Intelligent Adversary Risk Analysis: A Bioterrorism Risk Management Model

The tragic events of 9/11 and the concerns about the potential for a terrorist or hostile state attack with weapons of mass destruction have led to an increased emphasis on risk analysis for homeland security. Uncertain hazards (natural and engineering) have been successfully analyzed using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Unlike uncertain hazards, terrorists and hostile states are intelligent adversaries who can observe our vulnerabilities and dynamically adapt their plans and actions to achieve their objectives. This article compares uncertain hazard risk analysis with intelligent adversary risk analysis, describes the intelligent adversary risk analysis challenges, and presents a probabilistic defender–attacker–defender model to evaluate the baseline risk and the potential risk reduction provided by defender investments. The model includes defender decisions prior to an attack; attacker decisions during the attack; defender actions after an attack; and the uncertainties of attack implementation, detection, and consequences. The risk management model is demonstrated with an illustrative bioterrorism problem with notional data.     

Adversarial risk analysis for counterterrorism modeling

Recent large-scale terrorist attacks have raised interest in models for resource allocation against terrorist threats. The unifying theme in this area is the need to develop methods for the analysis of allocation decisions when risks stem from the intentional actions of intelligent adversaries. Most approaches to these problems have a game-theoretic flavor although there are also several interesting decision-analytic-based proposals. One of them is the recently introduced framework for adversarial risk analysis, which deals with decision-making problems that involve intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. We explore how adversarial risk analysis addresses some standard counterterrorism models: simultaneous defend-attack models, sequential defend-attack-defend models, and sequential defend-attack models with private information. For each model, we first assess critically what would be a typical game-theoretic approach and then provide the corresponding solution proposed by the adversarial risk analysis framework, emphasizing how to coherently assess a predictive probability model of the adversary's actions, in a context in which we aim at supporting decisions of a defender versus an attacker. This illustrates the application of adversarial risk analysis to basic counterterrorism models that may be used as basic building blocks for more complex risk analysis of counterterrorism problems.     

Use of Advances in Technology for Maritime Risk Assessment

The maritime industry is moving toward a "goal-setting" risk-based regime. This opens the way to safety engineers to explore and exploit flexible and advanced risk modeling and decision-making approaches in the design and operation processes. In this article, following a brief review of the current status of maritime risk assessment, a design/operation selection framework and a design/operation optimization framework are outlined. A general discussion of control engineering techniques and their application to risk modeling and decision making is given. Four novel risk modeling and decision-making approaches are then outlined with illustrative examples to demonstrate their use. Such approaches may be used as alternatives to facilitate risk modeling and decision making in situations where conventional techniques cannot be appropriately applied. Finally, recommendations on further exploitation of advances in general engineering and technology are suggested with respect to risk modeling and decision making.     

A Comparative Analysis of PRA and Intelligent Adversary Methods for Counterterrorism Risk Management

In counterterrorism risk management decisions, the analyst can choose to represent terrorist decisions as defender uncertainties or as attacker decisions. We perform a comparative analysis of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) methods including event trees, influence diagrams, Bayesian networks, decision trees, game theory, and combined methods on the same illustrative examples (container screening for radiological materials) to get insights into the significant differences in assumptions and results. A key tenent of PRA and decision analysis is the use of subjective probability to assess the likelihood of possible outcomes. For each technique, we compare the assumptions, probability assessment requirements, risk levels, and potential insights for risk managers. We find that assessing the distribution of potential attacker decisions is a complex judgment task, particularly considering the adaptation of the attacker to defender decisions. Intelligent adversary risk analysis and adversarial risk analysis are extensions of decision analysis and sequential game theory that help to decompose such judgments. These techniques explicitly show the adaptation of the attacker and the resulting shift in risk based on defender decisions.     

