generation also puts stress on housing and health services, and it will increase the need for pension checks as it ages. Although French fertility is no longer high and immigration is no longer dominated by the British, the French group's 200-year struggle to preserve its identity continues on in the current effort of the Quebec government to enforce the use of French language by law within that province. Geography and climate dictate another demographic fact that divides the country and pervades its history. In addition to intense regionalism, uneven population distribution is responsible for 2 other concerns: the rapid growth of several already large cities and depopulation of many small communities. Focus in this discussion is on Canada's population growth in the past and as projected for the future, historical and current fertility, mortality and immigration trends, the search for a new immigration policy, the impact of the baby boom generation on the population's age structure and the problems this creates, and recent shifts in population distribution and in the country's ethnic and linguistic makeup. The population policy proposals evolved thus far involve to a great extent the use of immigration as a lever for achieving given population objectives.     

The marriage boom and marriage bust in the United States: An age–period–cohort analysis

In the 1950s and 1960s there was an unprecedented marriage boom in the United States. This was followed in the 1970s by a marriage bust. Some argue that both phenomena are cohort effects, while others argue that they are period effects. The study reported here tested the major period and cohort theories of the marriage boom and bust, by estimating an age–period–cohort model of first marriage for the years 1925–79 using census microdata. The results of the analysis indicate that the marriage boom was mostly a period effect, although there were also cohort influences. More specifically, the hypothesis that the marriage boom was mostly a response to rising wages is shown to be consistent with the data. However, much of the marriage bust can be accounted for by unidentified cohort influences, at least until 1980.     

Understanding U.S. fertility: findings from the National Survey of Family Growth,Cycle III

The 1st overview of findings from Cycle III of the National Survey of Family Growth, the latest of 7 such surveys of US fertility since 1955 and the 1st to cover all women of childbearing age in the conterminous US is presented. Interviews between August 1982 and February 1983 with 7969 women, representative of 54 million women aged 15-44, reveal that sterilization is now the leading contraceptive method in the US, used by 33% of all contraceptors in 1982 (22%, female sterilization; 11% male sterilization), followed by the pill (29%), condom (12%), diaphragm (8%), and IUD (7%). Linked to this is the continuing decline in unwanted births since the baby boom peak in 1957, which accounted for nearly 1/2 of the drop between 1973 and 1982 in ever-married women's children ever born, from 2.2 to 1.9/woman. However, births conceived sooner than planned increased slightly among younger married women, probably due to the large drop in pill use since 1973 and increased use of the less effective diaphragm and condom among couples still intending to have more children. Black women are now more likely than white women to use the most effective female methods: female sterilization, pill, and IUD. Only 45% of women aged 15-44 in 1982 had used a contraceptive method at 1st intercourse. 4 out of 5 women married for the 1st time between 1975 and 1982 had intercourse before marriage. However, premarital sexual activity may be leveling off among white teenagers after a steep rise since the early 1970s and declining moderately among black teenagers. 16% of 1st marriages among ever-married women aged 15-44 in 1982 had been dissoved within 5 years, mostly by divorce or separation. 59% of black women with children in 1982 had their 1st birth before marriage, compared to 11% of white mothers. The proportion of babies who were breastfed more than doubled between 1970-71 and 1980-81, from 24 to 53%.     

The two generation urbanite hypothesis revisited

It is generally accepted that socioeconomic differentials in fertility are minimal among urban couples with nonfarm origins -- two generation urbanites. In this paper, we replicate Duncan's (1965) analysis to see if the two generation urbanite hypothesis holds for more recent cohorts of American women. In four cohorts of women, drawn from three recent fertility surveys, we find no support for the two generation urbanite hypothesis. It appears that the links between farm background, socioeconomic status and fertility were different for the low fertility cohorts of women born in the early 1900's and the more recent cohorts of women who experienced the baby boom.     

components of change in the number of households: 1970–1980

There was an increase from 62.8 to 79.1 million households in the United States during the 1970s. The number of households increased much more rapidly than the population. This paper decomposes this growth in the number of households into components associated with changing age and marital status composition and changing age by marital status-specific propensities to form households. About one-third of the increase in the number of households was due to increased age by marital status propensity to form households, and two-thirds was due to shifts in the age by marital status distribution and population growth. The increased propensity to form households had its major impact at ages under 35, and primarily among never-married persons. The composition component had its primary impact at ages 25–44 as a result of the baby boom, and also because of the increased fractions never married and separated and divorced.     

The end of “Catholic” fertility

Catholic and non-Catholic fertility during the post-World War II period are compared in this paper. Evidence accumulated across five sample surveys of fertility in the United States, which were conducted at five-year intervals from 1955 through 1975, forms the basis for the analysis; both cohort and period measures are employed. Starting from a situation where Catholic fertility was very little higher than that of non-Catholics, it is shown that the differential increased markedly during the baby boom and then declined to a point where the two trends nearly come together in the mid-1970s. Interpretation of the recent convergence in the light of various theories that have been put forward to explain the differential suggests that it will be an enduring phenomenon.     

Who is holding the baby? Women's experiences of contact with their baby immediately after birth: An Australian population-based survey

BackgroundSeeing and holding their baby immediately after the birth is the pinnacle of the childbearing process for parents. Few studies have examined women's experiences of seeing and holding their baby immediately after birth. We investigated women's experiences of initial contact with their newborns using data from an Australian population-based survey.MethodsAll women who gave birth in September/October in 2007 in two Australian states were mailed questionnaires six months following the birth. Women were asked three questions about early newborn contact including where their baby was held in the first hour after birth and whether they were able to hold their baby as soon and for as long as they liked. We examined the association between model of maternity care and early newborn contact stratified by admission to SCN/NICU.ResultsThe majority (92%) of women whose babies remained with them reported holding their babies as soon and for as long as they liked in the first hour after birth. However, for women whose babies were admitted to SCN/NICU only a minority (47%) reported this. Women in public models of care (with the exception of primary midwifery care) whose babies remained with them were less likely to report holding their babies as soon and for as long as they liked compared to women in private care.ConclusionOur findings suggest that there is potential to increase the proportion of mothers and fathers who get to hold their baby immediately after the birth by modifying birth suite and operating room practices.     

