World and regional labour force trends and prospects

Changes in fertility during 1970-1985 will not have any effect on the composition of the world work force until 1985 because the people who will be of working age at that time have already been born. However, fertility for this period will directly influence the size of the age group 15-30 in the year 2000. Moreover, fertility trends for this period will have an indirect effect on participation of women in the labor force. The number of people in the labor force has proportionately followed total population. Just as total population is projected to increase in the single decade 1970-1980 by an amount equal to its size in 1750, so the labor force will increase by 360 million during the 1980's (its original size in 1750). By the end of the present century the world labor force may well number some 2,6000 million, reaching 3,000 million by the year 2010; 4,000 million by 2030; 5,000 million by 2070; and stabilizing at about 5,200 million by the end of the 21st century. There will be great regional variations. Increases will range from 20-35% in Europe and the U.S.S.R. to 100-120% in South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For East Asia and North America the increases may amount to 60% by the year 2000 and 100% by 2050. In 1970 less developed regions had 2/3 the world's labor force; by 2000 they will have 3/4. In 1970 about 20% of the labor force in more developed regions were working in agriculture while in less developed regions 2/3 were so engaged. In other terms, in more developed regions 10 farmers supported 108 persons while in less developed regions 10 farmers supported only 38. According to Food and Agriculture Organization projections, by 2000 only 3.5% of the labor force in developed regions and 43.5% in less developed regions will be in agriculture. Differences in gross national product between regions is striking. In 1970 the less developed regions contained 70% of world population, 67% of the world labor force, 87% of the world agricultural labor, and produced 15% of its wealth. There are also sharp contrasts in participation in the labor force. In less developed countries more youths and older persons are in the labor force while in developed countries more women work. By the year 2000 female activity rates in more developed regions will increase for ages 20-64 and decrease for those under 20 and over 64. This will raise female participation in the labor force to 35%. In less developed regions female participation is expected to decline. The proportion of young workers is expected to increase in less developed and decline in more developed regions; the same will be true for older workers. The dependency burden will be concentrated among the young in less developed nations; in more devel oped regions there will be larger numbers of older dependents.     

Demography of ageing

The world's elderly population, 60 years and older, reached 251.6 million by 1950, 488 million by 1990 and, according to United Nations projection estimates, it will reach 1205.3 million in 2025. These figures mean an increase of 144% between 1950 and 1990 and of 146% between 1990 and 2025. Asia accounted for the highest number of elderly persons: 49.2%, in 1990, Europe reported 19%, Africa 6.3%, and Latin America 6.5%. On the other hand, over the next 35 years, the European region figure will decrease to 12%, while other regions will show increased percentages: 58% for Asia and around 8% for Africa and Latin America. Fertility and mortality decreases in developing countries will result in the elderly population constituting 12% of the total population in the year 2025. In this same year, Latin America will have the same high proportion of elderly persons as the world will have in the year 2020. On the other hand, some of the developed regions, such as Northern America and Europe, will reach figures around 27%. Below the average value for these regions in the year 2025 will be the former Soviet Union with 20% and Oceania with 19.2%. Another way to confirm population aging is by computing the median age of a population. Thus, while in 1950 the world median age was 23.4 years, it increased up to 24.2 years in 1990, and is estimated to be 31.1 years by the year 2025. Developed regions show higher population aging than the less developed ones. In fact, in 1990, developed countries had a median age of 33.7 years and developing countries had a median age of 22 years. While the median age will be 40.7 years for developed countries in the year 2025, it will only be 29.7 years for less developed countries. Nevertheless, this relatively high median age indicates that the aging process has already started in less developed countries.     

The participation of women in the labour force of Latin America: fertility and other factors

The level of labor force participation among Latin American women, when compared with participation rates for other countries, is the lowest in the world. Only 20% or less of women 10 years of age and older are economically active. This level did not change much between 1950 and 1970. Few women work in agriculture. The following factors are considered for their effect on labor force participation of urban women: marital status, education, income, and the structure and stage of development of the society. Married women have a low participation rate. More highly educated women are more likely to work, but there must be demand for their work services. As the economy of various countries has progressed, female participation in domestic services has decreased, in industry has remained constant between 1960 and 1970, and in social services has expanded. It is concluded that work participation for married women will only increase with the following changes: 1) improved educational opportunities for women; 2) structural change and modernization in the economy; and 3) reduced family fertility. Changes in the first 2 factors are more important than reduced fertility. Since 1960, only Chile and Costa Rica have had a 25% decline in fertility rates.     

