MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS WITH OUTPUT STABILIZATION

What are the effects of legal minimum wage rates on the U.S. economy? Does minimum wage legislation promote the economic self-interest of high wage union labor and impede the economic self-interest of capitalists as our earlier research [Cox and Oaxaca 1982] suggested? This paper uses a nine sector econometric/simulation model of U.S. industry from 1975–1978 to answer these questions in the context of stabilization policies which hold aggregate real output constant. While most simulated percentage effects are small, those for the unskilled workers themselves are not. A 15.7 percent increase in the average nominal wage rate of unskilled labor, as a result of minimum wage legislation, produced an 11 percent decrease in unskilled employment, 2.2 million jobs lost, while increasing the real wage of unskilled workers by 15 percent. Simulated changes in several key variables support our earlier observations that the self-interests of labor unions, with skilled workers, conflict with those of capitalists over the issue of minimum wage legislation.     

Does the minimum wage drive teenagers out of the labor force?

Labor force participation is directly related to the value of being in the labor force. The effect of the minimum wage on labor force participation thus measures how the minimum wage affects the welfare of labor force participants. In contrast, a decline in employment tells us little about welfare, because of the offsetting wage increase. Only changes in labor force participation can directly measure the welfare effects of the minimum wage. Despite this, most literature about the minimum wage has been focused on employment. My empirical results show that the minimum wage has a significant negative effect on teenage labor force participation. Thus, a minimum wage reduces the value of entering the labor market.     

The migratory impact of minimum wage legislation: Puerto Rico, 1970-1987

"This study examines the impact of minimum wage setting on labor migration. A multiple time series framework is applied to monthly data for Puerto Rico from 1970-1987. The results show that net emigration from Puerto Rico to the United States fell in response to significant changes in the manner in which minimum wage policy was conducted, particularly after 1974. The extent of commuter type labor migration between Puerto Rico and the United States is influenced by minimum wage policy, with potentially important consequences for human capital investment and long-term standards of living."     

The minimum wage and productivity differentials

A firm’s ability to adjust its production process to economize on low-skilled labor when faced with a minimum wage increase will differ greatly depending on industry or occupation. For example, more capital-intensive means of cleaning hotel rooms or serving customers at restaurants may not be readily available without degrading service quality. In such situations, the productivity of labor is essentially capped, and firms have few options when the minimum wage increases. This simple observation has implications for studies that rely on microdata to examine the effects of minimum wage increases. If firms only increase prices in response to a minimum wage increase, employment effects are likely small. If the goal of the minimum wage is to redistribute income from firms and consumers to workers, minimum-wage increases targeted at industries and occupations where such rigidities result in an inelastic demand for labor may achieve the desired goal at a lower cost than across-the-board increases. However, such a scheme causes an inefficient allocation of labor and would be subjected to substantial political pressures that may lead to anomalous results. Additionally, it is unreasonable to conclude that policy makers have the necessary information to skillfully set the minimum wage. I thank Brian E. Chezum and Jeff Waddoups for helpful comments. All mistakes, of course, are my own.     

THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGES IN THE PRESENCE OF FRINGE BENEFITS: AN EXPANDED MODEL

Firms may react to a minimum wage hike by reducing their expenditures on fringe benefits. This possibility is incorporated into an expanded model of minimum wages. A set of predictions that differentiate this expanded model from current minimum wage models is derived and tested. The expanded model is shown to better predict the effect of minimum wages on labor force participation, quit rates, and prices than previous models. An interesting result of the expanded model is that a covered worker may be worse off due to a minimum wage hike even if he retains his job.     

LOBBYING FOR MINIMUM WAGES

Using a common agency lobbying framework, this paper illustrates how the minimum wage set reflects the interaction between economic and political factors and under what circumstances will the policymaker be induced, through lobbying, to change the minimum wage. Specifically, when the labor demand elasticity is large, lobbying is successful in inducing the policymaker to set the minimum wage in accordance with her political ideology. However, the paper also shows the conditions under which lobbying will reverse the ideological preference and induce a business‐friendly government to increase the minimum wage. Empirical analysis on a panel data for ten Canadian provinces gives considerable support for theoretical predictions. The real minimum wage decreases in skill‐adjusted union density and political ideology, while larger labor demand elasticity reinforces the influence of political ideology in the presence of lobbying. (JEL J38, D72, D78)     

Minimum wages and poverty with income-sharing

Textbook analysis tells us that in a competitive labor market, the introduction of a minimum wage above the competitive equilibrium wage will cause unemployment. This paper makes three contributions to the basic theory of the minimum wage. First, we analyze the effects of a higher minimum wage in terms of poverty rather than in terms of unemployment. Second, we extend the standard textbook model to allow for income-sharing between employed and unemployed persons in society. Third, we extend the basic model to deal with income sharing within families. We find that there are situations in which a higher minimum wage raises poverty, others where it reduces poverty, and yet others in which poverty is unchanged. We characterize precisely how the poverty effect depends on four parameters: the degree of poverty aversion, the elasticity of labor demand, the ratio of the minimum wage to the poverty line, and the extent of income-sharing. Thus, shifting the perspective from unemployment to poverty leads to a considerable enrichment of the theory of the minimum wage.      

