The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for Short‐Term Funds

We study European banks' demand for short‐term funds (liquidity) during the summer 2007 subprime market crisis. We use bidding data from the European Central Bank's auctions for one‐week loans, their main channel of monetary policy implementation. Our analysis provides a high‐frequency, disaggregated perspective on the 2007 crisis, which was previously studied through comparisons of collateralized and uncollateralized interbank money market rates which do not capture the heterogeneous impact of the crisis on individual banks. Through a model of bidding, we show that banks' bids reflect their cost of obtaining short‐term funds elsewhere (e.g., in the interbank market) as well as a strategic response to other bidders. The strategic response is empirically important: while a naïve interpretation of the raw bidding data may suggest that virtually all banks suffered an increase in the cost of short‐term funding, we find that, for about one third of the banks, the change in bidding behavior was simply a strategic response. We also find considerable heterogeneity in the short‐term funding costs among banks: for over one third of the bidders, funding costs increased by more than 20 basis points, and funding costs vary widely with respect to the country‐of‐origin. The funding costs we estimate using bidding data are also predictive of market‐ and accounting‐based measures of bank performance, reinforcing the usefulness of “revealed preference” information contained in bids.     

存款保险制度、影子银行与银行系统性风险

为了防范系统性银行危机的发生,我国于2015年推出了存款保险制度,该制度能否有效降低我国银行系统性风险是关乎金融稳定的重要现实问题.以我国存款保险制度的实施为契机,本文基于16家上市银行2010年第四季度~2017年第二季度的面板数据,首先,将金融机构间的关联网络和金融机构市值纳入到系统性金融风险的测度中,进而探讨我国存款保险制度对银行系统性风险的影响及其作用渠道.结果表明存款保险制度的实施显著提高了其他商业银行(中、农、工、建以外的商业银行)的系统性风险;存款保险制度主要通过影子银行渠道增加其他商业银行的系统性风险.本文的研究对于我国强化影子银行的宏观审慎管理、引入基于银行系统性风险的差别存款保险费率设计和完善系统重要性金融机构的评定,具有一定的借鉴意义.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION IN MARKETS WITH NAÏVE CONSUMERS

In a model of a competitive industry selling base goods and add‐ons, we investigate the conditions under which citizen‐consumers will support policies that eliminate behavioral inefficiencies induced by naïve consumers. Unregulated competitive markets have two effects: they produce deadweight losses, and they redistribute income away from biased consumers. Both unbiased and naïve consumers believe that they benefit from this redistribution (the naïve consumers are wrong), so support for efficiency‐improving regulation is limited. Extending our model to consumers with partial sophistication about their naïveté, we predict patterns of regulation consistent with the form and timing of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009.     

EVALUATING THEORIES OF BANK RUNS WITH HETEROGENEITY RESTRICTIONS

This paper empirically tests theories of bank runs. We use a structural panel VAR to extract runs from deposit market data. Identification exploits cross‐sectional heterogeneity in deposit insurance: we identify bank runs as adverse deposit market supply shocks hitting uninsured banks harder compared to insured. Conditional on a run, we study the behavior of uninsured banks with bad and good fundamentals. We find that both experience runs, but deposit outflows at the former are more severe. Panic effects, which affect all uninsured deposits alike, irrespective of fundamentals, dominate in the aggregate. Insured banks partially absorb the outflow of uninsured deposits.     

Impact of Retailers with Knowledge of Supplier's Inventory on Supply Chain Performance

We model a supply chain consisting of a supplier and multiple retailers facing deterministic demand. We denote some retailers as strategic in the sense that given the supplier inventory information, they will implement the optimal stocking policy by incorporating such information. On the other hand, some retailers are denoted as naïve in the sense that they ignore supply information and resort to a simplistic ordering policy. Naïve retailers learn the optimal policy over time and adjust their orders accordingly. We study the dynamics of this game and investigate the impact of such strategic and naïve retailers on the cost, ordering pattern and stocking policies of all parties. We analyze the supply chain under two scenarios: the centralized supply chain where the objective is to minimize the total supply chain cost, and the decentralized supply chain where each self‐interested player minimizes its own cost in a Stackelberg game setting. We fully characterize the optimal policies under both centralized and decentralized scenarios and show that, surprisingly, the supply chain might be better off by virtue of naïve retailers. The result is driven by the fact that strategic and naïve players’ decisions shift the positioning of inventory in the supply chain with its final impact being determined by the relative costs of different retailer‐types. Our results also offer managerial insights into how access to supply information can improve supply chain performance.     

