R＆D补贴与社会次佳R＆D

本文考虑一个带有R&D溢出的双寡头模型,其中每个企业先后确定自己的R&D支出和产量.假定双寡头在产量上不合作,文中首先给出了使社会福利最大的R＆D水平即社会次佳R＆D,随后分别就双寡头在R&D上不合作与合作两种情况,给出了政府为取得最大社会福利而对R&D进行补贴的效应.研究表明,政府通过补贴可以使R&D水平和福利达到社会次佳.     

统一世界市场上针对单边R&D的补贴策略

两个企业在统一世界市场上进行市场竞争,其中只有一个企业从事R&D活动.本文讨论创新企业所在国的R&D补贴问题.文中既讨论了一些参数对补贴率的影响,又分析了补贴率对两个企业产生的效应.本文同时指出,补贴率增加后,补贴额和创新企业的实际R&D投入随之增加.     

基于差异产品的政府最优R&D补贴策略研究

本文建立考虑产品差异的三阶段双寡头博弈模型:第一阶段政府选择R&D(Research and Development)补贴率,第二阶段企业确定自己的R8LD水平,第三阶段企业确定产品价格进行伯川德竞争.根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了R&D竞争、R&D卡特尔、共同实验、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等五种R&D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R&D补贴率.研究表明,当技术溢出程度较低且产品水平差异不大时,政府给予采用R&D竞争策略企业的补贴率不高于采用R&D卡特尔策略的企业;当技术溢出程度较高且产品水平差异较大时,结果则相反.在政府进行最优补贴后,从促进技术进步、扩大企业规模以及社会福利最大化的角度来看,五种R&D策略中,共同实验最差,技术共享联盟和研究共同体则最优.     

基于差异产品的政府最优R&D补贴策略研究

本文建立考虑产品差异的三阶段双寡头博弈模型:第一阶段政府选择R&D(Research and Development)补贴率,第二阶段企业确定自己的R&D水平,第三阶段企业确定产品价格进行伯川德竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了R&D竞争、R&D卡特尔、共同实验、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等五种R&D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R&D补贴率。研究表明,当技术溢出程度较低且产品水平差异不大时,政府给予采用R&D竞争策略企业的补贴率不高于采用R&D卡特尔策略的企业;当技术溢出程度较高且产品水平差异较大时,结果则相反。在政府进行最优补贴后,从促进技术进步、扩大企业规模以及社会福利最大化的角度来看,五种R&D策略中,共同实验最差,技术共享联盟和研究共同体则最优。     

创新动力与R&D溢出

本文从产业组织角度,比较已进入市场的企业与新进入的企业在技术创新动力上的差异,主要从四个方面考察：沉没成本效应;转换效应;效率效应;代理成本与创新激励。此外,企业创新的动机还受到R&D溢出的影响,本文对产业内和产业间R&D溢出所导致的企业创新行为作了具体分析。     

测算高校R&D综合实力的二次相对评价方法

对于提高高校 R&D综合实力有效努力程度的评估比对高校 R&D综合实力本身的评估更为重要 .本文提供了可以消除各高校客观条件的影响 ,能够真正体现高校在提高 R&D综合实力主观努力程度的二次相对评价方法 .     

考虑政府补贴与企业社会责任的两级供应链优化

企业社会责任问题日益受到管理者和研究者关注。研究随机需求下由一个供应商与一个零售商组成的分散式供应链,探讨政府补贴对供应链最优生产与社会责任投入决策的影响,并比较分析了分别由供应商与零售商主导下供应链的运作效率。结果表明,在集中式供应链中价格弹性对采购数量和企业社会责任总投入量的影响更为显著;而在分散式供应链中加入政府补贴因素,会使总收益呈现出倒U形的发展趋势,且零售商主导的分散式供应链会因政府补贴的减少表现出迅速下降的趋势;此外增加政府补贴,会使得供应商主导的分散式供应链中的供应商降低其企业社会责任投入,但对于零售商主导的分散式供应链的影响却不大。     

论企业规模与R&D投入相关性

在各国学者对企业规模与 R& D投入相关性研究成果的基础上 ,建立了独特的具有综合反映特征的指标 :相对 R& D支出弹性 .利用该指标深入分析了美国、中国及武汉企业规模与R& D投入强度的关联 ,比较了它们之间大中型企业 R& D行为异同 ,得到了具有强解释力的结论 .论文还对不同产业的 R& D投入行为差异作了较深入分析     

外部经济效应与政府研发补贴的效率

为提高政府研发补贴资金的使用效率,使政府在科技创新领域发挥更大的杠杆促进作用,从外部经济视角出发,在对政府研发补贴促进技术创新的内在作用机制进行理论分析的基础上,利用中国14个制造行业的面板数据,借助中介效应和调节效应等内在机制分析方法,对企业吸收能力的中介效应和产业集聚的调节效应进行定量分析,实证研究中国研发补贴有多大比例促进企业吸收能力的培养以及产业集聚对提高政府研发补贴利用效率的程度.研究结果表明,中国研发补贴主要通过低效率的无外部经济效应的渠道发挥作用,而高效率的有外部经济效应的渠道作用偏小,低产业集聚水平会制约政府研发补贴对技术创新的促进作用,明确政府在科研领域的职能分工、完善补贴资金的配置机制并促进技术的良好扩散对提高中国公共补贴资金的利用效率至关重要.     

