Can Environmental Insurance Succeed Where Other Strategies Fail? The Case of Underground Storage Tanks

Private risk reduction will be socially efficient only when firms are liable for all the damage that they cause. We find that environmental insurance can achieve social efficiency even when two traditional policy instruments—ex post fines and risk management mandates with ex ante fines—do not. Inefficiency occurs with ex post fines, when small firms declare bankruptcy and escape their liabilities, limiting the incentives from this policy tool. Firms ignore mandates to implement efficient risk management because regulatory agencies do not have sufficient resources to monitor every firm. The evolution of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's and states’ underground storage tank programs suggests that mandating environmental insurance can address inefficiency due to small firms declaring bankruptcy. Comparing insurance mandates to risk management mandates, the burden on a regulator is lower if all it has to do is to confirm that the firm has insurance rather than that the firm has actually, and effectively, implemented required management practices. For underground storage tanks, we show that insurance lowered toxic releases.     

Policy Incentives for Dangerous (But Necessary) Operations

In industries where firms perform dangerous (but necessary) operations, liability costs—due to potential harm to third parties—can be significant. Firms may therefore find it optimal to exit the market, and this may lead to an inefficiently low number of incumbents. A social planner can discourage exit by offering appropriately designed subsidies. Ex ante subsidies defray the costs associated with making operations safer (e.g., funds to subsidize the purchase of safety equipment). Ex post subsidies mitigate the financial damages caused by an accident (e.g., funds to defray the cost of cleaning up a toxic spill). We consider a model where (i) firms have private information about their ability to improve reliability and (ii) reliability investments are unobservable. We demonstrate that when the social value of reliability outweighs the benefit of increased competition, it is optimal to offer ex ante subsidies alone (i.e., to subsidize the cost of making operations safer). Conversely, when the benefits of competition outweigh the benefits of reliability, a combination of ex ante and ex post subsidies is optimal (i.e., not only to subsidize safer operations, but also to share the costs of a potential accident).     

Long‐Term Contracting: The Role of Private Information in Dynamic Supply Risk Management

We examine the critical role of evolving private information in managing supply risk. The problem features a dyadic channel where a dominant buyer operates a multiperiod inventory system with lost sales and fixed cost. He replenishes from a supplier, whose private state of production is vulnerable to random shocks and evolves dynamically over time. We characterize the optimal inventory policy with a simple semi‐stationary structure; it distorts order quantity for limiting information rent only in the initial period; the optimal payment compensates for production cost in every period but concedes real information rent only in the initial period. These properties allow us to derive an easy‐to‐implement revenue‐sharing contract that facilitates ex ante strategic planning and ex post dynamic execution. This work advances our understanding on when and how to use private information in dynamic risk management.     

The Firm as a Means of Concealing Information

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that a firm may owe its continued existence to its attempts to conceal information from its competitors about the unknown characteristics of a certain factor, not just to its savings on market transaction costs, its team‐working, risk‐sharing, or the encouragement of ex ante specific investment. This is because the existence of a firm contract severs the relationship between the factor market and the product market, thereby making it difficult for outsiders to observe the marginal contribution of the intermediate factor and make statistical inferences about the factor's unknown characteristics. Furthermore, an optimal contract is determined by a trade‐off not only between traditional risk‐sharing and incentive, but also between the incentive and information concealing. Finally, we show that this latter kind of trade‐off also affects the position of the optimal boundary of the firm.     

Managing Risk of Supply Disruptions: Incentives for Capacity Restoration

A supplier facing the prospect of disruption has to decide whether or not to invest in restoration capability. With restoration capability, if disruption occurs, additional costly effort can be exerted to rebuild capacity, although its outcome is uncertain. We study how a firm (buyer) can use incentive mechanisms to motivate a supplier's investment in capacity restoration, and compare this approach with the traditional approach of diversifying part of the order to an expensive but reliable supplier. Under a Restoration Enhancement (RE) strategy, the buyer uses price and/or order quantity incentives to encourage the supplier's restoration investment decision. Two different cases are considered—when the incentive is committed to ex ante (prior to disruption) and when it is committed to ex post (after disruption). In contrast, under a Supplier Diversification (SD) strategy, the buyer splits orders between a reliable supplier and an unreliable supplier to hedge against the disruption risk. Here, the buyer does not provide any separate incentive to the unreliable supplier. Our analysis indicates that under the RE strategy, where the buyer offers incentives, both the buyer and the supplier (weakly) prefer the ex ante commitment over the ex post one. Furthermore, the RE strategy is preferred over the SD strategy when the unreliable supplier's restoration outcome is more predictable or when a high restoration outcome is more likely. However, the buyer's preference for the SD strategy increases as market demand increases.     