Risk Analysis for Critical Asset Protection

This article proposes a quantitative risk assessment and management framework that supports strategic asset-level resource allocation decision making for critical infrastructure and key resource protection. The proposed framework consists of five phases: scenario identification, consequence and criticality assessment, security vulnerability assessment, threat likelihood assessment, and benefit-cost analysis. Key innovations in this methodology include its initial focus on fundamental asset characteristics to generate an exhaustive set of plausible threat scenarios based on a target susceptibility matrix (which we refer to as asset-driven analysis) and an approach to threat likelihood assessment that captures adversary tendencies to shift their preferences in response to security investments based on the expected utilities of alternative attack profiles assessed from the adversary perspective. A notional example is provided to demonstrate an application of the proposed framework. Extensions of this model to support strategic portfolio-level analysis and tactical risk analysis are suggested.     

Uncertainties in Pharmacokinetic Modeling for Perchloroethylene. I. Comparison of Model Structure, Parameters, and Predictions for Low-Dose Metabolism Rates for Models Derived by Different Authors

In recent years physiologically based pharmacokinetic models have come to play an increasingly important role in risk assessment for carcinogens. The hope is that they can help open the black box between external exposure and carcinogenic effects to experimental observations, and improve both high-dose to low-dose and interspecies projections of risk. However, to date, there have been only relatively preliminary efforts to assess the uncertainties in current modeling results. In this paper we compare the physiologically based pharmacokinetic models (and model predictions of risk-related overall metabolism) that have been produced by seven different sets of authors for perchloroethylene (tetrachloroethylene). The most striking conclusion from the data is that most of the differences in risk-related model predictions are attributable to the choice of the data sets used for calibrating the metabolic parameters. Second, it is clear that the bottom-line differences among the model predictions are appreciable. Overall, the ratios of low-dose human to bioassay rodent metabolism spanned a 30-fold range for the six available human/rat comparisons, and the seven predicted ratios of low-dose human to bioassay mouse metabolism spanned a 13-fold range. (The greater range for the rat/human comparison is attributable to a structural assumption by one author group of competing linear and saturable pathways, and their conclusion that the dangerous saturable pathway constitutes a minor fraction of metabolism in rats.) It is clear that there are a number of opportunities for modelers to make different choices of model structure, interpretive assumptions, and calibrating data in the process of constructing pharmacokinetic models for use in estimating "delivered" or "biologically effective" dose for carcinogenesis risk assessments. We believe that in presenting the results of such modeling studies, it is important for researchers to explore the results of alternative, reasonably likely approaches for interpreting the available data--and either show that any conclusions they make are relatively insensitive to particular interpretive choices, or to acknowledge the differences in conclusions that would result from plausible alternative views of the world.     

基于第一HJ距离的线性因子模型设定检验

模型设定检验是金融建模的重要环节,是减少模型风险的关键步骤.本文基于Hansen和Jagannathan[1]提出的第一HJ距离模型误设测度,以台湾市场丰富的股票和指数期权数据为基础,对8种常见的线性因子模型(包括基于金融资产价格的线性因子模型)进行模型误设检验,并探究模型设定对参数检验的影响.研究发现:在5%的显著性水平下,所有无条件信息模型均存在模型误设问题,仅FF3、LM、VanM、SkewM的条件信息模型成为可接受的正确模型;同时,是否考虑模型可能误设会影响SDF参数的检验,考虑模型可能误设能更有效地侦测因子的定价能力,而不考虑模型可能误设会高估模型SDF参数的t值绝对值,致使部分因子可能存在"伪"定价现象.     

Spatial Stochastic Simulation Offers Potential as a Quantitative Method for Pest Risk Analysis

Pest risk analysis represents an emerging field of risk analysis that evaluates the potential risks of the introduction and establishment of plant pests into a new geographic location and then assesses the management options to reduce those potential risks. Development of new and adapted methodology is required to answer questions concerning pest risk analysis of exotic plant pests. This research describes a new method for predicting the potential establishment and spread of a plant pest into new areas using a case study, Ralstonia solanacearum, a bacterial disease of potato. This method combines current quantitative methodologies, stochastic simulation, and geographic information systems with knowledge of pest biology and environmental data to derive new information about pest establishment potential in a geographical region where a pest had not been introduced. This proposed method extends an existing methodology for matching pest characteristics with environmental conditions by modeling and simulating dissemination behavior of a pest organism. Issues related to integrating spatial variables into risk analysis models are further discussed in this article.     