A Periodic Inventory Model for Stocking Modular Components

We study the benefit obtained by exploiting modular product design in fulfilling exogenous demand for both a complete assembly and its components in a service parts inventory system. Our goal is to reduce overall service system costs by allowing assembly and/or disassembly (A/D) to occur at some unit cost per A/D action. In an extensive set of computational experiments, we compare a naïve stocking and operating policy that treats all items independently and ignores the modular product structure and related A/D capability to the optimal base stock policy, and to a policy that allows A/D from the naïve stocking levels. While extensive computational analysis shows that the optimal base stock policy improves the system cost between 3 to 26% over the naïve approach, simply allowing A/D from the naïve stocking levels captures a significant portion (an average of 67%) of the naïve–optimal gap. Our computational results demonstrate that the optimization shifts the component‐assembly mix from the naïve levels and that limiting A/D capacity affects this mix. Limiting A/D capacity can actually increase the expected number of A/D actions (versus the uncapacitated case), since the optimization shifts stocking levels to reduce the probability that “too many” actions will be required.     

我国金融机构的系统性金融风险评估——基于极端分位数回归技术的风险度量

本文将极值理论引入到系统性金融风险度量中,通过极端分位数回归技术估计我国33家上市金融机构对金融系统整体的风险贡献,并识别出我国系统重要性金融机构。研究结果表明,我国金融机构的市场价值总资产收益率呈现明显的非正态分布特征,使用极端分位数回归技术可以更准确的度量尾部的风险联动性;银行类金融机构的系统性风险贡献水平最高且波动变化最大,系统性风险贡献排名前十的金融机构基本为银行类机构;证券类、保险类、信托类金融机构的风险贡献水平相对较低;通过与其他研究的对比发现,考虑到极端情形下的尾部风险联动性时,股份制商业银行对金融系统的风险贡献上升。本文的研究为系统重要性金融机构的宏观审慎监管提供了实证依据。     

跨部门金融机构系统重要性和共振效应的动态演化研究——基于中国A股市场的实证

金融机构由于其规模性和关联性对金融系统稳定有着举足轻重的作用。本文基于金融机构异质性风险下的收益，通过Granger因果引导关系构建金融部门的关联网络，从机构中心性、关联性和系统紧密性分析不同市场状态下银行、证券、保险和信托部门内和跨部门间的关联网络动态演化，并在关联分析的基础上引入规模指标，对金融机构的系统重要性进行综合评价。研究发现，我国金融系统的整体性和关联性日趋增强，系统内各部门之间和单一部门内金融机构联系都日趋紧密，跨部门间系统共振效应不断增强；银行和证券部门的影响力显著高于保险和信托部门，银行和保险部门的Granger影响力在熊市时相对增强，牛市时相对减弱，证券和信托部门的影响力则恰好相反；从多角度分析金融共振效应，最终给出我国金融机构系统重要性的分层级评价。结果不仅可以为金融机构的监管和系统性风险的控制提供参考依据，也可以对资本市场投资提供借鉴意义。     

中国A股市场金融板块间风险相依关系及动态演化研究

将中国金融板块细分为国有大型银行、全国性股份制银行、城商行、证券、保险和信托等6个金融子板块，并以2015年中国股市异动和2019年新冠肺炎疫情为研究背景，分析在两个场景下的不同时期内，6个金融板块间的风险相依关系及其动态演化。通过计算各板块间波动指数的互信息，构建金融板块风险相依关系网络，并使用最大生成树刻画该相依关系的核心结构。研究发现，在市场处于相对平静时期，银行类金融板块与非银行类金融板块二者彼此之间的风险关联较弱，处于相对割裂状态；在市场走势波动较大时，银行类金融板块与非银行类金融板块之间的风险关联程度增强，且保险板块成为重要的中间节点；在两个场景下的异动期和疫情期，国有大型银行板块和城商行板块分别成为最大的风险节点。     

双渠道风险传染下银行系统稳定性分析

随着金融危机的频率和范围的不断扩大,银行系统性风险的研究越来越受到重视。针对银行业系统性风险,构建银行同业拆借（直接传染渠道）、银行共同持有资产（间接传染渠道）的双渠道风险传染网络模型。该模型引入了宏观经济波动带来的投资风险,并允许银行通过贬值出售资产来弥补流动性,这更真实地反映了银行系统的操作规则。研究结果表明,在各种经济因素波动情况下,平均储蓄量、储蓄的波动幅度、投资的收益率、存款准备金率以及储蓄利率等对银行系统稳定性的有较大影响,并进行了定量分析。该研究为定量研究宏观经济波动下银行系统性风险问题提供了方案,并为决策者和监管部门防范银行系统性风险提供了参考。     