A Newsvendor Who Chooses Informational Effort

We study a newsvendor who can acquire the services of a forecaster, or, more generally, an information gatherer (IG) to improve his information about demand. When the IG's effort increases, does the average ex ante order quantity rise or fall? Do average ex post sales rise or fall? Improvements in information technology and in the services offered by forecasters provide motivation for the study of these questions. Much depends on our model of the IG and his efforts. We study an IG who sends a signal to a classic single‐period newsvendor. The signal defines the newsvendor's posterior probability distribution on the possible demands and the newsvendor uses that posterior to calculate the optimal order. Each of the possible posteriors is a scale/location transform of the same base distribution. When the IG works harder, the average scale parameter drops. Higher IG effort is always useful to the newsvendor. We show that there is a critical value of order cost. For costs on one side of this value more IG effort leads to a higher average ex ante order and for costs on the other side to a lower average order. But for all costs, more IG effort leads to higher average ex post sales. We obtain analogous results for a “regret‐averse” newsvendor who suffers a penalty that is a nonlinear function of the discrepancy between quantity ordered and true demand.     

Shareholder Value Effects of Voluntary Emissions Reduction

The relationship between emissions reduction and firm financial performance has been studied with mixed results. We consider potential sources of this ambiguity by examining announcements of voluntary emissions reduction (VER) from 1990 to 2009. We measure the stock market reaction associated with VER announcements to estimate the effects of time, emissions type, and whether the reduction was announced ex ante or ex post. We find that the market reaction to VER significantly decreased over time. The changing nature of the market reaction to VER over time highlights the importance of evaluating the financial impact of any VER in the current context rather than relying on past findings. We also find that the market reaction is more positive if the reduction is for greenhouse gas (GHG) rather than other emissions types. In light of the increasing concern with GHGs, this finding should be welcome news for managers. Last, we find a more positive market reaction for VER announcements that are pledges or statements of intent rather than realized achievements of VER. Managers contemplating VER might find benefit (and at least no harm) in announcing their intent to reduce emissions rather than waiting until they have achieved the reduction.     

Advance Selling in the Presence of Speculators and Forward‐Looking Consumers

This article examines the pricing policy of a monopolist seller who may sell in advance of consumption in a market that comprises of myopic consumers, forward‐looking consumers, and speculators. The latter group has no consumption value for the goods and is in the market with the sole objective of making a profit by reselling the purchased goods shortly after. Consumers, although homogeneous in terms of their valuations, are different with respect to their perspectives. We show that in an “upward” market where the expected valuation increases over time, the optimal pricing policy is an ex ante “static” one where the seller “prices into the future” and prices the myopic consumers out of the advance market. However, in a “downward” market where the expected valuation decreases over time, the seller adopts a dynamic pricing strategy except for the case when higher initial sales can trigger more demand subsequently and when the downward trend is not too high. In this case, the seller prefers an ex ante “static” pricing strategy and deliberately prices lower initially to sell to speculators. We identify the conditions under which the seller benefits from the existence of speculators in the market. Moreover, although the presence of entry costs is ineffective as an entry deterrence, we determine the conditions under which exit costs can rein in speculative purchase.     

Measuring the Performance of Corporate Acquisitions: An Empirical Comparison of Alternative Metrics*

The choice of performance measure has long been a difficult issue facing researchers. This article investigates the comparability of four common measures of acquisition performance: cumulative abnormal returns, managers' assessments, divestment data and expert informants' assessments. Independently each of these measures indicated a mean acquisition success rate of between 44–56%, within a sample of British cross‐border acquisitions. However, with the exception of a positive relationship between managers' and expert informants' subjective assessments, no significant correlation was found between the performance data generated by the alternative metrics. In particular, ex‐ante capital market reactions to an acquisition announcement exhibited little relation to corporate managers' ex‐post assessment. This is seen to reflect the information asymmetry that can exist between investors and company management, particularly regarding implementation aspects. Overall, the results suggest that future acquisitions studies should consider employing multiple performance measures in order to gain a holistic view of outcome, while in the longer term, opportunities remain to identify and refine improved metrics.     

