董事会战略参与效应及其影响因素研究

本研究从董事会职能角度考察了董事会战略参与的经济效应,并基于董事会结构探讨了董事会监督治理职能与战略服务职能间的兼容性对战略参与效应的影响。实证结果表明,董事会参与公司战略管理并没有实现预期的业绩改善,两职合一、独立董事比例对董事会战略参与效应具有正向调节作用,而董事会规模则具有负向调节效应。研究结果总体表明,董事会监督治理职能与战略服务职能具有融合的必要性和可能性,融合两种职能更有利于董事会效能的发挥。     

董事会构成的模糊综合评判方法

董事会既充当股东大会的代理人,又担当经理层的委托人,在公司治理结构中具有十分重要的地位,已经成为公司治理结构的核心。企业董事会的构成直接决定着董事会职能的有效发挥,因此选择合理的董事会构成模式,不仅能够有效地维护股东的利益,而且对企业的长远发展具有重要的战略意义。本文在对董事会构成模式及其影响因素分析的基础上,运用模糊数学理论和层次分析法,提出了选择董事会构成模式和确定董事会构成大体比例的模糊综合评判方法,为企业合理组织董事会捉供理论指导。     

公司治理结构对企业环境绩效的影响研究

本文从公司治理结构和环境绩效内涵出发,从公司股东、董事会和经理层探讨了公司治理结构对企业环境绩效的影响,研究发现公司治理结构对企业环境绩效具有显著的影响作用,从而提出应该完善公司治理结构,发挥公司治理监督职能的建议。     

股权投资者异质性对董事会职能演进的影响——以平高电气为例

本文利用案例研究方法,对上市公司平高电气董事会的职能演进过程进行了描述,并且针对董事会不同演进阶段,根据治理能力与投资动机两个维度对其主要投资者的治理行为进行了分析。研究发现突破了以往研究仅探讨股权集中度与控股大股东对内部治理影响的局限,提出了不同类型投资者对董事会职能演进所具有的不同作用。文章的主要学术贡献在于动态考察上市公司董事会职能的演进过程,并将股权异质性作为解释董事会职能演进的主要变量。研究结论对于国有企业引进战略投资者进行改制亦有一定的指导价值。     

董事会结构、职能和企业业绩的浅析

本文总结分析了董事会与企业业绩间关系主要研究结论,在讨论董事会的结构、董事会的行为及企业业绩基础上,提出了董事会的主要职能是决策职能,认为应通过若干人的有效组合形成互补效应以提高决策效率,进而提升企业业绩。     

董事会治理与企业绩效实证研究——以民营上市公司为例

董事会是公司治理结构的核心,董事会治理的效率将通过公司业绩反映出来。文章以2008年-2011年CCER民营上市公司为研究样本,对民营上市公司董事会特征与企业绩效之间关系进行实证研究。研究发现:第一,适当扩大董事会规模有助于提高企业绩效,即董事会规模与企业绩效正相关;第二,董事长持股比例、前三名董事薪酬之和与企业绩效之间呈显著性正相关。     

关于国有企业董事会建设的思考

现代企业制度的核心是法人治理,而法人治理的关键又在于董事会建设,我国国有企业在规范董事会建设完善企业法人治理结构工作上还任重道远。据2010年统计:124家中央企业改制面为70%,地方国有企业改制面90%,按公司法要求建立了法人治理结构;没有改制的企业还按《企业法》规定运行,没有董事会,实行总经理负责制。在已建立董事会的企业中,大多数企业治理效果也不理想,董事会建设不规范。目前,国务院国资委正在积极推动规范董事会建设这项工作,截止2011年底,已有宝钢集团、神化集团等42家央企开展了规范董事会运作试点工作,效果比较明显。董事会建设的改革方向就是国资委向企业外派董事,以实现民主决策和优化决策。     

转轨经济中的管理层激励机制研究

在公司治理结构中,董事会负责重大决策,经理层负责日常经营管理,二者的职能分工在相关法规和公司章程中都有明确规定,是雇用和被雇用的关系。在我国经济转轨过程中,企业管理层面临的主要问题是缺乏独立性,要么由于大股东在董事会中占据垄断地位而完全听命于董事会;要么由于所有者的治理空位而处于“内部人控制”状态,难以保证公司日常经营管理的稳定性和连续性。保持管理层具备适度独立性的关键环节,在于塑造科学的约束与激励机制。约束机制的规范化,依赖于以股东为主导的利害相关者通过公司治理结构和市场化的外部治理机制有效地…     

