逻辑与自然语言

一种观点认为,传统逻辑是用自然语言表述的,现代逻辑是用形式语言表述的.这种观点暗示着现代逻辑不能解决自然语言中的问题,而传统逻辑能够解决.这种观点是有问题的.传统逻辑和现代逻辑虽然有形式方而的区别,但最主要的区别还是句法和语义的:前者是主谓结构,后者是谓词结构.由此区别出发,传统逻辑和现代逻辑形成了对自然语言的不同解释.而后者的能力无疑更强.     

宗教信仰、语言游戏及公共讨论

在一个多元化社会生活的人会用两套语言，第一语言即作为公民用的公共语言；第二语言即作为个人其本身群体交往的语言，一个人的宗教语言可以是这个人的第二语言。要以公共语言的词语来言说宗教语言，我们就要仔细审视宗教语言和宗教信仰。与宗教语言有关的元素包括一个关于人神关系的属灵向度、一个关于群体价值的社会向度，以及一个关于个人素质的个人向度。虽然大部分关于宗教的讨论都会包含此三个向度，但也不能一概而论；长远策略是把宗教语言中的社会价值和个人素质加进公共语言中。     

Digraph Competitions and Cooperative Games

Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of (almost positive) TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in terms of game semi-circuits. Finally, applications to the ranking of teams in sports competitions and of alternatives in social choice theory are discussed.     

Coalitional Interval Games for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate

We propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. Associating with a strategic game a coalitional interval game we avoid having to take either a pessimistic or an optimistic approach to the problem. The paper makes two contributions to the literature: It provides a theoretical foundation for the study of coalitional interval games and it also provides, studies, and characterizes a natural method of associating coalitional interval games with strategic games.      

Socially Structured Games

We generalize the concept of a cooperative non-transferable utility game by introducing a socially structured game. In a socially structured game every coalition of players can organize themselves according to one or more internal organizations to generate payoffs. Each admissible internal organization on a coalition yields a set of payoffs attainable by the members of this coalition. The strengths of the players within an internal organization depend on the structure of the internal organization and are represented by an exogenously given power vector. More powerful players have the power to take away payoffs of the less powerful players as long as those latter players are not able to guarantee their payoffs by forming a different internal organization within some coalition in which they have more power. We introduce the socially stable core as a solution concept that contains those payoffs that are both stable in an economic sense, i.e., belong to the core of the underlying cooperative game, and stable in a social sense, i.e., payoffs are sustained by a collection of internal organizations of coalitions for which power is distributed over all players in a balanced way. The socially stable core is a subset and therefore a refinement of the core. We show by means of examples that in many cases the socially stable core is a very small subset of the core. We will state conditions for which the socially stable core is non-empty. In order to derive this result, we formulate a new intersection theorem that generalizes the KKMS intersection theorem. We also discuss the relationship between social stability and the wellknown concept of balancedness for NTU-games, a sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core. In particular we give an example of a socially structured game that satisfies social stability and therefore has a non-empty core, but whose induced NTU-game does not satisfy balancedness in the general sense of Billera.      

Games without Rules

We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.     

2012,向伦敦看去

2012年,伦敦因着奥运成为世界的焦点.我们向伦敦看去,看见证历史的宏伟建筑,看追寻古老帝国辉煌的博物馆,看带有工业革命标志的奥运风情……看中国体育代表团的一个又一个夺金的光荣时刻!     

Games,goals, and bounded rationality

A generalization of the standard n-person game is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by certain types of bounded rationality. Strategies (complete contingency plans) are replaced by policies, i.e., endmean pairs of goals and controls (partial contingency plans), which results in naturally disconnected player choice sets. Well-known existence theorems for pure strategy Nash equilibrium and bargaining solutions are generalized to policy games by modifying connectedness (convexity) requirements.     

一届无与伦比的奥运会

第29届奥林匹克运动会于2008年8月8日到8月24日在北京举行.带着举办一届"有特色、高水平"奥运会的庄严承诺,13亿中国人民以最大的努力和最大的热情,为人类搭建了一座欢乐的舞台.中国从未以这样的角色走进世界的视野.     

语言的图象与图象的语言——语言哲学转向视觉哲学

在研究兴趣上,西方哲学已经历了从观念哲学到语言哲学的转变,而受制于科技发展倾向的21世纪哲学,人类理解世界的方式,将从语言图象的时代向图象语言时代转变.语言在交流中的媒介作用越来越被形形色色的、广义上的虚拟数字图象形式所取代,这样的趋势清晰表明语言的局限,即习惯心理所认为的语言再现视觉的能力,是相当有限的.在这个意义上,随着印刷术文明的衰落,令人眼花缭乱的现代媒介不使用语言却能传达更丰富的、言不尽意的意义.语言的作用并非消失了,而是人们突然意识到,语言的本质,是一幅并不能实现指向外部事物功能的元图象,语言成为图象或者一种图象的语言.也许人类将培养起对图象的抽象能力,或许人性将因之彻底改变,人类的道德、政治、经济、文化生活也将随之天翻地覆.     

Non-Additive Beliefs in Solvable Games

This paper studies how the introduction of non-additive probabilities (capacities) affects the solvability of strategic games.     

人文奥运与北京古都旅游

北京的历史文化资源是其赢得第29届奥运会承办权的主要优势,而人文奥运的理念又给北京古都旅游带来了启示和契机。本文分析了北京古都旅游中存在的主要问题和有关认识上的偏差,提出了大力开展专项旅游的思路与主要对策,对北京古都旅游的创新进行了探讨。     

Achievable Hierarchies In Voting Games

Previous work by Diffo Lambo and Moulen [Theory and Decision 53, 313–325 (2002)] and Felsenthal and Machover [The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (1998)], shows that all swap preserving measures of voting power are ordinally equivalent on any swap robust simple voting game. Swap preserving measures include the Banzhaf, the Shapley–Shubik and other commonly used measures of a priori voting power. In this paper, we completely characterize the achievable hierarchies for any such measure on a swap robust simple voting game. Each possible hierarchy can be induced by a weighted voting game and we provide a constructive proof of this result. In particular, the strict hierarchy is always achievable as long as there are at least five players.     

节俭办奥运

奥运会必须和举办国的现实相结合,即使有能力承办,如果不注意节俭,一味讲究排场,会给主办国留下很多问题,从根本上违反奥林匹克精神。雅典奥运会存在着严峻的金融问题,这也是一个值得警惕的信号。北京勤俭办奥运要从风险最大的体育场馆做起,更要从制度、机制、观念和效率入手,并纳入法制管理的轨道。