Demonstration of power: Experimental results on bilateral bargaining

We test the empirical effectiveness of two theoretical proposals to equilibrate bargaining power in bilateral bargaining. Our experimental design is based on the two-player versions of the multibidding game (Pérez-Castrillo & Wettstein, 2001) and the bid-and-propose game (Navarro & Perea, 2005). Both models build on the ultimatum game and balance parties’ bargaining power by auctioning the role of the proposer in the first stage. We find that proposers learn how to send an acceptable proposal by trial and error, guided by responders’ rejections. The observed behavior stabilizes for the final experimental rounds and the payoff gap between the proposer and the responder seems to close down. However, the strategies chosen by subjects are remarkably different from the theoretical ones.     

Market economies and pro-social behavior: Experimental evidence from Central Asia

This study seeks to extend the body of knowledge of pro-social behavior in comparative market settings by reporting on a high-stakes ultimatum game and revelation game experiments in two transition economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. While controlling for cultural differences and framing effects, we find statistically significant differences in fairness and honesty behavior between the two countries. Specifically, subjects in Uzbekistan (in an earlier stage of transition to a market economy) are fairer and more honest than their later-stage Kazakh counterparts. Our experimental findings have implications for the literature on pro-social behavior and market economies, and more generally, on the transmission process between formal and informal institutions.     

Purchase deadline as a moderator of the effects of price uncertainty on search duration

A longstanding theoretical tenet in the economic psychology literature is that consumers respond to greater price uncertainty by increasing search. The generality of this tenet was investigated in the context of a moderating variable, purchase deadline. It was hypothesized that the effect of increased price uncertainty, as reflected by both cross-sectional price variability and longitudinal price variability, was moderated by temporal proximity to a purchase deadline. The hypothesis was tested by analyzing purchase data from a sample of consumers with known purchase deadlines searching for rental trucks. The results indicated that search increased in response to greater price uncertainty for distant deadlines but decreased in response to greater price uncertainty for proximal deadlines.     

What’s in a frame? Goal framing,trust and reciprocity

Economists often rely on the Berg et al. (1995) trust game, or variants thereof, to identify levels of trust and reciprocity, which are fundamental to discussions of social capital. But to what extent is behavior in this game sensitive to the way the instructions are framed? We use the Berg et al. trust game played for ten rounds with random re-matching to study this. We implement a number of variations in the way the game is presented to subjects. We show that levels of trust, reciprocity and returns to trust are significantly higher under “goal framing”, which highlights the conflict inherent in the game, between self-interest and maximizing social surplus. Furthermore, with such framing, trust measured via the experimental game exhibits significant positive correlation with trust measured via the Social Values Orientation questionnaire.     

Why is dishonesty difficult to mitigate? The interaction between descriptive norm and monetary incentive

We examine whether changes in perceived norm of dishonesty can offset the effects of changes in benefit from the dishonest action. We find partial support for the hypothesis in laboratory experiments on lying behavior in a cheap-talk sender-receiver game, conducted in two countries. In the experiments, we vary benefit from lying and shift senders’ norm perception by providing them information on lying from prior sessions. The findings suggest that senders adjust their perceived norm as expected, but they respond to norm in a somewhat self-serving manner. Specifically, when benefit from lying is lowered but senders are induced to believe in a higher norm of lying, they lie significantly more than when norm is not intervened. However, when benefit from lying is raised, our intervention to shift perceived norm of lying downward succeeds in altering senders’ belief as intended, but does not lower lying significantly. The results can be conceived as an indirect evidence of the challenge in curbing dishonesty by reducing private pecuniary gains in a society with a culture of dishonesty, while suggesting that even societies with history of low dishonesty may succumb to dishonesty when pecuniary incentives for dishonesty rise.     

The effect of education,income inequality and merit on inequality acceptance

A large number of observational and experimental studies have explored the determinants of individual preferences for redistribution. In general, inequalities are more likely to be accepted by people of higher socioeconomic status, in richer societies and when inequalities are perceived as justifiable owing to differences in productivity. Almås et al. (2020) show that in a relatively unequal society (the United States), the highly educated accept inequality significantly more than the less educated, whereas, in a relatively equal society (Norway), the less educated accept inequality more, but not significantly more, than the highly educated. Here, we replicate this finding using data from experiments conducted in four locations across three countries all distinct from the ones studied by Almås et al. However, a closer look at the data indicates that the origin of the interaction effect varies depending on which societies one compares. Data for Norway and the United States indicate that meritocratic values among the highly educated are less prevalent in more equal societies and that this is the driver of the triple interaction effect. In contrast, in our data the interaction effects have multiple drivers.     

