Reputation in Continuous‐Time Games

We study reputation dynamics in continuous‐time games in which a large player (e.g., government) faces a population of small players (e.g., households) and the large player's actions are imperfectly observable. The major part of our analysis examines the case in which public signals about the large player's actions are distorted by a Brownian motion and the large player is either a normal type, who plays strategically, or a behavioral type, who is committed to playing a stationary strategy. We obtain a clean characterization of sequential equilibria using ordinary differential equations and identify general conditions for the sequential equilibrium to be unique and Markovian in the small players' posterior belief. We find that a rich equilibrium dynamics arises when the small players assign positive prior probability to the behavioral type. By contrast, when it is common knowledge that the large player is the normal type, every public equilibrium of the continuous‐time game is payoff‐equivalent to one in which a static Nash equilibrium is played after every history. Finally, we examine variations of the model with Poisson signals and multiple behavioral types.     

Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation

We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long‐run player faces a series of short‐run players. The long‐run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long‐run player.     

Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

We investigate two‐player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close to unity. Monitoring is private and players cannot communicate. We require no condition concerning the accuracy of players' monitoring technology. We show the folk theorem for the prisoners' dilemma with conditional independence. We also investigate more general games where players' private signals are correlated only through an unobservable macro shock. We show that efficiency is sustainable for generic private signal structures when the size of the set of private signals is sufficiently large. Finally, we show that cartel collusion is sustainable in price‐setting duopoly.     

不完全竞争条件下的双向决策模型

本文依据不完全竞争的特点,运用模糊关系方程及其解法,给出了厂商在垄断、寡头和垄断竞争市场中的综合决策模型。厂商可按该模型决策,改进产品的综合水平,提高经济效益。     

Bargaining,Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts

Consider a two‐person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period, and collect payoffs (as a function of that period's actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent with regard to how the surplus is likely to be split, because a folk theorem applies. Perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a specific asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided, as the perturbation probabilities approach zero. Behavioral types may follow nonstationary strategies and respond to the opponent's play. In equilibrium, rational players initially choose a behavioral type to imitate and a war of attrition ensues. How much should a player try to get and how should she behave while waiting for the resolution of bargaining? In both respects she should build her strategy around the advice given by the “Nash bargaining with threats” (NBWT) theory developed for two‐stage games. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, she can guarantee herself virtually her NBWT payoff by imitating a behavioral type with the following simple strategy: in every period, ask for (and accept nothing less than) that player's NBWT share and, while waiting for the other side to concede, take the action Nash recommends as a threat in his two‐stage game. The results suggest that there are forces at work in some dynamic games that favor certain payoffs over all others. This is in stark contrast to the classic folk theorems, to the further folk theorems established for repeated games with two‐sided reputational perturbations, and to the permissive results obtained in the literature on bargaining with payoffs as you go.     

The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost‐Perfect Monitoring

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost‐perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n‐player games that satisfy the usual full‐dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap‐talk communication between players and no public randomization device.     

The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions

We show that in repeated interactions the avenues for effective provision of incentives depend crucially on the type of information players observe. We establish this conclusion for general repeated two‐player games in which information arrives via a continuous‐time stationary process that has a continuous multidimensional Brownian component and a Poisson component, and in which the players act frequently. The Poisson jumps can be used to effectively provide incentives both with transfers and value burning, while continuous Brownian information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers.     

具有缺陷产品的双渠道闭环供应链网络均衡

本文研究了供应商向制造商供应原材料,制造商制造的产品(其中部分含有缺陷),通过零售商渠道和电子商务渠道销售给消费者,以满足消费市场需求,同时考虑消费者消费后产生的废旧品经由回收中心处理再到制造商处进行再制造的闭环供应链网络均衡模型。运用变分不等式理论和互补理论,分别刻画了供应市场、制造市场、零售市场、消费市场以及回收中心的最优行为,进而建立了双渠道闭环供应链网络均衡模型。利用变分不等式的对数二次型预测与校正 (LQP-PC)算法,设计了模型求解算法。结合算例分析了双渠道、再制造率和产品缺陷对网络均衡的影响。算例结果表明:当制造商采用电子商务销售渠道时,对传统渠道会造成一定影响;制造商的再制造率增加时,制造商的利润显著增加,供应链的整体利润也有所增加;制造商的产品缺陷率降低时,其自身利润有所增加,而供应链整体利润增加明显。本文的研究结论对未来双渠道闭环供应链网络均衡的研究具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Weakly Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring

Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The existing literature has identified a relatively tractable subset of equilibria. The present paper introduces the notion of weakly belief‐free equilibria for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This is a tractable class which subsumes, as a special case, a major part of the existing literature (the belief‐free equilibria). It is shown that this class can outperform the equilibria identified by the previous work.     

Information Independence and Common Knowledge

In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents' knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence (the opponents' types are independent conditional on one's own) and (ii) type disassociation under common knowledge (the agents' types are independent, conditional on some common‐knowledge variable). Subjective independence is motivated by its implications in Bayesian games and in studies of equilibrium concepts. We find that a variable that disassociates types is more informative than any common‐knowledge variable. With three or more agents, conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent. They also imply that any variable which is common knowledge to two agents is common knowledge to all, and imply the existence of a unique common‐knowledge variable that disassociates types, which is the one defined by Aumann.     

Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case

This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability one. Our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. By reducing such problems to well‐defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment.     

Cooperation and Punishment

We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong ‘perturbation implies efficiency’ results require that the perturbations must include strategies that are ‘draconian’ in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a draconian strategy whose presence in the perturbations guarantees that any equilibrium is efficient. We also argue that the results of Anderlini and Sabourian (1995) using perturbation strategies that are cooperative (and hence nondraconian) are not due to computability per se but to the further restrictions they impose on allowable beliefs.     

Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms

We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)‐style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We define a new equilibrium concept that we call oblivious equilibrium, in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long‐run average industry state, but where firms ignore current information about competitors' states. The great advantage of oblivious equilibria is that they are much easier to compute than are Markov perfect equilibria. Moreover, we show that, as the market becomes large, if the equilibrium distribution of firm states obeys a certain “light‐tail” condition, then oblivious equilibria closely approximate Markov perfect equilibria. This theorem justifies using oblivious equilibria to analyze Markov perfect industry dynamics in Ericson and Pakes (1995)‐style models with many firms.     

Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has focused on public strategies: strategies that depend solely on the history of publicly observable signals. This paper sheds light on the role of private strategies: strategies that depend not only on public signals, but also on players' own actions in the past. Our main finding is that players can sometimes make better use of information by using private strategies and that efficiency in repeated games can be improved. Our equilibrium private strategy for repeated prisoners' dilemma games consists of two states and has the property that each player's optimal strategy is independent of the other player's state.     

基于学习的孵化器与创投协同知识创造资源共享研究

将学习因素纳入科技企业孵化器与创投多阶段协同知识创造资源共享的微观机制,建立孵化器与创投多阶段重复主从博弈模型,研究学习因素、税收强度、财政返还、创投股权对维系孵化器与创投协同知识(信息)合作的作用,以及孵化器的最优参与度和双方总的最优投入.研究发现,当孵化器与创投进行知识(信息)协同创造后从创业项目获取收益的比例要高于创投时,孵化器参与到与创投的合作.在满足孵化器与创投合作的条件下,孵化器的最优参与度与政府税收强度和财政返还比例正相关,与创投在创业项目中所占股份负相关.孵化器和创投总的最优投入水平与税收强度、财政返还比例、初始学习因素正相关,与创投在项目中所占股份的比例、博弈阶段长度和市场利率负相关.     