Do minimum wage hikes reduce employment? State-level evidence from the low-wage retail sector

Several recent studies have challenged the conventional notion that raising the minimum wage reduces employment. This study considers this issue by examining the minimum wage's influence on retail employment. Standard labor market analysis suggests that low-wage industries should be particularly sensitive to minimum wage hikes. Therefore, by considering retail employment using pooled-cross sectional, state-level data, this study extends recent research that generally emphasized teen employment. The empirical analysis considers state data from the latter 1980's, a unique period where many states raised their minimum wage above the federal level. Our results suggest that an increased minimum wage reduces retail employment, which is consistent with the standard labor market model. Moreover, further analysis indicates that minimum wage hikes also had relatively large adverse effects on total state employment growth, which implies that state minimum-wage policies can affect firm and household location. We thank Dan Rickman and the anonymous referee for their help with this study.     

Is it Race,Immigrant Status,or Both? An Analysis of Wage Disparities among Men in the United States1

The intersection of race and immigrant status forms a unique social space where minority group members and immigrants are afforded or denied the privileges that are routinely accorded to native-born, non-Hispanic whites. Yet recent research on the intersection of race and immigrant status is inconsistent in its findings, limited to a small number of racial groups, and does not account for the geographic distribution of racial/ethnic groups. In this paper, we shed light on the intersection of race and immigrant status by answering two questions: (1) Do racial disparities in socioeconomic outcomes vary by nativity? and (2) Do native-immigrant disparities in socioeconomic outcomes vary by race? Using 2000 Census data linked to metropolitan area and sending country data, we find that racial disparities are similar and significant among natives and immigrants (Question 1). Asians, blacks, and Latinos fare significantly worse than their white counterparts in both the native and immigrant populations. Furthermore, our analysis of native-immigrant wage disparities by race reveals that the immigrant experience is considerably worse for Asians, blacks, and Latinos (Question 2). These groups also receive fewer wage returns to years spent in the U.S. and their wage disparities are magnified by the percentage of immigrants in a metropolitan area – whereas all whites receive a wage premium when living in an area with a larger share of immigrants. The results suggest that race and immigrant status work in concert to uniquely influence the social experience of immigrant minorities in the U.S.     

Characteristics of cities that pass living wage ordinances: Are certain conditions more conducive than others?

Cities that have passed living wage ordinances often do so because of the strong political appeal of local living wage campaigns as a response to the declining value of the minimum wage, the outsourcing of municipal services, and rising income inequality. These campaigns generally consist of coalitions of community organizations, religious groups, and often times labor organizations. Organized labor is not the primary force behind most living wage campaigns, but they are an important constituency. Unexplored, however, are the labor market and other characteristics of those cities that have passed ordinances. This paper looks at data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and compares cities that passed living wage ordinances to those that did not. Cities in states with high union density, and with higher levels of income inequality and larger immigrant populations appear to be more likely to pass living wage ordinances than those cities that do not have these demographics. But as important as union support may be, without key demographic and economic characteristics, it is nonetheless insufficient to achieve living wage ordinances in most cases.     

Recent minimum wage increases and the minimum wage labor force

Coclusion  Recently Whaples (1996) reported that most labor economists believe that minimum wage laws decrease employment. Despite this, policy makers have continued to periodically raise the minimum, with the most recent increases occurring in October 1996 and September 1997. The various analyses done by Card, Katz, and Krueger, that showed little to no employment effect of past minimum wage increases, have provided additional ammunition for those who would seek further increases. However, using the estimates of Williams and Mills (1998), we demonstrate that the latest minimum wage increases substantially decreased employment for both sexes. We believe that future increases will do likewise.     

Do davis-bacon minimum wages raise product quality?

The Davis-Bacon Act requires labor on most federally financed construction projects to be paid a minimum wage, often equal to the union wage. Since contractors are apt to employ higher quality labor at this higher wage, Davis-Bacon supporters argue that higher quality output will result. Contrary to this reasoning, our paper shows that a Davis-Bacon type rule need not improve output quality. The switch to higher quality labor, combined with a competitive bidding process, produces an important possibility of perverse output quality results from Davis-Bacon.     

