The Astonishing Population Averted by China’s Birth Restrictions: Estimates,Nightmares, and Reprogrammed Ambitions

China launched an unprecedented program to control its population in 1971. Experts have dismissed the official estimate of 400 million births averted by this program as greatly exaggerated yet neglect to provide their own estimates. Counterfactual projections based on fertility declines in other countries suggest that China’s program-averted population numbered 360–520 million as of 2015. The low end of this range is based on Vietnam—China’s best national comparator, with a two-child program of its own—and the high end is based on a 16-country comparator selected, ironically, by critics of the official estimate. The latter comparator further implies that China’s one-child program itself averted a population of 400 million by 2015, three-quarters of the total averted population. All such estimates are projected to double by 2060, due mostly to counterfactual population momentum. These and other findings presented herein affirm the astonishing impact of China’s draconian policy choices and challenge the current consensus that rapid socioeconomic progress drove China’s fertility well below two children per family. International comparisons of fertility and income suggest instead that China’s very low fertility arrived two or three decades too soon. If China had not harshly enforced a norm of 1.5-children during the last quarter century, most mothers would have had two children, one-half birth higher than observed.     

A socioeconomic analysis of the determinants of fertility: the case of Vietnam

This paper is an economics-based quantitative analysis of the determinants of individual fertility in Vietnam, measured as the number of children ever born. In addition to the conventional linear model, two limited dependent variable models, Poisson and ordered-logit, are estimated using data from the 1988 Vietnam Demographic and Health Survery. We find, among other things, that husbands‘ characteristics are almost as important as those of wives in determining fertility, perhaps a reflection of the still dominant role of husbands in Vietnamese families. Both paternal and maternal education have important impacts on fertility. Of special interest is the evidence that supports the attitudinal effect of education over the opportunity-cost effect. Received April 22, 1996 / Accepted January 13, 1997     

Effects of population policy and economic reform on the trend in fertility in Guangdong province,China, 1975–2005

An analysis of data mainly from China's 1990 and 2000 censuses and 2005 mini-census shows how fertility decline between 1975 and 2005 in the province of Guangdong has been influenced by both fertility policy and economic and social development. Guangdong's development since 1975 has been very rapid and has attracted huge numbers of migrants from other provinces. The analysis of the province's fertility trend from 1975 shows clearly the influence of fertility policy on the trend. The analysis also shows that economic development has brought about large changes in population composition by urban/rural residence, education, occupation, and migration status, which, together with large fertility differentials by these characteristics, have contributed substantially to Guangdong's fertility decline, in large part through changes in proportions currently married.     

The Impact of Migration on Fertility under China’s Underlying Restrictions: A Comparative Study Between Permanent and Temporary Migrants

Compared with that in other countries, the issue of fertility in China is more complicated because of its restriction policy or system. Several major hypotheses have been proposed to explain and predict the impact of migration on China’s fertility regardless of China’s real situation. Therefore, this paper analyzes the impact of migration on fertility considering China’s underlying restrictions using the data from the Chinese General Social Survey carried out in 2008. The social class in this study was divided into two, namely urban class and rural class. By building the 2 × 2 mobility tables and the diagonal mobility model, the study determined the impact of migration on fertility and analyzed the influence of some restrictions, such as family planning, traditional fertility concept, and household registration system. Results show that migration greatly affects fertility: upward migration (i.e., from rural to urban) may decrease the fertility, whereas downward migration (i.e., from urban to rural) may increase it. The degree of decline on fertility is greater than that of increase. Family planning still plays a role in fertility decline. Traditional concepts on fertility, for example, bringing up sons to take care of parents in their old age and preferring boys to girls, are anchored on the people’s mind, which is detrimental to the stability of the fertility rate. Moreover, the household registration system primarily influences the fertility behavior of temporary migration, with a negative relationship between them.     