Cohort shifts in the timing of births in Ghana

A comparison of cohorts of ever-married Chanaian women suggests evidence of a fertility transition beginning among younger women and select subgroups. Ghana's crude birth rate declined from a high of 50/1000 population in 1970 to 38.8/1000 in 1985. To ascertain whether marital fertility is now being controlled through conscious attempts to lengthen birth intervals, World Fertility Survey data from 1979-80 on the timing of births among different birth cohorts were analyzed. It was hypothesized that, as a result of the influence of Western values that stress independence from parents and the introduction of compulsory education, cohorts of the mid-1950s and 1960s would be more likely to postpone childbearing, more active in the modern sector of the economy, and more accepting of modern contraceptive usage for birth spacing than women in the 1930-39, 1940-49, and 1950-59 cohorts. For the 1940-49 cohort, it took 10.8 months for 25% to have a birth following 1st marriage, 18.7 months for 50% to have a 1st birth, and 27.4 months for 75% to complete this step. By comparison, these figures for the 1955-64 birth cohort were 9.9, 16.7, and 20.5 months, respectively. The significantly shorter (p 0.01) interval between marriage and 1st birth found among younger women in part reflects rising age at marriage; mean age at 1st marriage was 17.9 years for the 1940 cohort and 21.6 years for the most recent cohort. After the birth of the 1st child, recent cohorts were more likely to wait longer for the 2nd birth. For women born in 1950-64, it took 21.8, 36.7, and 44.6 months for 25%, 50%, and 75%, respectively, to reach parity 2. This pattern of lengthened birth interval beyond the 1st birth was apparent at all parities in the youngest cohort and indicates increasing acceptance of contraception among those who have come of age during a period of rapid social change.     

Communique on the one-in-one thousand sample survey of birthrate of China's population

To analyze the history of the marriage and birth of Chinese women and to inspect the results of family planning work, to do well the jobs of demographic forecasting and formulating demographic plans, to provide a reliable basis for strengthening the scientific management of family planning work, the state Family Planning Commission organized and carried out a nationwide 1-person-in-1-thousand survey of birthrates in 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. The following are survey results: 1) 24.77% of the total survey population were women between 15 and 49 years of age; 2) among the women of childbearing age, 31.46% were unmarried, 64.53% were in 1st marriages, 2.89% were remarried; .19% were divorced but not remarried, and .94% were widows; 3) the average age of first marriage was 18.4 in the 1940s, 19 in the 1950s, 19.8 in the 1960s, 21.6 in the 1970s, and 23 in the late 1970s; and 4) the average number of births was 5.44 in the 1940s, 5.87 in the 1950s, 5.8 in the 1960s, and 4.01 in the 1970s. The survey reveals that education level and occupation have a strong relation to childbearing among Chinese women. The survey found that China and 170 million married childbearing aged women and that 118 million or 69.46% used birth control measures. 33 million couples had 1 child only, among them 42.3% has officially committed themselves to maintaining a 1 child family. The data reveal that major achievements in family planning work have been obtained, but the mission ahead is still arduous.     

Ökonomische und nicht-ökonomische Gefahren für Demokratien

Muller (1995a) claimed that during the 1960s and 1970s countries with (high) income inequality are more likely to face decline in democracy than countries with lower income inequality. This article uses new data to compare the negative impact of two economic determinants (income inequality, inflation) and two non-economic determinants (percent of Islamic population, world system periphery) on democracy. It is found that neither income inequality nor world system periphery does contribute to the explanation of the decline in democracy. Only inflation offers a tentative explanation for decline in democracy. The validity of the results is lessened by sample problems. Especially the data from communist countries appear to be less reliable.     