FINANCIAL CONTAGION THROUGH CAPITAL CONNECTIONS: A MODEL OF THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF BANK PANICS

Financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic setting with incomplete information and multiple banks. The equilibrium probability of bank failure is uniquely determined. We explore how the cross‐holding of deposits motivated by imperfectly correlated regional liquidity shocks can lead to contagious effects conditional on the failure of a financial institution. We show that contagious bank failure occurs with positive probability in the unique equilibrium of the economy and demonstrate that the presence of such contagion risk can prevent banks from perfectly insuring each other against liquidity shocks via the cross‐holding of deposits. (JEL: G2, C7)     

BANK NETWORKS AND MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION

This paper argues that the existence of bank networks is important for banks' reactions to monetary policy. For the example of Germany, it is found that small banks access the interbank market indirectly through the large head institutions of their respective network organizations. The interbank flows within these networks allow smaller banks to manage their funds in a fashion that helps them in keeping their loan portfolio with nonbanks relatively unaffected after a monetary contraction. This implies that tests for a bank‐lending channel in countries with comparable bank networks should not rely on a size criterion only, and explains why several recent contributions have found a prominent role for banks' liquidity positions. (JEL: C32, E52, G21)     

基于银行-资产双边网络模型的系统性风险及投资策略研究

受近几年的国际金融危机及金融全球化的影响,对金融系统的系统性风险的研究已成为国内外学者的关注热点。考虑到当前基于"银行-资产-银行"间接传播渠道的相关研究相对匮乏,本文基于银行-资产双边网络模型来分析银行系统性风险。首先,使用中国47家上市银行2018年的资产负债表数据构建了中国银行系统的双边网络模型,研究分析各类资产遭受冲击时外部冲击、降价出售效应及银行所持有的各类资产占银行总资产的比例对银行系统性风险的影响。然后,引入系统性冲击方式,通过设置具有不同属性的两大类资产并生成四种冲击事件来构建银行的投资策略模型,从资产视角探讨银行最优的投资策略。研究发现,外部冲击与降价出售效应这两个产生系统性风险的影响因素在一定区间值时会产生叠加效应,使银行系统性风险急剧增加;五种资产类中,贷款类资产对外部冲击最敏感;分析发现在各类资产冲击下都未倒闭的所有银行的资产组合具有一定的相似性;进一步研究发现银行系统中存在着最优的资产组合,使得银行在稳定的同时能获取最大收益,并且资产负债比越大的银行其风险承受能力越强,从而可以选择更激进的投资策略来追求高收益。     

When Gray is Good: Gray Markets and Market‐Creating Investments

Gray markets arise when an intermediary buys a product in a lower‐priced, often emerging market and resells it to compete with the product's original manufacturer in a higher priced, more developed market. Evidence suggests that gray markets make the original manufacturer worse off globally by eroding profit margins in developed markets. Thus, it is interesting that many firms do not implement control systems to curb gray market activity. Our analysis suggests that one possible explanation lies at the intersection of two economic phenomena: firms investing to build emerging market demand, and investments conferring positive externalities (spillovers) on a rival's demand. We find that gray markets amplify the incentives to invest in emerging markets, because investments increase both emerging market consumption and the gray market's cost base. Moreover, when market‐creating investments confer positive spillovers, each firm builds its own market more efficiently. Thus, firms can be better off with gray markets when investments confer spillovers, provided the spillover effect is sufficiently large. These results provide a perspective on why firms might not implement control systems to prevent gray market distribution in sectors where investment spillovers are common (e.g., the technology sector) and, more broadly, why gray markets persist in the economy.     

