基于信号传递模型的企业投资短视与敲竹杠长期投资行为分析

采用信号传递模型对投资短视和敲竹杠长期投资两种非效率投资行为进行均衡分析发现:在面临长短期投资决策时,经理仅依据项目的选择无法向股东传递自己的类型信息,因此如果不具备与股东谈判的能力,经理会选择短期项目以巩固自己的职位,如果此时短期项目的净现金流量较低则出现投资短视类型的非效率投资行为;如果具备与股东谈判的能力,经理会选择长期项目使得股东无法在长期项目收益实现之前解雇自己,如果此时长期项目的净现金流量较低则出现敲竹杠长期投资类型的非效率投资行为。分析还表明,适度的惩罚和激励都有助于减少经理的投资短视行为;但是只有适度的激励才有助于减少经理的敲竹杠长期投资行为。     

AMBIVALENT INVESTMENT AND THE HOLD‐UP PROBLEM

In this paper we add to the foundations of incomplete contracting literature. We study the hold‐up problem with ambivalent investment, where investment benefits the investing party if ex post the right decision is undertaken but harms the investing party if the wrong decision is made. In this context, we show that the power of contracts to provide investment incentives depends on three factors: the commitment value of contracts, the amount of quasirents that the investing party can expect in the case of out‐of‐contract renegotiation, and the degree of ambivalence of investment. First, contracts provide first‐best investment incentives when parties can commit to a contract regardless of the type of investment. Second, with sufficiently ambivalent investment, if parties cannot commit not to renegotiate a contract and if the investing party's bargaining power is intermediate, contracts cannot improve investment incentives above those provided by no contract. In contrast, a simple buyer or seller option contract is optimal when the investing party's bargaining power is extreme. (JEL: D23, K12, L22)     

Unobservable Investment and the Hold‐Up Problem

We study a two‐person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining. We show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small, then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus. Hence, bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold‐up problem even when the agent who makes the relation‐specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible. We consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two‐sided investment.     

基于收益分享契约的VMI模型研究

本文讨论了一个季节性商品销售环境下的供应商管理库存(Vendor Managed Inventory,VMI)模型,建立了零售商与供应商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并求出了该博弈的均衡解.在此基础上,文章引入了剩余补贴策略对模型进行了优化,并找到了在协调供应链前提下实现供应链成员期望收益帕累托改进的最优集.用一个算例对结论进行了说明.     

剩余劳动力转移的索洛模型解释

本文尝试将分析经济总量变化的经济增长理论应用于分析部门关系的经济发展问题,通过索洛模型中劳动力增长率的内生化,以非农部门经济变量为基础建立了分析二元经济剩余劳动力转移的模型,并对我国非农部门投资率与人均资本变化对剩余劳动力转移的影响进行了考察,结果表明模型能较好地解释中国经济发展过程中的剩余劳动力转移现象。     

Misplaced Inventory and Radio‐Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology: Information and Coordination

Misplaced inventory is a major operational problem in many supply chains. Radio‐frequency identification (RFID) technology has been publicized as a promising solution for the misplaced inventory. Adoption of this technology has a fixed cost and variable cost of implementation, which can cause incentive issues in the supply chain. In this paper, we consider a supply chain under misplacement of inventory subject to uncertain demand. We study both centralized and decentralized cases and identify the conditions to coordinate the supply chain under implementation of RFID. We show that the incentives of the parties for investing in the technology are not perfectly aligned in the existence of the fixed cost of investment. Based on the relative payments of the parties for the fixed cost of investment, the incentives to adopt RFID can be characterized into regions, where we observe only one party or two parties benefiting from the technology when the tag price falls in a region specified in the paper. We further establish the effects of changes in mean and variance of a uniform demand on the incentives for investing in RFID and find that the incentives of the firms may indeed decrease as demand becomes more variable.     

Ranking efficient units in DEA

Super-efficiency data envelopment analysis (DEA) model can be used in ranking the performance of efficient decision making units (DMUs). Because of the infeasibility problem associated with the super-efficiency DEA model, ranking has been restricted to the model where constant returns to scale and proportional changes in all inputs or all outputs are assumed. In fact, when super-efficiency is used as an efficiency stability measure, infeasibility means the highest super-efficiency. However, if super-efficiency is interpreted as input saving or output surplus achieved by a specific efficient DMU, infeasibility does not necessarily mean the highest super-efficiency. In order to obtain a complete ranking of efficient DMUs when the two assumptions are relaxed, a modified super-efficiency DEA model is proposed to overcome the infeasibility problem and to correctly capture the super-efficiency represented by the input saving or the output surplus. The current paper suggests using both input- and output-oriented super-efficiency models to characterize the super-efficiency when infeasibility occurs. As a result, we can rank the efficient DMUs if infeasibility occurs. The approach is applied to 20 largest Japanese companies and 15 US cities, respectively.     