Argentine experience in the field of illegal immigration

This article provides a brief history of Argentine policy toward migratory flows from neighboring countries and Europe, and concludes with statistics on the number of foreigners in Argentina in the 1970-80 period. Measures passed during the 1940s and 1950s were aimed at providing amnesty for foreigners who were residing in Argentina without immigrant status. However, the lack of an adequate administrative structure to regulate foreigners at the borders was a drawback for migration authorities and limited the possiblility of applying admission criteria effectively. By 1970, there were 583,000 foreigners from neighboring countries living in Argentina, which represented a 25% increase from 1960. 42% of these migrants were in the metropolitan region of the country, indicative of a shift away from employment in agriculture. Decree No. 87, passed in 1974, represented an extension of a migration policy aimed at granting ample facilities for permanent residence to aliens from contiguous countries and was designed to prevent abuse of clandestine workers by employers. As a result of this measure, 150,000 foreigners were able to settle legally in the country. A 1981 law, yet to be implemented, establishes a new legal framework aimed at fostering immigration and regulating the admission of foreigners. To attain the objective of settling workers in areas of the country considered of prime importance to economic development, the law provides for infrastructural investments and promotional measures in areas such as tax exemption and the granting of credit. The 1980 National Population Census indicated there were 677,000 foreigners from neighboring countries in Argentina. In that year, foreigners comprised 2.4% of the country's population and 3.1% of the inhabitants of the metropolitan region. These figures are indicative of a decline in the growth of immigration, most likely due to the decline in the purchasing power of workers' salaries in the late 1970s.     

Physician-nurse migration to the United States: regional and health status origins in relation to legislation and policy

This article examines the origins of physicians and nurses who were admitted as permanent immigrants to the US from 1962-1979. Data are mainly from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Countries used in the developmental analysis are only those whose population was estimated at 1 million or more as of mid-1979, encompassing 99% of the physicians and 97% of the nurses. Life expectancy at birth is the criterion used to differentiate origin countries by developmental dimension of health status. During the study period, health workers constituted about 30% of immigrants admitted to the US; of these, nurses and physicians constituted 72-82% throughout the study period. The period 1962-1979 has 4 distinct phases, marked by important legislative and/or policy changes; 1) 1962-1965, when the McCarran-Walter Act prevailed; 2) ending in 1968, the 2nd phase covers the transition mandated under the 1965 Immigration Act, which encouraged physician immigration; 3) the 3rd phase, 1969-1976, covers the transition to the 1976 Immigration and Nationality Act amendments; and 4) the 4th stage is 1977-1979. Results show that 1) under the McCarran-Walter Act, North America became the dominant physician source; 2) from 1966-1968, Asia attained dominance as the physician source and became even more predominant after 1968; 3) North America produced relatively few physicians in the early 1970s; 4) Europe produced substantially fewer physicians in the 1970s than in the 1960s; 5) South America, Africa, and Oceania were the lowest contributors of physicians; 6) during the McCarran-Walter years, North America and Europe produced almost 90% of nurses admitted into the US; 7) the 1965 Immigration Act and its aftermath resulted in Asia becoming the dominant source of nurses; 8) prior to the 1965 Immigration Act, Canada generated 20% of the aggregate number of physicians; 9) the Philippines surpassed Canada during the transition and India led after the transition; and 10) Canada supplied 30% of the nurses up through the transition, with the Philippines in the lead 1969-1979. Low health status countries were a relatively minor nurse source. Health status at the origin was a far less significant determinant of physician immigration than that of nurses. English language high and low health status country groups produced substantially more physician and nurse immigrants that their corresponding non-English language counterparts. The US attracted more physicians and nurses from less developed countries than more developed countries after 1968.     

Determinants of Black Suburbanization: Regional and Suburban Size Category Patterns*

This study analyzes the movement of blacks to the suburbs of American metropolitan areas, using the framework developed by Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) for the analysis of racial transition in inner city neighborhoods. The data are consistent with their model and suggest that the rate of black population growth is a function not only of the characteristies of individual suburbs themselves, but also of the central cities of the metropolitan areas within which they are located. The units of analysis are all suburbs with populations of 10,000 or more in 1960 and 1970. Suburban size is a key characteristic because the independent variables affect black population growth quite differently in different size categories. While there are clear differences between southern and nonsouthern suburbs in average levels of the push and pull variables, as well as the rate at which the black suburban population grew in the 1960s, the effects of these variables on black suburban growth were the same in both regions.     