董事会职能、决策质量和决策承诺在中国情境下的实证研究

本文关注公司董事会在战略决策过程中的作用,以中国各行业共计182家公司为研究样本,试图研究董事会的职能发挥与公司决策质量的关系,尤其是受董事会职能影响较大的决策者承诺在其中的中介作用。在初步研究的基础上,本文对董事会职能、决策者的决策承诺和决策质量概念进行了系统的探索性分析和验证性分析,证实了董事会职能与决策质量之间存在显著的正相关关系,并且决策承诺在董事会职能和决策质量的关系中起中介作用。研究结果显示,中国企业董事会在参与战略决策制定的过程中,不能仅仅关注反映决策质量的简单财务指标,更要关注决策者对决策的承诺,加强决策者对决策实施的承诺有助于提高最终的决策质量。     

外部制度环境、内部治理结构与企业竞争优势——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

如何通过有效的制度安排延续企业的竞争优势,是制度变迁背景下中国企业面临的核心问题.以2002～2005年中国上市公司为样本,实证分析了外部制度环境和内部治理结构对企业竞争优势的影响.回归结果发现,政府治理质量、市场环境水平、股权集中度、董事会独立性、董事会专业性,以及股权集中度和董事会独立性的互动与企业竞争优势呈正相关关系.研究结果表明,规范的外部制度环境与有效的内部治理结构能提高企业的竞争优势.     

Boards of Directors as Strategists in an Enacted World – The Danish Case

We argue that Boards of Directors of Danish companieshave been socially constructed as an importantdecision making body in the companies. Since 1974,employees have elected members to the Board ofDirectors. Today they can elect one third of the Boardmembers. In spite of this new composition of theBoard, it has emerged as a team that has been able toconvince the stakeholders, the press, and the publicabout its important standing in the management of thecompany.To understand this development we look at fourdifferent perspectives. (1) The changing businessenvironment that has framed the development:globalization, mergers and acquisitions, increasedcompetition, technological innovations, strategicalliances, political consumers, and ethical issues are factors that have been the motor for this change. (2)We use a radical social psychological version ofleadership theory (Meindl, 1993) to understand thesocial construction of the change of the role of theBoard of Directors that has occurred. We argue thatthe stakeholders and the society at large haveascribed importance and leadership to the Board, andthat it plays an important role as strategist in thecompanies. (3) We see the board as a theater ensemblestaging a performance for the audience (stakeholdersand the wider environment) using Erving Goffman's``Presentation of Self in Everyday Life' (1959) as atheoretical point of departure. From this point ofview, the role of the Board is to socialize newmembers, to maintain its unity, and to successfullyplay the role of strategists. (4) To understandstrategists you may understand the company and itsenvironment in either realist terms (objectiveenvironments) or in social constructivist terms(enacted environments) (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985). We adopt the enactment position.     

Board members’ contribution to strategic decision-making in small firms

This article explores how the boards of small firms actually undertake to perform strategic tasks. Board strategic involvement has seldom been investigated in the context of small firms. We seek to make a contribution by investigating antecedents of board strategic involvement. The antecedents are “board working style” and “board quality attributes”, which go beyond the board composition features of board size, CEO duality, the ratio of non-executive to executive directors and ownership. Hypotheses were tested on a sample of 497 Norwegian firms (from 5 to 30 employees). Our results show that board working style and board quality attributes rather than board composition features enhance board strategic involvement. Moreover, board quality attributes outperform board working style in fostering board strategic involvement.     

董事会对公司战略过程评价:逻辑架构与指标体系

公司的战略管理是所有管理活动的重中之重.它包括战略判断、计划与预算活动、战略执行以及适威Adaptive)与交互(Interactive)性的战略控制体系.而现代公司治理原则要求董事会应关注和评价公司的战略管理活动.本文进一步认为,在资本市场不够发达的情况下,董事会应关注公司战略管理的奎过程为此,我们提出了一个针对公司战略管理体系有效性评价的基本框架和评价指标体系,目的在于使公司治理有效地作月于管理过程,最终为企业创造价值.     

The Performance Implications of Ownership-driven Governance Reform

This paper explores the performance impact of recent changes in foreign shareholdings and boardroom reforms in Japan. Empirical research on the impact of reform on the Japanese corporate governance system could provide useful lessons for their European counterparts who are themselves facing similar pressures to reform. We found that although participation of outside directors in strategic decision-making was associated with positive stock returns, the increase in the ratio of outside directors, the separation of the board members and executive officers, and the reduction of board size were not related to firm performance.     

A Grounded Theory Exposition of the Role of the Supervisory Board in China*

This paper reports the findings of an investigation, through a series of interviews, into the role of the supervisory board (SB) in Chinese listed companies. The interviews were conducted and analysed using the grounded theory methodology. It is found that the SB performs one of four roles under the Chinese corporate environment: an honoured guest, a friendly advisor, a censored watchdog or an independent watchdog. The role of the SB is dependent on a variety of factors: SB characteristics, power relations between the Board of Directors and the SB, shareholding structure, the influence of the Communist Party of China and government, the role of independent directors and the requirements of the corporate law.     