Replication: Belief elicitation with quadratic and binarized scoring rules

Researchers increasingly elicit beliefs to understand the underlying motivations of decision makers. Two commonly used methods are the quadratic scoring rule (QSR) and the binarized scoring rule (BSR). Hossain and Okui (2013) use a within-subject design to evaluate the performance of these two methods in an environment where subjects report probabilistic beliefs over binary outcomes with objective probabilities. In a near replication of their study, we show that their results continue to hold with a between-subject design. This is an important validation of the BSR given that researchers typically implement only one method to elicit beliefs. In favor of the BSR, reported beliefs are less accurate under the QSR than the BSR. Consistent with theoretical predictions, risk-averse subjects distort their reported beliefs under the QSR.     

Income in jeopardy: How losing employment affects the willingness to take risks

Identifying the determinants of risk-taking is crucial for our understanding of a variety of choices. Using German panel data, we find that people become more risk-averse when losing work. The immediate income loss does not mediate this effect. It seems also unrelated to the loss of non-monetary benefits of work and to changes of worker’s emotional state. However, we find that risk aversion responds the more strongly to losing work the more future income is at stake, and that the effect manifests itself already on the eve of job loss when people do not yet suffer from the consequences of the event. We conclude that lower future income expectations and more uncertainty about future incomes may explain the effect of job loss on risk attitude. Our results might imply that a recession may reinforce itself as it induces people to fear job loss, which raises their risk aversion and might therefore reduce the willingness to invest in risky projects. Moreover, self-assessed risk attitude seems to measure absolute risk aversion and thus not only an underlying risk preference parameter.     

Being of two minds: Ultimatum offers under cognitive constraints

We experimentally investigate how proposers in the Ultimatum Game behave when their cognitive resources are constrained by time pressure and cognitive load. In a dual-system perspective, when proposers are cognitively constrained and thus their deliberative capacity is reduced, their offers are more likely to be influenced by spontaneous affective reactions. We find that under time pressure proposers make higher offers. This increase appears not to be explained by more reliance on an equality heuristic. Analysing the behaviour of the same individual in both roles leads us to favour the strategic over the other-regarding explanation for the observed increase in offers. In contrast, proposers who are under cognitive load do not behave differently from proposers who are not.     

Willingness to contribute to collective forest management: Evidence from Godere in the Gambela Region of Ethiopia

This paper examines factors determining willingness to contribute to collective forest management at Godere Forest Priority Area in the Gambela Region of Ethiopia. Using data collected from 160 households, we tested a number of hypotheses. Results show that households that perceived destruction, a belief in beneficiaries’ responsibility for the forest management, participation in social institutions and governing council favorably determine willingness to contribute. Nevertheless, users’ characteristics (age, group membership, income from the forest) had negative effect on willingness. State-driven development and settlers’ activities had negatively affected indigenous people's use of forest, leading to a reduction in their willingness. This suggests the need to put effective property rights in place to cause a shift in users’ behavior.     

The efficacy of tables versus graphs in disrupting dark networks: An experimental study

An agent tasked with disrupting a dark (covert and illegal) network must first be presented with information about the organization's structure. This paper uses a behavioral experiment to test in a stylized dark network disruption setting whether an agent makes a better disruption choice when the information is displayed in a table or a graph format. We find that subjects make decisions more quickly when presented with graphs, but that subjects perform weakly better with tables. An important lesson is that the display should explicitly distinguish non-existent links from potential links of unknown status.     

Racial conflict and the malignancy of identity

This paper demonstrates how our sense of identity can emerge out of mere markers of social distinction that may have no innate significance, but, nevertheless, spread to various aspects of our lives and be the root of conflict. The basis of such conflicts could arise from the use of race to form conditional judgments about people's behavior. Moreover, there are contexts where racial conflict is inevitable even though, if individuals had common knowledge of one another's preferences, there would be no conflict. It is argued that this kind of conflict, where many individuals have no innate aggressive preference, is widespread and understanding the process that gives rise to such conflict is the key to crafting effective policy that contains it.     

Tra i Leoni: Revealing the preferences behind a superstition

We examine a superstition for which adherence is nearly universal among its target population. Using a combination of field interventions that involve unsuspecting participants and a lab-style value elicitation, we investigate the nature and strength of peoples’ underlying preferences. While a substantial minority of people are willing to incur a relatively high individual cost in order to adhere to the superstition, for many, adherence is contingent on the behavior of others. Our findings are consistent with the idea that it is the conforming nature of the majority that sustains the false beliefs of the minority.     

