Social Learning in One‐Arm Bandit Problems

We study a two‐player one‐arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop experimenting is irreversible, and players observe each other's actions but not each other's payoffs. We prove that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies and provide several qualitative results on the sequence of cutoffs.     

Cost‐Benefit Analysis for Optimization of Risk Protection Under Budget Constraints

Cost‐benefit analysis (CBA) is commonly applied as a tool for deciding on risk protection. With CBA, one can identify risk mitigation strategies that lead to an optimal tradeoff between the costs of the mitigation measures and the achieved risk reduction. In practical applications of CBA, the strategies are typically evaluated through efficiency indicators such as the benefit‐cost ratio (BCR) and the marginal cost (MC) criterion. In many of these applications, the BCR is not consistently defined, which, as we demonstrate in this article, can lead to the identification of suboptimal solutions. This is of particular relevance when the overall budget for risk reduction measures is limited and an optimal allocation of resources among different subsystems is necessary. We show that this problem can be formulated as a hierarchical decision problem, where the general rules and decisions on the available budget are made at a central level (e.g., central government agency, top management), whereas the decisions on the specific measures are made at the subsystem level (e.g., local communities, company division). It is shown that the MC criterion provides optimal solutions in such hierarchical optimization. Since most practical applications only include a discrete set of possible risk protection measures, the MC criterion is extended to this situation. The findings are illustrated through a hypothetical numerical example. This study was prepared as part of our work on the optimal management of natural hazard risks, but its conclusions also apply to other fields of risk management.     

Supply Networks as a Complex Adaptive System: Toward Simulation‐Based Theory Building on Evolutionary Decision Making

In this article, we examine how the firms embedded in supply networks engage in decision making over time. The supply networks as a complex adaptive system are simulated using cellular automata (CA) through a dynamic evolution of cooperation (i.e., “voice” decision) and defection (i.e., “exit” decision) among supply network agents (i.e., firms). Simple local rules of interaction among firms generate complex patterns of cooperation and defection decisions in the supply network. The incentive schemes underlying decision making are derived through different configurations of the payoff‐matrix based on the game theory argument. The prisoner's dilemma game allows capturing the localized decision‐making process by rational agents, and the CA model allows the self‐organizing outcome to emerge. By observing the evolution of decision making by cooperating and defecting agents, we offer testable propositions regarding relationship development and distributed nature of governance mechanisms for managing supply networks.     

Decision Making in Cross‐Functional Teams: The Role of Decision Power*

Through a series of game‐theoretical models, this study systematically examines decision making in cross‐functional teams. It provides a framework for the design of an organization‐specific decision‐making process and for the alignment of a team's microdecision with the “optimal” decision that maximizes the firm's payoff. This study finds that even without changing the team leader, firms could change and even dictate the team's microdecision outcome via adjusting the team member's seniority, empowering team members with veto power or involving a supervisor as a threat to overrule the team decision. This finding implies that to reposition products in the marketplace, structuring cross‐functional teams’ microdecision‐making processes is essential.     

Co‐opetition and Investment for Supply‐Chain Resilience

This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The Harsanyi–Selten–Nash bargaining framework is used to model the supply chain participants' choice of risk mitigation investments. The bargaining approach allows a framing of both joint financing of mitigation activities before the fact and loss‐sharing net of insurance payouts after the fact. The disagreement outcome in the bargaining game is assumed to be the result of the corresponding non‐cooperative game. We describe an incentive‐compatible contract that leads to First Best investment and equal “gain” for all players, when the solution is “interior” (as it almost certainly is in practice). A supplier that has superior security practices (i.e., is inherently safer) exploits its informational advantage by extracting an “information rent” in the usual spirit of incomplete information games. We also identify a special case of this contract, which is robust to moral hazard. The role of auditing in reinforcing investment incentives is also examined.     

Bounds of Relative Regret Limit in p‐Robust Supply Chain Network Design

This research studies the p‐robust supply chain network design with uncertain demand and cost scenarios. The optimal design integrates the supplier selection together with the facility location and capacity problem. We provide a new framework to obtain the relative regret limit, which is critical in the robust supply chain design but is assumed to be a known value in the existing literature. We obtain lower and upper bounds for relative regret limit and obtain a sequence of optimal solutions for series relative regret limits between the upper and lower bounds. An algorithm for p‐robust supply chain network design is provided. A series of numerical examples are designed to find the properties of the bottleneck scenarios. A scenario with low probability and a low optimal objective function value for the scenario has a greater chance of being a bottleneck. To focus only on the influence from the relative regret, we also introduce three separate new objective functions in p‐robust design. The proposed new theories and approaches provide a sequence of options for decision makers to reduce the marketing risks effectively in supply chain network design.     