Benchmarking and Monitoring International Warehouse Operations in Europe

We report on a cross‐sectional and longitudinal comparison of European distribution centers in the Netherlands. European distribution centers are responsible for the distribution of a manufacturer's (mostly Asian or American) products over customers in a large part of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, often with strict service‐level agreements. In total, 65 physical warehouses, containing 140 European, Asian, and American European distribution center operations, in combination with different outsourcing relations (own‐account, dedicated outsourced, and public outsourced), were benchmarked in 2000 and monitored over the period 2000–2004. We conclude that both in 2000 and 2004, European warehouses are more efficient than Asian and American warehouses, and outsourced operations (particularly public warehouses) are more efficient than own‐account operations. Over the period 2000–2004, efficiency appears to have declined substantially; the most distinct differences are to be found among public outsourced warehouses and, because many European distribution center warehouse operations of European origin are run by public service providers, among European warehouses. This decline in efficiency also led to a decline in productivity, in spite of the fact that overall the available technology has improved. We conjecture potential causes for this decline.     

Managing Supply Chain Execution: Monitoring Timeliness and Correctness via Individualized Trace Data

Improvements in information technologies provide new opportunities to control and improve business processes based on real‐time performance data. A class of data we call individualized trace data (ITD) identifies the real‐time status of individual entities as they move through execution processes, such as an individual product passing through a supply chain or a uniquely identified mortgage application going through an approval process. We develop a mathematical framework which we call the State‐Identity‐Time (SIT) Framework to represent and manipulate ITD at multiple levels of aggregation for different managerial purposes. Using this framework, we design a pair of generic quality measures—timeliness and correctness—for the progress of entities through a supply chain. The timeliness and correctness metrics provide behavioral visibility that can help managers to grasp the dynamics of supply chain behavior that is distinct from asset visibility such as inventory. We develop special quality control methods using this framework to address the issue of overreaction that is common among managers faced with a large volume of fast‐changing data. The SIT structure and its associated methods inform managers on if, when, and where to react. We illustrate our approach using simulations based on real RFID data from a Walmart RFID pilot project.     

项目经理激励报酬机制与企业监督博弈分析

项目经理的投机行为可以通过监督或激励来缓解。本文建立了有关项目管理中的国有企业监督与项目经理行为之间的模型,并运用此模型分析了项目经理的激励机制、项目经理的行为和企业监督之间的关系,并为如何有效地避免项目经理的投机行为,改进当前激励报酬形式提供了一种分析工具。     

Prioritizing and Monitoring Concurrent Project Work: Effects on Switching Behavior

Project switching occurs when a multi‐project worker shifts his/her attention from one project to another before completing the first project. In this study, we study the effects of two areas of management policy on project switching behavior, project prioritization, and work monitoring. We conduct a controlled experiment to evaluate direct and combined effects of prioritization, scheduled progress checks, and managerial progress checks on project switching behavior in a distributed, multi‐project work environment. We use computerized tasks constituting multiple projects as a means of efficiently simulating a project work setting. Working professionals served as subjects for the experiment, thereby enabling us to control for experience and other individual differences that may vary across workers in real‐world projects. We find that clarifying priorities has little overall effect on the prevalence of switching in our multi‐project setting, while the presence of managerial progress checks has significant and distinct impacts, driving up switch tendencies. Interestingly, various attributes of the timing of these monitoring events also significantly impact the likelihood that workers will switch in response to these event triggers. We discuss the implications of these findings for managerial practice and for future research.     

基于监管、学习和声誉的联盟稳定性:实验研究

借鉴实验经济学的研究方法,研究了监管、学习和声誉机制对联盟成员机会主义行为的影响。实验用囚徒困境模型表示联盟成员间的合作竞争关系,通过控制监管力度,逐步引入学习机制和声誉机制来比较分析各机制的作用及关系。结果表明,监管越完善,越有利于控制机会主义行为,但其成本也越高;学习机制的引入,可以进一步减少机会主义行为,但联盟中的学习者也可借助信息优势,在监管严格时回避风险,在监管放松时采取机会主义行为获取短期超额收益;声誉机制的加入使得机会主义行为进一步减少,联盟企业借助信息优势获取超额收益的副作用也被消除。