Planned relocation of severely depopulated rural settlements: a case study from Japan

Large-scale rural-urban migration in post-war Japan in conjunction with demographic transition resulted in the depopulating of the rural areas from the late 1950s. The Japanese government has been energetic since 1970 in attempting to halt the drift to the cities. One of the less successful policies has been the voluntary resettlement of severely depopulated communities.This paper examines one such extreme case, that of Kojō, a village in the mountains of Hyōgo Prefecture, which has lost more than 80% of its population since 1955. By the early 1980s, the population of Kojō was so depleted and had aged so rapidly that the inhabitants opted for resettlement.This paper traces the economic and demographic decline of the village of Kojō, and presents the administrative background to the resettlement plan. It examines in detail the rehabilitation of the inhabitants in a purpose-built housing estate in December 1984, and attempts to draw some conclusions regarding the concept of resettlement of severely depopulated settlements in remote rural areas.     

Modernization and the demographic transition: cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of a revised model

Problems associated with past research on the fertility-development issue are identified in this article, and a model of the macro-level determinants of fertility -- a model informed by the revised theory of fertility transition -- is specified. This model is estimated both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. In addition, a model is specified that assesses the importance of a family planning program effort on fertility change in less developed countries. The effects on fertility change of other variables is controlled. Using crude birth rates for 117 countries, the model is operationalized and the revised model is applied to 1974 rates. A longitudinal model of 1955-1959 to 1974 change in rates is then tested. The final model for 81 less developed countries from the original set of 117 countries includes a measure of family planning effort. Results support the view that high levels of modernization increase motivation to control fertility, but they also show that excessive reliance on developmental change in less developed countries to bring about fetility declines would prolong unnecessarily the current period of rapid population growth. The dominant role of modernization in the models that lack data on family planning programs only facilitates understanding of the past. Modernization is not the only road to future lower fertility. Modernization, abortion, and family planning programs are explicit policy relevant variables. It was found that legalized abortion has a large and independent impact on lowering birth rates and that family planning programs also reduce unwanted births in less developed countries. These programs were the most important factor related to change in 1955-1959 to 1974 crude birth rate.     

Debt and the Built Urban Environment: Examining the Growth of Urban Slums in the Less Developed Countries, 1990–2010

The present study examines the influence of external debt on the change in the proportion of the total population living in urban slum conditions in the less developed countries between 1990 and 2010, drawing from a political economy of the world-system theoretical perspective. Ordinary least squares panel regression illustrates external debt as a percent of gross national income has a statistically significant positive effect producing higher levels of urban slum growth. This result is recurrent across all developing countries but is particularly strong among sub-Saharan African nations. Further, urban population growth 1960–1990 exhibits a positive effect contributing to higher urban slum growth. The results support the hypothesis that external debt burden is an important factor contributing to higher levels of urban slum growth in the less developed countries between 1990 and 2010. This effect, moreover, is particularly strong among sub-Saharan African countries relative to developing countries within other regions of the world.     

The implications of the demographic transition theory for fertility change in Nigeria

Data on educated urban women in Nigeria demonstrate the effect women's education and urbanization has on reproductive behavior, marriage, family formation, and family relationships. Available health services contribute to a fall in infant mortality, but most services are in urban areas. Further, people of high socioeconomic status who have access to modern health services are more concerned about public health problems than those in the low group. Urbanization occurs at a rate of about 11%/year. In Lagos, people with primary education delay marriage 1-2 years longer than those who have no education. Further, 71% of uneducated people in Ibadan who were = or + 38 years old were in a polygynous marriage compared to 38% of educated people in the same age group. The actual and desired family size in Nigeria ranks amoung the highest in the world. In addition, only 20% of the total population use modern contraceptives and usage is highest in Lagos and Ibadan. Most acceptors are educated urban middle class who use contraceptives to space births instead of the traditional spacing methods of postpartum abstinence and prolonged lactation. Eventually more and more urban middle class women will use contraceptives to prevent births. 1% of these acceptors are demographic innovators, however. Further they begin to use contraceptives at high parities. Still child mortality among them is lower than others. Since the late 1970s, as people are being exposed to Western culture, the economy has improved, mortality has fallen, more children attend schools, yet fertility has grown substantially in urban and rural areas. With the expansion of Western education to females, the changing pattern of life style of the educated urban middle class, and increase of women in nontraditional professions, expectations and needs of children will change. Around 2000 Nigeria will begin its demographic transition from high to low fertility.     