A Stochastic Inventory Model With Fast‐Ship Commitments

We present a multiperiod model of a retail supply chain, consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer, in which regular replenishment occurs periodically but players have the option to support fast delivery when customers experience a stockout during a replenishment period. Because expedited shipments increase the supplier's transportation cost, and possibly production/inventory costs, the supplier typically charges a markup over and above the prevailing wholesale price for fast‐shipped items. When fast shipping is not supported, items are backordered if customers are willing to wait until the start of the next replenishment period. We characterize the retailers and the supplier's optimal stocking and production policies and then utilize our analytical framework to study how the two players respond to changes in supply chain parameters. We identify a sufficient condition such that the centralized supply chain is better off with the fast‐ship option. We find a range of markups for fast‐ship orders such that the fast‐ship option is preferred by both the supplier and the retailer in a decentralized chain. However, a markup that is a win–win for both players may not exist even when offering fast‐ship option is better for the centralized chain. Our analysis also shows that depending on how the markup is determined, greater customer participation in fast‐ship orders does not necessarily imply more profits for the two players. For some predetermined markups, the retailer's profit with the fast‐ship option is higher when more customers are willing to wait. However, the retailer may not be able to benefit from the fast‐ship option because the supplier may choose not to support the fast‐ship option when fast‐ship participation increases due to the fact that the fast‐ship participation rate adversely affects the initial order size.     

Balancing Inventory and Stockout Risk in Retail Supply Chains Using Fast‐Ship

In this study, we consider a two‐retailer, one‐supplier supply chain in which retailers satisfy excess demand by offering to directly ship out‐of‐stock items on an expedited basis at no extra cost to customers. This practice is referred to as the fast‐ship option. We consider two scenarios along with the fast‐ship option. In the first scenario, retailers transship when out of stock, whereas in the second scenario, they do not. If they do not transship, some customers may perform the search on their own. In each scenario, the wholesale prices are either exogenous, or chosen endogenously by the supplier. For both cases, we determine the supplier's and the retailers’ optimal decisions. The key research question we ask and answer is the following: which of the two scenarios is preferred by either player when all decisions are made optimally? We show that when fewer customers are willing to search on their own and wholesale prices are exogenous, both the supplier and the retailers prefer to transship. In addition, the decision maker in a centralized chain will have the exact same preference as that of players in a decentralized setting when the retailers’ and the supplier's preferences coincide and wholesale prices are exogenous. This preference concordance does not hold if wholesale prices are endogenous.     

Optimal Sourcing and Lead‐Time Reduction under Evolutionary Demand Risk

We develop a real‐options model for optimizing production and sourcing choices under evolutionary supply‐chain risk. We model lead time as an endogenous decision and calculate the cost differential required to compensate for the risk exposure coming from lead time. The shape of the resulting cost‐differential frontier reveals the term structure of supply‐chain risk premiums and provides guidance as to the potential value of lead‐time reduction. Under constant demand volatility, the break‐even cost differential increases in volatility and lead time at a decreasing rate, making incremental lead‐time reduction less valuable than full lead‐time reduction. Stochastic demand volatility increases the relative value of incremental lead‐time reduction. When demand has a heavy right tail, the value of lead‐time reduction depends on how extreme values of demand are incorporated into the forecasting process. The cost‐differential frontier is invariant to discount rates, making the cost of capital irrelevant for choosing between lead times. We demonstrate the managerial implications of the model by applying it first to the classic Sport‐Obermeyer case and then to a supplier‐selection problem faced by a global manufacturer.     

The Impact of E‐Replenishment Strategy on Make‐to‐Order Supply Chain Performance

This research investigates the impact of electronic replenishment strategy on the operational activities and performance of a two‐stage make‐to‐order supply chain. We develop simulation‐based rolling schedule procedures that link the replenishment processes of the channel members and apply them in an experimental analysis to study manual, semi‐automated, and fully automated e‐replenishment strategies in decentralized and coordinated decision‐making supply chain structures. The average operational cost reductions for moving from a manual‐based system to a fully automated system are 19.6, 29.5, and 12.5%, respectively, for traditional decentralized, decentralized with information sharing, and coordinated supply chain structures. The savings are neither equally distributed among participants, nor consistent across supply chain structures. As expected, for the fully coordinated system, total costs monotonically decrease with higher levels of automation. However, for the two decentralized structures, under which most firms operate today, counter‐intuitive findings reveal that the unilateral application of e‐procurement technology by the buyer may lower his purchasing costs, but increase the seller's and system's costs. The exact nature of the relationship is determined by the channel's operational flexibility. Broader results indicate that while the potential economic benefit of e‐replenishment in a decentralized system is substantial, greater operational improvements maybe possible through supply chain coordination.     