Divide and Conquer: Competing with Free Technology Under Network Effects

We study how a commercial firm competes with a free open source product. The market consists of two customer segments with different preferences and is characterized by positive network effects. The commercial firm makes product and pricing decisions to maximize its profit. The open source developers make product decisions to maximize the weighted sum of the segments' consumer surplus, in addition to their intrinsic motivation. The more importance open source developers attach to consumer surplus, the more effort they put into developing software features. Even if consumers do not end up adopting the open source product, it can act as a credible threat to the commercial firm, forcing the firm to lower its prices. If the open source developers' intrinsic motivation is high enough, they will develop software regardless of eventual market dynamics. If the open source product is available first, all participants are better off when the commercial and open source products are compatible. However, if the commercial firm can enter the market first, it can increase its profits and gain market share by being incompatible with its open source competitor, even if customers can later switch at zero cost. This first‐mover advantage does not arise because users are “locked in,” but because the commercial firm deploys a “divide and conquer” strategy to attract early adopters and exploit late adopters. To capitalize on its first‐mover advantage, the commercial firm must increase its development investment to improve its product features.     

双渠道供应链中紧俏产品升级成本分担演化博弈分析

针对一个制造商和一个零售商所组成的双渠道供应链系统,本文运用演化博弈模型研究了供应链企业在紧俏产品升级成本分担中的产能分配问题,比较了无合作机制以及引入合作机制下供应链系统的演化稳定策略。研究发现：当无合作机制时,供应链系统根据不同的产能分配范围最终会稳定在以下3种策略上：(制造商投资,零售商不投资)、(制造商不投资,零售商投资)以及(制造商不投资,零售商不投资);当引入合作机制时,供应链系统在一定的产能分配范围内最终会稳定在双方共同投资的策略上。本文还通过算例分析了无合作机制时销售新产品的增加值以及产品升级成本对演化稳定策略的影响;产能分配比例,新产品批发价格对单方面投资概率的影响;引入合作机制下分享比例对共同投资为演化稳定策略时的影响。     

基于绿色投资效率的港航供应链投资策略研究

在IMO环境政策约束日趋严格的背景下，绿色投资成为港航企业提升自身竞争优势的方式之一。本文以港口主导的供应链为研究对象，分析三种投资场景与不同成员投资的利益关系，即从绿色技术投资效率对港航供应链的成本效应、绿色技术投入效应、经济效应和市场效应等方面展开分析，最后分析不同投资策略对消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。研究表明：港口绿色技术投资在一定程度上会增加整体供应链的成本投入；当绿色技术投资效率逐步提高时，绿色投入水平不断下降，降低了绿色投入的成本，从而达到“投入高效率，投入水平低增长，整体收益高增长”的投资效果；无论是承运人或是港口进行绿色技术投入，均会增加市场的服务价格，相较于非绿色技术投入，绿色技术投入时会增加整体市场的需求数量；从消费者剩余的角度考虑，承运人绿色技术投入相较于港口绿色技术投入产生的消费者剩余大，也会在一定程度上减少因价格“传递效应”带来的不利影响；从社会福利的角度考虑，虽然绿色投资可能会降低社会福利，但承运人投资产生的社会福利优于港口绿色投资时产生的社会福利；从保护环境的角度，政府的政策制定具有较高的优先级，有助于提升环境收益。研究结果进一步丰富了港航企业绿色投资的研究成果，可为合理权衡绿色技术投资效率，为港口供应链成员的绿色投资决策提供一定的参考，对绿色港口供应链的良性发展具有一定的指导意义。     

Obtaining the optimal fleet mix: A case study about towing tractors at airports

Planes do not have a reverse gear. Hence, they need to be towed by tractors when leaving the gate. Towing tractors differ with respect to investment as well as variable costs and plane type compatibility. We propose a model which addresses the problem of a cost minimal fleet composition to support towing service providers in their strategic investment decisions. The model takes into account a maximum lifetime, a minimum duration of use, an overhaul option and a sell option. In a case study with a major European airport (our cooperating airport) we generate a multi-period fleet investment schedule. Furthermore, we introduce a 4-step approach for demand aggregation based on flight schedule information. We analyze the impact of demand variation, flight schedule disruptions and cost structure on the optimal buy, overhaul and sell policy. The scenario analyses demonstrate the robustness of the investment schedule with respect to these factors. Ignoring the existing fleet, a green field scenario reveals saving potentials of more than 5% when applying this model.     