India's population: second and growing

Attention in this discussion of the population of India is directed to the following: international comparisons, population pressures, trends in population growth (interstate variations), sex ratio and literacy, urban-rural distribution, migration (interstate migration, international migration), fertility and mortality levels, fertility trends (birth rate decline, interstate fertility differentials, rural-urban fertility decline, fertility differentials by education and religion, marriage and fertility), mortality trends (mortality differentials, health care services), population pressures on socioeconomic development (per capita income and poverty, unemployment and employment, increasing foodgrain production, school enrollment shortfalls), the family planning program, implementing population policy statements, what actions would be effective, and goals and prospects for the future. India's population, a total of 684 million persons as of March 1, 1981, is 2nd only to the population of China. The 1981 population was up by 136 million persons, or 24.75%, over the 548 million enumerated in the 1971 census. For 1978, India's birth and death rates were estimated at 33.3 and 14.2/1000 population, down from about 41.1 and 18.9 during the mid-1960s. India's current 5-year plan has set a goal of a birth rate of 30/1000 population by 1985 and "replacement-level" fertility--about 2.3 births per woman--by 1996. The acceleration in India's population growth has come mainly in the past 3 decades and is due primarily to a decline in mortality that has markedly outstripped the fertility decline. The Janata Party which assumed government leadership in March 1977 did not dismantle the family planning program, but emphasis was shifted to promote family planning "without any compulsion, coercion or pressures of any sort." The policy statement stressed that efforts were to be directed towards those currently underserved, mainly in rural areas. Hard targets were rejected. Over the 1978-1981 period the family planning program slowly recovered. By March 1981, 33.4 million sterilizations had been performed since 1956 when statistics were 1st compiled. Another 3 million couples were estimated to be using IUDs and conventional contraceptives.     

鼓励生育政策能否提高生育率? ——基于生育成本缺口递增的视角

中国总和生育率的下降引发调整生育政策的讨论,但鲜有对鼓励生育政策的效果评估与理论解释.通过马斯洛需求层次理论构建生育成本缺口递增假说,并基于世界人口政策数据库与OECD家庭数据库对基于转移支付的鼓励生育政策进行了效果评估,得出如下结论:第一,生育成本是一种动态结构,需求跃迁导致生育成本缺口增速快于收入增速,进而决定鼓励...     

Fertility,Education, and Development: Evidence from India

Fertility has declined significantly in many parts of India since the early 1980s. This article examines the determinants of fertility levels and fertility decline, using data on Indian districts for 1981 and 1991. The authors find that women's education and child mortality are the most important factors explaining fertility differences across the country and over time. Low levels of son preference also contribute to lower fertility. By contrast, general indicators of modernization and development such as urbanization, poverty reduction, and male literacy exhibit no significant association with fertility. En passant, the authors probe a subject of much confusion— the relation between fertility decline and gender bias.     

Declining fertility and policy intervention in Europe: Some lessons for Australia?

The contemporary fertility situation in Europe is outlined with emphasis on trends in the late 1990s. It is shown that while most European countries have lower fertility levels than Australia there is wide variation between countries with respect to both their levels of fertility and their rate of fertility decline. While almost all countries are experiencing fertility decline the rate of decline is higher and the fertility is lower in countries where the male-breadwinner model is strongest. Attempts to influence fertility in European nations are discussed, particularly those involving the introduction of family-friendly policies. It is clear that despite popular beliefs to the contrary, societies where male-breadwinner models influence policy most are those with lowest fertility. The lesson for Australia is that family-friendly policies not only are desirable from the perspective of moving toward gender equality but are likely to stabilize or perhaps even marginally increase fertility.     

Policy options when population growth slows: The case of Thailand

Thailand reached replacement-level fertility almost a decade ago, although there has been a lag in measuring and recognising the implications of this benchmark event. Fertility could well sink still lower. The momentum of population growth will ensure substantial further increase before the population levels off, but this is not true in all regions. For example, earlier and faster fertility decline in the North, and net outmigration, have led to a situation where some geographical and age segments of the North's population are decreasing. Population policy in Thailand since 1970 has had two major planks: to reduce fertility through an active family planning program, and to distribute population away from the large primate city of Bangkok. The paper discusses whether these policies may need to be modified as a result of the major demographic and socio economic changes that have been taking place. It also discusses the limits to population policy in terms of the likely efficacy of various measures that could be adopted, based on both an assessment of the Thailand situation and the experience of other low-fertility countries.     