Benefactors and Beneficiaries: The Effects of Giving and Receiving on Cost‐Coalitional Problems

Motivated by supply chain collaborations in practice, we introduce a class of cost‐coalitional problems, which are based on a priori information about the cost faced by each agent in each set that it could belong to. Our focus is on problems with decreasingly monotonic coalitional costs. In this class of problems, we study the effects of giving and receiving when there exist players whose participation in an alliance always contributes to the savings of all alliance members (we refer to these players as benefactors), and there also exist players whose cost decreases in such an alliance (we call them beneficiaries). We use linear and quadratic norm cost games to analyze the role played by benefactors and beneficiaries in achieving stability of different cooperating alliances. We consider different notions of stability (the core and the bargaining set) and provide conditions for stability of an all‐inclusive alliance of agents which leads to minimum value of total cost incurred by all agents.     

Long‐Term Contracting: The Role of Private Information in Dynamic Supply Risk Management

We examine the critical role of evolving private information in managing supply risk. The problem features a dyadic channel where a dominant buyer operates a multiperiod inventory system with lost sales and fixed cost. He replenishes from a supplier, whose private state of production is vulnerable to random shocks and evolves dynamically over time. We characterize the optimal inventory policy with a simple semi‐stationary structure; it distorts order quantity for limiting information rent only in the initial period; the optimal payment compensates for production cost in every period but concedes real information rent only in the initial period. These properties allow us to derive an easy‐to‐implement revenue‐sharing contract that facilitates ex ante strategic planning and ex post dynamic execution. This work advances our understanding on when and how to use private information in dynamic risk management.     

The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost‐Perfect Monitoring

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost‐perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n‐player games that satisfy the usual full‐dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap‐talk communication between players and no public randomization device.     

Distributionally Robust Optimization of Two‐Stage Lot‐Sizing Problems

This paper studies two‐stage lot‐sizing problems with uncertain demand, where lost sales, backlogging and no backlogging are all considered. To handle the ambiguity in the probability distribution of demand, distributionally robust models are established only based on mean‐covariance information about the distribution. Based on shortest path reformulations of lot‐sizing problems, we prove that robust solutions can be obtained by solving mixed 0‐1 conic quadratic programs (CQPs) with mean‐risk objective functions. An exact parametric optimization method is proposed by further reformulating the mixed 0‐1 CQPs as single‐parameter quadratic shortest path problems. Rather than enumerating all potential values of the parameter, which may be the super‐polynomial in the number of decision variables, we propose a branch‐and‐bound‐based interval search method to find the optimal parameter value. Polynomial time algorithms for parametric subproblems with both uncorrelated and partially correlated demand distributions are proposed. Computational results show that the proposed models greatly reduce the system cost variation at the cost of a relative smaller increase in expected system cost, and the proposed parametric optimization method is much more efficient than the CPLEX solver.     

Coordinating Service‐Sensitive Demand and Capacity by Adaptive Decision Making: An Application of Case‐Based Decision Theory*

The subject of this article is the simultaneous choice of product price and manufacturing capacity if demand is stochastic and service‐level sensitive. In this setting, capacity as well as price have an impact on demand because several aspects of service level depend on capacity. For example, delivery time will be reduced if capacity is increased given a constant demand rate. We illustrate the relationship between service level, capacity, and demand reaction by a stylized application problem from the after‐sales services industry. The reaction of customers to variations in service level and price is represented by a kinked price‐demand‐rate function. We first derive the optimal price‐capacity combination for the resulting decision problem under full information. Subsequently, we focus on a decision maker (DM) who lacks complete knowledge of the demand function. Hence the DM is unable to anticipate the service level and consequently cannot identify the optimal solution. However, the DM will acquire additional information during the sales process and use it in subsequent revisions of the price‐capacity decision. Thus, this decision making is adaptive and based on experience. In contrast to the literature, which assumes certain repetitive procedures somewhat ad hoc, we develop an adaptive decision process based on case‐based decision theory (CBDT) for the price‐capacity problem. Finally, we show that a CBDT DM in our setting eventually finds the optimal solution, if the DM sets the price based on absorption costs and adequately adjusts the capacity with respect to the observed demand.     