期权动态套期保值双相机决策模型及实证研究

金融市场具有多变性,投资者一般需要根据市场情况动态地改变套期保值策略,使套期保值组合价格波动的风险被对冲掉。因此,有必要建立期权动态套期保值模型,得到动态的最优期权头寸,这意味着投资者需要按照模型所得到的头寸动态调仓才能达到风险最小的目的。然而,买入期权进行套期保值需要支付期权金成本,也就是投资者为了达到风险最小化的目的需要付出成本代价。那么,付出的代价是否“划算”是投资者面临的一个问题。此外,买入欧式看跌期权可以规避现货价格下跌的风险,但欧式期权只有到到期日时才能被执行,而投资者不一定要持有期权直到到期日。于是,投资者在投资期间选择何时退出是期权动态套期保值的另一个问题。 针对传统的期权套期保值策略存在错失退出良机和调仓过于频繁的问题,提出退出和调仓双相机决策准则,进一步优化传统套期保值策略。在满足预算、预期收益、头寸约束条件下,建立基于在险价值的最优期权动态套期保值模型,得到传统动态套期保值策略。在此基础上,基于经济价值视角将风险和成本代价统一化度量,利用期末绩效评价提出退出和调仓双相机决策准则,进一步修正期权套期保值策略。利用上证50ETF及以上证50ETF为标的的期权开展实证研究。 研究结果表明,运用退出相机准则提供了提前退出投资的参考时间点,运用调仓相机准则通过减少不必要的调仓降低调仓成本。通过对比发现传统的期权动态套期保值策略存在缺陷,运用双相机抉择的期权套期保值策略能够获得更有效率的套期保值结果。利用退出相机提供7个参考退出交易日,若在这些交易日选择退出,投资者将获得比较大的利润,利用调仓相机后增加了收益。 考虑双相机决策的期权最优套期保值模型改进了传统模型的单一决策,提出了更有效的风险控制策略,为投资者提供决策参考具有实际意义。     

Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning,Spillover, and Competition

We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier.     

基于社会福利的专利研发投资策略评价

专利技术的研发投资策略不仅影响企业价值还会影响消费者剩余,两种影响通常会呈现出两种不同的效应,从而导致专利研发投资决策对社会福利的不同影响.针对旨在通过研发专利技术从而垄断新兴市场的两非对称企业,结合投资时机选择期权博弈模型和消费者剩余模型得到非合作博弈(即专利竞赛)和合作博弈两种模式下的总投资净现值和消费者剩余,分析社会福利与影响其变化的诸多因素间的动态变化特征并提出相应的创新政策建议.结果表明,若以社会福利最大化为目标,则两企业的研发能力差异越小、专利技术的成长性越好、无风险利率越小、专利产品质量越低时,社会计划者的政策越应有利于合作研发模式;反之,政策越应鼓励竞争.而专利研发投资成本及初始价值会对两种模式下的社会福利差异的影响表现出"非线性"特征,政策的倾向性不确定.     

企业投资决策同伴效应及其特征的实证检验——基于中国上市公司的面板数据

企业投资的同伴效应是指企业的投资行为受到其参照组内同伴投资的影响。为解决识别同伴效应时面临的参照组有效性问题以及企业决策互相影响的联立性问题，本文选择跨区域的同行业企业作为同伴企业，首次构建了同伴企业的同区域跨行业企业的投资均值作为工具变量，基于2008-2015年中国上市公司的面板数据，实证检验了上市企业投资决策的同伴效应。结果表明，中国上市企业投资决策受到跨区域同行业的同伴企业投资显著正向影响，且这种同伴效应在增减变动方向上具有不对称性和乘数效应的基本特征。本文拓展和深化了企业财务决策同伴效应的现有研究，并有助于投资者与监管部门理解同伴效应的放大作用。     