Thinking about several problems of the research of our family planning strategy]

On the basis of 1982 census data, it is estimated that from 1987-1997 13 million women will enter the age of marriage and child-bearing each year. The tasks of keeping the population size around 1.2 billion by the year 2000 is arduous. Great efforts have to be made to continue encouraging one child/couple, and to pursue the current plans and policies and maintain strict control over fertility. Keeping population growth in pace with economic growth, environment, ecological balance, availability of per capita resources, education programs, employment capability, health services, maternal and child care, social welfare and social security should be a component of the long term development strategy of the country. Family planning is a comprehensive program which involves long cycles and complicated factors, viewpoints of expediency in guiding policy and program formulation for short term benefits are inappropriate. The emphasis of family planning program strategy should be placed on the rural areas where the majority of population reside. Specifically, the major aspects of strategic thrusts should be the linkage between policy implementation and reception, between family planning publicity and changes of ideation on fertility; the integrated urban and rural program management relating to migration and differentiation of policy towards minority population and areas in different economic development stages. In order to achieve the above strategies, several measures are proposed. (1) strengthening family planning program and organization structure; (2) providing information on population and contraception; (3) establishing family planning program network for infiltration effects; (4) using government financing, taxation, loan, social welfare and penalty to regulate fertility motivations; (5) improving the system of target allocation and data reporting to facilitate program implementation; (6) strengthening population projection and policy research; (7) and strengthening training of family planning personnel to improve program efficiency.     

Fertility trends in rural Hebei Province,People's Republic of China

Background: The People's Republic of China (PRC) has conducted several different population policies since its establishment. Although fertility has declined dramatically in the past three decades, the degree to which this was the result of the different population policies is still under debate. Purpose: We attempt to evaluate the effect of the different formal population policies conducted in the PRC by looking at the fertility behavior of rural women. Unlike urban women, rural women experienced less social control (in the absence of a work unit) and received fewer benefits from adhering to the one-child policy. Data: The data analyzed were collected from a stratified sample of households from 288 villages in 9 counties of Hebei Province, PRC, between 1996 and 1999. The number of children ever born was reported by 4,168 ever-married women aged 25 and over who had had at least one birth. Findings: Our analysis indicates that the formal population policies of the PRC had little effect on the number of children ever born to rural women in Hebei. These retrospective data, by cohort, indicate consistently declining fertility since the revolution (1949). Limited child bearing was associated with age and the level of education. Controlling for the effect of age and education, women born after 1960, at whom the one-child policy was directed, actually had more children than older women. Conclusions: The Chinese fertility decline, at least as reflected in the experience of rural women in Hebei Province, derived mainly from secular changes in women's access to education and other social resources rather than from the direct effects of population policies.     

Capping Kids: The Family Cap and Nonmarital Childbearing

An explicit goal of policymakers in drafting welfare reform policies was to reduce incentives for nonmarital childbearing. This paper estimates the extent to which state welfare reforms have lowered age and race-specific nonmarital fertility. Using state-level data from 1984 to 1999—a time period that includes the passage and implementation of national welfare reform—we estimate fixed effects models corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. We find evidence that the family cap, a policy that decreases or eliminates the incremental increase in benefits for mothers who have an additional child while on welfare, is associated with a decline in nonmarital birth ratios. However, we also find that the family cap is associated with higher marital birth rates. Taken together with other research, our findings suggest evidence of policy endogeneity.

Family Planning and Women’s and Children’s Health: Long-Term Consequences of an Outreach Program in Matlab, Bangladesh

We analyze the impact of an experimental maternal and child health and family planning program that was established in Matlab, Bangladesh, in 1977. Village data from 1974, 1982, and 1996 suggest that program villages experienced a decline in fertility of about 17 %. Household data from 1996 confirm that this decline in “surviving fertility” persisted for nearly two decades. Women in program villages also experienced other benefits: increased birth spacing, lower child mortality, improved health status, and greater use of preventive health inputs. Some benefits also diffused beyond the boundaries of the program villages into neighboring comparison villages. These effects are robust to the inclusion of individual, household, and community characteristics. We conclude that the benefits of this reproductive and child health program in rural Bangladesh have many dimensions extending well beyond fertility reduction, which do not appear to dissipate rapidly after two decades.     

Legacy,Policy, and Circumstance in Fertility Transition

Divergent fertility trends in the course of development are commonly ascribed to differences in state action—that is, to government policy, deliberate or inadvertent. However, fertility outcomes can also, often more persuasively, be traced to differences in cultural and institutional inheritance and in the supply and growth potential of human capital. These are materials that states and societies find themselves endowed with—in brief, their legacy. In reality, legacy and policy are interwoven: policy actions build on some legacy elements and attempt to combat others. And there is a third set of factors influencing fertility outcomes, covering distinctive features of the economic and geopolitical environment and essentially fortuitous events—together termed circumstance. Legacy and circumstance can shrink or shift the policy space, helping to explain past failures in policy achievement. These broad considerations are the basis for a sketch of East Asian/sub‐Saharan African contrasts in fertility transition over the last 50 years. The sketch points to missing avenues of policy action in the African case in seeking to overcome legacy obstacles.     

