联合促销下双渠道VMI供应链的竞争与协调

本文在双渠道VMI供应链中,假设制造商和零售商分别处于领导者和追随者的地位,考虑了制造商通过联合促销协调供应链上下游的策略以及双渠道需求之间的搭便车效应,以此为背景建立了制造商和零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并通过拉格朗日乘数法求解出了制造商的最优发货策略和零售商的最优定价与促销策略。研究发现制造商开辟网上渠道直销产品后,零售商缺货时间比例增大。进一步研究发现,制造商承担促销成本的比例,双渠道之间的搭便车效应对供应链成员的决策和利润有显著影响。另外,双渠道的需求越不稳定,则制造商开辟网上销售渠道后获利越高,同时零售商的利润越低。最后,通过算例验证了模型的有效性并对模型中主要参数进行了灵敏度分析。     

Managing Slow‐Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry

We address the value of information and value of centralized control in the context of a two‐echelon, serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provide a single perishable product to consumers. Our analysis is relevant for managing slow‐moving perishable products with fixed lot sizes and expiration dates of a week or less. We evaluate two supply chain structures. In the first structure, referred to as decentralized information sharing, the retailer shares its demand, inventory, and ordering policy with the supplier, yet both facilities make their own profit‐maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, centralized control, incentives are aligned and the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practices of company‐owned stores or vendor‐managed inventory. We measure the value of information and value of centralized control as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared and decision making is decentralized. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and fixed order quantities. We establish the importance of information sharing and centralized control in the supply chain and identify conditions under which benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the value of information, the major benefit in our setting is driven by the supplier's ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto‐improving for both supply chain partners in the decentralized setting.     

一类供应商管理库存供应链协调策略研究

对有确定需求、有初始库存和库存短缺的一种畅销商品,建立了供应商管理库存的供应链模型.然后,分别分析分散式、集中式和VMI三种供应链模式下的库存补充数量最优解及各方收益情况,得到VMI的实施将可能造成供应商收益下降.再运用委托-代理理论分别讨论了信息对称和信息不对称时的VMI数量折扣契约设计问题.最后,给出算例说明了,此协调策略有助于VMI的实施.     

Competition and Coordination in a Two‐Channel Supply Chain

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination.     

供应链中考虑零售商损失规避的交易契约研究

一个零售商和一个供应商组成的供应链系统,零售商以一定的概率具备损失规避特性,供应商根据此概率大小设计交易契约最大化自身利润。首先,采用博弈和激励机制理论,分别研究了混同契约和甄别契约的设计过程。在混同契约下,供应商针对不同类型的零售商制定统一批发价格,零售商根据该批发价格决定其最优订货量;在甄别契约下,供应商通过设计契约菜单激励零售商显示其真实的损失规避特性。得出,当产品生产成本较低时,供应商可以设计出有效的甄别契约,通过比较混同与甄别契约下的供应商最优期望利润得到最优契约;而当产品成本较高时,不存在有效的甄别契约,此时混同契约即为最优契约。其次,通过数值模拟,对比了在产品生产成本较低时的两种契约下,零售商具有损失规避特征的概率及其损失规避程度对供应商期望利润及零售商期望效用、期望利润的影响;得出,当存在有效的甄别契约时,供应商采用甄别契约总比采用混同契约所得的期望利润更高。     

供应链库存合约研究

研究了制造商与其供应商的供应链最优库存策略和在非合作情况下的库存策略,比较分析了两种情况下的库存策略,并设计了库存合约;分析表明,制造商通过设计有效的转移支付合约,可以实现供应链库存的最优化。     

Promotion Planning and Supply Chain Contracting in a High–Low Pricing Environment

Demand forecast errors threaten the profitability of high–low price promotion strategies. This article shows how to match demand and supply effectively by means of two‐segment demand forecasting and supply contracts. We find that demand depends on the path of past retail prices, which leads to only a limited number of reachable demand states. However, forecast errors cannot be entirely eliminated because competitive promotions entail some degree of random (i.e., last‐minute) pricing. A hedging approach can be deployed to distribute demand risk efficiently over multiple promotional campaigns and within the supply chain. A retailer that employs a portfolio of forward, option, and spot contracts can avoid both stockouts and excess inventories while achieving the first‐best solution and Pareto improvements. We provide an improved forecasting method as well as stochastic programs to solve for optimal production and purchasing policies such that the right amount of inventory is available at the right time. By connecting a stockpiling model of demand with the supply side, we derive insights on optimal risk management strategies for both manufacturers and retailers in a market environment characterized by frequent price promotions and multiple discount levels. We employ a data set of the German retail market for a key generator of store traffic—namely, diapers.     