Grasp the work of family planning by unifying thinking and stabilizing the policy

The China Population Information and Research Center reported that in 1988 the number of childbearing women between 20 and 49 was 4.65 million above 1987, but the population growth rate was 0.19 lower than in 1987. Controlling the population is still a difficult problem. The 3rd baby boom of New China; economic, cultural, social, and other factors; and the uneven progress of family planning are cited as causes of the lack of control. The 13th Party's Congress in 1989 plans to work to reform family planning and control population growth. In particular, late marriages and childbearing will be promoted; in cities, one-child-per- couple will be policy; in rural areas, only girl households will be allowed another child only after several years; local family planning regulations will be supported; and research on family planning and safer, longer acting contraceptives will be financed.     

The demographic transition in the Korean peninsula, 1910-1990: South and North Korea compared

North and South Korea have both experienced demographic transition and fertility and mortality declines. The fertility declines came later in North Korea. In 1990, the population was 43.4 million in South Korea and 21.4 million in North Korea and the age and sex compositions were similar. This evolution of population structure occurred despite differences in political systems and fertility determinants. Differences were in the fertility rate and the rate of natural increase. The total fertility rate was 2.5 children in North Korea and 1.6 in South Korea. The rate of natural increase was 18.5 per 1000 in North Korea and 9.8 in South Korea. Until 1910, the Korean peninsula was in the traditional stage characterized by high fertility and mortality. The early transitional stage came during 1910-45 under the Japanese annexation. Health and medical facilities improved and the crude birth rate rose and then declined. With the exception of the war years, population expanded as a function of births, deaths, and international migration. Poor economic conditions in rural areas acted as a push factor for south-directed migration, migration to Japan, and urban migration. Next came the chaotic stage, during 1945-60. South Korean population expanded during this period of political unrest. Repatriation and refugee migration constituted a large proportion of the population increase. Although the war brought high mortality, new medicine and disease treatment reduced the mortality rate after the war. By 1955-60, the crude death rate was 16.1 per 1000 in South Korea. The crude birth rate remained high at 42 per 1000 between 1950-55. The postwar period was characterized by the baby boom and higher fertility than the pre-war period of 1925-45. Total fertility was 6.3 by 1955-60. The late transitional stage occurred during 1960-85 with reduced fertility and continued mortality decline. By 1980-85, total fertility was 2.3 in the closed population. The restabilization stage occurred during 1985-90, and fertility declined to 1.6. In North Korea, strong population control policies precipitated fertility decline. In South Korea, the determinants were contraception, rising marriage age, and increased use of abortion concomitant with improved socioeconomic conditions.     

Delayed childbearing in the U.S.: facts and fictions

Between 1970-82, the proportion of 1st births in the US to women 25 and older rose from 19-36% and the proportion of women still childless at ages 25-34 increased by 56% at about the same time. Although a sharp contrast with the baby boom era of the 1950s and 1960s, todays's epidemic of delayed childbearing is similar to patterns earlier in the 20th century. As then, much is due to delayed age at marriage, but baby boomers now in the their late 20s and early 30s are also delaying childbirth after marriage. The trend stems in part from their economic difficulties as they compete in a tight job market caused both by their large numbers and a turbulent economy. But it is also related to women's increasing education and, in turn, increasing opportunities in and commitment to the labor force, which can be expected to encourage a delayed childbearing even after prospects brighten for young people. Although a diverse group, most of today's delayed childbearers are white, highly educated, 2-career couples. Adequate daytime care for preschool children is a prime concern. Although more employers now offer childcare assistance and flexible work schedules to working parents, the juggle between jobs and childraising can be a strain. On the plus side are delayed childbearers' greater maturity and generally higher incomes, which can ease potential problems created by parent-child age differences as their children grow up. Businesses have been quick to respond to the new market of older, affluent, 1st-time mothers. New methods of treating of circumventing infertility and prenatal detection of chromosomal birth defects can now help overcome potential biological problems that may concern women who choose to delay childbearing past age 30.     

Is demography destiny? The role of structural and demographic factors in Australis past and future labour supply

Following the release of the Intergenerational Report, the Australian Treasury identified the levers to address the economic effects of demographic ageing as ‘the three Ps’: population, participation and productivity. To date, the first ‘P’, population, has been treated as an exogenous factor, with the common view being that there is very little that the government can do to supplant demographic ageing. Focusing upon labour supply, this paper shows how variation in Australia’s underlying demography can significantly alter Australia’s future labour supply. Although governments cannot redirect the cohort flow component of population ageing, much can be achieved in promoting growth of the labour supply by maintaining or increasing fertility (in the longer term), or increasing targeted migration (in the short to medium term). This paper also decomposes the relative role of cohort flow, changing demography and changing labour force participation on the growth of the labour supply over the past 20 years. Over this period, the entry of the baby boom generation (cohort flow) and increased labour force participation of women accounted for almost all of the growth in the labour force. Changing demography had very little effect. However, Australias future labour supply will not include a large increase in cohort flow (as caused by the baby boomers) or a very large increase in female labour force participation. Regardless of the assumptions used, labour supply growth will be considerably lower in the next and subsequent 20 years, when compared to the previous 20.