EXPLAINING GIFT‐EXCHANGE—THE LIMITS OF GOOD INTENTIONS

This paper explores the limitations of intention‐based social preferences as an explanation of gift‐exchange between a firm and a worker. In a framework with one self‐interested and one reciprocal player, gift‐giving never arises in equilibrium. Instead, any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players. Besides gift‐exchange, this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework. Even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games, the self‐interested player never benefits from reciprocity. We discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift‐exchange in employment relations.     

Reputation in Continuous‐Time Games

We study reputation dynamics in continuous‐time games in which a large player (e.g., government) faces a population of small players (e.g., households) and the large player's actions are imperfectly observable. The major part of our analysis examines the case in which public signals about the large player's actions are distorted by a Brownian motion and the large player is either a normal type, who plays strategically, or a behavioral type, who is committed to playing a stationary strategy. We obtain a clean characterization of sequential equilibria using ordinary differential equations and identify general conditions for the sequential equilibrium to be unique and Markovian in the small players' posterior belief. We find that a rich equilibrium dynamics arises when the small players assign positive prior probability to the behavioral type. By contrast, when it is common knowledge that the large player is the normal type, every public equilibrium of the continuous‐time game is payoff‐equivalent to one in which a static Nash equilibrium is played after every history. Finally, we examine variations of the model with Poisson signals and multiple behavioral types.     

Lot‐sizing Decisions Under Limited‐time Price Reduction*

We consider the optimal lot‐sizing policy for an inventoried item when the vendor offers a limited‐time price reduction. We use the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach in our analysis, thereby eliminating the sources of approximation found in most of the earlier studies that use an average annual cost approach. We first characterize the optimal lot‐sizing policies and their properties, then develop an algorithm for determining the optimal lot sizes. We analytically demonstrate that the lot sizes derived using an average annual cost approach for the different variants of the problem are, in general, larger than the DCF optimum. While DCF analysis is more rigorous and yields precise lot sizes, we recognize that the associated mathematical models and the solution procedure are rather complex. Since simple and easy‐to‐understand policies have a strong practical appeal to decision makers, we propose a DCF version of a simple and easy‐to‐implement heuristic called the “Early Purchase” (EP) strategy and discuss its performance. We supplement our analytical developments with a detailed computational analysis and discuss the implications of our findings for decision making.     

Assemble‐to‐Order Inventory Management via Stochastic Programming: Chained BOMs and the M‐System

We study an inventory management mechanism that uses two stochastic programs (SPs), the customary one‐period assemble‐to‐order (ATO) model and its relaxation, to conceive control policies for dynamic ATO systems. We introduce a class of ATO systems, those that possess what we call a “chained BOM.” We prove that having a chained BOM is a sufficient condition for both SPs to be convex in the first‐stage decision variables. We show by examples the necessity of the condition. For ATO systems with a chained BOM, our result implies that the optimal integer solutions of the SPs can be found efficiently, and thus expedites the calculation of control parameters. The M system is a representative chained BOM system with two components and three products. We show that in this special case, the SPs can be solved as a one‐stage optimization problem. The allocation policy can also be reduced to simple, intuitive instructions, of which there are four distinct sets, one for each of four different parameter regions. We highlight the need for component reservation in one of these four regions. Our numerical studies demonstrate that achieving asymptotic optimality represents a significant advantage of the SP‐based approach over alternative approaches. Our numerical comparisons also show that outside of the asymptotic regime, the SP‐based approach has a commanding lead over the alternative policies. Our findings indicate that the SP‐based approach is a promising inventory management strategy that warrants further development for more general systems and practical implementations.     

Workforce‐constrained Preventive Maintenance Scheduling Using Evolution Strategies

Heavy equipment overhaul facilities such as aircraft service centers and railroad yards face the challenge of minimizing the makespan for a set of preventive maintenance (PM) tasks, requiring single or multiple skills, within workforce availability constraints. In this paper, we examine the utility of evolution strategies to this problem. Comparison of the computational efforts of evolution strategies with exhaustive enumeration to reach optimal solutions for 60 small problems illustrates the ability of evolution strategies to yield optimal solutions increasingly efficiently with increasing problem size. A set of 852 large‐scale problems was solved using evolution strategies to examine the effects of task‐related problem characteristics, workforce‐related variables, and evolution strategies population size (μ) on CPU time. The results empirically supported practical utility of evolution strategies to solve large‐scale, complex preventive maintenance problems involving single‐ and multiple‐skilled workforce. Finally, comparison of evolution strategies and simulated annealing for the 852 experiments indicated much faster convergence to optimality with evolution strategies.