Socially and privately optimal shareholder activism

This paper aims to evaluate the private and social gains of shareholder activism in an optimal contracting framework involving dispersed shareholders who may become active. The social gains are based on the welfare to stake holders in the firm, whereas the private gains are based on shareholder wealth only. Active shareholders influence the contracting game with the CEO, and therefore also the size and the distribution of the surplus to be split between the shareholders and the CEO. Although the model is very simple and focussing on the creation and distribution of welfare between the shareholders and the CEO, we nonetheless identify surprising divergence between the private and social profitability of shareholder activism. Shareholder activism that is privately profitable is not necessarily socially profitable. The distributional effects of shareholder activism may dominate the efficiency effects to make shareholder activism a negative social NPV project.      

创新投入补贴还是创新产品补贴:技术联盟的政府策略选择

作为技术创新的有效途径,技术联盟创新方式受到了高度重视。由于补贴方式的争议以及溢出效应的存在促使国家必须对技术联盟企业补贴方式进行判断。本文构建了一个三阶段的博弈模型,对创新投入补贴和创新产品补贴进行分析。解析分析和算例表明:企业的创新投入会随着溢出效应的增强而增加,在宽松知识产权的激励下企业的创新投入会与溢出效应之间达到良性循环;在政府介入技术联盟创新系统的情况下,创新产品补贴方式比创新投入补贴方式更为有效。这对政府部门加大创新激励,科学选择创新补贴方式具有重要的指导意义。     

A Behavioral Theory of Corporate Governance: Explicating the Mechanisms of Socially Situated and Socially Constituted Agency

We propose a behavioral theory of corporate governance based on an ontological foundation of socially situated and socially constituted agency. More specifically, we advance a multi-level, mechanism-based, theory of governance that is socially informed yet actor-centric, and thus offers a distinct alternative to under-socialized governance theories, such as agency theory. We highlight the contributions of recent governance research in providing the foundation for such a behavioral theory, with particular emphasis on our prior work that demonstrated the relevance of social structural relationships, institutional processes, and social cognition. We conclude with a discussion of the central themes that emerge from our perspective.     

Subsidies on Labour and Capital under Wage Bargaining

ABSTRACT: Micro-policy instruments are often grouped into labour subsidies and capital subsidies. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect on employment of labour and capital subsidies when the wage rate is endogeneous. The problem is studied within a sequential three-stage model, integrating the investment decision, wage-bargaining and the employment decision. The paper demonstrates that labour subsidies may fail, depending on technology and the risk aversion of the workers.     

社会责任消费行为量表研究

在创建和谐社会的进程中,消费者的社会责任日益受到政府和公众的重视.在文献回顾的基础上,界定社会责任消费行为的概念,结合深入访谈的结果初步形成这一概念的构成维度,通过大规模问卷调查建立中国消费者SRCB-China量表.研究发现,社会责任消费行为由9个维度构成,即保护环境、节约能源、保护动物、监督企业和维权、支持企业的负责任行为、抵制企业的反责任行为、支持中小企业、适度消费、支持国货.数据显示,SRCB-China量表具有较好的内部一致性信度、内容效度、收敛效度、区别效度和校标效度.     

标准导向型技术的合作与独立研发

围绕信息技术产业中的标准导向型技术,分析和比较了合作研发与独立研发的绩效.依据企业是否协调信息分享和研发投资两个纬度,将标准导向型技术的创新模式细分为完全的研发竞争、专利联盟、纯粹的合作研发和带专利池的合作研发,在AJ和KMZ两个经典模型的基础上发展了双寡头模型来研究4种创新模式的绩效.博弈模型得出了一些新结论:第1,...     

Equitable Taxation and the Provision of Health Insurance Subsidies

Current U.S. income tax laws allow many taxpayers to exclude from taxable income part or all of the cost of acquiring health insurance through an employer‐sponsored benefit plan. This favorable tax treatment generally applies regardless of whether the employer or employee actually pays the health insurance premiums. We describe the effects of this tax policy on the U.S. tax system's horizontal and vertical equity. We also explain how taxpayers covered by employer‐sponsored plans are significantly subsidized by the government in acquiring health insurance, whereas taxpayers who acquire health insurance by other means or who are not covered by health insurance at all receive no such government assistance. We conclude that any prospective health‐care policy initiatives, including modifications to the 2010 health‐care reforms, should contemplate both the horizontal and vertical equity of the tax treatment of health insurance premiums.     

HYBRID R&D

We develop a model of R&D collaboration in which individual firms carry out in‐house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non‐core activities with other firms. We develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which R&D investments in different projects of a firm are complementary. We show that this condition is met by standard price and quantity setting oligopoly models. We then study the relation between the number of joint projects and investments and profits. In this context, we identify a second aspect of complementarity: Equilibrium investments in in‐house as well as in each joint project are increasing in the number of projects. However, we find that an increase in number of joint projects of all firms lowers collective profits, suggesting the presence of excessive incentives for conducting research. (JEL: L13, L14, L22, O31, O32)