Comparative Risk and Policy Analysis in Environmental Health

There is increasing interest in the integration of quantitative risk analysis with benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness methods to evaluate environmental health policy making and perform comparative analyses. However, the combined use of these methods has revealed deficiencies in the available methods, and the lack of useful analytical frameworks currently constrains the utility of comparative risk and policy analyses. A principal issue in integrating risk and economic analysis is the lack of common performance metrics, particularly when conducting comparative analyses of regulations with disparate health endpoints (e.g., cancer and noncancer effects or risk-benefit analysis) and quantitative estimation of cumulative risk, whether from exposure to single agents with multiple health impacts or from exposure to mixtures. We propose a general quantitative framework and examine assumptions required for performing analyses of health risks and policies. We review existing and proposed risk and health-impact metrics for evaluating policies designed to protect public health from environmental exposures, and identify their strengths and weaknesses with respect to their use in a general comparative risk and policy analysis framework. Case studies are presented to demonstrate applications of this framework with risk-benefit and air pollution risk analyses. Through this analysis, we hope to generate discussions regarding the data requirements, analytical approaches, and assumptions required for general models to be used in comparative risk and policy analysis.     

Foundational Challenges for Advancing the Field and Discipline of Risk Analysis

Risk analysis as a field and discipline is about concepts, principles, approaches, methods, and models for understanding, assessing, communicating, managing, and governing risk. The foundation of this field and discipline has been subject to continuous discussion since its origin some 40 years ago with the establishment of the Society for Risk Analysis and the Risk Analysis journal. This article provides a perspective on critical foundational challenges that this field and discipline faces today, for risk analysis to develop and have societal impact. Topics discussed include fundamental questions important for defining the risk field, discipline, and science; the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary features of risk analysis; the interactions and dependencies with other sciences; terminology and fundamental principles; and current developments and trends, such as the use of artificial intelligence.     

Comparative assessment of analytical approaches to quantify the risk for introduction of rare animal diseases: the example of avian influenza in Spain

Trade of animals and animal products imposes an uncertain and variable risk for exotic animal diseases introduction into importing countries. Risk analysis provides importing countries with an objective, transparent, and internationally accepted method for assessing that risk. Over the last decades, European Union countries have conducted probabilistic risk assessments quite frequently to quantify the risk for rare animal diseases introduction into their territories. Most probabilistic animal health risk assessments have been typically classified into one-level and multilevel binomial models. One-level models are more simple than multilevel models because they assume that animals or products originate from one single population. However, it is unknown whether such simplification may result in substantially different results compared to those obtained through the use of multilevel models. Here, data used on a probabilistic multilevel binomial model formulated to assess the risk for highly pathogenic avian influenza introduction into Spain were reanalyzed using a one-level binomial model and their outcomes were compared. An alternative ordinal model is also proposed here, which makes use of simpler assumptions and less information compared to those required by traditional one-level and multilevel approaches. Results suggest that, at least under certain circumstances, results of the one-level and ordinal approaches are similar to those obtained using multilevel models. Consequently, we argue that, when data are insufficient to run traditional probabilistic models, the ordinal approach presented here may be a suitable alternative to rank exporting countries in terms of the risk that they impose for the spread of rare animal diseases into disease-free countries.     

Optimal Randomized Scheduling by Replacement

In the replacement scheduling problem, a system consists of n processors drawn from a pool of p,all initially alive. At any time some processor can die. The scheduler is immediately informed of the fault butnot of its location. It must then choose another set of n processors. If this new set contains a dead processor, the system crashes and halts. The performance of a scheduling protocol is measured by the expected number of deaths the system tolerates before it crashes. We provide an optimal randomized scheduling protocol for this problem.The framework of this work combines an absolute performance measure for protocols and so-called adaptive online adversaries. This framework is rarely addressed because of the complexity of the interaction between protocols and adversaries. A major contribution of ourwork is to provide a theoretical foundation for the analysis of this interaction. In particular we make explicit how the protocol and the adversary affect the probability distribution of the analysis—a very general problem. We carefully analyze the exchange of sinformation between the two players, and reveal how they use their information optimally. The optimality of the protocol is established by using of a saddle point method for protocols and adversaries.     