外资银行的进入对我国信贷市场贷款价格的影响

本文从中资银行和外资银行分别具有信息优势和融资成本优势的基本假设出发,建立了不对称信息下的银行信贷市场竞争模型,从贷款价格的角度来研究外资银行通过绿地投资和兼并收购两种方式进入对我国信贷市场的影响,且在并购方式中将并购对象按规模分为了本地大银行和小银行。结果表明,外资银行通过兼并收购本地大银行方式进入对贷款价格的降低效果不大,而通过兼并收购小银行方式进入能够全面降低本地银行的贷款价格,在处于竞争劣势地位的本地大银行的老客户市场通过绿地投资模式进入可以大幅度的降低贷款价格。     

A multivariate analysis of the financial characteristics of foreign and domestic banks in the UK

For the banking sector in the EU, the UK is one of the most important countries, since over a quarter of all banking assets in the EU are held in the UK and it is the largest single international banking centre, accounting for 20% of the world's cross-border lending. The UK banking sector has traditionally been one of the most open and it is characterized by a rapidly increasing foreign bank presence. Foreign banks account for 55% of the total assets of the UK banking sector. The objective of this paper is to investigate the performance of the banking sector in the UK focusing on the performance of the domestic banks as opposed to the performance of the foreign banks operating in the UK. For this purpose, a multivariate analysis is performed to identify the existing differences between the financial characteristics of domestic and foreign banks, considering profitability, liquidity, risk and efficiency factors. The data sample covers 26 domestic and 32 foreign banks operating in the UK over the period 1998–2001.     

金融压力指数构建及其有效性检验——基于中国数据的实证分析

金融压力指数能较好地实时反映一国金融体系承受风险的压力状况,帮助决策者和市场参与各方及时准确地前瞻性评估潜在风险来临时可能承受的金融压力水平。根据各市场对整个金融体系的影响程度,利用CDF-信用加总权重法确定各指标权重,构建了包括银行、股票、外汇、保险四大市场的我国金融压力指数测度模型体系。实证研究表明,我国金融压力的阶段性特征明显,在国际金融危机发生时,往往伴随着高的金融压力;我国金融压力主要来自于银行部门,随着近年来我国银行治理水平提高和资本市场发展,银行部门压力指数正缓慢下降,股票市场压力却逐渐上升;外汇市场和保险市场压力指数长期保持在低位运行。有效性检验表明,来自我国FSI的冲击在滞后6个季度会对宏观经济产生显著的不利影响。     

Competitive Goals and Plant Investment in Environment and Safety Practices: Moderating Effect of National Culture

Operations managers clearly play a critical role in targeting plant‐level investments toward environment and safety practices. In principle, a “rational” response would be to align this investment with senior management's competitive goals for operational performance. However, operations managers also are influenced by contingent factors, such as their national culture, thus creating potential tension that might bias investment away from a simple rational response. Using data from 1,453 plants in 24 countries, we test the moderating influence of seven of the national cultural characteristics on investment at the plant level in environment and safety practices. Four of the seven national cultural characteristics from GLOBE (i.e., uncertainty avoidance, in‐group collectivism, future orientation and performance orientation) shifted investment away from an expected “rational” response. Positive bias was evident when the national culture favored consistency and formalized procedures and rewarded performance improvement. In contrast, managers exhibited negative bias when familial groups and local coalitions were powerful, or future outcomes—rather than current actions—were more important. Overall, this study highlights the critical importance of moving beyond a naïve expectation that plant‐level investment will naturally align with corporate competitive goals for environment and safety. Instead, the national culture where the plant is located will influence these investments, and must be taken into account by senior management.     

基于信号博弈的中外资银行信贷竞争行为分析

在银行业全面开放及贷款利率市场化条件下,异,对中外资银行信贷舍约竞争行为的影响。结果表明：本文利用信号博弈模型,讨论了信息差异及经营成本差1）中资银行的竞争优势是老借款人。2）外资银行提供分离合约时,在中资银行的新借款人市场上将出现“柠檬效应”;外资银行提供混同合约时,中资银行将失去所有新借款人。     

向银行业投资的过度性甄别及动机分析

基于向银行业投资的资金总量与资金使用效率的关系,本文甄别了投资者投向银行业的资金是否存在过度投资现象,并提出金融业务特征假说来解释这一现象.研究结果表明,投向银行业的资金整体上存在明显的过度投资,且金融业务特征假说成立,即投资者正是因企图占有金融业务集聚的金融资源而过度投资.国有银行和城市商业银行的过度投资尤为突出,非上市银行也存在过度投资,并都证实了金融业务特征假说;从投资渠道来看,投向银行业的债权资金存在最为严重的过度投资,而金融业务特征假说在权益资金投资者上体现得最为明显.完善监管体制和提高信息透明度均有利于减轻过度投资并纠正不良的投资动机.