THE JOINT DESIGN OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: A FIRST PASS

Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk‐averse workers, risk‐neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the “first best,”unemployment insurance comes with employment protection—in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.     

Managing Risk as a Duality of Harm and Benefit: A Study of Organizational Risk Objects in the Global Insurance Industry

This study examines how organizations construct and manage risk objects as a duality of harm–benefit within their normal operations. It moves beyond the existing focus on accidents, disasters and crisis. We study the risk‐transfer processes of 35 insurers where they navigate the tension of retaining risk in their insurance portfolio to increase the benefit of making profit and transferring risk to reinsurance to reduce the harm of paying claims. We show that organizations’ constructions of risk are underpinned by everyday risk management practices of centralizing, calculating and diversifying. Through variation in these practices, not all organizations seek balance and we in turn uncover the sensemaking processes of abstracting and localizing that enable organizations to prioritize harm or benefit. This contributes to the risk literature by illuminating the co‐constitutive relationship between risk sensemaking processes and everyday risk management practices. Following the complex linkages involved in the construction of risk objects as sources of harm–benefit, our analysis also contributes to the literature on dualities. It shows that while immediate trade‐offs between harm–benefit occur, prioritizing one element of the duality is ultimately a means for attaining the other. Thus, while initial imbalance is evident, prioritization can be an enabling approach to navigating duality.     

Split‐Award Procurement Auctions—Can Bayesian Equilibrium Strategies Predict Human Bidding Behavior in Multi‐Object Auctions?

We analyze if and when symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium predictions can explain human bidding behavior in multi‐object auctions. We focus on two sealed‐bid split‐award auctions with ex ante split decisions as they can be regularly found in procurement practice. These auction formats are straightforward multi‐object extensions of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction. We derive the risk‐neutral symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium strategies and find that, although the two auction mechanisms yield the same expected costs to the buyer, other aspects of the two models, including the equilibrium bidding strategies, differ significantly. The strategic considerations in these auction formats are more involved than in single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions, and it is questionable whether expected utility maximization can explain human bidding behavior in such multi‐object auctions. Therefore, we analyzed the predictive accuracy of our equilibrium strategies in the laboratory. In human subject experiments we found underbidding, which is in line with earlier experiments on single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions. To control for regret, we organize experiments against computerized bidders, who play the equilibrium strategy. In computerized experiments where bid functions are only used in a single auction, we found significant underbidding on low‐cost draws. In experiments where the bid function is reused in 100 auctions, we could also control effectively for risk aversion, and there is no significant difference of the average bidding behavior and the risk‐neutral Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function. The results suggest that strategic complexity does not serve as an explanation for underbidding in split‐award procurement auctions, but risk aversion does have a significant impact.     

Equilibrium Bias of Technology

This paper presents three sets of results about equilibrium bias of technology. First, I show that when the menu of technological possibilities only allows for factor‐augmenting technologies, the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change relatively biased toward that factor—meaning that the induced technological change increases the relative marginal product of the factor becoming more abundant. Moreover, this induced bias can be strong enough to make the relative marginal product of a factor increasing in response to an increase in its supply, thus leading to an upward‐sloping relative demand curve. I also show that these results about relative bias do not generalize when more general menus of technological possibilities are considered. Second, I prove that under mild assumptions, the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change that is absolutely biased toward that factor—meaning that it increases its marginal product at given factor proportions. The third and most important result in the paper establishes the possibility of and conditions for strong absolute equilibrium bias—whereby the price (marginal product) of a factor increases in response to an increase in its supply. I prove that, under some regularity conditions, there will be strong absolute equilibrium bias if and only if the aggregate production function of the economy fails to be jointly concave in factors and technology. This type of failure of joint concavity is possible in economies where equilibrium factor demands and technologies result from the decisions of different agents.     