An Integrated Physical Dispersion and Behavioral Response Model for Risk Assessment of Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) Events

A radiological dispersion device (RDD) or "dirty" bomb is a conventional explosive wrapped in radiological material. Terrorists may use an RDD to disperse radioactive material across a populated area, causing casualties and/or economic damage. Nearly all risk assessment models for RDDs make unrealistic assumptions about public behavior in their health assessments, including assumptions that the public would stand outside in a single location indefinitely. In this article, we describe an approach for assessing the risks of RDD events incorporating both physical dispersion and behavioral response variables. The general approach is tested using the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as a case study. Atmospheric models simulate an RDD attack and its likely fallout, while radiation exposure models assess fatal cancer risk. We model different geographical distributions of the population based on time of day. We evaluate aggregate health impacts for different public responses (i.e., sheltering-in-place, evacuating). We find that current RDD models in use can be improved with the integration of behavioral components. Using the results from the model, we show how risk varies across several behavioral and physical variables. We show that the best policy to recommend to the public depends on many different variables, such as the amount of trauma at ground zero, the capability of emergency responders to get trauma victims to local hospitals quickly and efficiently, how quickly evacuations can take place in the city, and the amount of shielding available for shelterers. Using a parametric analysis, we develop behaviorally realistic risk assessments, we identify variables that can affect an optimal risk reduction policy, and we find that decision making can be improved by evaluating the tradeoff between trauma and cancer fatalities for various RDD scenarios before they occur.     

AbSRiM: An Agent‐Based Security Risk Management Approach for Airport Operations

Security risk management is essential for ensuring effective airport operations. This article introduces AbSRiM, a novel agent‐based modeling and simulation approach to perform security risk management for airport operations that uses formal sociotechnical models that include temporal and spatial aspects. The approach contains four main steps: scope selection, agent‐based model definition, risk assessment, and risk mitigation. The approach is based on traditional security risk management methodologies, but uses agent‐based modeling and Monte Carlo simulation at its core. Agent‐based modeling is used to model threat scenarios, and Monte Carlo simulations are then performed with this model to estimate security risks. The use of the AbSRiM approach is demonstrated with an illustrative case study. This case study includes a threat scenario in which an adversary attacks an airport terminal with an improvised explosive device. The approach provides a promising way to include important elements, such as human aspects and spatiotemporal aspects, in the assessment of risk. More research is still needed to better identify the strengths and weaknesses of the AbSRiM approach in different case studies, but results demonstrate the feasibility of the approach and its potential.     

Using Probability Boxes to Model Elicited Information: A Case Study

Governments are responsible for making policy decisions, often in the face of severe uncertainty about the factors involved. Expert elicitation can be used to fill information gaps where data are not available, cannot be obtained, or where there is no time for a full‐scale study and analysis. Various features of distributions for variables may be elicited, for example, the mean, standard deviation, and quantiles, but uncertainty about these values is not always recorded. Distributional and dependence assumptions often have to be made in models and although these are sometimes elicited from experts, modelers may also make assumptions for mathematical convenience (e.g., assuming independence between variables). Probability boxes (p‐boxes) provide a flexible methodology to analyze elicited quantities without having to make assumptions about the distribution shape. If information about distribution shape(s) is available, p‐boxes can provide bounds around the results given these possible input distributions. P‐boxes can also be used to combine variables without making dependence assumptions. This article aims to illustrate how p‐boxes may help to improve the representation of uncertainty for analyses based on elicited information. We focus on modeling elicited quantiles with nonparametric p‐boxes, modeling elicited quantiles with parametric p‐boxes where the elicited quantiles do not match the elicited distribution shape, and modeling elicited interval information.     

Model uncertainty and choices made by modelers: lessons learned from the International Atomic Energy Agency model intercomparisons.