Comparing corporate governance practices and exit decisions between US and Japanese firms

This study examines how widespread the similarities between US and Japanese corporate governance practices have become. Results suggest that, in spite of convergence in many areas of business practices, Japanese board structures and governance practices still differ greatly from those in the United States—particularly in Securities and Exchange Commission-mandated reforms such as independent audit and compensation committees. Our results suggest that corporate governance differences between Japanese and US firms may be driven, in part, by differences in directors’ recognition of investors’ performance expectations. In particular, results indicate that the exit barriers related to employment influence decision-making for Japanese directors more strongly than they affect US directors’ decisions. Board independence—particularly with respect to audit and compensation committee membership—reduces the height of perceived exit barriers. Results suggest that, in spite of convergence in many areas of business practices, Japanese board structures and governance practices still differ greatly from those in the United States although it does not conclude that the transition is necessarily desirable.     

Corporate governance and board accounts: exploring a neglected interface between boards of directors and management

There is an absence of research about what information boards of directors have access to and how they use that information. The purpose of this paper is to explore and theorize about the content and use of information to boards of directors. The paper introduces and elaborates on the concept of ‘board accounts’, which is defined as the information supplied to boards of directors by top-management. The paper locates the board accounts in the Swedish institutional setting and demonstrates how the concept can be operationalized in an empirical setting. On the basis of a unique material of archived board records in a Swedish company, the paper explores the board accounts over a period of 10 years (1989–1998). It is found that while use of the board accounts in the case study company changes considerably over time, the content of the board accounts remains largely unchanged. This raises questions about where and when directors receive information, the reliability of the information in the board accounts, and recent attempts to integrate corporate governance and management accounting (CIMA, Performance reporting to boards: a guide to good practice, 2003; CIMA strategic scorecard: boards engaging in strategy, 2005; Seal, Management Accounting Research 17(4):389–408, 2006). Finally, the paper discusses the merits of historical archive-based approaches in this field and possibilities for future research.

董事会治理研究的理论根源及研究脉络评析

本文以董事会治理研究为主题,对几十年来相关研究的理论基础进行了梳理,对不同理论的基础观点、实证支持和最新进展等内容进行了综合阐述,对这些理论各自的局限性做出了评价,有利于我们进一步了解董事会运作机理和提高董事会治理效果.在此基础上,我们以提高治理绩效为宗旨,构建了一个董事会治理研究的逻辑框架体系,藉此可以看出,已有研究对董事会属性、角色与绩效之间关系的作用途径和机理还了解较少,特别是随着公司治理实践的不断发展和经济环境的变化,对于董事会治理的研究还有大量的未知领域需要去探索.最后我们列出了今后董事会治理研究的一些思路和建议.     

Roles and responsibilities of boards of directors revisited in reconciling conflicting stakeholders interests while maintaining corporate responsibility

The article analyses the business of business and comes to the view that the role of business is to balance all stakeholders’ interests while giving relative dominance to the interests of investors, over those of other stakeholders. Based on this understanding, we propose an economic model, which describes the nexus and interactions between the interests of stakeholders, and develops a set of functions aimed at achieving better management of risk through corporate socially responsible (i.e. CSR) investment. The model takes into account the utilities of the corporate officers, short term and long term investors. All three functions are considered by the Board of Directors, who are deemed the final arbiters with respect to firm decision-making and the body to whom executive management owes fiduciary duties. Finally, a decision rule is developed that defines the circumstances under which the Board of Directors will consider to invest corporate funds in CSR.     

外资参股、董事会特征与商业银行经营绩效——基于中国121家商业银行的实证分析

董事会是公司治理的核心,本文首次从外资股东参与董事会治理的视角,在运用固定效应模型和手工收集面板数据的基础上,使用分组比较研究方法,实证检验了2007-2016年121家商业银行外资参股、董事会特征与经营绩效的关系,结果发现引入外资参股的商业银行中：（1）董事会规模、非执行董事占比、董事会会议频率、专业委员会数目均与经营绩效之间存在显著正相关关系;（2）董事会中外资董事占比的增加,董事会规模、董事会会议频率、专业委员会数目与经营绩效之间的正相关关系均会显著减弱,然而非执行董事占比与经营绩效之间的正相关关系则会显著增强。据此,本文建议商业银行引入外资参股后：（1）应鼓励外资参与董事会治理,适当扩大董事会规模;向外资股东提供适量的非执行董事席位;适度增加董事会会议频率;积极完善专业委员会体系。（2）控制董事会中外资董事占比的不合理增加,确保外资董事与独立董事之间的实质性独立。