基于Heston模型时间一致的资产负债管理鲁棒策略

本文在非完备市场框架下，研究了时间一致的鲁棒最优投资组合选择问题。首先，假设金融市场由无风险资产和风险资产构成，其中风险资产的价格过程服从Heston随机波动率模型，且投资者面临一个不可控的外生负债。其次，应用随机最优控制理论，给出并证明了验证定理，建立了相应的拓展Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)方程组，通过求解拓展的HJB方程组，得到了鲁棒均衡投资策略和值函数的显式解。最后，通过数值模拟，给出了模型参数变动对均衡投资策略和效用改善的影响。结果表明：(1) 当风险资产的价格和其波动的相关系数大于零时，股票方差的波动越大，越不利于投资。否则反之。(2) 当风险资产的价格和其波动的相关系数越大时，风险资产的风险就越大，投资者会采取保守的投资策略，减少投资。(3) 负债的波动率变大，投资者会面临更大的负债风险，为了对冲风险，投资者会增加风险资产的投资。(4) 当投资者考虑模型不确定的影响时，采用鲁棒投资策略能显著提高投资者的效用水平。     

考虑顾客策略行为和产品质量的闭环供应链决策模型

策略型的顾客对于不同质量的产品以及不同时间的产品会有不同的估值和支付意愿,企业在进行决策时应当考虑顾客的策略性行为。建立了由一个制造商(即原始设备制造商)和一个独立的再制造商以及一组策略型顾客组成的闭环供应链模型,利用动态博弈理论分析了当由独立的再制造商负责回收旧产品并进行再制造时顾客策略行为和再制造品的质量水平对闭环供应链的产品价格、利润、消费者剩余的影响。研究结果表明,当顾客的策略程度增加时,制造商的利润减少,再制造商的利润和消费者剩余增加。当再制造品的质量水平增加时,制造商的利润降低,再制造商的利润先增加后降低,消费者剩余增加。     

双寡头R&D合作与非合作时的最优溢出

本文考虑一个双寡头模型,其中两个企业都从事存在溢出的R&D活动。每个企业在产品市场上进行竞争之前,首先确定自己的R&D投资。根据在R&D阶段和产量阶段是否合作,讨论三种情况下使企业利润最大化的溢出水平。在每种情况下,都讨论了溢出的变动对R&D支出、产量、利润、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。     

P2P Marketplaces and Retailing in the Presence of Consumers' Valuation Uncertainty

Can peer‐to‐peer (P2P) marketplaces benefit traditional supply chains when consumers may experience valuation risk? P2P marketplaces can mitigate consumers' risk by allowing them to trade mismatched goods; yet, they also impose a threat to retailers and their suppliers as they compete over consumers. Further, do profit‐maximizing marketplaces always extract the entire consumer surplus from the online trades? Our two‐period model highlights the effects introduced by P2P marketplaces while accounting for the platform's pricing decisions. We prove that with low product unit cost, the P2P marketplace sets its transaction fee to the market clearing price, thereby extracting all of the seller surplus. In this range of product unit cost, the supply chain partners are worse off due to the emergence of a P2P marketplace. However, when the unit cost is high, the platform sets its transaction fee to be less than the market clearing price, intentionally leaving money on the table, as a mechanism to stimulate first period demand for new goods in expectation for some of them to be traded later, in the second period, via the marketplace. It is not until the surplus left with the sellers is sufficiently high that the supply chain partners manage to extract some of this surplus, ultimately making them better off due to a P2P marketplace. We further analyze the impact of a P2P marketplace on consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, we consider model variants accounting for a frictionless platform and consumer strategic waiting.     

CSR投入下产品质量决策与专利授权合同设计

良好的专利授权有助于激发企业持续创新的动力，实现专利技术的商业化和产业化，而产品质量则是决定企业能否取得市场竞争优势的关键。本文针对由专利持有企业和品牌企业组成的系统，考虑市场需求信息不对称以及品牌企业承担社会责任（Corporate social responsibility， CSR），研究品牌企业产品质量决策和专利授权合同设计问题，进而分析CSR投入对各个企业利润、消费者剩余以及社会福利的影响。研究结果表明：不同市场条件下，专利持有企业会策略性地设计专利授权合同形式，即选择仅包含"一次性固定授权费"或者"一次性固定授权费+版税提成"的专利授权合同；品牌企业CSR投入并不会影响专利授权合同的形式，但会提高一次性固定授权费；CSR投入会促使品牌企业提高产品质量，但并不一定会导致产品销售价格的提高；CSR投入虽然会降低品牌企业利润，但能有效提升专利持有企业利润、消费者剩余和社会福利。