Rank and response: A field experiment on peer information and water use behavior

Perception of peer rank, or how we perform relative to our peers, can be a powerful motivator. While research exists on the effect of social information on decision making, there is less work on how ranked comparisons with our peers influence our behavior. This paper outlines a field experiment conducted with 3896 households in Castro Valley, California, which uses household mailers with various forms of social information and peer rank messaging to motivate water conservation. The experiment tests the effect of a visible peer rank on water use, and how the competitive framing of rank information influences behavioral response. The results show that households with relatively low or high water use in the pre-treatment period responded differently to how rank information was framed. I find that a neutrally-framed peer rank caused a small “boomerang effect” (i.e., an increase in average water use) for low water use households, but this effect was eliminated by competitive framing. At the same time, a competitively-framed peer rank demotivated high water use households, increasing their average water use over the full period of the experiment. This result is supported by evidence that the competitive frame on rank information increased water use for households who ranked “last” in the peer group – a detrimental “last place effect” from competitively-framed rankings.     

When the cost has sunk: Measuring and comparing the sunk-cost bias in autistic and neurotypical persons

This paper measures and compares the sunk-cost bias among autistic adults, and neurotypical controls. Frequent influencing personality traits and task factors affecting the sunk-cost bias such as age, gender, and education level, time spent in the decision task, and the level of sunk cost (e.g., very low, low, moderate, and high), are controlled for in the analysis. Results show that both autistic and neurotypical individuals are subject to the sunk-cost bias, however, with autistic individuals being less affected by this bias. Results also show significant differences among subgroups of autistic and neurotypical individuals, with autistic individuals with more autism traits being less subject to the sunk-cost bias. For individuals with autism, time spent in the decision task is found to be negatively associated to the sunk-cost bias.     

No mood effects in the field: The case of car inspections

We study mood effect in the field to measure its economic impact and address shortcomings in the existing literature, which typically uses one single mood proxy and ignores selection effects. Using over 50 million car inspections in Sweden and England and multiple mood proxies, we study whether car inspectors are more lenient on good mood days and if car owners self-select into those days. We find evidence of a “Friday effect” in England and a small selection bias, but no support for consistent mood effect. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the expectations of rational actors who may exploit mood effect and the need to study mood in the field using different settings and multiple proxies to avoid hasty conclusions.     

Dictator game variants with probabilistic (and cost-saving) payoffs: A systematic test

Driven by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and previous evidence, I systematically test the validity of common dictator game variants with probabilistic payoffs. Using a unified experimental framework, I include four approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators, paying only some players, paying only some decisions, and role uncertainty. I also relate transfers in the dictator game variants to established complementary individual difference measures of prosociality: social value orientation, personal values, a donation to charity, and the Big Five personality factor agreeableness. My data shows that the standard dictator game presents the expected correlations with the complementary measures of prosociality. Involving fewer receivers yields comparably valid results. By contrast, when only some players or decisions are paid or, particularly, when subjects face role uncertainty, the expected associations with complementary prosociality measures are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also significantly biased upward. I conclude that the validity of dictator game outcomes is highly sensitive to the applied methods. Not all dictator game variants can be recommended for the valid measurement of social preferences.     

The bomb-crater effect of tax audits: Beyond the misperception of chance

The experimental literature has identified the Bomb Crater Effect (BoCE), i.e., the fact that tax compliance drops immediately after a taxpayer is audited. From a theoretical perspective, BoCE has been explained either by the misperception of chance, also known as the gambler’s fallacy, or by the loss repair effect. The aim of this paper is to look more closely at the former. We run a laboratory experiment in which the information set is relatively rich but the implementation of the Bayesian updating process is fairly simple. By doing so, we are able to elicit a range of consistent but heterogeneous probability beliefs and to distinguish between Bayesian and non-Bayesian subjects. We obtain two major results concerning Bayesian subjects. First, they exhibit a strong and robust short-run BoCE. Second, they are seemingly not affected by the audits of other taxpayers in their compliance decision. These results are robust to different definitions of Bayesianity as well as to different specifications and conflict with the evidence that Bayesian agents correctly perceive the chance of being audited. In turn, these findings suggest that the existing explanations of the BoCE are not satisfactory and that alternative theories are needed.     

Gender differences in willingness to compete: The role of public observability

A recent literature emphasizes that gender differences in the labor market may in part be driven by a gender gap in willingness to compete. However, whereas experiments in this literature typically investigate willingness to compete in private environments, real world competitions often have a more public nature, which introduces potential social image concerns. If such image concerns are important, and men and women differ in the degree to which they want to be seen as competitive, making tournament entry decisions publicly observable may further exacerbate the gender gap. We test this prediction using a laboratory experiment (N = 784) that varies the degree to which the decision to compete, and its outcome, is publicly observable. We find that public observability does not alter the magnitude of the gender gap in willingness to compete in an economically or statistically significant way.     

Carry a big stick,or no stick at all: Punishment and endowment heterogeneity in the trust game

We investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, reciprocity), the capacity of punishment (i.e., the deterrence hypothesis) and hidden costs of punishment (i.e., models of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation). Our results are hardly coherent with the first two (inequality aversion and deterrence), but roughly consistent with the latter.