基于随机需求的供应链产供销计划协同模型研究

考虑随机客户需求,研究从供应商到最终客户的多层供应链网络产供销计划协同问题。根据给定的假设条件和问题的分析,首先从系统整体优化的角度,建立带有补偿问题的多周期二级随机规划模型,然后提出了优化-仿真相结合的模型求解策略。最后,给出仿真数据进行算例分析,对比采取协同和异步方式制定产供销计划在总成本方面的差异,分析基于随机需求和确定性平均需求的产供销计划在总成本方面的分布特性,计算结果表明随机需求条件下的产供销计划协同模型一方面可以显著缩减供应链总成本,另一方面可以有效控制原材料采购量、产品产量和发货量,减少库存,从而降低客户需求波动带来的市场风险。     

基于供应链金融的随机需求条件下的订货策略

本文将供应链金融中的融资问题融入到允许延迟支付的报童模型中,同时考虑了订货商的销售情况对偿还能力的影响,融资利息、销售收入利息以及支付信用期等现金管理要素,建立起订货商在连续随机需求条件下的库存管理模型,通过对模型的求解与灵敏度分析,对供应链金融模式下订货商的订货策略进行了深入探讨,得出了一系列有益的结论。所建立的模型同时为中小销售型企业提供一种新的资金获取以及确定订货策略的方法。     

多渠道供应链中物流系统的容量扩充与分配模型

考虑一个传统供应链将市场由单一的实体商店零售扩大到互联网上的在线零售,为满足新增的在线零售需求,供应商需要扩充物流系统的供应容量,并设计新增容量的分配方案。本文针对由一个中心仓库和多个地区仓库组成的二级物流系统,在保留现有配送网络结构的基础上,构建了物流系统的容量扩充与分配模型,并提出一种基于拉格朗日松弛法的求解算法。我们通过数值实验表明了算法的有效性,并通过数值算例说明了运输成本与库存汇聚效应对最优容量扩充与分配方案的影响。     

Distributing a Product Line in a Decentralized Supply Chain

Although there is a rich literature on single product distribution in decentralized supply chains, the incentive problems that arise in distributing a product line have largely not been investigated. In practice, most manufacturers distribute a line of products with different features and qualities and not just a single product. Consider a manufacturer who distributes a product line through competing downstream retailers. In this setting, we investigate how and why the retailers' price and inventory decisions deviate from the centrally optimal decisions. Due to substitution between different product variants, as well as between different retailers, the incentive problems associated with distributing a product line are more complicated than that of distributing a single product. We characterize retailers' incentive distortions under a residual‐claimancy contract, and construct contracts that achieve channel coordination. We show that retail price floors or inventory buybacks, appropriately tailored to each product variant, are among the contracts that can achieve coordination. Using numerical simulations, we demonstrate how the optimal contract terms (such as wholesale prices and buyback prices) for each variant are influenced by the parameters of an underlying consumer choice model.     

Sourcing Decisions with Stochastic Supplier Reliability and Stochastic Demand

Supplier sourcing strategies are a crucial factor driving supply chain success. In this paper, we investigate the implications of uncertain supplier reliability on a firm's sourcing decisions in an environment with stochastic demand. In particular, we characterize specific conditions under which a firm should choose a single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategy. In an environment with both uncertain demand and supply, we characterize the total order quantity, the number of suppliers selected for order placement, and the allocation of the total order quantity among these selected suppliers. For deeper managerial insight, we also examine the sensitivity of the optimal sourcing decisions to interactions between uncertainties in product demand and supply reliability. We show that sourcing from a single supplier is an optimal strategy for environments characterized by high levels of demand uncertainty or high salvage values. A numerical analysis based on data obtained from an office products retailer further reinforces our analytical results. In addition, we also find that when minimal order quantities are imposed, there are situations where it is not optimal to place an order with the lowest cost supplier.     

Value of Sharing Production Yield Information in a Serial Supply Chain

New developments in corporate information technology such as enterprise resource planning systems have significantly increased the flow of information among members of supply chains. However, the benefits of sharing information can vary depending on the supply chain structure and its operational characteristics. Most of the existing research has studied the impact of sharing downstream information (e.g., a manufacturer sharing information with its suppliers). We evaluate the benefits of sharing upstream yield information (e.g., a supplier sharing information with the manufacturer) in a two‐stage serial supply chain in which the supplier has multiple internal processes and is faced with uncertain output due to yield losses. We are interested in determining when the sharing of the supplier's information is most beneficial to the manufacturer. After proposing an order‐up‐to type heuristic policy, we perform a detailed computational study and observe that this information is most beneficial when the supplier's yield variance is high and when end‐customer demand variance is low. We also find that the manufacturer's backorder‐to‐holding cost ratio has little, if any, impact on the usefulness of information.     

Building Supply Chain Resilience through Virtual Stockpile Pooling

Stockpiling inventory is an essential strategy for building supply chain resilience. It enables firms to continue operating while finding a solution to an unexpected event that causes a supply disruption or demand surge. While extremely valuable when actually deployed, stockpiles incur large holding costs and usually provide no benefits until such a time. To help to reduce this cost, this study presents a new approach for managing stockpiles. We show that if leveraged intelligently, stockpiles can also help an organization better meet its own regular demand by enabling a type of virtual pooling we call virtual stockpile pooling (VSP). The idea of VSP is to first integrate the stockpile into several locations’ regular inventory buffers and then dynamically reallocate the stockpile among these locations in reaction to the demand realizations to achieve a kind of virtual transshipment. To study how to execute VSP and determine when it can provide the most value, we formulate a stylized multi‐location stochastic inventory model and solve for the optimal stockpile allocation and inventory order policies. We show that VSP can provide significant cost savings: in some cases nearly the full holding cost of the stockpile (i.e., VSP effectively maintains the stockpile for free), in other cases nearly the savings of traditional physical inventory pooling. Last, our results prescribe implementing VSP with many locations for large stockpiles, but only a few locations for small stockpiles.     