The treatment of uncertainties associated with modeling and risk assessment has recently attracted significant attention. The methodology and guidance for dealing with parameter uncertainty have been fairly well developed and quantitative tools such as Monte Carlo modeling are often recommended. However, the issue of model uncertainty is still rarely addressed in practical applications of risk assessment. The use of several alternative models to derive a range of model outputs or risks is one of a few available techniques. This article addresses the often-overlooked issue of what we call "modeler uncertainty," i.e., difference in problem formulation, model implementation, and parameter selection originating from subjective interpretation of the problem at hand. This study uses results from the Fruit Working Group, which was created under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) BIOMASS program (BIOsphere Modeling and ASSessment). Model-model and model-data intercomparisons reviewed in this study were conducted by the working group for a total of three different scenarios. The greatest uncertainty was found to result from modelers' interpretation of scenarios and approximations made by modelers. In scenarios that were unclear for modelers, the initial differences in model predictions were as high as seven orders of magnitude. Only after several meetings and discussions about specific assumptions did the differences in predictions by various models merge. Our study shows that parameter uncertainty (as evaluated by a probabilistic Monte Carlo assessment) may have contributed over one order of magnitude to the overall modeling uncertainty. The final model predictions ranged between one and three orders of magnitude, depending on the specific scenario. This study illustrates the importance of problem formulation and implementation of an analytic-deliberative process in risk characterization.     

Topological Performance Measures as Surrogates for Physical Flow Models for Risk and Vulnerability Analysis for Electric Power Systems

Critical infrastructure systems must be both robust and resilient in order to ensure the functioning of society. To improve the performance of such systems, we often use risk and vulnerability analysis to find and address system weaknesses. A critical component of such analyses is the ability to accurately determine the negative consequences of various types of failures in the system. Numerous mathematical and simulation models exist that can be used to this end. However, there are relatively few studies comparing the implications of using different modeling approaches in the context of comprehensive risk analysis of critical infrastructures. In this article, we suggest a classification of these models, which span from simple topologically‐oriented models to advanced physical‐flow‐based models. Here, we focus on electric power systems and present a study aimed at understanding the tradeoffs between simplicity and fidelity in models used in the context of risk analysis. Specifically, the purpose of this article is to compare performance estimates achieved with a spectrum of approaches typically used for risk and vulnerability analysis of electric power systems and evaluate if more simplified topological measures can be combined using statistical methods to be used as a surrogate for physical flow models. The results of our work provide guidance as to appropriate models or combinations of models to use when analyzing large‐scale critical infrastructure systems, where simulation times quickly become insurmountable when using more advanced models, severely limiting the extent of analyses that can be performed.     

Defining Susceptibility for Microbial Risk Assessment: Results of a Workshop

An interdisciplinary workshop was convened by the George Washington University in June 2001 to discuss how to incorporate new knowledge about susceptibility to microbial pathogens into risk assessment and management strategies. Experts from government, academic, and private sector organizations discussed definitions, methods, data needs, and issues related to susceptibility in microbial risk assessment. The participants agreed that modeling approaches need to account for the highly specific nature of host-pathogen relationships, and the wide variability of infectivity, immunity, disease transmission, and outcome rates within microbial species and strains. Concerns were raised about distinguishing between exposure and dose more clearly, interpreting experimental and outbreak data correctly, and using thresholds and possibly linearity at low doses. Recommendations were made to advance microbial risk assessment by defining specific terms and concepts more precisely, designing explicit conceptual frameworks to guide development of more complex models and data collection, addressing susceptibility in all steps of the model, measuring components of immunity to characterize susceptibility, reexamining underlying assumptions, applying default methods appropriately, obtaining more mechanistic data to improve default methods, and developing more biologically relevant and continuous risk estimators. The interrelated impacts of selecting specific subpopulations and health outcomes, and of increasing model complexity and data demands, were considered in the contexts of public policy goals and resources required. The participants stated that zero risk is unattainable, so targeted and effective risk reduction and communication strategies are essential not only to raise pubic awareness about water quality but also to protect the most susceptible members of the population.