Does Europe need immigrants? Population and work force projections

European countries defined as all Northern and Western Europe including the former East Germany had a population of 498.4 million in 1990. In 1990 Western Europe had 374.4 million people. The European Community (EC) makes u 92% of the total population. Projections forecast a peak of the EC population (excluding the former East Germany) in 2005 at 334.2 million compared with 327 million in 1989, then declining to 332.5 million in 2010, 329.0 million min 2015 and 324.5 million in 2020. In Europe outside the East, the 20-24 year old work force entrance age group will drop from 29,860,000 in 1990 to 26,400,000 in 1005 and 23,480,000 in 2000: decreasing by 6,380,000 or 21.3%. Fertility rose by 22% in Sweden between 1985 and 1990, the rise of negligible in France and Belgium, but 2% in the UK and Switzerland, 4% in the Netherlands, 13% in Norway, 16% in Denmark, and even 6% in Germany and Luxembourg. The Ec labor force was 145 million in 1990 (excluding East Germany); it is projected to peak at 146.9 million in 2000, decline slowly until 2010 and decline faster up to 2025 with the steepest decline occurring in Germany and Italy. Unemployment rates would change from the 1990 estimate of 15.7 million to 15.5 million in 1995. Net migration into the 12 EC countries was on average -4,800 from 1965 to 1969; 357,000 from 1970 to 1974; 164,400 from 1980 to 1984; and 533,000/year from 1985 to 1989 as a result of the rise of asylum applicants and migration of ethnic Germans into Germany. Increased immigration is not needed to satisfy work force shortages for the next 10-20 years in Western Europe or in the EC. Other issues addressed are the economic activity forecast, the hidden labor supply, skill shortages, Eastern Europe, and teenage shortage. High-level manpower movements, immigration of asylum seekers, and illegal immigration will continue, but in the long run the conditions of employment and welfare support have to be improved for the women of Europe.     

MEASURING AGGREGATE RELIGIOSITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1952–2005

I present a method for measuring aggregate religiosity. The method allows one to combine many indicators of religiosity, even if the indicators measure only a portion of religiosity, or if the indicators are not measured every year of the series. I demonstrate the method by measuring aggregate religiosity of the US population from 1952 through 2005. The results show the sharp rise in religiosity during the 1950s, the decline beginning in the 1960s, and the slower decline since the 1970s. I present evidence of content and convergent validity of this new index.     

Unsanctioned births in China

This study hypothesizes that "unsanctioned" births (beyond the limit authorized by the government) in China are more likely among couples who have strong traditional fertility norms and less likely among couples who adopt new family planning norms. The theoretical framework is based on cultural conflict theory as developed by Sellin. Data are obtained from 6654 ever married women aged under 49 years from the 1987 In-Depth Fertility Survey for Guangdong province. Over 30% of the sample were married before 20 years of age. 20% had 1 child, 26.7% had 2 children, about 23% had 3 children, 13.9% had 4 children, and under 10% had 5 or more children. The average number of living children was 2.5. Findings reveal that socioeconomic status was significantly related to unsanctioned births; they were more common in less developed areas and among women of lower socioeconomic status (SES). Persons living in areas with a high monetary contribution per person in family planning efforts at the county level were less likely to have unsanctioned births. Women who lived in urban areas, worked in state enterprises, and had parents with high educational status were less likely to have unsanctioned births. They were more likely among women who married at an early age, lived with parents after the marriage, had female living children, and had failed pregnancies. They were also more likely among women who had arranged marriages, a traditional desire for large family sizes, an early marriage ideal, and a preference for sons. Knowledge of family planning and greater use of abortion were related to a lower incidence of unsanctioned births. Women who talked with their husbands about their family size desires were less likely to have unsanctioned births. Parental educational attainment only had an influence among rural women. Variables impacted on fertility differently in urban and rural areas.     

Recent Trends in Metropolitan-Nonmetropolitan Fertility1

Abstract Although decline and convergence in metropolitan (metro) and nonmetropolitan (nonmetro) fertility levels are longterm trends, a detailed analysis of the period since 1970 shows a pattern of exceptions and conditions which underscore the need for giving continued attention to differences by residence. There was a divergence of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan fertility rates in the 1970–1980 decade, but the renewed convergence since 1980 has made an important contribution to the turnaround reversal of metropolitan-nonmetropolitan population change. This recent rate convergence is not a simple coming together of the age-specific rates, but the balancing of changes in opposite directions for younger and older women. Metro-nonmetro differences widened in favor of nonmetro for women 20–24 years of age and in favor of metro for women over 30 years of age. The apparent catching up of postponed first and second births is found primarily among metropolitan women over 30 years of age.     