Supply Chain Coordination in a Market with Customer Service Competition

We consider a market with two competing supply chains, each consisting of one wholesaler and one retailer. We assume that the business environment forces supply chains to charge similar prices and to compete strictly on the basis of customer service. We model customer service competition using game‐theoretical concepts. We consider three competition scenarios between the supply chains. In the uncoordinated scenario, individual members of both supply chains maximize their own profits by individually selecting their service and inventory policies. In the coordinated scenario, wholesalers and retailers of each supply chain coordinate their service and inventory policy decisions to maximize supply chain profits. In the hybrid scenario, competition is between one coordinated and one uncoordinated supply chain. We discuss the derivation of the equilibrium service strategies, resulting inventory policies, and profits for each scenario, and compare the equilibria in a numerical study. We find that coordination is a dominant strategy for both supply chains, but as in the prisoner's dilemma, both supply chains are often worse off under the coordinated scenario relative to the uncoordinated scenario. The consumers are the only guaranteed beneficiaries of coordination.     

基于时变需求的供应链基本库存水平优化研究

在时变需求环境下,基于模型推导得到供需双方基本库存水平局部优化与整体优化决策方程,并基于算例对基本库存水平整体优化的成本绩效以及需求时变性的影响进行数据分析,得到如下重要结论:基本库存水平整体优化明显降低供应链库存成本.     

Demand Forecast Sharing in Supply Chains

This paper examines the incentives of a manufacturer and a retailer to share their demand forecasts. The demand at the retailer is a linearly decreasing function of price. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price first, and the retailer sets the retail price after observing the wholesale price. Both players set their prices based on their forecasts of demand. In the make‐to‐order scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity after observing the actual demand; in the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity before the demand is realized. In the make‐to‐order scenario, we show that sharing the forecast unconditionally by the retailer with the manufacturer benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. We also demonstrate that a side payment contract cannot induce Pareto‐optimal information sharing equilibrium, but a discount based wholesale price contract can. The social welfare as well as consumer surplus is higher under the discount contract, compared with under no information sharing. In the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer realizes additional benefits in the form of savings in inventory holding and shortage costs when forecasts are shared. If the savings from inventory holding and shortage costs because of information sharing are sufficiently high, then a side payment contract that induces Pareto‐optimal information sharing is feasible in the make‐to‐stock scenario. We also provide additional managerial insights with the help of a computational study.     

基于随机产出与随机需求的农产品供应链风险共担合同

本文采用单位价格补贴的风险共担机制,分析了农产品供应链中随机产出和随机需求下供应商-制造商采取不同的风险共担合同对农资投入、供应商、制造商以及整个供应链的利润的影响。文中的风险共担合同包括风险无共担合同、需求风险共担合同、产出风险共担合同、产出-需求风险共担合同,结合算例,结论得出:需求风险分担可以使供应链利润增加;产出风险分担可以增加供应商的利润收益,而赋予制造商控制供应商农资投入积极性的权利;产出-需求共担合同既能增加供应链及各成员的利润收益,同时还使得双方相互制约、相互协调,促使供应链良好发展。最后,结合非线性补贴的风险分担形式对上述合同的有效性进行了验证,研究表明,不同的补贴形式只在量上对决策存在影响,而本质上的结论并没有变化。     

供应链管理对于大型复杂产品制造业集群演进的影响机理研究

产业集群演进是指在一定驱动力下产业集群从某个具有阶段特征的整体结构与态势向另一个具有阶段特征的结构与态势转变发展的过程。在这个过程中供应链管理可以促进资源的有效整合和利用,优化产业结构,促进产业升级。在前人关于大型复杂产品和供应链管理相关研究基础上,以组织要素、产品复杂性要素、产业关联度要素为影响变量,构建了供应链管理对大型复杂产品制造业集群演进的影响机理模型,通过实证分析,得出SCM对于大型复杂产品制造业集群演进的影响机理是一个全方位的作用模式,这为大型复杂产品制造业集群中供应链管理提供了借鉴。     

需求信息可部分观察时供应链中的信息汇聚效应

考虑由一个供应商和两个零售商组成的二级供应链,供应链中的上下游企业共享需求信息.假设产品的需求分布未知且需求信息只可部分观察,企业按贝叶斯法则更新自己的先验.由于需求信息在供应商处汇聚,供应商与零售商占有的信息量不同,这就可能扭曲供应商对市场需求的认识,造成供应商认为市场过度膨胀或萎缩,我们把这种现象称为信息汇聚效应.本文将给出信息汇聚效应的定义,并给出在两周期供应链中发生信息汇聚效应的充分条件,进而推出发生信息汇聚效应概率的下界.数值算例表明,在一定情况下,在供应链中发生信息汇聚的概率会很可观.