Incentive for Peer‐to‐Peer Knowledge Sharing among Farmers in Developing Economies

This study examines the peer‐to‐Peer interactions among farmers when both knowledge learning and sharing are available. We construct a stylized model in which heterogeneous farmers are endowed with their initial production capabilities and can post questions in the platform for help. A representative expert regularly monitors the forum and provides answers to the farmers’ questions, but may be non‐responsive sometimes due to the limited capacity. A knowledgeable core user (farmer) can choose to be silent or responsive, and is allowed to strategically determine the informativeness of her answers. The farmers face the minimum quantity restriction for attracting the buyers, and must make production before the time of sales. We show that in equilibrium the core user never provides answers that are more informative than the expert's, irrespective of her ex ante knowledge level. Redesigning or restructuring the platform does not help eliminate this inefficient knowledge provision. We also find that hiring more staff to frequently monitor the forum turns out to be detrimental for the peer‐to‐peer interactions. Moreover, the competition on knowledge sharing between the platform expert and the core user features strategic complementarity sometimes but strategic substitution at other times. Third, charging for the platform usage may discourage uninformative answers, but it could also discourage the core user from sharing knowledge with other farmers.     

Insurance,Public Assistance,and Household Flood Risk Reduction: A Comparative Study of Austria,England, and Romania

In light of increasing losses from floods, many researchers and policymakers are looking for ways to encourage flood risk reduction among communities, business, and households. In this study, we investigate risk‐reduction behavior at the household level in three European Union Member States with fundamentally different insurance and compensation schemes. We try to understand if and how insurance and public assistance influence private risk‐reduction behavior. Data were collected using a telephone survey (n = 1,849) of household decisionmakers in flood‐prone areas. We show that insurance overall is positively associated with private risk‐reduction behavior. Warranties, premium discounts, and information provision with respect to risk reduction may be an explanation for this positive relationship in the case of structural measures. Public incentives for risk‐reduction measures by means of financial and in‐kind support, and particularly through the provision of information, are also associated with enhancing risk reduction. In this study, public compensation is not negatively associated with private risk‐reduction behavior. This does not disprove such a relationship, but the negative effect may be mitigated by factors related to respondents' capacity to implement measures or social norms that were not included in the analysis. The data suggest that large‐scale flood protection infrastructure creates a sense of security that is associated with a lower level of preparedness. Across the board there is ample room to improve both public and private policies to provide effective incentives for household‐level risk reduction.     

Contingency Strategies in Managing Supply Systems with Uncertain Lead‐Times

The globalization of markets and geographic dispersion of production facilities, combined with a heavy outsourcing of supply chain processes, have substantially increased the exposure of supply chains to supply lead‐times of long and uncertain nature. In this paper, we study the potential use of two contingency strategies on top of the conventionally used time buffer—statically planned safety lead‐time (SL)—approach to deal with the lead‐time uncertainty. These are (1) the ex‐ante planning for disruption safety stock (DSS) to be released when a “disruption” (in this case, late delivery of the order) occurs; and (2) the ex‐post dynamic emergency response (DER), which dynamically decides on the timing and size of an emergency order to be placed. Our work elaborates on the optimal parameter setting for these strategies, compares their added values when used to complement the traditional SL approach, and examines how the use of the contingency strategies affects the SL and corresponding cycle length of a periodic review system. Our research finds that: (1) the above contingency strategies reduce the reliance on the SL and are cost effective when the coefficient of variation (CV) of the uncertain lead‐time is high; (2) it is important to re‐optimize the SL to account for the contingency plans; and (3) re‐optimization of the cycle length to account for the presence of the contingency responses, as opposed to using an EOQ‐determined cycle length, does not significantly improve the cost performance. However, such re‐optimization does well in the SL approach when the CV of the uncertain lead‐time is high.     

An Experimental Investigation of Procurement Auctions with Asymmetric Sellers

Electronic reverse auctions are a commonly used procurement mechanism. Research to date has focused on suppliers who are ex ante symmetric in that their costs are drawn from a common distribution. However, in many cases, a seller's range of potential costs depends on their own operations, location, or economies of scale and scope. Thus, understanding how different bidder types impact auction outcomes is key when designing an auction. This study reports the results of the first controlled laboratory experiment designed to compare prices between first‐price and second‐price procurement auctions for homogeneous goods when seller cost types are asymmetric and the number of bidders varies. The results indicate that first‐price auctions generate lower prices regardless of market composition. The results also reveal that first‐price auctions are at least weakly more efficient than second‐price auctions despite the theoretical prediction that the reverse should hold in asymmetric auctions. Post hoc analysis of individual bidders' behavior in first‐price auctions revealed evidence that bidders systematically underbid when their cost realizations were close to the lower bound. Furthermore, bidders adjust their behavior based on the type of the other bidders in the market in a manner inconsistent with theory. Consequently, adding a third bidder to a two‐bidder market is not advantageous to the buyer unless that third bidder is a low‐cost type.     