生育理性和生育决策与我国低生育水平稳定机制的转变

自改革开放以来 ,我国人口生育率水平出现了迅速的转变 ,特别是 1 992年我国确立了市场经济为目标的经济改革以来 ,生育率水平更是进一步降低到更替水平以下。如果说 ,生育率的迅速转变是在国家计划生育政策干预下启动的 ,那么 ,在 1 990年代生育率的下降应该主要是社会和经济发展的结果。以市场经济为导向的经济改革和经济的迅速发展 ,已经为稳定我国城市地区人口低生育率水平提供了必要的经济条件 ,同时 ,制度、技术和文化等因素的变革已经为我国个人生育决策理性化创造了条件 ,低生育水平的稳定机制已经开始从政策控制为主转向群众自我控制为主的转变     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

Social change,population policies,and fertility decline in Colombia and Venezuela

This paper takes a comparative case-study approach to examine the social and policy correlates of fertility decline. The analysis compares fertility behavior across a mature and young cohort of women in Colombia and Venezuela, two countries that experienced rapid demographic change under dissimilar socioeconomic and population policy conditions. Based on the distinction between birth-spacing and birth-stopping behavior the analysis tests several propositions derived from the adaptation and innovation explanations of fertility decline. Results show that fertility regulation at low parities was largely absent among mature women in both countries, representing an innovative behavior among younger women. The introduction of fertility control, however, was highly dependent on women's socioeconomic position, particularly their educational and occupational characteristics. The strong family planning programs in Colombia resulted in a more rapid extension of contraceptive use, particularly female sterilization, and stopping behavior after two children relative to Venezuela. Results highlight the diversity of conditions under which fertility can decline in developing countries and the importance of family planning and other policy initiatives to understanding the different pathways towards lower fertility.     

China's population policy: A model of a constant stream of births

The current population policy of China, which emphasizes one child per family, is facing considerable challenge brought about by socioeconomic reforms. The principal challenge is greater individual freedom created by the reforms. The present article examines this conflict.Based on cohort-period fertility analysis, the author proposes a policy of a constand stream of births which ensures a moderate growth rate and a smooth age structure while enabling each couple to have at least two children. Simulation suggests that, in order to achieve the two goals of limiting population size (to about 1.2 billion in 2000 and 1.4 billion in the 2050s) and allowing more individual fertility choice (2.2 children per family), the annual stream of births should be around 20 million and the mean age of childbearing has to increase from 26 to 30 over the next 10–15 years.The author concludes that, if the policy proposed here succeeds, some social and economic problems associated with the conflict between the reforms initiated by the government and its one-child policy will be mitigated.Paper presented at the 1989 meeting of the Population Association of America.     

Political demography: Powerful trends under-attended by demographic science

The interconnections between politics and the dramatic demographic changes under way around the world have been neglected by the two research disciplines that could contribute most to their understanding: demography and political science. Instead, this area of ‘political demography’ has largely been ceded to political activists, pundits, and journalists, leading often to exaggerated or garbled interpretation. The terrain includes some of the most politically sensitive and contested issues: alleged demographically determined shifts in the international balance of power; low fertility, population decline, and demographic ageing; international migration; change in national identity; and compositional shifts in politically sensitive social categories and human rights. Meanwhile many governments and non-governmental actors have actively pursued varieties of ‘strategic demography’, deploying fertility, mortality, or migration as instruments of domestic or international policy. Political scientists and demographers could and should use their knowledge and analytic techniques to improve understanding and to moderate excessive claims and fears on these topics.     

Fertility decline in Germany: An econometric appraisal

Summary A re-analysis of Knodel's data provides some new results for the fertility decline in Germany and a new approach to testing hypotheses about the demographic transition. Two formulations of transition theory are compared: one emphasizing the importance of changing social and economic structure for fertility decline; the other, the changing relationships between fertility and its determinants over time. To evaluate these formulations, multivariate time series cross-sectional models are developed. The statistical models permit the estimation of relationships both cross-sectionally and over time. As a consequence, the ability of the independent variables to explain cross-sectional as against temporal differences is evaluated. Industrialization, urbanization, religious composition, migration, infant mortality and marriage patterns satisfactorily explain the fertility decline once regional differences have been taken into account. Persisting characteristics of regional units account for much of the unexplained variance. Industrialization is the main explanatory variable of fertility decline in Germany. In the period considered, its impact on fertility increased substantially.