One century of foreign immigration to the United States: 1880-1979

Due to declining fertility rates and increased numbers of immigrants, legal foreign immigration now comprises 1/4 of the US's annual population growth. This article uses 1900-1979 Immigration and Naturalization Service data on immigrants' intended destination to examine immigration policy and its effect on immigrants and the American people. From the US's beginnings to the 1880s, immigrants came mainly from Great Britain, Germany, and other Northern and Western European countries, in the 1890s; over 70% of immigrants came from Italy, Austria, Hungary, Russia, and Germany. Immigration had peaked at over 1 million persons a year at the outbreak of World War I, then declined sharply, and rose again greatly during the first 2 decades of the 20th Century. The first significant legislation to restrict ethnic groups was in the early 1880s with the Chinese Exclusion Act; In 1924, Congress passed the 2nd Immigration and Naturalization Act which used the 1890 census to set quotas for ethnic groups, and later used the 1920 census to fix quotas in the national origins system; both pieces of legislation favored Northern and Western Europeans. Immigration declined drastically during the 1930s and early 1940s, but the Displaced Persons Act, the War Brides Act, and 1950s legislation allowed more Asian refugees and some other ethnic groups to enter the country. The nationality origins quotas were eliminated in 1965, and were followed by dramatic changes in immigration character as persons from formerly low quota nations flooded into the US. 1976 and 1978 legislation made immigration still more equitable, and the Refugee Act of 1980 allowed admittance of 50,000 refugees with no regard for geographic or ideological biases. A preference system, in operation since 1924, has favored relatives of citizens and immigrants with certain skills. Females presently outnumber male immigrants, average immigrant age is 26.2 years, and over 1/2 of the immigrants since 1950 have been housewives, children, or others with no occupation. In the 1970s, 1 in 10 immigrants was a professional or technical worker, probably from Asia. In 1900, most immigrants headed for mainly northern, industrialized cities, especially New York. In recent years, too destinations have included New York, California, Washington, Texas, and Florida. Throughout the century, 3/5 immigrants went to only 5 states, so many states have received very few immigrants since 1900. Due to the amount spent on receiving refugees, and economic and job problems, many Americans think immigration should be greatly limited. Today's 1 million legal and illegal immigrants will continue to change the composition of the American population, as the long established Northern and Western European population declines.     

Thailand's responses to transnational migration during economic growth and economic downturn

This paper gives an historical overview of immigration to Thailand since the 1970s and emigration since the 1960s. It describes migration policies since the 1930s. Final discussion focuses on the impact of economic contraction on migration. Immigration to Thailand dates back to the 1760s when a huge wave of Chinese emigrated to Thailand. The flow continued until about 1850 and resumed during 1905-17. The next big waves of immigrants were after 1975, when refugees fled Indochina, and in the 1990s, when migrants flocked from neighboring countries drawn to the booming economy. Thai professionals left in the 1960s for the USA. During the 1980s, many left for work in the Middle East. During the 1990s, Thai migrants moved within the East and Southeastern Asian countries and the USA or Europe, and they included many women and illegal migrants. Emigrants leave as arranged by the government, by employers, by recruitment agencies, and as trainees. The first official act was in 1950 and revised in 1979. Many work permits were approved in the 1990s, especially for unskilled labor. There are supports for Thai migrants abroad, but little is offered to foreigners at home. By 1997, the country's recession led to nonrenewal of many work permits. The 1998 economic crisis led to a new labor policy that deported illegal and unskilled migrant workers in order to create jobs for Thais. Policy encouraged Thais to seek work overseas.     

The Changing Culture of Fatherhood in Comic‐Strip Families: A Six‐Decade Analysis

A content analysis of 490 Father's Day and Mother's Day comic strips published from 1940 to 1999 indicates that the culture of fatherhood has fluctuated since World War II. “Incompetent” fathers appeared frequently in the late 1940s, early 1950s, and late 1960s but were rarer in the late 1950s, early and late 1970s, early 1980s, and early 1990s. Fathers who were mocked were especially common in the early and late 1960s and early 1980s but were less common in the late 1940s, early and late 1950s, and early and late 1970s. Fathers who were nurturant and supportive toward children were most evident in the late 1940s, early 1950s, and early and late 1990s, with the longitudinal pattern resembling a U‐shaped curve. Differences between fathers and mothers also oscillated from one decade to the next.