A gradient Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm for computing multivariate maximum likelihood estimates and posterior distributions: mixture dose-response assessment

Multivariate probability distributions, such as may be used for mixture dose‐response assessment, are typically highly parameterized and difficult to fit to available data. However, such distributions may be useful in analyzing the large electronic data sets becoming available, such as dose‐response biomarker and genetic information. In this article, a new two‐stage computational approach is introduced for estimating multivariate distributions and addressing parameter uncertainty. The proposed first stage comprises a gradient Markov chain Monte Carlo (GMCMC) technique to find Bayesian posterior mode estimates (PMEs) of parameters, equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) in the absence of subjective information. In the second stage, these estimates are used to initialize a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation, replacing the conventional burn‐in period to allow convergent simulation of the full joint Bayesian posterior distribution and the corresponding unconditional multivariate distribution (not conditional on uncertain parameter values). When the distribution of parameter uncertainty is such a Bayesian posterior, the unconditional distribution is termed predictive. The method is demonstrated by finding conditional and unconditional versions of the recently proposed emergent dose‐response function (DRF). Results are shown for the five‐parameter common‐mode and seven‐parameter dissimilar‐mode models, based on published data for eight benzene–toluene dose pairs. The common mode conditional DRF is obtained with a 21‐fold reduction in data requirement versus MCMC. Example common‐mode unconditional DRFs are then found using synthetic data, showing a 71% reduction in required data. The approach is further demonstrated for a PCB 126‐PCB 153 mixture. Applicability is analyzed and discussed. Matlab^® computer programs are provided.     

Promoting Seismic Retrofit Implementation Through “Nudge”: Using Warranty as a Driver

This article proposes a new type of warranty policy that applies the “nudge” concept developed by Thaler and Sunstein to encourage homeowners in Japan to implement seismic retrofitting. Homeowner adaptation to natural disasters through loss reduction measures is known to be inadequate. To encourage proactive risk management, the “nudge” approach capitalizes on how choice architecture can influence human decision‐making tendencies. For example, people tend to place more value on a warranty for consumer goods than on actuarial value. This article proposes a “warranty for seismic retrofitting” as a “nudge” policy that gives homeowners the incentive to adopt loss reduction measures. Under such a contract, the government guarantees all repair costs in the event of earthquake damage to the house if the homeowner implements seismic retrofitting. To estimate the degree to which a warranty will increase the perceived value of seismic retrofitting, we use field survey data from 1,200 homeowners. Our results show that a warranty increases the perceived value of seismic retrofitting by an average of 33%, and an approximate cost‐benefit analysis indicates that such a warranty can be more economically efficient than an ex ante subsidy. Furthermore, we address the failure of the standard expected utility model to explain homeowners’ decisions based on warranty evaluation, and explore the significant influence of ambiguity aversion on the efficacy of seismic retrofitting and nonanalytical factors such as feelings or trust.     

QMRA for Drinking Water: 2. The Effect of Pathogen Clustering in Single‐Hit Dose‐Response Models

Spatial and/or temporal clustering of pathogens will invalidate the commonly used assumption of Poisson‐distributed pathogen counts (doses) in quantitative microbial risk assessment. In this work, the theoretically predicted effect of spatial clustering in conventional “single‐hit” dose‐response models is investigated by employing the stuttering Poisson distribution, a very general family of count distributions that naturally models pathogen clustering and contains the Poisson and negative binomial distributions as special cases. The analysis is facilitated by formulating the dose‐response models in terms of probability generating functions. It is shown formally that the theoretical single‐hit risk obtained with a stuttering Poisson distribution is lower than that obtained with a Poisson distribution, assuming identical mean doses. A similar result holds for mixed Poisson distributions. Numerical examples indicate that the theoretical single‐hit risk is fairly insensitive to moderate clustering, though the effect tends to be more pronounced for low mean doses. Furthermore, using Jensen's inequality, an upper bound on risk is derived that tends to better approximate the exact theoretical single‐hit risk for highly overdispersed dose distributions. The bound holds with any dose distribution (characterized by its mean and zero inflation index) and any conditional dose‐response model that is concave in the dose variable. Its application is exemplified with published data from Norovirus feeding trials, for which some of the administered doses were prepared from an inoculum of aggregated viruses. The potential implications of clustering for dose‐response assessment as well as practical risk characterization are discussed.