Economic Theories of Low-Wage Work

This article examines economic theories of the low-wage labor market to increase understanding of economic inequality and poverty in the United States, particularly related to the labor market. On the one hand, neoclassical, labor monopsony, and Harris-Todaro models explain how minimum wage policies are related to supply and demand of labor, human capital, employment, and unemployment. On the other hand, the efficiency wage model, the dual labor market theory, and technology development and globalization account for the causes of the wage differentials. This article includes a conceptual map that illustrates the interrelationships between these economic theories of low-wage work.     

Nontransferable rents and an unrecognized social cost of minimum wage laws

This paper identifies an additional social cost of minimum wage laws. The nontransferable sunk investments made in competing to obtain minimum wage jobs produce a social cost since individuals will remain in those positions as long as they obtain a positive return on this investment. This will be true even when more efficient providers of the service exist. The higher the minimum wage is, the greater the level of sunk nontransferable investments and, therefore, the greater the potential inefficient allocation of labor.     

Minimum wages and the wessels effect in a monopsony model

The Wessels model suggests that firms respond to increases in the minimum wage rate by decreasing the level of fringe benefits — an action which produces an inefficiency effect that lowers workers’ utility and the supply of labor. Standard models of monopsony, however, argue that wage floors prevent the exercise of market power and increase employment. I show that wage floors, even with fringe benefit curtailment, may increase employment by lowering the marginal expense of labor. Employee utility and employment will rise somewhat but not as much had the firm acted competitively in setting both wages and fringes.     

The Effects of Minimum Wages over the Business Cycle

This study examines whether the low-skilled employment effects of minimum wage increases differ over the state business cycle. Controlling for spatial heterogeneity via state-specific productivity shocks to the low-skilled sector and state-specific non-linear time trends, the results suggest that minimum wage increases between 1989 and 2012 reduce low-skilled employment more during recessions than expansions. Estimated employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage range from 0 to ?0.2 during state economic expansions, but reach as high as ?0.3 during troughs in the business cycle.     

EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT-ONE VIEW

Persistent wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment appear to be recurrent problems in most economies. What could be preventing the wage adjustment necessary to clear the labor market? Many recent papers claim to have found the answer in efficiency wage models. This paper surveys this literature and attempts to evaluate its accomplishments. It concludes that the efficiency wage models fail to explain wage rigidity or persistent involuntary unemployment.     

INFLATION DYNAMICS AND LABOR MARKET SPECIFICATIONS: A BAYESIAN DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH FOR JAPAN'S ECONOMY

Which labor market specification is better able to describe inflation dynamics, a widely used sticky wage model or a recently investigated labor market search model? Using a Bayesian likelihood approach, we estimate these two models with Japan's data. This article shows that the labor market search model is superior to the sticky wage model in terms of both marginal likelihood and out‐of‐sample forecast performance, particularly regarding inflation. The labor market search model is better able to replicate the cross‐correlation among inflation, real wages, and output in the data. Moreover, in this model, real marginal cost is determined by both hiring cost and unit labor cost that varies with employment fluctuations, which gives rise to a high contemporaneous correlation between inflation and real marginal cost as represented in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. (JEL E24, E32, E37)     

The labor market effects of minimum wage laws: A new perspective

Economists almost uniformly argue that minimum wage laws benefit some workers at the expense of other workers. This argument is implicitly founded on the assumption that money wages are the only form of labor compensation. Based on the more realistic assumption that labor is paid in many different ways, the analysis of this paper demonstrates that all laborers within a perfectly competitive labor market are adversely affected by minimum wages. Although employment opportunities are reduced by such laws, affected labor markets clear. Conventional analysis of the effect of minimum wages on monopsony markets is also upset by the model developed. The author is indebted to Rex Cottle, Benjamin Hawkins, Hugh Macaulay, Michael Maloney, Thomas Schaap, Gordon Tullock, Gene Uselton, and Karen Vaughn for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

The illegal alien work force,demand for unskilled labor,and the minimum wage

Estimates of the illegal alien work force, employment, and the number employed below the legal minimum wage are not available, but are often required for the study of a variety of public policy issues, e.g., immigration and refugee policy, and policy towards the monitoring of minimum wage laws. This paper attempts to fill this void by developing estimates of these quantities. Of equal importance, however, is determining what light this and other related evidence throws upon the oft-expressed view that the demand for unskilled labor at below-legal-minimum wage rates is virtually inelastic. Evidence is presented which contradicts this belief. I am grateful to Janet Hunt and Richard H. Timberlake, Jr. for valuable comments but I absolve them of responsibility for any errors.